🕷️ Crawler Inspector

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Raw Queries and Responses

1. Shard Calculation

Query:

Response:

Calculated Shard: 170 (from laksa103)

2. Crawled Status Check

Query:

curl -X POST \
  'http://laksa170.int.ahrefs:8124/' \
  -H 'Content-Type: text/plain' \
  -H 'X-ClickHouse-Database: crawler3' \
  -H 'Authorization: Basic YXBpOg==' \
  -d 'SELECT getAhrefsURLFromUnparsed(src_unparsed) AS found_url, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(download_stamp), 0) AS crawl_time, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(props_url_first_seen), 0) AS first_indexed_time, download_http_code AS http_code, src_unparsed AS src_unparsed, src_root_hash AS src_root_hash, history_drop_reason AS history_drop_reason, meta_title AS meta_title, meta_descriptions AS meta_descriptions, attrs_boilerpipe_text AS attrs_boilerpipe_text, attrs_markdown AS attrs_markdown, attrs_readable_markdown AS attrs_readable_markdown, meta_canonical AS meta_canonical FROM crawler3.page_info_local FINAL PREWHERE (src_root_hash, src_unparsed) IN ((getAhrefsRootHashFromUnparsed(getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://www.npr.org/2010/09/08/129720165/bp-report-blames-multiple-companies-for-gulf-spill\')), getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://www.npr.org/2010/09/08/129720165/bp-report-blames-multiple-companies-for-gulf-spill\'))) FORMAT JSONEachRow'

Response:

{"found_url":"https:\/\/www.npr.org\/2010\/09\/08\/129720165\/bp-report-blames-multiple-companies-for-gulf-spill","crawl_time":1776282721,"first_indexed_time":1710583339,"http_code":200,"src_unparsed":"org,npr!www,\/2010\/09\/08\/129720165\/bp-report-blames-multiple-companies-for-gulf-spill s443","src_root_hash":"156162564976766770","history_drop_reason":null,"meta_title":"BP Report Blames Multiple Companies For Gulf Spill : NPR","meta_descriptions":["The oil giant's 193-page report says a sequence of failures led to the massive Gulf of Mexico spill that fouled waters and shorelines for months. The company's findings are far from the final word on possible causes of the explosion that sank the Deepwater Horizon drill rig."],"attrs_boilerpipe_text":"A key piece of evidence in the Deepwater Horizon investigation — the blowout preventer — was raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The failed mechanism, along with the well cap, was put on a vessel in the Gulf.\nPetty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue\/U.S. Coast Guard\/Getty Images\nhide caption\ntoggle caption\nPetty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue\/U.S. Coast Guard\/Getty Images\nA key piece of evidence in the Deepwater Horizon investigation — the blowout preventer — was raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The failed mechanism, along with the well cap, was put on a vessel in the Gulf.\nPetty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue\/U.S. Coast Guard\/Getty Images\nA new BP report concludes that \"multiple companies and work teams\" are to blame for the Gulf of Mexico rig explosion and the largest oil spill in U.S. history, including the rig's owner and a company working on the well shortly before the blast.\nIn the 193-page internal report posted Wednesday on BP's website, the British oil giant says the April disaster was caused by \"a sequence of failures involving a number of different parties.\"\n\"It is evident that a series of complex events, rather than a single mistake or failure, led to the tragedy. Multiple parties, including BP, Halliburton and Transocean, were involved,\" outgoing CEO Tony Hayward said in the report.\nThe accident killed 11 workers aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig and spewed more than 200 million gallons of oil from the undersea well over the next three months.\nBP's findings aren't the final word on what went wrong, as several divisions of the U.S. government, including the Justice Department, Coast Guard and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, are also investigating. And a key piece of evidence -- the failed blowout preventer -- was only raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined.\nThe investigation report was generated by a BP team led by Mark Bly, BP's head of safety and operations. At a Wednesday briefing in Washington, Bly said eight separate failures were uncovered that led to the disaster.\nBly also said that while the company's report was clinical and fact-based, the investigative team had \"a very strong emotional feeling about the accident.\"\n-- There were weaknesses in cement design and testing, quality assurance and risk assessment  for the Deepwater Horizon's well.\n-- Problems with a device called the shoe track at the bottom of the well allowed oil and gas to enter.\n-- The Transocean rig crew and BP well site leaders wrongly concluded that a an integrity test of the well was successful.\n-- Over a critical 40-minute period, the rig crew failed to realize that oil and gas were coming up the well.\n-- Fluids coming up through the well should have been diverted overboard to relieve pressure while the crew addressed the problems.\n-- There were design flaws in the \"mud gas separator,\" which should have diverted high-pressure oil and gas coming up the well.\n-- The rig's heating, ventilation and air conditioning system probably diverted a gas-rich mixture from the well into the engine rooms, causing at least one engine to race and spark -- the probable source of the explosion.\n-- The final line of defense, the blowout preventer, failed.\nIn public hearings, BP has already tried to shift some of the blame to rig owner Transocean and contractor Halliburton. BP was leasing the rig from Transocean and owned the well that blew out.\nHayward singled out Halliburton for criticism in the report, pointing to that company's \"bad cement job\" in lining the well bore. But he was careful to defend the basic design of the well, key aspects of which were dictated by BP.\nBP admitted in the report that its engineers misinterpreted a negative-pressure test meant to determine well integrity after the cementing work. The company also blamed Transocean workers for failing to spot problems and take necessary action.\n\"The Transocean rig crew and BP well site leaders reached the incorrect view that the test was successful and that well integrity had been established,\" the report said. It added: \"The Transocean rig crew failed to recognize and act on the influx of hydrocarbons into the well until the hydrocarbons were in the riser and rapidly flowing to the surface.\"\nA Transocean lawyer said the company had no immediate comment on the report.\nNPR Science Correspondent Richard Harris said the bottom line in the report is that many things caused the accident \"but it all started with bad cement.\"\nHalliburton's attempt to pump cement into the bottom of the well to create a solid seal to keep oil and gas from coming up the well \"turned out to be a difficult and complicated cement job, and it didn't go right,\" Harris said. The test to see if the cement was holding was misinterpreted by engineers.\n\"If they'd have interpreted the results of those tests correctly, they would have realized that they had a problem\" and probably would have been able to avoid the disaster, Harris said.\nAlthough BP said it \"did not evaluate evidence against legal standards,\" in the report, diluting its role in the disaster was likely part of a legal strategy by BP, Harris said.\n\"Basically, what BP is trying to do is come up with both a legal and a [public relations] explanation,\" he told\nMorning Edition.\nBP faces hundreds of lawsuits and potentially billions of dollars in liabilities.\n\"A lot depends on whether [BP] was grossly negligent or whether this was a whole series of accidents,\" he said.\nMembers of Congress, industry experts and workers who survived the rig explosion have accused BP's engineers of cutting corners to save time and money on a project that was 43 days and more than $20 million behind schedule at the time of the blast.\nThe blowout preventer, which was supposed to be a fail-safe mechanism, was still en route to a NASA facility in New Orleans, where it will be analyzed by government investigators.\nWhat is known is that the blowout preventer didn't seal the well pipe at the sea bottom after an eruption of methane gas triggered the explosion.\nIn the report, BP acknowledged that the failure of the preventer was \"probably because critical components were not working.\" The report also found signs of \"potential weaknesses in the testing regime and maintenance management system\" for the blowout preventer.","attrs_markdown":"Accessibility links\n\n- [Skip to main content](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/2010\/09\/08\/129720165\/bp-report-blames-multiple-companies-for-gulf-spill#mainContent)\n- [Keyboard shortcuts for audio player](https:\/\/help.npr.org\/contact\/s\/article?name=what-are-the-keyboard-shortcuts-for-using-the-npr-org-audio-player)\n\n![]()\n\n****Loading****\n\n- **Hourly News**\n- **Listen Live**\n- **My Playlist**\n\n- Open Navigation Menu\n- [![NPR logo](https:\/\/media.npr.org\/chrome\/npr-logo-2026-animated.gif)](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/)\n- **![Station Logo](https:\/\/branding.npr.org\/logo\/service-logo\/logo-Color-Logo-s305.png)**\n  \n  ![WAMU 88.5 logo](https:\/\/branding.npr.org\/logo\/service-logo\/logo-Color-Logo-s305.png)\n  \n  WAMU 88.5\n  \n  - 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The company's findings are far from the final word on possible causes of the explosion that sank the Deepwater Horizon drill rig.**\n\n[**Special Series** Gulf Oil Spill: Containment And Clean Up](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/series\/126475680\/gulf-oil-spill-complete-coverage)\n\n# BP Report Blames Multiple Companies For Gulf Spill\nSeptember 8, 201011:20 AM ET\n\nBy\n\n[Scott Neuman](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/people\/131724812\/scott-neuman)\n\n![](https:\/\/media.npr.org\/assets\/news\/2010\/09\/08\/oil_wide-84d4c11597d4753786bc16b693c4f0f9c2b21f6b.jpg?s=1100&c=50&f=jpeg)\n\nEnlarge this image\n\nA key piece of evidence in the Deepwater Horizon investigation — the blowout preventer — was raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The failed mechanism, along with the well cap, was put on a vessel in the Gulf.  **Petty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue\/U.S. Coast Guard\/Getty Images**  ****hide caption****\n\n****toggle caption****\n\nPetty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue\/U.S. Coast Guard\/Getty Images\n\n![]()\n\nA key piece of evidence in the Deepwater Horizon investigation — the blowout preventer — was raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The failed mechanism, along with the well cap, was put on a vessel in the Gulf.\n\nPetty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue\/U.S. Coast Guard\/Getty Images\n\nA new BP report concludes that \"multiple companies and work teams\" are to blame for the Gulf of Mexico rig explosion and the largest oil spill in U.S. history, including the rig's owner and a company working on the well shortly before the blast.\n\n### What Happened In The Gulf?\n[Read BP's Full Report](http:\/\/www.bp.com\/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9034902&contentId=7064891)\n\n#### Business\n## NPR's Richard Harris Reports On The BP Investigation\n#### BP Report Shares Blame For Rig Explosion\n******Listen****· 4:11******\n\n4-Minute Listen\n\n****Playlist****\n\n[**Transcript**](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/transcripts\/129730991)\n\n**Toggle more options**\n\n- [**Download**](https:\/\/ondemand.npr.org\/anon.npr-mp3\/npr\/atc\/2010\/09\/20100908_atc_01.mp3?d=251&e=129730991&t=progseg&seg=1&p=2&sc=siteplayer&aw_0_1st.playerid=siteplayer)\n- ****Embed****\n  **Embed**\n  \n  **`<iframe src=\"https:\/\/www.npr.org\/player\/embed\/129730991\/129730980\" width=\"100%\" height=\"290\" frameborder=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" title=\"NPR embedded audio player\">`**\n- [**Transcript**](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/transcripts\/129730991)\n\n#### Around the Nation\n## Reaction: More Finger-Pointing Than Internal Scrutiny\n#### BP Report An Exercise In Finger-Pointing\n******Listen****· 2:58******\n\n2-Minute Listen\n\n****Playlist****\n\n[**Transcript**](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/transcripts\/129730995)\n\n**Toggle more options**\n\n- [**Download**](https:\/\/ondemand.npr.org\/anon.npr-mp3\/npr\/atc\/2010\/09\/20100908_atc_02.mp3?d=178&e=129730995&t=progseg&seg=2&p=2&sc=siteplayer&aw_0_1st.playerid=siteplayer)\n- ****Embed****\n  **Embed**\n  \n  **`<iframe src=\"https:\/\/www.npr.org\/player\/embed\/129730995\/129730981\" width=\"100%\" height=\"290\" frameborder=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" title=\"NPR embedded audio player\">`**\n- [**Transcript**](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/transcripts\/129730995)\n\nIn the 193-page internal report posted Wednesday on BP's website, the British oil giant says the April disaster was caused by \"a sequence of failures involving a number of different parties.\"\n\n\"It is evident that a series of complex events, rather than a single mistake or failure, led to the tragedy. Multiple parties, including BP, Halliburton and Transocean, were involved,\" outgoing CEO Tony Hayward said in the report.\n\nThe accident killed 11 workers aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig and spewed more than 200 million gallons of oil from the undersea well over the next three months.\n\nSponsor Message\n\nBP's findings aren't the final word on what went wrong, as several divisions of the U.S. government, including the Justice Department, Coast Guard and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, are also investigating. And a key piece of evidence -- the failed blowout preventer -- was only raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined.\n\nThe investigation report was generated by a BP team led by Mark Bly, BP's head of safety and operations. At a Wednesday briefing in Washington, Bly said eight separate failures were uncovered that led to the disaster.\n\nBly also said that while the company's report was clinical and fact-based, the investigative team had \"a very strong emotional feeling about the accident.\"\n\n### Eight Key Findings\n\\-- There were weaknesses in cement design and testing, quality assurance and risk assessment for the Deepwater Horizon's well.\n\n\\-- Problems with a device called the shoe track at the bottom of the well allowed oil and gas to enter.\n\n\\-- The Transocean rig crew and BP well site leaders wrongly concluded that a an integrity test of the well was successful.\n\n\\-- Over a critical 40-minute period, the rig crew failed to realize that oil and gas were coming up the well.\n\n\\-- Fluids coming up through the well should have been diverted overboard to relieve pressure while the crew addressed the problems.\n\n\\-- There were design flaws in the \"mud gas separator,\" which should have diverted high-pressure oil and gas coming up the well.\n\n\\-- The rig's heating, ventilation and air conditioning system probably diverted a gas-rich mixture from the well into the engine rooms, causing at least one engine to race and spark -- the probable source of the explosion.\n\n\\-- The final line of defense, the blowout preventer, failed.\n\nIn public hearings, BP has already tried to shift some of the blame to rig owner Transocean and contractor Halliburton. BP was leasing the rig from Transocean and owned the well that blew out.\n\nHayward singled out Halliburton for criticism in the report, pointing to that company's \"bad cement job\" in lining the well bore. But he was careful to defend the basic design of the well, key aspects of which were dictated by BP.\n\nBP admitted in the report that its engineers misinterpreted a negative-pressure test meant to determine well integrity after the cementing work. The company also blamed Transocean workers for failing to spot problems and take necessary action.\n\nSponsor Message\n\n\"The Transocean rig crew and BP well site leaders reached the incorrect view that the test was successful and that well integrity had been established,\" the report said. It added: \"The Transocean rig crew failed to recognize and act on the influx of hydrocarbons into the well until the hydrocarbons were in the riser and rapidly flowing to the surface.\"\n\nA Transocean lawyer said the company had no immediate comment on the report.\n\nNPR Science Correspondent Richard Harris said the bottom line in the report is that many things caused the accident \"but it all started with bad cement.\"\n\nHalliburton's attempt to pump cement into the bottom of the well to create a solid seal to keep oil and gas from coming up the well \"turned out to be a difficult and complicated cement job, and it didn't go right,\" Harris said. The test to see if the cement was holding was misinterpreted by engineers.\n\n\"If they'd have interpreted the results of those tests correctly, they would have realized that they had a problem\" and probably would have been able to avoid the disaster, Harris said.\n\nAlthough BP said it \"did not evaluate evidence against legal standards,\" in the report, diluting its role in the disaster was likely part of a legal strategy by BP, Harris said.\n\n\"Basically, what BP is trying to do is come up with both a legal and a \\[public relations\\] explanation,\" he told *Morning Edition.*\n\nBP faces hundreds of lawsuits and potentially billions of dollars in liabilities.\n\n\"A lot depends on whether \\[BP\\] was grossly negligent or whether this was a whole series of accidents,\" he said.\n\nMembers of Congress, industry experts and workers who survived the rig explosion have accused BP's engineers of cutting corners to save time and money on a project that was 43 days and more than \\$20 million behind schedule at the time of the blast.\n\nSponsor Message\n\nThe blowout preventer, which was supposed to be a fail-safe mechanism, was still en route to a NASA facility in New Orleans, where it will be analyzed by government investigators.\n\nWhat is known is that the blowout preventer didn't seal the well pipe at the sea bottom after an eruption of methane gas triggered the explosion.\n\nIn the report, BP acknowledged that the failure of the preventer was \"probably because critical components were not working.\" The report also found signs of \"potential weaknesses in the testing regime and maintenance management system\" for the blowout preventer.\n\n- **Facebook**\n- **Flipboard**\n- **Email**\n\n###### Read & Listen\n- [Home](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/)\n- [News](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/sections\/news\/)\n- [Culture](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/sections\/culture\/)\n- [Music](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/music\/)\n- [Podcasts & Shows](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/podcasts-and-shows)\n\n###### Connect\n- [Newsletters](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/newsletters\/)\n- [Facebook](https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/NPR\/)\n- [Instagram](https:\/\/www.instagram.com\/npr\/)\n- [Press](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/series\/750003\/press-room\/)\n- [Public Editor](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/sections\/publiceditor\/)\n- [Corrections](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/corrections\/)\n- [Transcripts](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/transcripts\/)\n- [Contact & Help](https:\/\/help.npr.org\/contact\/s\/)\n\n###### About NPR\n- [Overview](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/about\/)\n- [Diversity](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/diversity\/)\n- [NPR Network](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/network\/)\n- [Accessibility](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/about-npr\/1136563345\/accessibility)\n- [Ethics](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/ethics\/)\n- [Finances](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/about-npr\/178660742\/public-radio-finances)\n\n###### Get Involved\n- [Support Public Radio](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/support\/)\n- [Sponsor NPR](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/about-npr\/186948703\/corporate-sponsorship)\n- [NPR Careers](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/careers\/)\n- [NPR Shop](https:\/\/shopnpr.org\/)\n- [NPR Extra](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/sections\/npr-extra\/)\n\n- [Terms of Use](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/about-npr\/179876898\/terms-of-use)\n- [Privacy](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/about-npr\/179878450\/privacy-policy)\n- [Your Privacy Choices](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/about-npr\/179878450\/privacy-policy#yourchoices)\n- [Text Only](https:\/\/text.npr.org\/)\n- © 2026 npr\n\nSponsor Message\n\nSponsor Message\n\n[Become an NPR sponsor](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/about-npr\/186948703\/corporate-sponsorship)\n\n![NPR Plus logo](https:\/\/prod-eks-static-assets.npr.org\/chrome_svg\/npr-plus\/npr-plus-combo-logo.svg)\n\n##### Exclusive benefits\n\n###### Give a little. Get a lot.\nSupport mission-driven journalism while getting something great in return. Enjoy bonus content, early access and sponsor-free listening from your favorite NPR podcasts.\n\n[Get NPR+](https:\/\/plus.npr.org\/?utm_medium=nprweb&source=mvpcta)\n\nAlready have NPR+?[Sign In](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/2010\/09\/08\/129720165\/bp-report-blames-multiple-companies-for-gulf-spill)\n\nClose modal\n\nBy clicking “Accept All Cookies” or continuing, you agree to the use of cookies, similar tracking and storage technologies, and information about your device to enhance your viewing, listening and user experience, personalize content, personalize messages from NPR’s sponsors, provide social media features, and analyze NPR’s traffic. This information is shared with social media, sponsorship, analytics, and other vendors or service providers. 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Note that if you disable or delete cookies, you may lose access to certain features of the NPR Services.\n\n**User ID:**  026fcbaa-d556-426f-9cbf-a902c1d655e0\n\n*This User ID will be used as a unique identifier while storing and accessing your preferences for future.*\n\n**Timestamp:**  --\n\nAllow All\n\n### Manage Consent Preferences\n#### Strictly Necessary or Essential Cookies\nAlways Active\n\nThese cookies are essential to provide you with services available through the NPR Services and to enable you to use some of their features. For example, these cookies allow NPR to remember your registration information while you are logged in. Local station customization, the NPR Shop, and other interactive features also use cookies. 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We use this information to help operate the NPR Services more efficiently, to gather broad demographic information and to monitor the level of activity on the NPR Services.\n\n#### Functional Cookies\nFunctional Cookies\n\nThese cookies allow our Services to remember choices you make when you use them, such as remembering your Member station preferences and remembering your account details. The purpose of these cookies is to provide you with a more personal experience and to prevent you from having to re-enter your preferences every time you visit the NPR Services.\n\n#### Targeting and Sponsor Cookies\nTargeting and Sponsor Cookies\n\nThese cookies track your browsing habits or other information, such as location, to enable us to show sponsorship credits which are more likely to be of interest to you. These cookies use information about your browsing history to group you with other users who have similar interests. Based on that information, and with our permission, we and our sponsors can place cookies to enable us or our sponsors to show sponsorship credits and other messages that we think will be relevant to your interests while you are using third-party services.\n\n### Cookie List\nClear\n\n- checkbox label\n  \n  label\n\nApply\n\nCancel\n\nConsent Leg.Interest\n\ncheckbox label\n\nlabel\n\ncheckbox label\n\nlabel\n\ncheckbox label\n\nlabel\n\nReject All\n\nConfirm My Choices\n\n[![Powered by Onetrust](https:\/\/cdn.cookielaw.org\/logos\/static\/powered_by_logo.svg)](https:\/\/www.onetrust.com\/products\/cookie-consent\/)","attrs_readable_markdown":"![](https:\/\/media.npr.org\/assets\/news\/2010\/09\/08\/oil_wide-84d4c11597d4753786bc16b693c4f0f9c2b21f6b.jpg?s=1100&c=50&f=jpeg)\n\nA key piece of evidence in the Deepwater Horizon investigation — the blowout preventer — was raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The failed mechanism, along with the well cap, was put on a vessel in the Gulf.  **Petty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue\/U.S. Coast Guard\/Getty Images**  ****hide caption****\n\n****toggle caption****\n\nPetty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue\/U.S. Coast Guard\/Getty Images\n\n![](https:\/\/media.npr.org\/assets\/news\/2010\/09\/08\/oil-7776b8723ca808b6c5faf0cc96cf8dfdbbabcdd2.jpg?s=2600&c=100&f=jpeg)\n\nA key piece of evidence in the Deepwater Horizon investigation — the blowout preventer — was raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The failed mechanism, along with the well cap, was put on a vessel in the Gulf.\n\nPetty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue\/U.S. Coast Guard\/Getty Images\n\nA new BP report concludes that \"multiple companies and work teams\" are to blame for the Gulf of Mexico rig explosion and the largest oil spill in U.S. history, including the rig's owner and a company working on the well shortly before the blast.\n\nIn the 193-page internal report posted Wednesday on BP's website, the British oil giant says the April disaster was caused by \"a sequence of failures involving a number of different parties.\"\n\n\"It is evident that a series of complex events, rather than a single mistake or failure, led to the tragedy. Multiple parties, including BP, Halliburton and Transocean, were involved,\" outgoing CEO Tony Hayward said in the report.\n\nThe accident killed 11 workers aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig and spewed more than 200 million gallons of oil from the undersea well over the next three months.\n\nBP's findings aren't the final word on what went wrong, as several divisions of the U.S. government, including the Justice Department, Coast Guard and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, are also investigating. And a key piece of evidence -- the failed blowout preventer -- was only raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined.\n\nThe investigation report was generated by a BP team led by Mark Bly, BP's head of safety and operations. At a Wednesday briefing in Washington, Bly said eight separate failures were uncovered that led to the disaster.\n\nBly also said that while the company's report was clinical and fact-based, the investigative team had \"a very strong emotional feeling about the accident.\"\n\n\\-- There were weaknesses in cement design and testing, quality assurance and risk assessment for the Deepwater Horizon's well.\n\n\\-- Problems with a device called the shoe track at the bottom of the well allowed oil and gas to enter.\n\n\\-- The Transocean rig crew and BP well site leaders wrongly concluded that a an integrity test of the well was successful.\n\n\\-- Over a critical 40-minute period, the rig crew failed to realize that oil and gas were coming up the well.\n\n\\-- Fluids coming up through the well should have been diverted overboard to relieve pressure while the crew addressed the problems.\n\n\\-- There were design flaws in the \"mud gas separator,\" which should have diverted high-pressure oil and gas coming up the well.\n\n\\-- The rig's heating, ventilation and air conditioning system probably diverted a gas-rich mixture from the well into the engine rooms, causing at least one engine to race and spark -- the probable source of the explosion.\n\n\\-- The final line of defense, the blowout preventer, failed.\n\nIn public hearings, BP has already tried to shift some of the blame to rig owner Transocean and contractor Halliburton. BP was leasing the rig from Transocean and owned the well that blew out.\n\nHayward singled out Halliburton for criticism in the report, pointing to that company's \"bad cement job\" in lining the well bore. But he was careful to defend the basic design of the well, key aspects of which were dictated by BP.\n\nBP admitted in the report that its engineers misinterpreted a negative-pressure test meant to determine well integrity after the cementing work. The company also blamed Transocean workers for failing to spot problems and take necessary action.\n\n\"The Transocean rig crew and BP well site leaders reached the incorrect view that the test was successful and that well integrity had been established,\" the report said. It added: \"The Transocean rig crew failed to recognize and act on the influx of hydrocarbons into the well until the hydrocarbons were in the riser and rapidly flowing to the surface.\"\n\nA Transocean lawyer said the company had no immediate comment on the report.\n\nNPR Science Correspondent Richard Harris said the bottom line in the report is that many things caused the accident \"but it all started with bad cement.\"\n\nHalliburton's attempt to pump cement into the bottom of the well to create a solid seal to keep oil and gas from coming up the well \"turned out to be a difficult and complicated cement job, and it didn't go right,\" Harris said. The test to see if the cement was holding was misinterpreted by engineers.\n\n\"If they'd have interpreted the results of those tests correctly, they would have realized that they had a problem\" and probably would have been able to avoid the disaster, Harris said.\n\nAlthough BP said it \"did not evaluate evidence against legal standards,\" in the report, diluting its role in the disaster was likely part of a legal strategy by BP, Harris said.\n\n\"Basically, what BP is trying to do is come up with both a legal and a \\[public relations\\] explanation,\" he told *Morning Edition.*\n\nBP faces hundreds of lawsuits and potentially billions of dollars in liabilities.\n\n\"A lot depends on whether \\[BP\\] was grossly negligent or whether this was a whole series of accidents,\" he said.\n\nMembers of Congress, industry experts and workers who survived the rig explosion have accused BP's engineers of cutting corners to save time and money on a project that was 43 days and more than \\$20 million behind schedule at the time of the blast.\n\nThe blowout preventer, which was supposed to be a fail-safe mechanism, was still en route to a NASA facility in New Orleans, where it will be analyzed by government investigators.\n\nWhat is known is that the blowout preventer didn't seal the well pipe at the sea bottom after an eruption of methane gas triggered the explosion.\n\nIn the report, BP acknowledged that the failure of the preventer was \"probably because critical components were not working.\" The report also found signs of \"potential weaknesses in the testing regime and maintenance management system\" for the blowout preventer.","meta_canonical":null}

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URL	https://www.npr.org/2010/09/08/129720165/bp-report-blames-multiple-companies-for-gulf-spill
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Meta Title	BP Report Blames Multiple Companies For Gulf Spill : NPR
Meta Description	The oil giant's 193-page report says a sequence of failures led to the massive Gulf of Mexico spill that fouled waters and shorelines for months. The company's findings are far from the final word on possible causes of the explosion that sank the Deepwater Horizon drill rig.
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Boilerpipe Text	A key piece of evidence in the Deepwater Horizon investigation — the blowout preventer — was raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The failed mechanism, along with the well cap, was put on a vessel in the Gulf. Petty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue/U.S. Coast Guard/Getty Images hide caption toggle caption Petty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue/U.S. Coast Guard/Getty Images A key piece of evidence in the Deepwater Horizon investigation — the blowout preventer — was raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The failed mechanism, along with the well cap, was put on a vessel in the Gulf. Petty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue/U.S. Coast Guard/Getty Images A new BP report concludes that "multiple companies and work teams" are to blame for the Gulf of Mexico rig explosion and the largest oil spill in U.S. history, including the rig's owner and a company working on the well shortly before the blast. In the 193-page internal report posted Wednesday on BP's website, the British oil giant says the April disaster was caused by "a sequence of failures involving a number of different parties." "It is evident that a series of complex events, rather than a single mistake or failure, led to the tragedy. Multiple parties, including BP, Halliburton and Transocean, were involved," outgoing CEO Tony Hayward said in the report. The accident killed 11 workers aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig and spewed more than 200 million gallons of oil from the undersea well over the next three months. BP's findings aren't the final word on what went wrong, as several divisions of the U.S. government, including the Justice Department, Coast Guard and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, are also investigating. And a key piece of evidence -- the failed blowout preventer -- was only raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The investigation report was generated by a BP team led by Mark Bly, BP's head of safety and operations. At a Wednesday briefing in Washington, Bly said eight separate failures were uncovered that led to the disaster. Bly also said that while the company's report was clinical and fact-based, the investigative team had "a very strong emotional feeling about the accident." -- There were weaknesses in cement design and testing, quality assurance and risk assessment for the Deepwater Horizon's well. -- Problems with a device called the shoe track at the bottom of the well allowed oil and gas to enter. -- The Transocean rig crew and BP well site leaders wrongly concluded that a an integrity test of the well was successful. -- Over a critical 40-minute period, the rig crew failed to realize that oil and gas were coming up the well. -- Fluids coming up through the well should have been diverted overboard to relieve pressure while the crew addressed the problems. -- There were design flaws in the "mud gas separator," which should have diverted high-pressure oil and gas coming up the well. -- The rig's heating, ventilation and air conditioning system probably diverted a gas-rich mixture from the well into the engine rooms, causing at least one engine to race and spark -- the probable source of the explosion. -- The final line of defense, the blowout preventer, failed. In public hearings, BP has already tried to shift some of the blame to rig owner Transocean and contractor Halliburton. BP was leasing the rig from Transocean and owned the well that blew out. Hayward singled out Halliburton for criticism in the report, pointing to that company's "bad cement job" in lining the well bore. But he was careful to defend the basic design of the well, key aspects of which were dictated by BP. BP admitted in the report that its engineers misinterpreted a negative-pressure test meant to determine well integrity after the cementing work. The company also blamed Transocean workers for failing to spot problems and take necessary action. "The Transocean rig crew and BP well site leaders reached the incorrect view that the test was successful and that well integrity had been established," the report said. It added: "The Transocean rig crew failed to recognize and act on the influx of hydrocarbons into the well until the hydrocarbons were in the riser and rapidly flowing to the surface." A Transocean lawyer said the company had no immediate comment on the report. NPR Science Correspondent Richard Harris said the bottom line in the report is that many things caused the accident "but it all started with bad cement." Halliburton's attempt to pump cement into the bottom of the well to create a solid seal to keep oil and gas from coming up the well "turned out to be a difficult and complicated cement job, and it didn't go right," Harris said. The test to see if the cement was holding was misinterpreted by engineers. "If they'd have interpreted the results of those tests correctly, they would have realized that they had a problem" and probably would have been able to avoid the disaster, Harris said. Although BP said it "did not evaluate evidence against legal standards," in the report, diluting its role in the disaster was likely part of a legal strategy by BP, Harris said. "Basically, what BP is trying to do is come up with both a legal and a [public relations] explanation," he told Morning Edition. BP faces hundreds of lawsuits and potentially billions of dollars in liabilities. "A lot depends on whether [BP] was grossly negligent or whether this was a whole series of accidents," he said. Members of Congress, industry experts and workers who survived the rig explosion have accused BP's engineers of cutting corners to save time and money on a project that was 43 days and more than $20 million behind schedule at the time of the blast. The blowout preventer, which was supposed to be a fail-safe mechanism, was still en route to a NASA facility in New Orleans, where it will be analyzed by government investigators. What is known is that the blowout preventer didn't seal the well pipe at the sea bottom after an eruption of methane gas triggered the explosion. In the report, BP acknowledged that the failure of the preventer was "probably because critical components were not working." The report also found signs of "potential weaknesses in the testing regime and maintenance management system" for the blowout preventer.
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The company's findings are far from the final word on possible causes of the explosion that sank the Deepwater Horizon drill rig. [Special Series Gulf Oil Spill: Containment And Clean Up](https://www.npr.org/series/126475680/gulf-oil-spill-complete-coverage) # BP Report Blames Multiple Companies For Gulf Spill September 8, 201011:20 AM ET By [Scott Neuman](https://www.npr.org/people/131724812/scott-neuman) ![](https://media.npr.org/assets/news/2010/09/08/oil_wide-84d4c11597d4753786bc16b693c4f0f9c2b21f6b.jpg?s=1100&c=50&f=jpeg) Enlarge this image A key piece of evidence in the Deepwater Horizon investigation — the blowout preventer — was raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The failed mechanism, along with the well cap, was put on a vessel in the Gulf. Petty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue/U.S. Coast Guard/Getty Images hide caption toggle caption Petty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue/U.S. Coast Guard/Getty Images ![]() A key piece of evidence in the Deepwater Horizon investigation — the blowout preventer — was raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The failed mechanism, along with the well cap, was put on a vessel in the Gulf. Petty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue/U.S. Coast Guard/Getty Images A new BP report concludes that "multiple companies and work teams" are to blame for the Gulf of Mexico rig explosion and the largest oil spill in U.S. history, including the rig's owner and a company working on the well shortly before the blast. ### What Happened In The Gulf? [Read BP's Full Report](http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9034902&contentId=7064891) #### Business ## NPR's Richard Harris Reports On The BP Investigation #### BP Report Shares Blame For Rig Explosion **Listen· 4:11** 4-Minute Listen Playlist [Transcript](https://www.npr.org/transcripts/129730991) Toggle more options - [Download](https://ondemand.npr.org/anon.npr-mp3/npr/atc/2010/09/20100908_atc_01.mp3?d=251&e=129730991&t=progseg&seg=1&p=2&sc=siteplayer&aw_0_1st.playerid=siteplayer) - Embed Embed `<iframe src="https://www.npr.org/player/embed/129730991/129730980" width="100%" height="290" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" title="NPR embedded audio player">` - [Transcript](https://www.npr.org/transcripts/129730991) #### Around the Nation ## Reaction: More Finger-Pointing Than Internal Scrutiny #### BP Report An Exercise In Finger-Pointing **Listen· 2:58** 2-Minute Listen Playlist [Transcript](https://www.npr.org/transcripts/129730995) Toggle more options - [Download](https://ondemand.npr.org/anon.npr-mp3/npr/atc/2010/09/20100908_atc_02.mp3?d=178&e=129730995&t=progseg&seg=2&p=2&sc=siteplayer&aw_0_1st.playerid=siteplayer) - Embed Embed `<iframe src="https://www.npr.org/player/embed/129730995/129730981" width="100%" height="290" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" title="NPR embedded audio player">` - [Transcript*](https://www.npr.org/transcripts/129730995) In the 193-page internal report posted Wednesday on BP's website, the British oil giant says the April disaster was caused by "a sequence of failures involving a number of different parties." "It is evident that a series of complex events, rather than a single mistake or failure, led to the tragedy. Multiple parties, including BP, Halliburton and Transocean, were involved," outgoing CEO Tony Hayward said in the report. The accident killed 11 workers aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig and spewed more than 200 million gallons of oil from the undersea well over the next three months. Sponsor Message BP's findings aren't the final word on what went wrong, as several divisions of the U.S. government, including the Justice Department, Coast Guard and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, are also investigating. And a key piece of evidence -- the failed blowout preventer -- was only raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The investigation report was generated by a BP team led by Mark Bly, BP's head of safety and operations. At a Wednesday briefing in Washington, Bly said eight separate failures were uncovered that led to the disaster. Bly also said that while the company's report was clinical and fact-based, the investigative team had "a very strong emotional feeling about the accident." ### Eight Key Findings \-- There were weaknesses in cement design and testing, quality assurance and risk assessment for the Deepwater Horizon's well. \-- Problems with a device called the shoe track at the bottom of the well allowed oil and gas to enter. \-- The Transocean rig crew and BP well site leaders wrongly concluded that a an integrity test of the well was successful. \-- Over a critical 40-minute period, the rig crew failed to realize that oil and gas were coming up the well. \-- Fluids coming up through the well should have been diverted overboard to relieve pressure while the crew addressed the problems. \-- There were design flaws in the "mud gas separator," which should have diverted high-pressure oil and gas coming up the well. \-- The rig's heating, ventilation and air conditioning system probably diverted a gas-rich mixture from the well into the engine rooms, causing at least one engine to race and spark -- the probable source of the explosion. \-- The final line of defense, the blowout preventer, failed. In public hearings, BP has already tried to shift some of the blame to rig owner Transocean and contractor Halliburton. BP was leasing the rig from Transocean and owned the well that blew out. Hayward singled out Halliburton for criticism in the report, pointing to that company's "bad cement job" in lining the well bore. But he was careful to defend the basic design of the well, key aspects of which were dictated by BP. BP admitted in the report that its engineers misinterpreted a negative-pressure test meant to determine well integrity after the cementing work. The company also blamed Transocean workers for failing to spot problems and take necessary action. Sponsor Message "The Transocean rig crew and BP well site leaders reached the incorrect view that the test was successful and that well integrity had been established," the report said. It added: "The Transocean rig crew failed to recognize and act on the influx of hydrocarbons into the well until the hydrocarbons were in the riser and rapidly flowing to the surface." A Transocean lawyer said the company had no immediate comment on the report. NPR Science Correspondent Richard Harris said the bottom line in the report is that many things caused the accident "but it all started with bad cement." Halliburton's attempt to pump cement into the bottom of the well to create a solid seal to keep oil and gas from coming up the well "turned out to be a difficult and complicated cement job, and it didn't go right," Harris said. The test to see if the cement was holding was misinterpreted by engineers. "If they'd have interpreted the results of those tests correctly, they would have realized that they had a problem" and probably would have been able to avoid the disaster, Harris said. Although BP said it "did not evaluate evidence against legal standards," in the report, diluting its role in the disaster was likely part of a legal strategy by BP, Harris said. "Basically, what BP is trying to do is come up with both a legal and a \[public relations\] explanation," he told Morning Edition.* BP faces hundreds of lawsuits and potentially billions of dollars in liabilities. "A lot depends on whether \[BP\] was grossly negligent or whether this was a whole series of accidents," he said. Members of Congress, industry experts and workers who survived the rig explosion have accused BP's engineers of cutting corners to save time and money on a project that was 43 days and more than \$20 million behind schedule at the time of the blast. Sponsor Message The blowout preventer, which was supposed to be a fail-safe mechanism, was still en route to a NASA facility in New Orleans, where it will be analyzed by government investigators. What is known is that the blowout preventer didn't seal the well pipe at the sea bottom after an eruption of methane gas triggered the explosion. In the report, BP acknowledged that the failure of the preventer was "probably because critical components were not working." The report also found signs of "potential weaknesses in the testing regime and maintenance management system" for the blowout preventer. - Facebook - Flipboard - Email ###### Read & Listen - [Home](https://www.npr.org/) - [News](https://www.npr.org/sections/news/) - [Culture](https://www.npr.org/sections/culture/) - [Music](https://www.npr.org/music/) - [Podcasts & Shows](https://www.npr.org/podcasts-and-shows) ###### Connect - [Newsletters](https://www.npr.org/newsletters/) - [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/NPR/) - [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/npr/) - [Press](https://www.npr.org/series/750003/press-room/) - [Public Editor](https://www.npr.org/sections/publiceditor/) - [Corrections](https://www.npr.org/corrections/) - [Transcripts](https://www.npr.org/transcripts/) - [Contact & Help](https://help.npr.org/contact/s/) ###### About NPR - [Overview](https://www.npr.org/about/) - [Diversity](https://www.npr.org/diversity/) - [NPR Network](https://www.npr.org/network/) - [Accessibility](https://www.npr.org/about-npr/1136563345/accessibility) - [Ethics](https://www.npr.org/ethics/) - [Finances](https://www.npr.org/about-npr/178660742/public-radio-finances) ###### Get Involved - [Support Public Radio](https://www.npr.org/support/) - [Sponsor NPR](https://www.npr.org/about-npr/186948703/corporate-sponsorship) - [NPR Careers](https://www.npr.org/careers/) - [NPR Shop](https://shopnpr.org/) - [NPR Extra](https://www.npr.org/sections/npr-extra/) - [Terms of Use](https://www.npr.org/about-npr/179876898/terms-of-use) - [Privacy](https://www.npr.org/about-npr/179878450/privacy-policy) - [Your Privacy Choices](https://www.npr.org/about-npr/179878450/privacy-policy#yourchoices) - [Text Only](https://text.npr.org/) - © 2026 npr Sponsor Message Sponsor Message [Become an NPR sponsor](https://www.npr.org/about-npr/186948703/corporate-sponsorship) ![NPR Plus logo](https://prod-eks-static-assets.npr.org/chrome_svg/npr-plus/npr-plus-combo-logo.svg) ##### Exclusive benefits ###### Give a little. 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Readable Markdown	![](https://media.npr.org/assets/news/2010/09/08/oil_wide-84d4c11597d4753786bc16b693c4f0f9c2b21f6b.jpg?s=1100&c=50&f=jpeg) A key piece of evidence in the Deepwater Horizon investigation — the blowout preventer — was raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The failed mechanism, along with the well cap, was put on a vessel in the Gulf. Petty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue/U.S. Coast Guard/Getty Images **hide caption toggle caption** Petty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue/U.S. Coast Guard/Getty Images ![](https://media.npr.org/assets/news/2010/09/08/oil-7776b8723ca808b6c5faf0cc96cf8dfdbbabcdd2.jpg?s=2600&c=100&f=jpeg) A key piece of evidence in the Deepwater Horizon investigation — the blowout preventer — was raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The failed mechanism, along with the well cap, was put on a vessel in the Gulf. Petty Officer 1st Class Thomas M. Blue/U.S. Coast Guard/Getty Images A new BP report concludes that "multiple companies and work teams" are to blame for the Gulf of Mexico rig explosion and the largest oil spill in U.S. history, including the rig's owner and a company working on the well shortly before the blast. In the 193-page internal report posted Wednesday on BP's website, the British oil giant says the April disaster was caused by "a sequence of failures involving a number of different parties." "It is evident that a series of complex events, rather than a single mistake or failure, led to the tragedy. Multiple parties, including BP, Halliburton and Transocean, were involved," outgoing CEO Tony Hayward said in the report. The accident killed 11 workers aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig and spewed more than 200 million gallons of oil from the undersea well over the next three months. BP's findings aren't the final word on what went wrong, as several divisions of the U.S. government, including the Justice Department, Coast Guard and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, are also investigating. And a key piece of evidence -- the failed blowout preventer -- was only raised to the surface on Saturday and has yet to be closely examined. The investigation report was generated by a BP team led by Mark Bly, BP's head of safety and operations. At a Wednesday briefing in Washington, Bly said eight separate failures were uncovered that led to the disaster. Bly also said that while the company's report was clinical and fact-based, the investigative team had "a very strong emotional feeling about the accident." \-- There were weaknesses in cement design and testing, quality assurance and risk assessment for the Deepwater Horizon's well. \-- Problems with a device called the shoe track at the bottom of the well allowed oil and gas to enter. \-- The Transocean rig crew and BP well site leaders wrongly concluded that a an integrity test of the well was successful. \-- Over a critical 40-minute period, the rig crew failed to realize that oil and gas were coming up the well. \-- Fluids coming up through the well should have been diverted overboard to relieve pressure while the crew addressed the problems. \-- There were design flaws in the "mud gas separator," which should have diverted high-pressure oil and gas coming up the well. \-- The rig's heating, ventilation and air conditioning system probably diverted a gas-rich mixture from the well into the engine rooms, causing at least one engine to race and spark -- the probable source of the explosion. \-- The final line of defense, the blowout preventer, failed. In public hearings, BP has already tried to shift some of the blame to rig owner Transocean and contractor Halliburton. BP was leasing the rig from Transocean and owned the well that blew out. Hayward singled out Halliburton for criticism in the report, pointing to that company's "bad cement job" in lining the well bore. But he was careful to defend the basic design of the well, key aspects of which were dictated by BP. BP admitted in the report that its engineers misinterpreted a negative-pressure test meant to determine well integrity after the cementing work. The company also blamed Transocean workers for failing to spot problems and take necessary action. "The Transocean rig crew and BP well site leaders reached the incorrect view that the test was successful and that well integrity had been established," the report said. It added: "The Transocean rig crew failed to recognize and act on the influx of hydrocarbons into the well until the hydrocarbons were in the riser and rapidly flowing to the surface." A Transocean lawyer said the company had no immediate comment on the report. NPR Science Correspondent Richard Harris said the bottom line in the report is that many things caused the accident "but it all started with bad cement." Halliburton's attempt to pump cement into the bottom of the well to create a solid seal to keep oil and gas from coming up the well "turned out to be a difficult and complicated cement job, and it didn't go right," Harris said. The test to see if the cement was holding was misinterpreted by engineers. "If they'd have interpreted the results of those tests correctly, they would have realized that they had a problem" and probably would have been able to avoid the disaster, Harris said. Although BP said it "did not evaluate evidence against legal standards," in the report, diluting its role in the disaster was likely part of a legal strategy by BP, Harris said. "Basically, what BP is trying to do is come up with both a legal and a \[public relations\] explanation," he told Morning Edition. BP faces hundreds of lawsuits and potentially billions of dollars in liabilities. "A lot depends on whether \[BP\] was grossly negligent or whether this was a whole series of accidents," he said. Members of Congress, industry experts and workers who survived the rig explosion have accused BP's engineers of cutting corners to save time and money on a project that was 43 days and more than \$20 million behind schedule at the time of the blast. The blowout preventer, which was supposed to be a fail-safe mechanism, was still en route to a NASA facility in New Orleans, where it will be analyzed by government investigators. What is known is that the blowout preventer didn't seal the well pipe at the sea bottom after an eruption of methane gas triggered the explosion. In the report, BP acknowledged that the failure of the preventer was "probably because critical components were not working." The report also found signs of "potential weaknesses in the testing regime and maintenance management system" for the blowout preventer.
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