🕷️ Crawler Inspector

URL Lookup

Direct Parameter Lookup

Raw Queries and Responses

1. Shard Calculation

Query:

Response:

Calculated Shard: 115 (from laksa016)

2. Crawled Status Check

Query:

curl -X POST \
  'http://laksa115.int.ahrefs:8124/' \
  -H 'Content-Type: text/plain' \
  -H 'X-ClickHouse-Database: crawler3' \
  -H 'Authorization: Basic YXBpOg==' \
  -d 'SELECT getAhrefsURLFromUnparsed(src_unparsed) AS found_url, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(download_stamp), 0) AS crawl_time, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(props_url_first_seen), 0) AS first_indexed_time, download_http_code AS http_code, src_unparsed AS src_unparsed, src_root_hash AS src_root_hash, history_drop_reason AS history_drop_reason, meta_title AS meta_title, meta_descriptions AS meta_descriptions, attrs_boilerpipe_text AS attrs_boilerpipe_text, attrs_markdown AS attrs_markdown, attrs_readable_markdown AS attrs_readable_markdown, meta_canonical AS meta_canonical FROM crawler3.page_info_local FINAL PREWHERE (src_root_hash, src_unparsed) IN ((getAhrefsRootHashFromUnparsed(getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi\')), getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi\'))) FORMAT JSONEachRow'

Response:

{"found_url":"https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2019\/02\/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi","crawl_time":1764308302,"first_indexed_time":1551390244,"http_code":200,"src_unparsed":"org,usip!www,\/publications\/2019\/02\/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi s443","src_root_hash":"4367961689013780315","history_drop_reason":null,"meta_title":"U.S.-North Korea Negotiations: What Happened in Hanoi? | United States Institute of Peace","meta_descriptions":["President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un unexpectedly cut short their second summit Thursday after failing to come to an agreement to dismantle Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and provide sanctions relief. USIP’s Ambassador Joseph Yun and Frank Aum explain what happened in Hanoi and what comes next for U.S.-North Korea nuclear diplomacy."],"attrs_boilerpipe_text":"Why was there no agreement in Hanoi between President Trump and Chairman Kim? The negotiations broke down over what denuclearization steps Kim was willing to take and how much sanctions relief Trump was willing to provide. We may need the dust to settle before we get all the details, but there seems to be differing viewpoints on what happened. Based on President Trump’s press conference, North Korea would agree to completely dismantle its nuclear facility at Yongbyon, but in return wanted the entire sanctions regime lifted, which President Trump wasn’t willing to accede to. According to Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho’s midnight press conference, however, North Korea only wanted relief from five United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions from 2016 and 2017 in exchange for the complete dismantlement of the Yongbyon facility. But, President Trump added one more request unrelated to the Yongbyon nuclear facility that signaled that the U.S. wasn’t interested in the North Korean proposal. It is unclear which five UNSC resolutions Foreign Minister Ri was referring to, but most likely they would have constituted a significant part of the sanctions regime against North Korea. It is also unclear what additional request President Trump made. It appears that the president was willing to shoot for a “big deal” that would provide complete sanctions relief as well as other incentives such as an end-of-war declaration and exchange of liaison offices, but this would require complete denuclearization, including all nuclear facilities (not just Yongbyon), weapons, and materials. But both sides realized almost immediately that the gap in how each side values denuclearization and sanctions relief was much too wide. What comes next in the diplomatic process? A positive outcome is that the “dual freeze” on North Korean nuclear and missile tests and U.S.-South Korea military exercises, which helped create the peaceful environment for diplomacy to proceed, remains in place. President Trump conveyed that Chairman Kim agreed to continue to suspend nuclear and missile tests, and all but said that U.S.-ROK joint exercises will remain suspended or at least significantly modified. Another silver lining from the Hanoi negotiations is the confirmation that the U.S. approach to North Korea embraces reciprocity and the simultaneous discussion of denuclearization and peace. The exact sequencing of concessions is a separate matter but there is less concern that Washington will demand that North Korea denuclearizes first before any steps can be taken on peace-related issues. Still, both principals return home empty-handed and without a clear picture of what lies ahead. From a process perspective, a significant letdown from the Hanoi summit was the lack of any roadmap or clarity on additional working-level negotiations. Although Trump indicated that Secretary Pompeo will continue meeting with his counterpart, there was no specificity about when these meetings would happen, whether Special Representative Steve Biegun would engage in regular working-level negotiations, and what the end goals would be in the next two years. Another concern is that if the two top decision makers, Trump and Kim, couldn’t agree on a deal, then what chance do lower-level officials, like Pompeo and North Korean spy chief Kim Yong Chul, or Biegun and chief nuclear negotiator Kim Hyok Chol, have of making progress? The outcome could be an even bigger setback for Kim Jong Un. If North Korea really wants summit-level diplomacy, they should realize that Trump is not likely to agree to a future summit without an iron-clad guarantee of success. The biggest disappointment from the Hanoi “no deal” is likely being felt by President Moon and South Korea. The lack of any sanctions relief will make it difficult, if not impossible, to conduct serious North-South economic engagement and move forward on cooperation projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex and inter-Korean railways. Moreover, Chairman Kim’s visit to Seoul, which many thought imminent, now looks unlikely anytime soon since there will be no achievements to tout at the summit. Were there any other interesting takeaways? One of the biggest concerns among North Korea watchers has been the lack of a common definition between the two sides about denuclearization. President Trump acknowledged in the press conference that the two countries’ visions about denuclearization were not exactly the same, so it appears more work is needed on this topic. Also, President Trump confirmed that there are other nuclear sites beyond Yongbyon that Washington is interested in, answering affirmatively about a second suspected uranium enrichment site. Most Korea watchers already knew about these additional sites, but it helps to have presidential-level confirmation that Yongbyon isn’t the only site of concern.","attrs_markdown":"![](https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/tr?id=289839664888464&ev=PageView&noscript=1)\n\n![](https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/tr?id=289839664888464&ev=PageView&noscript=1)\n\n[Skip to main content](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2019\/02\/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi#main-content)\n\n[Menu](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2019\/02\/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi)\n\n# [United States Institute of Peace](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/)\n- [About USIP](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/about) *\/*\n- [Countries & Regions](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/regions-countries) *\/*\n- [Research & Analysis](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/research-analysis) *\/*\n- [Gandhi-King Global Academy](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/academy\/gandhi-king-global-academy)\n\nSearch\n\n[Close](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2019\/02\/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi)\n\n# [United States Institute of Peace](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/)\n\n[About USIP](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/about) [Countries & Regions](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/regions-countries) [Research & Analysis](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/research-analysis) [Gandhi-King Global Academy](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/academy\/gandhi-king-global-academy)  [Connect](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/connect)   [Press](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/press)   [Projects](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/projects)   [The Olive Branch Blog](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/blog)\n\n## We provide analysis, education, and resources to those working for peace around the world.\n[More About USIP](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/about)\n\n# [United States Institute of Peace](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/)\nClose\n\nSearch for experts, projects, publications, courses, and more.\n\n## There are no contents that meet the filtering criteria.\n\n[Home](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/) ▶ [Research & Analysis](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/research-analysis)\n\n# U.S.-North Korea Negotiations: What Happened in Hanoi?\nWashington and Pyongyang can’t agree on a deal, remain divided on what denuclearization means.\n\nThursday, February 28, 2019 *\/*\n\n**By:**  Ambassador Joseph Yun; Frank Aum\n\n**Publication Type:** [Analysis](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/research-analysis?publication_type%5B0%5D=12#filters)\n\n[Share This](https:\/\/www.addtoany.com\/share#url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.usip.org%2Fpublications%2F2019%2F02%2Fus-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi&title=U.S.-North%20Korea%20Negotiations%3A%20What%20Happened%20in%20Hanoi%3F)\n\n[Print the Page](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2019\/02\/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi)\n\nPresident Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un unexpectedly cut short their second summit Thursday after failing to come to an agreement to dismantle Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and provide sanctions relief. USIP’s Ambassador Joseph Yun and Frank Aum explain what happened in Hanoi and what comes next for U.S.-North Korea nuclear diplomacy.\n\n![President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, meet at the Metropole Hotel in Hanoi, Vietnam, Feb. 28, 2019. (Doug Mills\/The New York Times)](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/image_with_caption\/public\/2019-02\/20190228-nyt-us_nkorea_14-ac.jpg?itok=a-p2kRNQ)\n\nPresident Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, meet at the Metropole Hotel in Hanoi, Vietnam, Feb. 28, 2019. (Doug Mills\/The New York Times)\n\n### Why was there no agreement in Hanoi between President Trump and Chairman Kim?\nThe negotiations broke down over what denuclearization steps Kim was willing to take and how much sanctions relief Trump was willing to provide. We may need the dust to settle before we get all the details, but there seems to be differing viewpoints on what happened.\n\nBased on President Trump’s press conference, North Korea would agree to completely dismantle its nuclear facility at Yongbyon, but in return wanted the entire sanctions regime lifted, which President Trump wasn’t willing to accede to.\n\nAccording to Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho’s midnight press conference, however, North Korea only wanted relief from five United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions from 2016 and 2017 in exchange for the complete dismantlement of the Yongbyon facility. But, President Trump added one more request unrelated to the Yongbyon nuclear facility that signaled that the U.S. wasn’t interested in the North Korean proposal.\n\nIt is unclear which five UNSC resolutions Foreign Minister Ri was referring to, but most likely they would have constituted a significant part of the sanctions regime against North Korea. It is also unclear what additional request President Trump made.\n\nIt appears that the president was willing to shoot for a “big deal” that would provide complete sanctions relief as well as other incentives such as an end-of-war declaration and exchange of liaison offices, but this would require complete denuclearization, including all nuclear facilities (not just Yongbyon), weapons, and materials. But both sides realized almost immediately that the gap in how each side values denuclearization and sanctions relief was much too wide.\n\n### What comes next in the diplomatic process?\nA positive outcome is that the “dual freeze” on North Korean nuclear and missile tests and U.S.-South Korea military exercises, which helped create the peaceful environment for diplomacy to proceed, remains in place. President Trump conveyed that Chairman Kim agreed to continue to suspend nuclear and missile tests, and all but said that U.S.-ROK joint exercises will remain suspended or at least significantly modified.\n\nAnother silver lining from the Hanoi negotiations is the confirmation that the U.S. approach to North Korea embraces reciprocity and the simultaneous discussion of denuclearization and peace. The exact sequencing of concessions is a separate matter but there is less concern that Washington will demand that North Korea denuclearizes first before any steps can be taken on peace-related issues.\n\nStill, both principals return home empty-handed and without a clear picture of what lies ahead.\n\nFrom a process perspective, a significant letdown from the Hanoi summit was the lack of any roadmap or clarity on additional working-level negotiations. Although Trump indicated that Secretary Pompeo will continue meeting with his counterpart, there was no specificity about when these meetings would happen, whether Special Representative Steve Biegun would engage in regular working-level negotiations, and what the end goals would be in the next two years. Another concern is that if the two top decision makers, Trump and Kim, couldn’t agree on a deal, then what chance do lower-level officials, like Pompeo and North Korean spy chief Kim Yong Chul, or Biegun and chief nuclear negotiator Kim Hyok Chol, have of making progress?\n\nThe outcome could be an even bigger setback for Kim Jong Un. If North Korea really wants summit-level diplomacy, they should realize that Trump is not likely to agree to a future summit without an iron-clad guarantee of success.\n\nThe biggest disappointment from the Hanoi “no deal” is likely being felt by President Moon and South Korea. The lack of any sanctions relief will make it difficult, if not impossible, to conduct serious North-South economic engagement and move forward on cooperation projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex and inter-Korean railways. Moreover, Chairman Kim’s visit to Seoul, which many thought imminent, now looks unlikely anytime soon since there will be no achievements to tout at the summit.\n\n### Were there any other interesting takeaways?\nOne of the biggest concerns among North Korea watchers has been the lack of a common definition between the two sides about denuclearization. President Trump acknowledged in the press conference that the two countries’ visions about denuclearization were not exactly the same, so it appears more work is needed on this topic.\n\nAlso, President Trump confirmed that there are other nuclear sites beyond Yongbyon that Washington is interested in, answering affirmatively about a second suspected uranium enrichment site. Most Korea watchers already knew about these additional sites, but it helps to have presidential-level confirmation that Yongbyon isn’t the only site of concern.\n***\n\n### About the Authors\n### Ambassador Joseph Yun\nSenior Advisor to the Asia Center\n\n### Frank Aum\nSenior Expert, Northeast Asia\n\n### Countries\n[![North Korea](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2016-12\/north-korea.svg) North Korea](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/regions\/asia\/north-korea)\n\n### Stay Informed\nUSIP has a variety of newsletters and announcements with the latest analysis, publications and events.\n\n[Sign up\\!](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/newsletter-signup)\n\n## Related Research & Analysis\n[![Pursuing Stable Coexistence: A Reorientation of U.S. Policy Toward North Korea](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/summary_image\/public\/2025-06\/20250610-koreas_border_crossing_1-nyt-ac.jpg?itok=dyzOJdkg)](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2025\/06\/pursuing-stable-coexistence-reorientation-us-policy-toward-north-korea)\n\n### [Pursuing Stable Coexistence: A Reorientation of U.S. Policy Toward North Korea](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2025\/06\/pursuing-stable-coexistence-reorientation-us-policy-toward-north-korea)\nTuesday, June 10, 2025\n\n**By:**  Frank Aum; Ankit Panda\n\nIt is now clear that applying pressure does not lead to North Korean restraint; rather, it fuels North Korean provocations. The United States and its allies should instead seek stable coexistence with Pyongyang as an overarching goal.\n\n**Type:**  [Analysis](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/research-analysis?publication_type%5B0%5D=12#filters)\n\n[![The Current Situation in North Korea](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/summary_image\/public\/2023-03\/the-current-situation-in-north-korea-cover.jpg?itok=Wgc5YiW4)](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2025\/02\/current-situation-north-korea)\n\n### [The Current Situation in North Korea](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2025\/02\/current-situation-north-korea)\nThursday, February 13, 2025\n\nIn 2018, reinvigorated diplomacy and reduced tensions generated hope for a more secure and peaceful Korean Peninsula. At a historic summit in Singapore in June, the United States and North Korea committed to establish “new U.S.-DPRK relations” while North Korea also committed to work toward the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” However, the two countries disagreed about what each side should concede and when, leading to a diplomatic failure at a subsequent summit in Hanoi in February 2019. Today, the United States and North Korea coexist in an antagonistic, high-risk stalemate.\n\n**Type:**  [Fact Sheet](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/research-analysis?publication_type%5B0%5D=6#filters)\n\n[![The Risks of South Korea’s Nuclear Armament Under a Troubled Democracy](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/summary_image\/public\/2025-02\/20250210_skorea-politics-11_nyt_ac.jpg?itok=e0Rq_8pJ)](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2025\/02\/risks-south-koreas-nuclear-armament-under-troubled-democracy)\n\n### [The Risks of South Korea’s Nuclear Armament Under a Troubled Democracy](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2025\/02\/risks-south-koreas-nuclear-armament-under-troubled-democracy)\nMonday, February 10, 2025\n\n**By:**  Lami Kim\n\nOn President Donald Trump’s first day in office, he referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power.” Just a few months before, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un said he would “exponentially” increase his country’s nuclear weapons arsenal, which he followed by testing a new intercontinental ballistic missile and a new hypersonic missile. Additionally, there are concerns that Moscow may transfer sensitive military technologies to North Korea in exchange for Pyongyang supplying weaponry and troops for Russia’s war on Ukraine. These developments inject new urgency into a key question that will have major ramifications for stability and security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond: Should South Korea go nuclear?\n\n**Type:**  [Analysis](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/research-analysis?publication_type%5B0%5D=12#filters)\n\n[![To Build Peaceful Coexistence with North Korea, Focus on Ordinary North Koreans](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/summary_image\/public\/2025-01\/20250129_nkorea-desperation-3_nyt_ac.jpg?itok=xRY291x4)](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2025\/01\/build-peaceful-coexistence-north-korea-focus-ordinary-north-koreans)\n\n### [To Build Peaceful Coexistence with North Korea, Focus on Ordinary North Koreans](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2025\/01\/build-peaceful-coexistence-north-korea-focus-ordinary-north-koreans)\nWednesday, January 29, 2025\n\n**By:**  Dr. Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings\n\nFor any peaceful coexistence between the United States and North Korea to take root, there will need to be multiple levels of dialogue, engagement and cooperation. Given the historic distrust between the two countries, this is easier said than done. But “people-focused” engagement — that is, engagement that centers North Korean people’s wellbeing — could allow Americans to establish working relationships with North Korean counterparts while also demonstrating U.S. commitment to improving the lives of ordinary North Koreans.\n\n**Type:**  [Analysis](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/research-analysis?publication_type%5B0%5D=12#filters)\n\n[View All Research & Analysis](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/research-analysis)\n\n### Latest News\n#### [What the New Houthi Terrorist Designation Means for Yemen - Time](https:\/\/time.com\/7265418\/houthi-terrorist-fto-status-us-relations-yemen\/)\nFriday, March 7, 2025\n\n#### [Crisis in the Sahel Can Muslim extremist violence in the region be stopped? - CQ Researcher](https:\/\/cqpress.sagepub.com\/cqresearcher\/report\/cqpromo\/zpjNKw\/crisis-in-the-sahel-cqresrre20250228)\nFriday, February 28, 2025\n\n#### ['Contemplated suicide': Ethiopians recount horror of SE Asia scam centres - AFP](https:\/\/www.yahoo.com\/news\/contemplated-suicide-ethiopians-recount-horror-020421352.html?guccounter=1)\nThursday, February 27, 2025\n\n#### [Military, police, MILF join forces in friendly basketball match - GMA News](https:\/\/www.gmanetwork.com\/news\/topstories\/nation\/937258\/military-police-milf-join-forces-for-basketball-match\/story\/)\nMonday, February 24, 2025\n\n[View All News](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/press)\n\n# [United Status Instute of Peace](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/)\n2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037  \nTel: +1.202.457.1700\n\n- [About USIP](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/about)\n- [Countries & Regions](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/regions-countries)\n- [Research & Analysis](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/research-analysis)\n- [Gandhi-King Global Academy](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/academy\/gandhi-king-global-academy)\n\n[Connect](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/connect) [Press](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/press) [Projects](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/projects) [The Olive Branch Blog](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/blog)\n\n- [Facebook](https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/usinstituteofpeace \"usinstituteofpeace\")\n- [Instagram](https:\/\/www.instagram.com\/usipeace\/ \"@usipeace\")\n- [LinkedIn](https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/company\/united-states-institute-of-peace \"United States Institute of Peace\")\n- [Youtube](https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/user\/usinstituteofpeace \"usinstituteofpeace\")\n\nThe United States Institute of Peace [Legal and Privacy Information](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/legal\/privacy) \\| [FOIA Inquiries](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/freedom-information-act-foia)\n\n✓\n\nThanks for sharing\\!\n\n[AddToAny](https:\/\/www.addtoany.com\/ \"Share Buttons\")\n\n[More…](https:\/\/www.usip.org\/publications\/2019\/02\/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi#addtoany \"Show all\")","attrs_readable_markdown":null,"meta_canonical":null}

3. Robots.txt Check

Query:

Response:

4. Spam/Ban Check

Query:

Response:

5. Seen Status Check

ℹ️ Skipped - page is already crawled

📄

INDEXABLE

✅

CRAWLED

4 months ago

🤖

ROBOTS ALLOWED

Page Info Filters

Filter	Status	Condition	Details
HTTP status	PASS	`download_http_code = 200`	HTTP 200
Age cutoff	PASS	`download_stamp > now() - 6 MONTH`	4.8 months ago
History drop	PASS	`isNull(history_drop_reason)`	No drop reason
Spam/ban	PASS	`fh_dont_index != 1 AND ml_spam_score = 0`	ml_spam_score=0
Canonical	PASS	`meta_canonical IS NULL OR = '' OR = src_unparsed`	Not set

Page Details

Property	Value
URL	https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi
Last Crawled	2025-11-28 05:38:22 (4 months ago)
First Indexed	2019-02-28 21:44:04 (7 years ago)
HTTP Status Code	200
Meta Title	U.S.-North Korea Negotiations: What Happened in Hanoi? \| United States Institute of Peace
Meta Description	President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un unexpectedly cut short their second summit Thursday after failing to come to an agreement to dismantle Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and provide sanctions relief. USIP’s Ambassador Joseph Yun and Frank Aum explain what happened in Hanoi and what comes next for U.S.-North Korea nuclear diplomacy.
Meta Canonical	null
Boilerpipe Text	Why was there no agreement in Hanoi between President Trump and Chairman Kim? The negotiations broke down over what denuclearization steps Kim was willing to take and how much sanctions relief Trump was willing to provide. We may need the dust to settle before we get all the details, but there seems to be differing viewpoints on what happened. Based on President Trump’s press conference, North Korea would agree to completely dismantle its nuclear facility at Yongbyon, but in return wanted the entire sanctions regime lifted, which President Trump wasn’t willing to accede to. According to Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho’s midnight press conference, however, North Korea only wanted relief from five United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions from 2016 and 2017 in exchange for the complete dismantlement of the Yongbyon facility. But, President Trump added one more request unrelated to the Yongbyon nuclear facility that signaled that the U.S. wasn’t interested in the North Korean proposal. It is unclear which five UNSC resolutions Foreign Minister Ri was referring to, but most likely they would have constituted a significant part of the sanctions regime against North Korea. It is also unclear what additional request President Trump made. It appears that the president was willing to shoot for a “big deal” that would provide complete sanctions relief as well as other incentives such as an end-of-war declaration and exchange of liaison offices, but this would require complete denuclearization, including all nuclear facilities (not just Yongbyon), weapons, and materials. But both sides realized almost immediately that the gap in how each side values denuclearization and sanctions relief was much too wide. What comes next in the diplomatic process? A positive outcome is that the “dual freeze” on North Korean nuclear and missile tests and U.S.-South Korea military exercises, which helped create the peaceful environment for diplomacy to proceed, remains in place. President Trump conveyed that Chairman Kim agreed to continue to suspend nuclear and missile tests, and all but said that U.S.-ROK joint exercises will remain suspended or at least significantly modified. Another silver lining from the Hanoi negotiations is the confirmation that the U.S. approach to North Korea embraces reciprocity and the simultaneous discussion of denuclearization and peace. The exact sequencing of concessions is a separate matter but there is less concern that Washington will demand that North Korea denuclearizes first before any steps can be taken on peace-related issues. Still, both principals return home empty-handed and without a clear picture of what lies ahead. From a process perspective, a significant letdown from the Hanoi summit was the lack of any roadmap or clarity on additional working-level negotiations. Although Trump indicated that Secretary Pompeo will continue meeting with his counterpart, there was no specificity about when these meetings would happen, whether Special Representative Steve Biegun would engage in regular working-level negotiations, and what the end goals would be in the next two years. Another concern is that if the two top decision makers, Trump and Kim, couldn’t agree on a deal, then what chance do lower-level officials, like Pompeo and North Korean spy chief Kim Yong Chul, or Biegun and chief nuclear negotiator Kim Hyok Chol, have of making progress? The outcome could be an even bigger setback for Kim Jong Un. If North Korea really wants summit-level diplomacy, they should realize that Trump is not likely to agree to a future summit without an iron-clad guarantee of success. The biggest disappointment from the Hanoi “no deal” is likely being felt by President Moon and South Korea. The lack of any sanctions relief will make it difficult, if not impossible, to conduct serious North-South economic engagement and move forward on cooperation projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex and inter-Korean railways. Moreover, Chairman Kim’s visit to Seoul, which many thought imminent, now looks unlikely anytime soon since there will be no achievements to tout at the summit. Were there any other interesting takeaways? One of the biggest concerns among North Korea watchers has been the lack of a common definition between the two sides about denuclearization. President Trump acknowledged in the press conference that the two countries’ visions about denuclearization were not exactly the same, so it appears more work is needed on this topic. Also, President Trump confirmed that there are other nuclear sites beyond Yongbyon that Washington is interested in, answering affirmatively about a second suspected uranium enrichment site. Most Korea watchers already knew about these additional sites, but it helps to have presidential-level confirmation that Yongbyon isn’t the only site of concern.
Markdown	![](https://www.facebook.com/tr?id=289839664888464&ev=PageView&noscript=1) ![](https://www.facebook.com/tr?id=289839664888464&ev=PageView&noscript=1) [Skip to main content](https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi#main-content) [Menu](https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi) # [United States Institute of Peace](https://www.usip.org/) - [About USIP](https://www.usip.org/about) / - [Countries & Regions](https://www.usip.org/regions-countries) / - [Research & Analysis](https://www.usip.org/research-analysis) / - [Gandhi-King Global Academy](https://www.usip.org/academy/gandhi-king-global-academy) Search [Close](https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi) # [United States Institute of Peace](https://www.usip.org/) [About USIP](https://www.usip.org/about) [Countries & Regions](https://www.usip.org/regions-countries) [Research & Analysis](https://www.usip.org/research-analysis) [Gandhi-King Global Academy](https://www.usip.org/academy/gandhi-king-global-academy) [Connect](https://www.usip.org/connect) [Press](https://www.usip.org/press) [Projects](https://www.usip.org/projects) [The Olive Branch Blog](https://www.usip.org/blog) ## We provide analysis, education, and resources to those working for peace around the world. [More About USIP](https://www.usip.org/about) # [United States Institute of Peace](https://www.usip.org/) Close Search for experts, projects, publications, courses, and more. ## There are no contents that meet the filtering criteria. [Home](https://www.usip.org/) ▶ [Research & Analysis](https://www.usip.org/research-analysis) # U.S.-North Korea Negotiations: What Happened in Hanoi? Washington and Pyongyang can’t agree on a deal, remain divided on what denuclearization means. Thursday, February 28, 2019 / By: Ambassador Joseph Yun; Frank Aum Publication Type: [Analysis](https://www.usip.org/research-analysis?publication_type%5B0%5D=12#filters) [Share This](https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.usip.org%2Fpublications%2F2019%2F02%2Fus-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi&title=U.S.-North%20Korea%20Negotiations%3A%20What%20Happened%20in%20Hanoi%3F) [Print the Page](https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi) President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un unexpectedly cut short their second summit Thursday after failing to come to an agreement to dismantle Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and provide sanctions relief. USIP’s Ambassador Joseph Yun and Frank Aum explain what happened in Hanoi and what comes next for U.S.-North Korea nuclear diplomacy. ![President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, meet at the Metropole Hotel in Hanoi, Vietnam, Feb. 28, 2019. (Doug Mills/The New York Times)](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/styles/image_with_caption/public/2019-02/20190228-nyt-us_nkorea_14-ac.jpg?itok=a-p2kRNQ) President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, meet at the Metropole Hotel in Hanoi, Vietnam, Feb. 28, 2019. (Doug Mills/The New York Times) ### Why was there no agreement in Hanoi between President Trump and Chairman Kim? The negotiations broke down over what denuclearization steps Kim was willing to take and how much sanctions relief Trump was willing to provide. We may need the dust to settle before we get all the details, but there seems to be differing viewpoints on what happened. Based on President Trump’s press conference, North Korea would agree to completely dismantle its nuclear facility at Yongbyon, but in return wanted the entire sanctions regime lifted, which President Trump wasn’t willing to accede to. According to Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho’s midnight press conference, however, North Korea only wanted relief from five United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions from 2016 and 2017 in exchange for the complete dismantlement of the Yongbyon facility. But, President Trump added one more request unrelated to the Yongbyon nuclear facility that signaled that the U.S. wasn’t interested in the North Korean proposal. It is unclear which five UNSC resolutions Foreign Minister Ri was referring to, but most likely they would have constituted a significant part of the sanctions regime against North Korea. It is also unclear what additional request President Trump made. It appears that the president was willing to shoot for a “big deal” that would provide complete sanctions relief as well as other incentives such as an end-of-war declaration and exchange of liaison offices, but this would require complete denuclearization, including all nuclear facilities (not just Yongbyon), weapons, and materials. But both sides realized almost immediately that the gap in how each side values denuclearization and sanctions relief was much too wide. ### What comes next in the diplomatic process? A positive outcome is that the “dual freeze” on North Korean nuclear and missile tests and U.S.-South Korea military exercises, which helped create the peaceful environment for diplomacy to proceed, remains in place. President Trump conveyed that Chairman Kim agreed to continue to suspend nuclear and missile tests, and all but said that U.S.-ROK joint exercises will remain suspended or at least significantly modified. Another silver lining from the Hanoi negotiations is the confirmation that the U.S. approach to North Korea embraces reciprocity and the simultaneous discussion of denuclearization and peace. The exact sequencing of concessions is a separate matter but there is less concern that Washington will demand that North Korea denuclearizes first before any steps can be taken on peace-related issues. Still, both principals return home empty-handed and without a clear picture of what lies ahead. From a process perspective, a significant letdown from the Hanoi summit was the lack of any roadmap or clarity on additional working-level negotiations. Although Trump indicated that Secretary Pompeo will continue meeting with his counterpart, there was no specificity about when these meetings would happen, whether Special Representative Steve Biegun would engage in regular working-level negotiations, and what the end goals would be in the next two years. Another concern is that if the two top decision makers, Trump and Kim, couldn’t agree on a deal, then what chance do lower-level officials, like Pompeo and North Korean spy chief Kim Yong Chul, or Biegun and chief nuclear negotiator Kim Hyok Chol, have of making progress? The outcome could be an even bigger setback for Kim Jong Un. If North Korea really wants summit-level diplomacy, they should realize that Trump is not likely to agree to a future summit without an iron-clad guarantee of success. The biggest disappointment from the Hanoi “no deal” is likely being felt by President Moon and South Korea. The lack of any sanctions relief will make it difficult, if not impossible, to conduct serious North-South economic engagement and move forward on cooperation projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex and inter-Korean railways. Moreover, Chairman Kim’s visit to Seoul, which many thought imminent, now looks unlikely anytime soon since there will be no achievements to tout at the summit. ### Were there any other interesting takeaways? One of the biggest concerns among North Korea watchers has been the lack of a common definition between the two sides about denuclearization. President Trump acknowledged in the press conference that the two countries’ visions about denuclearization were not exactly the same, so it appears more work is needed on this topic. Also, President Trump confirmed that there are other nuclear sites beyond Yongbyon that Washington is interested in, answering affirmatively about a second suspected uranium enrichment site. Most Korea watchers already knew about these additional sites, but it helps to have presidential-level confirmation that Yongbyon isn’t the only site of concern. * ### About the Authors ### Ambassador Joseph Yun Senior Advisor to the Asia Center ### Frank Aum Senior Expert, Northeast Asia ### Countries [![North Korea](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2016-12/north-korea.svg) North Korea](https://www.usip.org/regions/asia/north-korea) ### Stay Informed USIP has a variety of newsletters and announcements with the latest analysis, publications and events. [Sign up\!](https://www.usip.org/newsletter-signup) ## Related Research & Analysis [![Pursuing Stable Coexistence: A Reorientation of U.S. Policy Toward North Korea](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/styles/summary_image/public/2025-06/20250610-koreas_border_crossing_1-nyt-ac.jpg?itok=dyzOJdkg)](https://www.usip.org/publications/2025/06/pursuing-stable-coexistence-reorientation-us-policy-toward-north-korea) ### [Pursuing Stable Coexistence: A Reorientation of U.S. Policy Toward North Korea](https://www.usip.org/publications/2025/06/pursuing-stable-coexistence-reorientation-us-policy-toward-north-korea) Tuesday, June 10, 2025 By: Frank Aum; Ankit Panda It is now clear that applying pressure does not lead to North Korean restraint; rather, it fuels North Korean provocations. The United States and its allies should instead seek stable coexistence with Pyongyang as an overarching goal. Type: [Analysis](https://www.usip.org/research-analysis?publication_type%5B0%5D=12#filters) [![The Current Situation in North Korea](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/styles/summary_image/public/2023-03/the-current-situation-in-north-korea-cover.jpg?itok=Wgc5YiW4)](https://www.usip.org/publications/2025/02/current-situation-north-korea) ### [The Current Situation in North Korea](https://www.usip.org/publications/2025/02/current-situation-north-korea) Thursday, February 13, 2025 In 2018, reinvigorated diplomacy and reduced tensions generated hope for a more secure and peaceful Korean Peninsula. At a historic summit in Singapore in June, the United States and North Korea committed to establish “new U.S.-DPRK relations” while North Korea also committed to work toward the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” However, the two countries disagreed about what each side should concede and when, leading to a diplomatic failure at a subsequent summit in Hanoi in February 2019. Today, the United States and North Korea coexist in an antagonistic, high-risk stalemate. Type: [Fact Sheet](https://www.usip.org/research-analysis?publication_type%5B0%5D=6#filters) [![The Risks of South Korea’s Nuclear Armament Under a Troubled Democracy](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/styles/summary_image/public/2025-02/20250210_skorea-politics-11_nyt_ac.jpg?itok=e0Rq_8pJ)](https://www.usip.org/publications/2025/02/risks-south-koreas-nuclear-armament-under-troubled-democracy) ### [The Risks of South Korea’s Nuclear Armament Under a Troubled Democracy](https://www.usip.org/publications/2025/02/risks-south-koreas-nuclear-armament-under-troubled-democracy) Monday, February 10, 2025 By: Lami Kim On President Donald Trump’s first day in office, he referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power.” Just a few months before, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un said he would “exponentially” increase his country’s nuclear weapons arsenal, which he followed by testing a new intercontinental ballistic missile and a new hypersonic missile. Additionally, there are concerns that Moscow may transfer sensitive military technologies to North Korea in exchange for Pyongyang supplying weaponry and troops for Russia’s war on Ukraine. These developments inject new urgency into a key question that will have major ramifications for stability and security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond: Should South Korea go nuclear? Type: [Analysis](https://www.usip.org/research-analysis?publication_type%5B0%5D=12#filters) [![To Build Peaceful Coexistence with North Korea, Focus on Ordinary North Koreans](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/styles/summary_image/public/2025-01/20250129_nkorea-desperation-3_nyt_ac.jpg?itok=xRY291x4)](https://www.usip.org/publications/2025/01/build-peaceful-coexistence-north-korea-focus-ordinary-north-koreans) ### [To Build Peaceful Coexistence with North Korea, Focus on Ordinary North Koreans](https://www.usip.org/publications/2025/01/build-peaceful-coexistence-north-korea-focus-ordinary-north-koreans) Wednesday, January 29, 2025 By: Dr. Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings For any peaceful coexistence between the United States and North Korea to take root, there will need to be multiple levels of dialogue, engagement and cooperation. Given the historic distrust between the two countries, this is easier said than done. But “people-focused” engagement — that is, engagement that centers North Korean people’s wellbeing — could allow Americans to establish working relationships with North Korean counterparts while also demonstrating U.S. commitment to improving the lives of ordinary North Koreans. Type:** [Analysis](https://www.usip.org/research-analysis?publication_type%5B0%5D=12#filters) [View All Research & Analysis](https://www.usip.org/research-analysis) ### Latest News #### [What the New Houthi Terrorist Designation Means for Yemen - Time](https://time.com/7265418/houthi-terrorist-fto-status-us-relations-yemen/) Friday, March 7, 2025 #### [Crisis in the Sahel Can Muslim extremist violence in the region be stopped? - CQ Researcher](https://cqpress.sagepub.com/cqresearcher/report/cqpromo/zpjNKw/crisis-in-the-sahel-cqresrre20250228) Friday, February 28, 2025 #### ['Contemplated suicide': Ethiopians recount horror of SE Asia scam centres - AFP](https://www.yahoo.com/news/contemplated-suicide-ethiopians-recount-horror-020421352.html?guccounter=1) Thursday, February 27, 2025 #### [Military, police, MILF join forces in friendly basketball match - GMA News](https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/937258/military-police-milf-join-forces-for-basketball-match/story/) Monday, February 24, 2025 [View All News](https://www.usip.org/press) # [United Status Instute of Peace](https://www.usip.org/) 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037 Tel: +1.202.457.1700 - [About USIP](https://www.usip.org/about) - [Countries & Regions](https://www.usip.org/regions-countries) - [Research & Analysis](https://www.usip.org/research-analysis) - [Gandhi-King Global Academy](https://www.usip.org/academy/gandhi-king-global-academy) [Connect](https://www.usip.org/connect) [Press](https://www.usip.org/press) [Projects](https://www.usip.org/projects) [The Olive Branch Blog](https://www.usip.org/blog) - [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/usinstituteofpeace "usinstituteofpeace") - [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/usipeace/ "@usipeace") - [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-institute-of-peace "United States Institute of Peace") - [Youtube](https://www.youtube.com/user/usinstituteofpeace "usinstituteofpeace") The United States Institute of Peace [Legal and Privacy Information](https://www.usip.org/legal/privacy) \\| [FOIA Inquiries](https://www.usip.org/freedom-information-act-foia) ✓ Thanks for sharing\! [AddToAny](https://www.addtoany.com/ "Share Buttons") [More…](https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi#addtoany "Show all")
Readable Markdown	null
Shard	115 (laksa)
Root Hash	4367961689013780315
Unparsed URL	org,usip!www,/publications/2019/02/us-north-korea-negotiations-what-happened-hanoi s443