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| Meta Title | Taiwan, the Long Game Not Invasion | RealClearDefense |
| Meta Description | China enters the Lunar New Year amid uncertainty over domestic power dynamics and the implications for policy toward Taiwan. On January 24, 2026, General Zhang, the highest-ranking officer in the Chin |
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| Boilerpipe Text | China enters the Lunar New Year amid uncertainty over domestic power dynamics and the implications for policy toward Taiwan.
On January 24, 2026, General Zhang, the highest-ranking officer in the Chinese military and second only to Xi Jinping on the Central Military Commission (CMC), wasÂ
purged
. With this move, Xi has eliminatedÂ
five of seven
 CMC members following sweeping removals across the officer corps. The reasons remain unclear. Did Xi doubt the military’s loyalty, or were there disagreements over modernization or planning for Taiwan?
Beijing regards Taiwan as an integral part of China. In 1949 the leaders of the Republic of China  (ROC)Â
retreated to Taiwan
  following defeat in the civil war. InÂ
1971
, the United Nations transferred recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing insists “
reunification
” is inevitable.Â
Xi
 has called on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be capable of invasion by 2027 and to complete unification by 2049. Hawks in the west see these as timelines for conflict. Pragmatists note that 2027 marks the PLA’s centenary and 2049 the PRC’s hundredth anniversary—historicalÂ
milestones
 rather than launch dates.
Hawks cite China’s December launch of “
Justice Mission 25
,” its largest joint live-fire exercise to date, simulating blockade or invasion scenarios around Taiwan. They also point toÂ
threatening remarks
 by China’s consul general in Osaka directed at Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi after she suggested Japan would aid Taiwan if invaded. Pragmatists counter that the exercise was part of the "
stern warning
" conveyed by Beijing following anÂ
$11 billion arms sale
 to Taiwan and dismiss the consul’s remarks as undisciplined rhetoric. They argue China is unlikely toÂ
risk
 confrontation with a nuclear-armed maritime power, the United States.
Instead, they view China’s approach as consistent with ancient Chinese strategic thought that rewards patience, encirclement, and indirect pressure, Â
breaking  the enemy’s resistance without fighting.
It is true that over recent decades, China’s military has expanded rapidly. TheÂ
Congressional Research Service
 assesses the PLA Navy as the world’s largest, with roughly 400 battle-force ships compared with America’s 287. China also possesses the world’s largest Â
coast guard
, a key asset in any quarantine scenario.
Beijing has also developed amphibious capabilities and rehearsed landings in exercises such as Justice Mission 25. However, the PLA lacks combat experience in large-scale amphibious or joint warfare operations. AÂ
130
-kilometer crossing of the Taiwan Strait would expose initial waves to heavy fire, while limited landing sites would complicate reinforcement and resupply. The widescale purges of the military also make this an inopportune time for such a complex operation.
Taiwan relies on geography and asymmetric defense and the prospect of urban warfare. Rugged coasts, steep mountains, and dense urban terrain favor defenders. Taipei has adopted a “
porcupine
” strategy built around, mines, rapid-strike naval vessels, and missile defenses designed to make invasion prohibitively costly.
Regional powers are committed to keeping South China Sea lanes open. In August, the Philippines and Australia conducted theÂ
Alon 25
  naval drill in disputed waters. Another exercise,Â
ANNUALEX 2025
, followed in October in the Philippine Sea under Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (
JMSDF
). The Philippines’ geography makes it strategically pivotal. The former U.S. base atÂ
Subic Bay
 is being revived, and U.S.–Philippine ties are deepening under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (
EDCA
), granting U.S. access to bases relevant to regional contingencies.
Under theÂ
Taiwan Relations Act
, the United States maintains unofficial ties and provides arms to Taiwan. TheÂ
Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act
”, signed in December 2025, further clarified Washington’s position. The U.S. Navy underscored its commitment by sailing the Â
USS Abraham Lincoln
 through waters claimed by China at the start of the New Year.
Since the election of PresidentÂ
Lai Ching-te
 of the Democratic Progressive Party (
DPP
), viewed by Beijing as independence-leaning, the PLA Air Force and Navy have stepped-up incursions into Taiwanese airspace and waters. “Joint Sword” exercises rehearse encirclement andÂ
gray-zone
 tactics that normalize Chinese presence while testing Taiwan’s defenses.
Alongside military pressure, Beijing pursues engagement. Millions of Taiwanese live, work, have family ties, invest in or study on the mainland. China, including Hong Kong, remains Taiwan’sÂ
largest trading partner
, supporting a pro-engagement bloc led by the Kuomintang (
KMT
), which directs a coalition majority and endorses theÂ
1992 Consensus
 for “One China.” The DPP’s failed effort toÂ
recall
 31 KMT lawmakers exposed divisionsÂ
Beijing could exploit
 ahead of Taiwan’s 2028 presidential election.
China’s Taiwan policy blends intimidation with inducement, seeking to make unification appear inevitable. While military action cannot be ruled out, current indicators point toward sustained encirclement and coercion rather than imminent war.
David W. Wise
is a retired businessman who publishes frequently about public policy.
He is a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University |
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# Taiwan, the Long Game Not Invasion
By [David W. Wise](https://www.realcleardefense.com/authors/david_w_wise/)
February 27, 2026
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China enters the Lunar New Year amid uncertainty over domestic power dynamics and the implications for policy toward Taiwan.
On January 24, 2026, General Zhang, the highest-ranking officer in the Chinese military and second only to Xi Jinping on the Central Military Commission (CMC), was [purged](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/china/china-xi-jinping-general-zhang-corruption-purge-taiwan-invasion-rcna255911 "https://www.nbcnews.com/world/china/china-xi-jinping-general-zhang-corruption-purge-taiwan-invasion-rcna255911"). With this move, Xi has eliminated [five of seven](https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2026/january/what-chinas-latest-military-purges-mean "https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2026/january/what-chinas-latest-military-purges-mean") CMC members following sweeping removals across the officer corps. The reasons remain unclear. Did Xi doubt the military’s loyalty, or were there disagreements over modernization or planning for Taiwan?
Beijing regards Taiwan as an integral part of China. In 1949 the leaders of the Republic of China (ROC) [retreated to Taiwan](https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2016/12/04/2003660529 "https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2016/12/04/2003660529") following defeat in the civil war. In [1971](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054?ln=en&v=pdf "https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054?ln=en&v=pdf"), the United Nations transferred recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing insists “[reunification](https://chinaecongroup.com/2024/04/xis-taiwan-timeline-tied-to-legacy/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "https://chinaecongroup.com/2024/04/xis-taiwan-timeline-tied-to-legacy/?utm_source=chatgpt.com")” is inevitable. [Xi](https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2024/Sullivan/ "https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2024/Sullivan/") has called on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be capable of invasion by 2027 and to complete unification by 2049. Hawks in the west see these as timelines for conflict. Pragmatists note that 2027 marks the PLA’s centenary and 2049 the PRC’s hundredth anniversary—historical [milestones](https://jamestown.org/chinas-2027-goal-marks-the-plas-centennial-not-an-expedited-military-modernization/ "https://jamestown.org/chinas-2027-goal-marks-the-plas-centennial-not-an-expedited-military-modernization/") rather than launch dates.
Hawks cite China’s December launch of “[Justice Mission 25](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-military-conduct-live-fire-exercises-around-taiwan-tuesday-2025-12-28/ "https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-military-conduct-live-fire-exercises-around-taiwan-tuesday-2025-12-28/"),” its largest joint live-fire exercise to date, simulating blockade or invasion scenarios around Taiwan. They also point to [threatening remarks](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/editorials/2025/11/14/chinese-diplomat-crosses-line-with-japan/ "https://www.japantimes.co.jp/editorials/2025/11/14/chinese-diplomat-crosses-line-with-japan/") by China’s consul general in Osaka directed at Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi after she suggested Japan would aid Taiwan if invaded. Pragmatists counter that the exercise was part of the "[stern warning](https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202512/18/WS6943eefaa310d6866eb2f5d0.html "https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202512/18/WS6943eefaa310d6866eb2f5d0.html")" conveyed by Beijing following an [\$11 billion arms sale](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7095g45p1po "https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7095g45p1po") to Taiwan and dismiss the consul’s remarks as undisciplined rhetoric. They argue China is unlikely to [risk](https://www.aei.org/articles/a-failed-chinese-invasion-of-taiwan-would-be-disastrous-for-xi-jinping/ "https://www.aei.org/articles/a-failed-chinese-invasion-of-taiwan-would-be-disastrous-for-xi-jinping/") confrontation with a nuclear-armed maritime power, the United States.
Instead, they view China’s approach as consistent with ancient Chinese strategic thought that rewards patience, encirclement, and indirect pressure, [breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.](https://www.fcta.org/books/ArtOfWar_SunTzu.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com#Chap03 "https://www.fcta.org/books/ArtOfWar_SunTzu.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com#Chap03")
It is true that over recent decades, China’s military has expanded rapidly. The [Congressional Research Service](https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf "https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf") assesses the PLA Navy as the world’s largest, with roughly 400 battle-force ships compared with America’s 287. China also possesses the world’s largest [coast guard](https://connect.xfinity.com/appsuite/China%20Coast%20Guard%20Increasingly%20Assertive "https://connect.xfinity.com/appsuite/China%20Coast%20Guard%20Increasingly%20Assertive"), a key asset in any quarantine scenario.
Beijing has also developed amphibious capabilities and rehearsed landings in exercises such as Justice Mission 25. However, the PLA lacks combat experience in large-scale amphibious or joint warfare operations. A [130](https://www.worldatlas.com/straits/taiwan-strait.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com "https://www.worldatlas.com/straits/taiwan-strait.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com")\-kilometer crossing of the Taiwan Strait would expose initial waves to heavy fire, while limited landing sites would complicate reinforcement and resupply. The widescale purges of the military also make this an inopportune time for such a complex operation.
Taiwan relies on geography and asymmetric defense and the prospect of urban warfare. Rugged coasts, steep mountains, and dense urban terrain favor defenders. Taipei has adopted a “[porcupine](https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/04/taiwan-sharpens-porcupine-capabilities-to-deter-ccp-invasion-threat/ "https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/04/taiwan-sharpens-porcupine-capabilities-to-deter-ccp-invasion-threat/")” strategy built around, mines, rapid-strike naval vessels, and missile defenses designed to make invasion prohibitively costly.
Regional powers are committed to keeping South China Sea lanes open. In August, the Philippines and Australia conducted the [Alon 25](https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2025-08-29/australia-philippines-conclude-force-projection-training-exercise-alon-25 "https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2025-08-29/australia-philippines-conclude-force-projection-training-exercise-alon-25") naval drill in disputed waters. Another exercise, [ANNUALEX 2025](https://news.usni.org/2025/10/22/u-s-sailors-marines-join-partners-for-biennial-exercise-in-philippine-sea?utm_source=chatgpt.com "https://news.usni.org/2025/10/22/u-s-sailors-marines-join-partners-for-biennial-exercise-in-philippine-sea?utm_source=chatgpt.com"), followed in October in the Philippine Sea under Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force ([JMSDF](https://www.warpowerjapan.com/navalpower.php#google_vignette "https://www.warpowerjapan.com/navalpower.php#google_vignette")). The Philippines’ geography makes it strategically pivotal. The former U.S. base at [Subic Bay](https://behindthefront.substack.com/p/the-return-of-subic-bay?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email "https://behindthefront.substack.com/p/the-return-of-subic-bay?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email") is being revived, and U.S.–Philippine ties are deepening under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement ([EDCA](https://ph.usembassy.gov/enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement-edca-fact-sheet/ "https://ph.usembassy.gov/enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement-edca-fact-sheet/")), granting U.S. access to bases relevant to regional contingencies.
Under the [Taiwan Relations Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479 "https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479"), the United States maintains unofficial ties and provides arms to Taiwan. The [Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/1512 "https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/1512")”, signed in December 2025, further clarified Washington’s position. The U.S. Navy underscored its commitment by sailing the [USS Abraham Lincoln](https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2026-01-12/abraham-lincoln-carrier-south-china-sea-20379999.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com "https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2026-01-12/abraham-lincoln-carrier-south-china-sea-20379999.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com") through waters claimed by China at the start of the New Year.
Since the election of President [Lai Ching-te](https://www.npr.org/2026/01/01/g-s1-104249/taiwan-president-sovereignty-china-military-drills "https://www.npr.org/2026/01/01/g-s1-104249/taiwan-president-sovereignty-china-military-drills") of the Democratic Progressive Party ([DPP](https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/taiwans-democratic-progressive-party-faces-multiple-crises "https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/taiwans-democratic-progressive-party-faces-multiple-crises")), viewed by Beijing as independence-leaning, the PLA Air Force and Navy have stepped-up incursions into Taiwanese airspace and waters. “Joint Sword” exercises rehearse encirclement and [gray-zone](https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/OR_CCP-Gray-Zone-Tactics-Against-TW.pdf "https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/OR_CCP-Gray-Zone-Tactics-Against-TW.pdf") tactics that normalize Chinese presence while testing Taiwan’s defenses.
Alongside military pressure, Beijing pursues engagement. Millions of Taiwanese live, work, have family ties, invest in or study on the mainland. China, including Hong Kong, remains Taiwan’s [largest trading partner](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/05/taiwans-trade-with-china-is-far-bigger-than-its-trade-with-the-us.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com "https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/05/taiwans-trade-with-china-is-far-bigger-than-its-trade-with-the-us.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com"), supporting a pro-engagement bloc led by the Kuomintang ([KMT](https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/10/can-the-kuomintang-rise-again/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/10/can-the-kuomintang-rise-again/?utm_source=chatgpt.com")), which directs a coalition majority and endorses the [1992 Consensus](https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart/ "https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart/") for “One China.” The DPP’s failed effort to [recall](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-recall-vote-implications-for-taiwan-china-and-the-united-states/ "https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-recall-vote-implications-for-taiwan-china-and-the-united-states/") 31 KMT lawmakers exposed divisions [Beijing could exploit](https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/10/11/beijings-choice-of-magnanimity-over-menace-would-better-woo-taiwan/ "https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/10/11/beijings-choice-of-magnanimity-over-menace-would-better-woo-taiwan/") ahead of Taiwan’s 2028 presidential election.
China’s Taiwan policy blends intimidation with inducement, seeking to make unification appear inevitable. While military action cannot be ruled out, current indicators point toward sustained encirclement and coercion rather than imminent war.
***
***David W. Wise** is a retired businessman who publishes frequently about public policy.* *He is a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University*
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| Readable Markdown | China enters the Lunar New Year amid uncertainty over domestic power dynamics and the implications for policy toward Taiwan.
On January 24, 2026, General Zhang, the highest-ranking officer in the Chinese military and second only to Xi Jinping on the Central Military Commission (CMC), was [purged](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/china/china-xi-jinping-general-zhang-corruption-purge-taiwan-invasion-rcna255911 "https://www.nbcnews.com/world/china/china-xi-jinping-general-zhang-corruption-purge-taiwan-invasion-rcna255911"). With this move, Xi has eliminated [five of seven](https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2026/january/what-chinas-latest-military-purges-mean "https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2026/january/what-chinas-latest-military-purges-mean") CMC members following sweeping removals across the officer corps. The reasons remain unclear. Did Xi doubt the military’s loyalty, or were there disagreements over modernization or planning for Taiwan?
Beijing regards Taiwan as an integral part of China. In 1949 the leaders of the Republic of China (ROC) [retreated to Taiwan](https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2016/12/04/2003660529 "https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2016/12/04/2003660529") following defeat in the civil war. In [1971](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054?ln=en&v=pdf "https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054?ln=en&v=pdf"), the United Nations transferred recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing insists “[reunification](https://chinaecongroup.com/2024/04/xis-taiwan-timeline-tied-to-legacy/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "https://chinaecongroup.com/2024/04/xis-taiwan-timeline-tied-to-legacy/?utm_source=chatgpt.com")” is inevitable. [Xi](https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2024/Sullivan/ "https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2024/Sullivan/") has called on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be capable of invasion by 2027 and to complete unification by 2049. Hawks in the west see these as timelines for conflict. Pragmatists note that 2027 marks the PLA’s centenary and 2049 the PRC’s hundredth anniversary—historical [milestones](https://jamestown.org/chinas-2027-goal-marks-the-plas-centennial-not-an-expedited-military-modernization/ "https://jamestown.org/chinas-2027-goal-marks-the-plas-centennial-not-an-expedited-military-modernization/") rather than launch dates.
Hawks cite China’s December launch of “[Justice Mission 25](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-military-conduct-live-fire-exercises-around-taiwan-tuesday-2025-12-28/ "https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-military-conduct-live-fire-exercises-around-taiwan-tuesday-2025-12-28/"),” its largest joint live-fire exercise to date, simulating blockade or invasion scenarios around Taiwan. They also point to [threatening remarks](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/editorials/2025/11/14/chinese-diplomat-crosses-line-with-japan/ "https://www.japantimes.co.jp/editorials/2025/11/14/chinese-diplomat-crosses-line-with-japan/") by China’s consul general in Osaka directed at Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi after she suggested Japan would aid Taiwan if invaded. Pragmatists counter that the exercise was part of the "[stern warning](https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202512/18/WS6943eefaa310d6866eb2f5d0.html "https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202512/18/WS6943eefaa310d6866eb2f5d0.html")" conveyed by Beijing following an [\$11 billion arms sale](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7095g45p1po "https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7095g45p1po") to Taiwan and dismiss the consul’s remarks as undisciplined rhetoric. They argue China is unlikely to [risk](https://www.aei.org/articles/a-failed-chinese-invasion-of-taiwan-would-be-disastrous-for-xi-jinping/ "https://www.aei.org/articles/a-failed-chinese-invasion-of-taiwan-would-be-disastrous-for-xi-jinping/") confrontation with a nuclear-armed maritime power, the United States.
Instead, they view China’s approach as consistent with ancient Chinese strategic thought that rewards patience, encirclement, and indirect pressure, [breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.](https://www.fcta.org/books/ArtOfWar_SunTzu.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com#Chap03 "https://www.fcta.org/books/ArtOfWar_SunTzu.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com#Chap03")
It is true that over recent decades, China’s military has expanded rapidly. The [Congressional Research Service](https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf "https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf") assesses the PLA Navy as the world’s largest, with roughly 400 battle-force ships compared with America’s 287. China also possesses the world’s largest [coast guard](https://connect.xfinity.com/appsuite/China%20Coast%20Guard%20Increasingly%20Assertive "https://connect.xfinity.com/appsuite/China%20Coast%20Guard%20Increasingly%20Assertive"), a key asset in any quarantine scenario.
Beijing has also developed amphibious capabilities and rehearsed landings in exercises such as Justice Mission 25. However, the PLA lacks combat experience in large-scale amphibious or joint warfare operations. A [130](https://www.worldatlas.com/straits/taiwan-strait.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com "https://www.worldatlas.com/straits/taiwan-strait.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com")\-kilometer crossing of the Taiwan Strait would expose initial waves to heavy fire, while limited landing sites would complicate reinforcement and resupply. The widescale purges of the military also make this an inopportune time for such a complex operation.
Taiwan relies on geography and asymmetric defense and the prospect of urban warfare. Rugged coasts, steep mountains, and dense urban terrain favor defenders. Taipei has adopted a “[porcupine](https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/04/taiwan-sharpens-porcupine-capabilities-to-deter-ccp-invasion-threat/ "https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/04/taiwan-sharpens-porcupine-capabilities-to-deter-ccp-invasion-threat/")” strategy built around, mines, rapid-strike naval vessels, and missile defenses designed to make invasion prohibitively costly.
Regional powers are committed to keeping South China Sea lanes open. In August, the Philippines and Australia conducted the [Alon 25](https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2025-08-29/australia-philippines-conclude-force-projection-training-exercise-alon-25 "https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2025-08-29/australia-philippines-conclude-force-projection-training-exercise-alon-25") naval drill in disputed waters. Another exercise, [ANNUALEX 2025](https://news.usni.org/2025/10/22/u-s-sailors-marines-join-partners-for-biennial-exercise-in-philippine-sea?utm_source=chatgpt.com "https://news.usni.org/2025/10/22/u-s-sailors-marines-join-partners-for-biennial-exercise-in-philippine-sea?utm_source=chatgpt.com"), followed in October in the Philippine Sea under Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force ([JMSDF](https://www.warpowerjapan.com/navalpower.php#google_vignette "https://www.warpowerjapan.com/navalpower.php#google_vignette")). The Philippines’ geography makes it strategically pivotal. The former U.S. base at [Subic Bay](https://behindthefront.substack.com/p/the-return-of-subic-bay?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email "https://behindthefront.substack.com/p/the-return-of-subic-bay?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email") is being revived, and U.S.–Philippine ties are deepening under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement ([EDCA](https://ph.usembassy.gov/enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement-edca-fact-sheet/ "https://ph.usembassy.gov/enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement-edca-fact-sheet/")), granting U.S. access to bases relevant to regional contingencies.
Under the [Taiwan Relations Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479 "https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479"), the United States maintains unofficial ties and provides arms to Taiwan. The [Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/1512 "https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/1512")”, signed in December 2025, further clarified Washington’s position. The U.S. Navy underscored its commitment by sailing the [USS Abraham Lincoln](https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2026-01-12/abraham-lincoln-carrier-south-china-sea-20379999.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com "https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2026-01-12/abraham-lincoln-carrier-south-china-sea-20379999.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com") through waters claimed by China at the start of the New Year.
Since the election of President [Lai Ching-te](https://www.npr.org/2026/01/01/g-s1-104249/taiwan-president-sovereignty-china-military-drills "https://www.npr.org/2026/01/01/g-s1-104249/taiwan-president-sovereignty-china-military-drills") of the Democratic Progressive Party ([DPP](https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/taiwans-democratic-progressive-party-faces-multiple-crises "https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/taiwans-democratic-progressive-party-faces-multiple-crises")), viewed by Beijing as independence-leaning, the PLA Air Force and Navy have stepped-up incursions into Taiwanese airspace and waters. “Joint Sword” exercises rehearse encirclement and [gray-zone](https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/OR_CCP-Gray-Zone-Tactics-Against-TW.pdf "https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/OR_CCP-Gray-Zone-Tactics-Against-TW.pdf") tactics that normalize Chinese presence while testing Taiwan’s defenses.
Alongside military pressure, Beijing pursues engagement. Millions of Taiwanese live, work, have family ties, invest in or study on the mainland. China, including Hong Kong, remains Taiwan’s [largest trading partner](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/05/taiwans-trade-with-china-is-far-bigger-than-its-trade-with-the-us.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com "https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/05/taiwans-trade-with-china-is-far-bigger-than-its-trade-with-the-us.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com"), supporting a pro-engagement bloc led by the Kuomintang ([KMT](https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/10/can-the-kuomintang-rise-again/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/10/can-the-kuomintang-rise-again/?utm_source=chatgpt.com")), which directs a coalition majority and endorses the [1992 Consensus](https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart/ "https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart/") for “One China.” The DPP’s failed effort to [recall](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-recall-vote-implications-for-taiwan-china-and-the-united-states/ "https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-recall-vote-implications-for-taiwan-china-and-the-united-states/") 31 KMT lawmakers exposed divisions [Beijing could exploit](https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/10/11/beijings-choice-of-magnanimity-over-menace-would-better-woo-taiwan/ "https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/10/11/beijings-choice-of-magnanimity-over-menace-would-better-woo-taiwan/") ahead of Taiwan’s 2028 presidential election.
China’s Taiwan policy blends intimidation with inducement, seeking to make unification appear inevitable. While military action cannot be ruled out, current indicators point toward sustained encirclement and coercion rather than imminent war.
***
***David W. Wise** is a retired businessman who publishes frequently about public policy.* *He is a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University* |
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