🕷️ Crawler Inspector

URL Lookup

Direct Parameter Lookup

Raw Queries and Responses

1. Shard Calculation

Query:

Response:

Calculated Shard: 48 (from laksa067)

2. Crawled Status Check

Query:

curl -X POST \
  'http://laksa048.int.ahrefs:8124/' \
  -H 'Content-Type: text/plain' \
  -H 'X-ClickHouse-Database: crawler3' \
  -H 'Authorization: Basic YXBpOg==' \
  -d 'SELECT getAhrefsURLFromUnparsed(src_unparsed) AS found_url, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(download_stamp), 0) AS crawl_time, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(props_url_first_seen), 0) AS first_indexed_time, download_http_code AS http_code, src_unparsed AS src_unparsed, src_root_hash AS src_root_hash, history_drop_reason AS history_drop_reason, meta_title AS meta_title, meta_descriptions AS meta_descriptions, attrs_boilerpipe_text AS attrs_boilerpipe_text, attrs_markdown AS attrs_markdown, attrs_readable_markdown AS attrs_readable_markdown, meta_canonical AS meta_canonical, ml_categories_json AS ml_categories_json, ml_types_json AS ml_types_json, ml_intent_types_json AS ml_intent_types_json, meta_language AS meta_language, attrs_author AS attrs_author, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(attrs_publish_time), 0) AS attrs_publish_time, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(attrs_original_publish_time), 0) AS attrs_original_publish_time, ifNull(attrs_is_republished, 0) AS attrs_is_republished, ifNull(attrs_nr_words, 0) AS attrs_nr_words, ifNull(attrs_boilerpipe_nr_words, 0) AS attrs_boilerpipe_nr_words, ifNull(body_ext_links_number, 0) AS body_ext_links_number, ifNull(body_int_links_number, 0) AS body_int_links_number, ifNull(meta_nofollow, 0) AS meta_nofollow, ifNull(meta_noarchive, 0) AS meta_noarchive, ifNull(props_was_rendered, 0) AS props_was_rendered, ifNull(src_redirect, \'\') AS src_redirect, ifNull(download_time_msec, 0) AS download_time_msec, ifNull(download_ttfb_msec, 0) AS download_ttfb_msec, ifNull(download_size, 0) AS download_size FROM crawler3.page_info_local FINAL PREWHERE (src_root_hash, src_unparsed) IN ((getAhrefsRootHashFromUnparsed(getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/conflict-creeps-caribbean-calm\')), getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/conflict-creeps-caribbean-calm\'))) FORMAT JSONEachRow'

Response:

{"found_url":"https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/conflict-creeps-caribbean-calm","crawl_time":1776262717,"first_indexed_time":1757653878,"http_code":200,"src_unparsed":"org,lowyinstitute!www,\/the-interpreter\/conflict-creeps-caribbean-calm s443","src_root_hash":"10565166561016978448","history_drop_reason":null,"meta_title":"Conflict creeps into Caribbean calm | Lowy Institute","meta_descriptions":["Small European territories fear the cost of proximity as tensions boil between Washington and Caracas."],"attrs_boilerpipe_text":"While global attention remains fixed on conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, a new danger zone is emerging in an unlikely location: the Caribbean. This typically peaceful region has become the setting for US President Donald Trump’s latest foreign policy gambit, which has already triggered a massive\nsurge\nof American military assets to the southern Caribbean – roughly 4,000 soldiers, seven warships, and a nuclear submarine.\nTensions spiked on 2 September, when Trump\nordered\na strike on a vessel near Venezuela that killed 11 people. Though unable to provide concrete evidence, the US President justified the attack by claiming those aboard were members of the Venezuelan drug cartel Tren de Aragua. The following day, Secretary of State Marco Rubio escalated further, warning that such attacks “\nwill happen again\n“. Venezuela has since said\nnone of those killed\nwere cartel members.\nOver recent months, Trump has dramatically intensified pressure on Venezuela. Last month, his administration designated President Nicolás Maduro as a terrorist under US law and\nplaced\na $50 million bounty on his head. This followed the Treasury Department’s July\ndecision\nto add Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles to its list of specially designated global terrorist organisations,\nalleging\n that the cartel is led by Maduro and other high-ranking officials. Maduro responded by vowing to\ndeploy\n4.5 million militia personnel to defend the country’s “seas, our skies and our lands” from any incursions.\nThe Trump administration shows no signs of backing down. Last week, Trump announced\nplans\nto deploy 10 F-35 fighter jets to Puerto Rico to bolster operations against drug cartels operating in the region. CNN\nreported\nunnamed sources last week claiming that strikes within Venezuelan territory remain a possibility.\nMehmet Yaren Bozgun\/Anadolu via Getty Images\nThis surge in violence has sparked alarm among Caribbean islands, particularly those closest to Venezuela. The Dutch island of Curaçao, situated just 65 kilometres from the Venezuelan coast, faces particular vulnerability. For more than a decade, the island has served as a primary\ndestination\nfor Venezuelan\nrefugees\nfleeing Maduro’s regime, straining local resources and creating significant maritime security challenges.\nWhile Curaçao’s government has\nurged\ncalm and emphasised the island’s neutral status, officials acknowledge the growing risk of being drawn into a US-Venezuela conflict. Under existing US-Netherlands\nagreements\n, American forces can\nuse\nCuraçao’s airport and airspace for drug trafficking surveillance – but only with unarmed aircraft. The Dutch Ministry of Defence has\nadmitted\nit lacks detailed information about current US operations, stating only that it is “monitoring the situation closely”.\nThe Caribbean’s small island nations and territories now find themselves uncomfortably positioned at the intersection of US-Venezuela hostilities and broader great power rivalry.\nDutch policymakers are increasingly\nwrestling\nwith stretched military resources as they attempt to fulfil NATO obligations in Ukraine while safeguarding national security and economic interests in faraway places like the Caribbean and the Indo-Pacific. Still, recognising the deteriorating security environment, the Netherlands\npledged\n€24 million (AU$42 million) in 2024 to strengthen Caribbean defences: €12 million for militia enhancement and another €12 million for air warning and defence systems, including portable anti-aircraft missiles.\nThe Hague’s attention has increasingly been pulled toward the Caribbean, even before Trump’s strike. Maritime security challenges have intensified not only due to Venezuelan refugees seeking asylum on Dutch Caribbean islands, but also following the\ndetention\n in June of a Dutch captain and his multinational crew by Venezuelan authorities on espionage charges. With no news of the captain in two months, mounting diplomatic tensions are making it increasingly difficult for the Netherlands to neglect the rapidly worsening security situation threatening its islands.\nThis is particularly the case due to the complex geopolitical dynamics facing the region. In reality, US motivations extend far beyond targeting drug cartels. Maduro’s regime enjoys backing from both\nBeijing\nand\nMoscow\n– two of America’s primary adversaries. For years,\nChina\n and\nRussia\n have sought to expand their influence in America’s backyard through oil deals and various kinds of economic projects. This directly challenges America’s position in the region, risking a loss of influence that could have a range of negative long-term repercussions for US interests.\nVenezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has a $50 million bounty on his head (Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela Press Office\/Anadolu via Getty Images)\nRussia’s Foreign Ministry quickly condemned Trump’s strike last week,\ndeclaring\nthat the “situation is threatening regional and global security”. While Beijing has yet to comment on the situation, earlier this year, China’s President Xi Jinping did\nexpress\nhis firm support “in safeguarding sovereignty, national dignity and social stability” in Venezuela.\nVenezuela has the potential to become fertile ground for great power competition, with potentially severe spillover effects for surrounding Caribbean islands. The situation grows more precarious given Europe’s concentration of military resources on Ukraine. Unlike their continental counterparts, Dutch, French and British Caribbean territories\nare not\ncovered by NATO security\nguarantees\nin the event of conflict, making the potential consequences of conflict in the region even more dire for these islands.\nWhile full-scale war in the Caribbean remains unlikely in the near term, the probability of increased tensions and regional instability – driven by Trump’s aggressive posture, Maduro’s fixation on remaining in power, and Europe’s distracted focus – appears increasingly high. The Caribbean’s small island nations and territories now find themselves uncomfortably positioned at the intersection of US-Venezuela hostilities and broader great power rivalry, with limited ability to influence events that could fundamentally reshape their region’s security landscape.","attrs_markdown":"[Skip to main content](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/conflict-creeps-caribbean-calm#main-content)\n\n[The Interpreter](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter)\n\n## Interpreter - Menu Links\n- [Articles](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/archive)\n- [Debates](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/debate)\n- [Contributors](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/contributors)\n- [About](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/about-interpreter)\n\nPublished daily by the  [**Lowy Institute**](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/)\n\nPublished daily by the  [**Lowy Institute**](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/)\n\n# Conflict creeps into Caribbean calm\n[Gabriela Bernal](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/contributors\/articles\/gabriela-bernal)\n\nSmall European territories fear the cost of proximity  \nas tensions boil between Washington and Caracas.\n\n![Screen shots taken from a video released by US President Donald Trump on social media said to show a strike on a vessel in the Caribbean](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/interpreter_article_image\/public\/2025-09\/Still%20shots.jpg?itok=7vab3EcD)\n\nScreen shots taken from a video released by US President Donald Trump on social media said to show a strike on a vessel in the Caribbean\n\nPublished 12 Sep 2025\n\n- [The Americas](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/archive?issue=200)\n\n[Follow @gabrielabbernal](https:\/\/twitter.com\/@gabrielabbernal)\n***\nListen to this article\n\nWhile global attention remains fixed on conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, a new danger zone is emerging in an unlikely location: the Caribbean. This typically peaceful region has become the setting for US President Donald Trump’s latest foreign policy gambit, which has already triggered a massive [surge](https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2025\/08\/15\/politics\/us-military-deploying-caribbean-latin-america-cartel-mission) of American military assets to the southern Caribbean – roughly 4,000 soldiers, seven warships, and a nuclear submarine.\n\nTensions spiked on 2 September, when Trump [ordered](https:\/\/truthsocial.com\/@realDonaldTrump\/posts\/115136798909755892) a strike on a vessel near Venezuela that killed 11 people. Though unable to provide concrete evidence, the US President justified the attack by claiming those aboard were members of the Venezuelan drug cartel Tren de Aragua. The following day, Secretary of State Marco Rubio escalated further, warning that such attacks “[will happen again](https:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/story\/news\/politics\/2025\/09\/03\/hegseth-rubio-promise-more-military-strikes-on-drug-targets\/85963709007\/)“. Venezuela has since said [none of those killed](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/americas\/people-killed-us-boat-strike-were-not-tren-de-aragua-venezuela-minister-says-2025-09-11\/) were cartel members.\n\nOver recent months, Trump has dramatically intensified pressure on Venezuela. Last month, his administration designated President Nicolás Maduro as a terrorist under US law and [placed](https:\/\/www.state.gov\/nicolas-maduro-moros) a \\$50 million bounty on his head. This followed the Treasury Department’s July [decision](https:\/\/ofac.treasury.gov\/recent-actions\/20250725) to add Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles to its list of specially designated global terrorist organisations, [alleging](https:\/\/home.treasury.gov\/news\/press-releases\/sb0207) that the cartel is led by Maduro and other high-ranking officials. Maduro responded by vowing to [deploy](https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2025\/08\/19\/americas\/venezuela-maduro-militia-us-military-deployment-intl-latam) 4.5 million militia personnel to defend the country’s “seas, our skies and our lands” from any incursions.\n\nThe Trump administration shows no signs of backing down. Last week, Trump announced [plans](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/americas\/trump-plays-down-possible-regime-change-venezuela-us-deploys-stealth-fighter-2025-09-05\/) to deploy 10 F-35 fighter jets to Puerto Rico to bolster operations against drug cartels operating in the region. CNN [reported](https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2025\/09\/05\/politics\/trump-weighs-strikes-targeting-cartels-inside-venezuela) unnamed sources last week claiming that strikes within Venezuelan territory remain a possibility.\n\n![An infographic titled \"US warships deployed off the coast of Venezuela\" with a map illustration (Mehmet Yaren Bozgun\/Anadolu via Getty Images)](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2025-09\/GettyImages-2232760649%20v2.jpg)\n\nMehmet Yaren Bozgun\/Anadolu via Getty Images\n\nThis surge in violence has sparked alarm among Caribbean islands, particularly those closest to Venezuela. The Dutch island of Curaçao, situated just 65 kilometres from the Venezuelan coast, faces particular vulnerability. For more than a decade, the island has served as a primary [destination](https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/forgotten-frontlines-aruba-curacao-and-venezuelan-displacement-crisis) for Venezuelan [refugees](https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2025-02\/FactSheet_2024_MCOPanama_%20Aruba%20and%20Curacao%20October-December%2024.pdf) fleeing Maduro’s regime, straining local resources and creating significant maritime security challenges.\n\nWhile Curaçao’s government has [urged](https:\/\/caribischnetwerk.ntr.nl\/2025\/08\/26\/curacao-wordt-meegesleept-in-conflict-tussen-de-verenigde-staten-en-venezuela\/) calm and emphasised the island’s neutral status, officials acknowledge the growing risk of being drawn into a US-Venezuela conflict. Under existing US-Netherlands [agreements](https:\/\/wetten.overheid.nl\/BWBV0001980\/2001-11-02), American forces can [use](https:\/\/www.tweedekamer.nl\/kamerstukken\/kamervragen\/detail?id=2025Z15280&did=2025D35983) Curaçao’s airport and airspace for drug trafficking surveillance – but only with unarmed aircraft. The Dutch Ministry of Defence has [admitted](https:\/\/caribischnetwerk.ntr.nl\/2025\/09\/06\/vs-aanval-op-venezolaanse-boot-vergroot-spanningen-op-de-caribische-eilanden\/) it lacks detailed information about current US operations, stating only that it is “monitoring the situation closely”.\n\nThe Caribbean’s small island nations and territories now find themselves uncomfortably positioned at the intersection of US-Venezuela hostilities and broader great power rivalry.\n\nDutch policymakers are increasingly [wrestling](https:\/\/www.tweedekamer.nl\/kamerstukken\/plenaire_verslagen\/detail\/2024-2025\/32) with stretched military resources as they attempt to fulfil NATO obligations in Ukraine while safeguarding national security and economic interests in faraway places like the Caribbean and the Indo-Pacific. Still, recognising the deteriorating security environment, the Netherlands [pledged](https:\/\/dossierkoninkrijksrelaties.nl\/2024\/12\/06\/kamer-defensie-mag-caribisch-deel-koninkrijk-niet-vergeten\/) €24 million (AU\\$42 million) in 2024 to strengthen Caribbean defences: €12 million for militia enhancement and another €12 million for air warning and defence systems, including portable anti-aircraft missiles.\n\nThe Hague’s attention has increasingly been pulled toward the Caribbean, even before Trump’s strike. Maritime security challenges have intensified not only due to Venezuelan refugees seeking asylum on Dutch Caribbean islands, but also following the [detention](https:\/\/www.telegraaf.nl\/binnenland\/nederlandse-kapitein-pim-de-rhoodes-en-bemanning-van-schatzoekschip-vermist-na-onderschepping-door-venezolaanse-marine\/78777114.html) in June of a Dutch captain and his multinational crew by Venezuelan authorities on espionage charges. With no news of the captain in two months, mounting diplomatic tensions are making it increasingly difficult for the Netherlands to neglect the rapidly worsening security situation threatening its islands.\n\nThis is particularly the case due to the complex geopolitical dynamics facing the region. In reality, US motivations extend far beyond targeting drug cartels. Maduro’s regime enjoys backing from both [Beijing](https:\/\/www.fmprc.gov.cn\/eng\/xw\/zyxw\/202505\/t20250513_11619919.html) and [Moscow](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/putin-venezuelas-maduro-sign-strategic-partnership-pact-2025-05-07\/) – two of America’s primary adversaries. For years, [China](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri) and [Russia](https:\/\/pism.pl\/publications\/the-course-of-cooperation-between-russia-and-its-latin-american-partners) have sought to expand their influence in America’s backyard through oil deals and various kinds of economic projects. This directly challenges America’s position in the region, risking a loss of influence that could have a range of negative long-term repercussions for US interests.\n\n![Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro (Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela Press Office\/Anadolu via Getty Images)](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/sites\/default\/files\/inline-images\/GettyImages-2234181084.jpg)\n\nVenezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has a \\$50 million bounty on his head (Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela Press Office\/Anadolu via Getty Images)\n\nRussia’s Foreign Ministry quickly condemned Trump’s strike last week, [declaring](https:\/\/mid.ru\/en\/foreign_policy\/news\/2044875\/) that the “situation is threatening regional and global security”. While Beijing has yet to comment on the situation, earlier this year, China’s President Xi Jinping did [express](https:\/\/english.www.gov.cn\/news\/202505\/10\/content_WS681e8bd6c6d0868f4e8f269d.html) his firm support “in safeguarding sovereignty, national dignity and social stability” in Venezuela.\n\nVenezuela has the potential to become fertile ground for great power competition, with potentially severe spillover effects for surrounding Caribbean islands. The situation grows more precarious given Europe’s concentration of military resources on Ukraine. Unlike their continental counterparts, Dutch, French and British Caribbean territories [are not](https:\/\/www.tweedekamer.nl\/kamerstukken\/detail?id=2021D08579&did=2021D08579) covered by NATO security [guarantees](https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_110496.htm) in the event of conflict, making the potential consequences of conflict in the region even more dire for these islands.\n\nWhile full-scale war in the Caribbean remains unlikely in the near term, the probability of increased tensions and regional instability – driven by Trump’s aggressive posture, Maduro’s fixation on remaining in power, and Europe’s distracted focus – appears increasingly high. The Caribbean’s small island nations and territories now find themselves uncomfortably positioned at the intersection of US-Venezuela hostilities and broader great power rivalry, with limited ability to influence events that could fundamentally reshape their region’s security landscape.\n***\n#### Related Content\n[![Life in Havana during a national blackout across Cuba on 23 March 2026 as a US oil blockade bites (Yamil Lage\/AFP via Getty Images)](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/large\/public\/2026-03\/GettyImages-2267411731.jpg?itok=FFgKlwr3)](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/cuba-next)\n\n## [Is Cuba next?](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/cuba-next)\n\n***\nPrevious Article   \n [The resource potential in Pakistan that Trump hopes to tap into](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/resource-potential-pakistan-trump-hopes-tap)\n\nNext Article   \n [Ethiopia’s grand projects fail the human capital test](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/ethiopia-s-grand-projects-fail-human-capital-test)\n\n## Subscribe to The Interpreter\nGet the latest commentary and analysis  \non international events from experts at  \nthe Lowy Institute and around the world.\n\n***\nThe Interpreter features in-depth analysis & expert commentary on the latest international events, published daily by the [**Lowy Institute**](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/).\n\n© Copyright 2026  [**Lowy Institute**](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/)\n\n- [Debates](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/debate)\n- [Contributors](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/contributors)\n- [Articles](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/archive)\n- [About](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/about-interpreter)\n- [Terms of Use](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/terms-use-content-supply-terms)\n- [Log In](https:\/\/portal.lowyinstitute.org\/Account\/Login\/)\n- [My bookmarks](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/saved-items)","attrs_readable_markdown":"While global attention remains fixed on conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, a new danger zone is emerging in an unlikely location: the Caribbean. This typically peaceful region has become the setting for US President Donald Trump’s latest foreign policy gambit, which has already triggered a massive [surge](https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2025\/08\/15\/politics\/us-military-deploying-caribbean-latin-america-cartel-mission) of American military assets to the southern Caribbean – roughly 4,000 soldiers, seven warships, and a nuclear submarine.\n\nTensions spiked on 2 September, when Trump [ordered](https:\/\/truthsocial.com\/@realDonaldTrump\/posts\/115136798909755892) a strike on a vessel near Venezuela that killed 11 people. Though unable to provide concrete evidence, the US President justified the attack by claiming those aboard were members of the Venezuelan drug cartel Tren de Aragua. The following day, Secretary of State Marco Rubio escalated further, warning that such attacks “[will happen again](https:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/story\/news\/politics\/2025\/09\/03\/hegseth-rubio-promise-more-military-strikes-on-drug-targets\/85963709007\/)“. Venezuela has since said [none of those killed](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/americas\/people-killed-us-boat-strike-were-not-tren-de-aragua-venezuela-minister-says-2025-09-11\/) were cartel members.\n\nOver recent months, Trump has dramatically intensified pressure on Venezuela. Last month, his administration designated President Nicolás Maduro as a terrorist under US law and [placed](https:\/\/www.state.gov\/nicolas-maduro-moros) a \\$50 million bounty on his head. This followed the Treasury Department’s July [decision](https:\/\/ofac.treasury.gov\/recent-actions\/20250725) to add Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles to its list of specially designated global terrorist organisations, [alleging](https:\/\/home.treasury.gov\/news\/press-releases\/sb0207) that the cartel is led by Maduro and other high-ranking officials. Maduro responded by vowing to [deploy](https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2025\/08\/19\/americas\/venezuela-maduro-militia-us-military-deployment-intl-latam) 4.5 million militia personnel to defend the country’s “seas, our skies and our lands” from any incursions.\n\nThe Trump administration shows no signs of backing down. Last week, Trump announced [plans](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/americas\/trump-plays-down-possible-regime-change-venezuela-us-deploys-stealth-fighter-2025-09-05\/) to deploy 10 F-35 fighter jets to Puerto Rico to bolster operations against drug cartels operating in the region. CNN [reported](https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2025\/09\/05\/politics\/trump-weighs-strikes-targeting-cartels-inside-venezuela) unnamed sources last week claiming that strikes within Venezuelan territory remain a possibility.\n\n![An infographic titled \"US warships deployed off the coast of Venezuela\" with a map illustration (Mehmet Yaren Bozgun\/Anadolu via Getty Images)](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2025-09\/GettyImages-2232760649%20v2.jpg)\n\nMehmet Yaren Bozgun\/Anadolu via Getty Images\n\nThis surge in violence has sparked alarm among Caribbean islands, particularly those closest to Venezuela. The Dutch island of Curaçao, situated just 65 kilometres from the Venezuelan coast, faces particular vulnerability. For more than a decade, the island has served as a primary [destination](https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/forgotten-frontlines-aruba-curacao-and-venezuelan-displacement-crisis) for Venezuelan [refugees](https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2025-02\/FactSheet_2024_MCOPanama_%20Aruba%20and%20Curacao%20October-December%2024.pdf) fleeing Maduro’s regime, straining local resources and creating significant maritime security challenges.\n\nWhile Curaçao’s government has [urged](https:\/\/caribischnetwerk.ntr.nl\/2025\/08\/26\/curacao-wordt-meegesleept-in-conflict-tussen-de-verenigde-staten-en-venezuela\/) calm and emphasised the island’s neutral status, officials acknowledge the growing risk of being drawn into a US-Venezuela conflict. Under existing US-Netherlands [agreements](https:\/\/wetten.overheid.nl\/BWBV0001980\/2001-11-02), American forces can [use](https:\/\/www.tweedekamer.nl\/kamerstukken\/kamervragen\/detail?id=2025Z15280&did=2025D35983) Curaçao’s airport and airspace for drug trafficking surveillance – but only with unarmed aircraft. The Dutch Ministry of Defence has [admitted](https:\/\/caribischnetwerk.ntr.nl\/2025\/09\/06\/vs-aanval-op-venezolaanse-boot-vergroot-spanningen-op-de-caribische-eilanden\/) it lacks detailed information about current US operations, stating only that it is “monitoring the situation closely”.\n\nThe Caribbean’s small island nations and territories now find themselves uncomfortably positioned at the intersection of US-Venezuela hostilities and broader great power rivalry.\n\nDutch policymakers are increasingly [wrestling](https:\/\/www.tweedekamer.nl\/kamerstukken\/plenaire_verslagen\/detail\/2024-2025\/32) with stretched military resources as they attempt to fulfil NATO obligations in Ukraine while safeguarding national security and economic interests in faraway places like the Caribbean and the Indo-Pacific. Still, recognising the deteriorating security environment, the Netherlands [pledged](https:\/\/dossierkoninkrijksrelaties.nl\/2024\/12\/06\/kamer-defensie-mag-caribisch-deel-koninkrijk-niet-vergeten\/) €24 million (AU\\$42 million) in 2024 to strengthen Caribbean defences: €12 million for militia enhancement and another €12 million for air warning and defence systems, including portable anti-aircraft missiles.\n\nThe Hague’s attention has increasingly been pulled toward the Caribbean, even before Trump’s strike. Maritime security challenges have intensified not only due to Venezuelan refugees seeking asylum on Dutch Caribbean islands, but also following the [detention](https:\/\/www.telegraaf.nl\/binnenland\/nederlandse-kapitein-pim-de-rhoodes-en-bemanning-van-schatzoekschip-vermist-na-onderschepping-door-venezolaanse-marine\/78777114.html) in June of a Dutch captain and his multinational crew by Venezuelan authorities on espionage charges. With no news of the captain in two months, mounting diplomatic tensions are making it increasingly difficult for the Netherlands to neglect the rapidly worsening security situation threatening its islands.\n\nThis is particularly the case due to the complex geopolitical dynamics facing the region. In reality, US motivations extend far beyond targeting drug cartels. Maduro’s regime enjoys backing from both [Beijing](https:\/\/www.fmprc.gov.cn\/eng\/xw\/zyxw\/202505\/t20250513_11619919.html) and [Moscow](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/putin-venezuelas-maduro-sign-strategic-partnership-pact-2025-05-07\/) – two of America’s primary adversaries. For years, [China](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri) and [Russia](https:\/\/pism.pl\/publications\/the-course-of-cooperation-between-russia-and-its-latin-american-partners) have sought to expand their influence in America’s backyard through oil deals and various kinds of economic projects. This directly challenges America’s position in the region, risking a loss of influence that could have a range of negative long-term repercussions for US interests.\n\n![Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro (Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela Press Office\/Anadolu via Getty Images)](https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/sites\/default\/files\/inline-images\/GettyImages-2234181084.jpg)\n\nVenezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has a \\$50 million bounty on his head (Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela Press Office\/Anadolu via Getty Images)\n\nRussia’s Foreign Ministry quickly condemned Trump’s strike last week, [declaring](https:\/\/mid.ru\/en\/foreign_policy\/news\/2044875\/) that the “situation is threatening regional and global security”. While Beijing has yet to comment on the situation, earlier this year, China’s President Xi Jinping did [express](https:\/\/english.www.gov.cn\/news\/202505\/10\/content_WS681e8bd6c6d0868f4e8f269d.html) his firm support “in safeguarding sovereignty, national dignity and social stability” in Venezuela.\n\nVenezuela has the potential to become fertile ground for great power competition, with potentially severe spillover effects for surrounding Caribbean islands. The situation grows more precarious given Europe’s concentration of military resources on Ukraine. Unlike their continental counterparts, Dutch, French and British Caribbean territories [are not](https:\/\/www.tweedekamer.nl\/kamerstukken\/detail?id=2021D08579&did=2021D08579) covered by NATO security [guarantees](https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_110496.htm) in the event of conflict, making the potential consequences of conflict in the region even more dire for these islands.\n\nWhile full-scale war in the Caribbean remains unlikely in the near term, the probability of increased tensions and regional instability – driven by Trump’s aggressive posture, Maduro’s fixation on remaining in power, and Europe’s distracted focus – appears increasingly high. 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Conflict creeps into Caribbean calm | Lowy Institute

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Small European territories fear the cost of proximity as tensions boil between Washington and Caracas.

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[Skip to main content](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/conflict-creeps-caribbean-calm#main-content) [The Interpreter](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter) ## Interpreter - Menu Links - [Articles](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/archive) - [Debates](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debate) - [Contributors](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/contributors) - [About](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/about-interpreter) Published daily by the [**Lowy Institute**](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/) Published daily by the [**Lowy Institute**](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/) # Conflict creeps into Caribbean calm [Gabriela Bernal](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/contributors/articles/gabriela-bernal) Small European territories fear the cost of proximity as tensions boil between Washington and Caracas. ![Screen shots taken from a video released by US President Donald Trump on social media said to show a strike on a vessel in the Caribbean](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/styles/interpreter_article_image/public/2025-09/Still%20shots.jpg?itok=7vab3EcD) Screen shots taken from a video released by US President Donald Trump on social media said to show a strike on a vessel in the Caribbean Published 12 Sep 2025 - [The Americas](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/archive?issue=200) [Follow @gabrielabbernal](https://twitter.com/@gabrielabbernal) *** Listen to this article While global attention remains fixed on conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, a new danger zone is emerging in an unlikely location: the Caribbean. This typically peaceful region has become the setting for US President Donald Trump’s latest foreign policy gambit, which has already triggered a massive [surge](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/15/politics/us-military-deploying-caribbean-latin-america-cartel-mission) of American military assets to the southern Caribbean – roughly 4,000 soldiers, seven warships, and a nuclear submarine. Tensions spiked on 2 September, when Trump [ordered](https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115136798909755892) a strike on a vessel near Venezuela that killed 11 people. Though unable to provide concrete evidence, the US President justified the attack by claiming those aboard were members of the Venezuelan drug cartel Tren de Aragua. The following day, Secretary of State Marco Rubio escalated further, warning that such attacks “[will happen again](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2025/09/03/hegseth-rubio-promise-more-military-strikes-on-drug-targets/85963709007/)“. Venezuela has since said [none of those killed](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/people-killed-us-boat-strike-were-not-tren-de-aragua-venezuela-minister-says-2025-09-11/) were cartel members. Over recent months, Trump has dramatically intensified pressure on Venezuela. Last month, his administration designated President Nicolás Maduro as a terrorist under US law and [placed](https://www.state.gov/nicolas-maduro-moros) a \$50 million bounty on his head. This followed the Treasury Department’s July [decision](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250725) to add Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles to its list of specially designated global terrorist organisations, [alleging](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0207) that the cartel is led by Maduro and other high-ranking officials. Maduro responded by vowing to [deploy](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/19/americas/venezuela-maduro-militia-us-military-deployment-intl-latam) 4.5 million militia personnel to defend the country’s “seas, our skies and our lands” from any incursions. The Trump administration shows no signs of backing down. Last week, Trump announced [plans](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trump-plays-down-possible-regime-change-venezuela-us-deploys-stealth-fighter-2025-09-05/) to deploy 10 F-35 fighter jets to Puerto Rico to bolster operations against drug cartels operating in the region. CNN [reported](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/05/politics/trump-weighs-strikes-targeting-cartels-inside-venezuela) unnamed sources last week claiming that strikes within Venezuelan territory remain a possibility. ![An infographic titled "US warships deployed off the coast of Venezuela" with a map illustration (Mehmet Yaren Bozgun/Anadolu via Getty Images)](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/GettyImages-2232760649%20v2.jpg) Mehmet Yaren Bozgun/Anadolu via Getty Images This surge in violence has sparked alarm among Caribbean islands, particularly those closest to Venezuela. The Dutch island of Curaçao, situated just 65 kilometres from the Venezuelan coast, faces particular vulnerability. For more than a decade, the island has served as a primary [destination](https://www.csis.org/analysis/forgotten-frontlines-aruba-curacao-and-venezuelan-displacement-crisis) for Venezuelan [refugees](https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/FactSheet_2024_MCOPanama_%20Aruba%20and%20Curacao%20October-December%2024.pdf) fleeing Maduro’s regime, straining local resources and creating significant maritime security challenges. While Curaçao’s government has [urged](https://caribischnetwerk.ntr.nl/2025/08/26/curacao-wordt-meegesleept-in-conflict-tussen-de-verenigde-staten-en-venezuela/) calm and emphasised the island’s neutral status, officials acknowledge the growing risk of being drawn into a US-Venezuela conflict. Under existing US-Netherlands [agreements](https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0001980/2001-11-02), American forces can [use](https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2025Z15280&did=2025D35983) Curaçao’s airport and airspace for drug trafficking surveillance – but only with unarmed aircraft. The Dutch Ministry of Defence has [admitted](https://caribischnetwerk.ntr.nl/2025/09/06/vs-aanval-op-venezolaanse-boot-vergroot-spanningen-op-de-caribische-eilanden/) it lacks detailed information about current US operations, stating only that it is “monitoring the situation closely”. The Caribbean’s small island nations and territories now find themselves uncomfortably positioned at the intersection of US-Venezuela hostilities and broader great power rivalry. Dutch policymakers are increasingly [wrestling](https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail/2024-2025/32) with stretched military resources as they attempt to fulfil NATO obligations in Ukraine while safeguarding national security and economic interests in faraway places like the Caribbean and the Indo-Pacific. Still, recognising the deteriorating security environment, the Netherlands [pledged](https://dossierkoninkrijksrelaties.nl/2024/12/06/kamer-defensie-mag-caribisch-deel-koninkrijk-niet-vergeten/) €24 million (AU\$42 million) in 2024 to strengthen Caribbean defences: €12 million for militia enhancement and another €12 million for air warning and defence systems, including portable anti-aircraft missiles. The Hague’s attention has increasingly been pulled toward the Caribbean, even before Trump’s strike. Maritime security challenges have intensified not only due to Venezuelan refugees seeking asylum on Dutch Caribbean islands, but also following the [detention](https://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/nederlandse-kapitein-pim-de-rhoodes-en-bemanning-van-schatzoekschip-vermist-na-onderschepping-door-venezolaanse-marine/78777114.html) in June of a Dutch captain and his multinational crew by Venezuelan authorities on espionage charges. With no news of the captain in two months, mounting diplomatic tensions are making it increasingly difficult for the Netherlands to neglect the rapidly worsening security situation threatening its islands. This is particularly the case due to the complex geopolitical dynamics facing the region. In reality, US motivations extend far beyond targeting drug cartels. Maduro’s regime enjoys backing from both [Beijing](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202505/t20250513_11619919.html) and [Moscow](https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-venezuelas-maduro-sign-strategic-partnership-pact-2025-05-07/) – two of America’s primary adversaries. For years, [China](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri) and [Russia](https://pism.pl/publications/the-course-of-cooperation-between-russia-and-its-latin-american-partners) have sought to expand their influence in America’s backyard through oil deals and various kinds of economic projects. This directly challenges America’s position in the region, risking a loss of influence that could have a range of negative long-term repercussions for US interests. ![Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro (Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela Press Office/Anadolu via Getty Images)](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/inline-images/GettyImages-2234181084.jpg) Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has a \$50 million bounty on his head (Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela Press Office/Anadolu via Getty Images) Russia’s Foreign Ministry quickly condemned Trump’s strike last week, [declaring](https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2044875/) that the “situation is threatening regional and global security”. While Beijing has yet to comment on the situation, earlier this year, China’s President Xi Jinping did [express](https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202505/10/content_WS681e8bd6c6d0868f4e8f269d.html) his firm support “in safeguarding sovereignty, national dignity and social stability” in Venezuela. Venezuela has the potential to become fertile ground for great power competition, with potentially severe spillover effects for surrounding Caribbean islands. The situation grows more precarious given Europe’s concentration of military resources on Ukraine. Unlike their continental counterparts, Dutch, French and British Caribbean territories [are not](https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2021D08579&did=2021D08579) covered by NATO security [guarantees](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm) in the event of conflict, making the potential consequences of conflict in the region even more dire for these islands. While full-scale war in the Caribbean remains unlikely in the near term, the probability of increased tensions and regional instability – driven by Trump’s aggressive posture, Maduro’s fixation on remaining in power, and Europe’s distracted focus – appears increasingly high. The Caribbean’s small island nations and territories now find themselves uncomfortably positioned at the intersection of US-Venezuela hostilities and broader great power rivalry, with limited ability to influence events that could fundamentally reshape their region’s security landscape. *** #### Related Content [![Life in Havana during a national blackout across Cuba on 23 March 2026 as a US oil blockade bites (Yamil Lage/AFP via Getty Images)](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/styles/large/public/2026-03/GettyImages-2267411731.jpg?itok=FFgKlwr3)](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/cuba-next) ## [Is Cuba next?](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/cuba-next) *** Previous Article [The resource potential in Pakistan that Trump hopes to tap into](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/resource-potential-pakistan-trump-hopes-tap) Next Article [Ethiopia’s grand projects fail the human capital test](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ethiopia-s-grand-projects-fail-human-capital-test) ## Subscribe to The Interpreter Get the latest commentary and analysis on international events from experts at the Lowy Institute and around the world. *** The Interpreter features in-depth analysis & expert commentary on the latest international events, published daily by the [**Lowy Institute**](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/). © Copyright 2026 [**Lowy Institute**](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/) - [Debates](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debate) - [Contributors](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/contributors) - [Articles](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/archive) - [About](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/about-interpreter) - [Terms of Use](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/terms-use-content-supply-terms) - [Log In](https://portal.lowyinstitute.org/Account/Login/) - [My bookmarks](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/saved-items)

Readable Markdown

While global attention remains fixed on conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, a new danger zone is emerging in an unlikely location: the Caribbean. This typically peaceful region has become the setting for US President Donald Trump’s latest foreign policy gambit, which has already triggered a massive [surge](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/15/politics/us-military-deploying-caribbean-latin-america-cartel-mission) of American military assets to the southern Caribbean – roughly 4,000 soldiers, seven warships, and a nuclear submarine. Tensions spiked on 2 September, when Trump [ordered](https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115136798909755892) a strike on a vessel near Venezuela that killed 11 people. Though unable to provide concrete evidence, the US President justified the attack by claiming those aboard were members of the Venezuelan drug cartel Tren de Aragua. The following day, Secretary of State Marco Rubio escalated further, warning that such attacks “[will happen again](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2025/09/03/hegseth-rubio-promise-more-military-strikes-on-drug-targets/85963709007/)“. Venezuela has since said [none of those killed](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/people-killed-us-boat-strike-were-not-tren-de-aragua-venezuela-minister-says-2025-09-11/) were cartel members. Over recent months, Trump has dramatically intensified pressure on Venezuela. Last month, his administration designated President Nicolás Maduro as a terrorist under US law and [placed](https://www.state.gov/nicolas-maduro-moros) a \$50 million bounty on his head. This followed the Treasury Department’s July [decision](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250725) to add Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles to its list of specially designated global terrorist organisations, [alleging](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0207) that the cartel is led by Maduro and other high-ranking officials. Maduro responded by vowing to [deploy](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/19/americas/venezuela-maduro-militia-us-military-deployment-intl-latam) 4.5 million militia personnel to defend the country’s “seas, our skies and our lands” from any incursions. The Trump administration shows no signs of backing down. Last week, Trump announced [plans](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trump-plays-down-possible-regime-change-venezuela-us-deploys-stealth-fighter-2025-09-05/) to deploy 10 F-35 fighter jets to Puerto Rico to bolster operations against drug cartels operating in the region. CNN [reported](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/05/politics/trump-weighs-strikes-targeting-cartels-inside-venezuela) unnamed sources last week claiming that strikes within Venezuelan territory remain a possibility. ![An infographic titled "US warships deployed off the coast of Venezuela" with a map illustration (Mehmet Yaren Bozgun/Anadolu via Getty Images)](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/GettyImages-2232760649%20v2.jpg) Mehmet Yaren Bozgun/Anadolu via Getty Images This surge in violence has sparked alarm among Caribbean islands, particularly those closest to Venezuela. The Dutch island of Curaçao, situated just 65 kilometres from the Venezuelan coast, faces particular vulnerability. For more than a decade, the island has served as a primary [destination](https://www.csis.org/analysis/forgotten-frontlines-aruba-curacao-and-venezuelan-displacement-crisis) for Venezuelan [refugees](https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/FactSheet_2024_MCOPanama_%20Aruba%20and%20Curacao%20October-December%2024.pdf) fleeing Maduro’s regime, straining local resources and creating significant maritime security challenges. While Curaçao’s government has [urged](https://caribischnetwerk.ntr.nl/2025/08/26/curacao-wordt-meegesleept-in-conflict-tussen-de-verenigde-staten-en-venezuela/) calm and emphasised the island’s neutral status, officials acknowledge the growing risk of being drawn into a US-Venezuela conflict. Under existing US-Netherlands [agreements](https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0001980/2001-11-02), American forces can [use](https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2025Z15280&did=2025D35983) Curaçao’s airport and airspace for drug trafficking surveillance – but only with unarmed aircraft. The Dutch Ministry of Defence has [admitted](https://caribischnetwerk.ntr.nl/2025/09/06/vs-aanval-op-venezolaanse-boot-vergroot-spanningen-op-de-caribische-eilanden/) it lacks detailed information about current US operations, stating only that it is “monitoring the situation closely”. The Caribbean’s small island nations and territories now find themselves uncomfortably positioned at the intersection of US-Venezuela hostilities and broader great power rivalry. Dutch policymakers are increasingly [wrestling](https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail/2024-2025/32) with stretched military resources as they attempt to fulfil NATO obligations in Ukraine while safeguarding national security and economic interests in faraway places like the Caribbean and the Indo-Pacific. Still, recognising the deteriorating security environment, the Netherlands [pledged](https://dossierkoninkrijksrelaties.nl/2024/12/06/kamer-defensie-mag-caribisch-deel-koninkrijk-niet-vergeten/) €24 million (AU\$42 million) in 2024 to strengthen Caribbean defences: €12 million for militia enhancement and another €12 million for air warning and defence systems, including portable anti-aircraft missiles. The Hague’s attention has increasingly been pulled toward the Caribbean, even before Trump’s strike. Maritime security challenges have intensified not only due to Venezuelan refugees seeking asylum on Dutch Caribbean islands, but also following the [detention](https://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/nederlandse-kapitein-pim-de-rhoodes-en-bemanning-van-schatzoekschip-vermist-na-onderschepping-door-venezolaanse-marine/78777114.html) in June of a Dutch captain and his multinational crew by Venezuelan authorities on espionage charges. With no news of the captain in two months, mounting diplomatic tensions are making it increasingly difficult for the Netherlands to neglect the rapidly worsening security situation threatening its islands. This is particularly the case due to the complex geopolitical dynamics facing the region. In reality, US motivations extend far beyond targeting drug cartels. Maduro’s regime enjoys backing from both [Beijing](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202505/t20250513_11619919.html) and [Moscow](https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-venezuelas-maduro-sign-strategic-partnership-pact-2025-05-07/) – two of America’s primary adversaries. For years, [China](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri) and [Russia](https://pism.pl/publications/the-course-of-cooperation-between-russia-and-its-latin-american-partners) have sought to expand their influence in America’s backyard through oil deals and various kinds of economic projects. This directly challenges America’s position in the region, risking a loss of influence that could have a range of negative long-term repercussions for US interests. ![Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro (Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela Press Office/Anadolu via Getty Images)](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/inline-images/GettyImages-2234181084.jpg) Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has a \$50 million bounty on his head (Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela Press Office/Anadolu via Getty Images) Russia’s Foreign Ministry quickly condemned Trump’s strike last week, [declaring](https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2044875/) that the “situation is threatening regional and global security”. While Beijing has yet to comment on the situation, earlier this year, China’s President Xi Jinping did [express](https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202505/10/content_WS681e8bd6c6d0868f4e8f269d.html) his firm support “in safeguarding sovereignty, national dignity and social stability” in Venezuela. Venezuela has the potential to become fertile ground for great power competition, with potentially severe spillover effects for surrounding Caribbean islands. The situation grows more precarious given Europe’s concentration of military resources on Ukraine. Unlike their continental counterparts, Dutch, French and British Caribbean territories [are not](https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2021D08579&did=2021D08579) covered by NATO security [guarantees](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm) in the event of conflict, making the potential consequences of conflict in the region even more dire for these islands. While full-scale war in the Caribbean remains unlikely in the near term, the probability of increased tensions and regional instability – driven by Trump’s aggressive posture, Maduro’s fixation on remaining in power, and Europe’s distracted focus – appears increasingly high. The Caribbean’s small island nations and territories now find themselves uncomfortably positioned at the intersection of US-Venezuela hostilities and broader great power rivalry, with limited ability to influence events that could fundamentally reshape their region’s security landscape.

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