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( Sept. 10, 2025 / JNS ) Syria has remained formally at war with Israel since 1973. Knowing it could not win a direct confrontation, Damascus waged war by proxy—arming Hezbollah and inviting Iran to entrench itself on Syrian soil. After the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, President Bashar Assad became consumed with clinging to power. For Israel, the immediate concern was no longer Syrian aggression but the risk of violence spilling across the border. Syria and Iran had signed a mutual defense pact in 2005, and Assad became more dependent on Tehran as his regime tottered. At one point, Iran was believed to have more than 13 military bases with five divisions of troops in Syria, provoking Israel to repeatedly bomb targets to prevent a buildup of troops and weaponry. Israel was less at war  with  Syria than at war  in  Syria. Before the Hamas-led terrorist attacks in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, Jerusalem was primarily engaged in interdicting Iranian smuggling of weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, preventing the construction of weapons factories or destroying those it discovered and ensuring Iranian-backed forces could not establish a toehold near the border with Israel. Early on, Israel decided that it was not interested in overthrowing the Assad regime because it was difficult, and they preferred the devil they knew to what they feared might be a radical Islamist alternative. Syria entered the current conflict when Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists based there fired rockets into Israel on Oct. 14, 2023. Israel responded by bombing the airports in Damascus and Aleppo. Israel kept up a steady diet of airstrikes afterward. On Sept. 8, 2024, Israel destroyed Iran’s nearly operational “Deep Layer” missile plant in Masyaf, Syria. In a two-hour raid, Israeli forces blew up planetary mixers vital for solid rocket fuel, crippling Iran’s missile program. After Israel launched its ground campaign in Lebanon on Sept. 30, 2024, airstrikes on targets in Syria intensified. Israel bombed areas along the border used to smuggle Iranian weapons from Syria to Hezbollah. Israel also repeatedly attacked arms warehouses and bases of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In November, the Israel Defense Forces destroyed buildings used as command centers by Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israel’s success against Hezbollah in Lebanon and its airstrikes on Iran earlier that year, in April, weakened and distracted Assad’s allies in his war with rebel forces. More significantly, his strongest patron, Russia, was absorbed with its war with Ukraine. On Dec. 8, a coalition of  Syrian rebel forces , led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), broke through to the Presidential Palace in Damascus. On the same day, a Kremlin official confirmed that Assad had fled to Moscow, seeking political asylum along with his family. The Assad family regime’s 54-year rule came to an end without Israel firing a shot. A new autocrat, Ahmad al-Sharaa (nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), claimed authority over the fractured nation. Iran withdrew its forces and diplomats from Syria. The leadership downplayed the damage to its interests, but Iran’s top-ranking general in Syria, Behrouz Esbati, acknowledged that “we were defeated, and defeated very badly.” Even before the fall of Assad, Esbati said the president had refused to allow Iranian-backed militias to attack Israel from Syria after the Hamas invasion. As Assad’s regime crumbled and rebel forces edged toward Israel’s frontier, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to take control of the buffer zone inside Syria established by the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, while reinforcing positions on Israel’s side of the border. In January, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz declared the IDF would remain in the zone indefinitely. With Israeli troops now entrenched beyond the Golan, the long-discussed notion of trading any part of the Heights for peace has all but vanished. Exploiting the chaos and the collapse of Assad’s army, Israel launched hundreds of airstrikes to demolish critical infrastructure and to prevent weapons from reaching hostile rebel groups. Israel destroyed a security complex in Damascus, along with research centers where it had previously said Iranian scientists developed missiles and chemical weapons. Strikes neutralized the Damascus International Airport’s air-defense systems, weakening Syria’s ability to interfere with Israeli air operations. Additional airstrikes eliminated almost the entire Syrian air force, as well as struck strategic missile depots and weapons-storage sites. The Israeli Navy destroyed Syrian naval vessels. Several weeks ago, the IDF estimated it had eliminated 80% of the former regime’s military capabilities. Netanyahu boasted that Assad’s collapse was “a direct result of the blows we inflicted on Iran and Hezbollah.” Yet Israel never aimed to topple the regime, nor did it anticipate the takeover by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led by al-Sharaa. What emerged was an unintended consequence—one that may prove far from a victory. While the removal of Assad was universally cheered, some analysts cautioned against embracing the rebels or taking their word that they would implement a more democratic regime. HTS and the other factions are radical Sunni Muslims. Taking a page from the Taliban playbook, the leaders want everyone to believe they have abandoned their more extreme views, but, as Col. (ret.) Richard Kemp cautioned, “In 2021, the Taliban tried to convince the world that they had changed from the group that inflicted such brutality on the country before being ejected 20 years earlier. Their spokesman said they would not seek revenge on those who had collaborated with Coalition forces and the U.S.-backed government and would even respect women’s rights and press freedom. We know how that worked out.” In July, al-Sharaa sent troops into the Druze village of Sweida in southern Syria, mistakenly assuming U.S. and Israeli acquiescence. Viewing the move as a threat to the Druze, Jerusalem launched airstrikes after clashes between regime forces, allied Bedouin fighters, and Druze militias spiraled into massacres and atrocities that killed more than 1,100 people, mostly Druze civilians. The violence sparked international outrage, Israeli calls for al-Sharaa’s removal, and U.S.-brokered ceasefire efforts with Turkey and Jordan. Israel has pledged to protect the Druze in Syria. As unlikely as it seemed a few months earlier, the United States believes it can convince Syria to join the  Abraham Accords . When U.S. President Donald Trump met with al-Sharaa in May, he specifically requested that Syria sign on to them. Even as reports indicate that Israel is talking with the new regime about defense agreements and possible normalization is dangled by Trump, Israeli officials continue to demonize the new leadership. Katz has called al-Sharaa a jihadist terrorist, disguising himself as a moderate. Whether Israel lost the war will depend not on the fall of Assad, but on what follows. If the new regime abandons its radical Islamic roots and joins the Abraham Accords, then Israel may achieve the unimaginable: turning its longest-standing foe into a partner. If Kemp is correct, as seems more likely, Israel may have another jihadi enemy on its border. Part I: Gaza and the illusion of victory Part II: Israel bloodied Hezbollah, but only Lebanon can defeat it Part III: Houthis keep the rockets coming Next week: Part V: A ravaged economy The opinions and facts presented in this article are those of the author, and neither JNS nor its partners assume any responsibility for them. In a world full of spin, truth matters. Help JNS share honest reporting about Israel.
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Powered by Salamandra Column ## Has Israel Lost the War? Part IV # Unexpected consequences in Syria ## If the new regime abandons its radical Islamic roots and joins the Abraham Accords, then Israel may achieve the unimaginable: turning its longest-standing foe into a partner. ![Asaad Al-Shaibani, minister of foreign affairs and expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic, raises the new flag of Syrian Arab Republic during a flag-raising event held at U.N. Headquarters in New York, April 25, 2025. Credit: Mark Garten/U.N. Photo.](https://me.jnsi.org/uploads/2025/05/UN71094793_MRG_6567_.jpg) Asaad Al-Shaibani, minister of foreign affairs and expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic, raises the new flag of Syrian Arab Republic during a flag-raising event held at U.N. Headquarters in New York, April 25, 2025. Credit: Mark Garten/U.N. Photo. [![Mitchell Bard](https://me.jnsi.org/uploads/2020/12/Mitchell-Bard-400x400.jpg)](https://www.jns.org/writers/mitchell-bard/ "Mitchell Bard") [Mitchell Bard](https://www.jns.org/writers/mitchell-bard/ "Mitchell Bard") - [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/bardphd) - [Twitter](https://x.com/mitchellgbard) - [Website](http://mitchellbard.com/) Read Full BIO + Mitchell Bard is a foreign-policy analyst and an authority on U.S.-Israel relations. He has written and edited 22 books, including *The Arab Lobby*, *Death to the Infidels: Radical Islam’s War Against the Jews;* *After Anatevka: Tevye in Palestine;* and *Forgotten Victims: The Abandonment of Americans in Hitler’s Camps*. [Edit](https://www.jns.org/wp-admin/post.php?post=583611&action=edit) - [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jns.org%2Funexpected-consequences-in-syria%2F) - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Unexpected+consequences+in+Syria&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jns.org%2Funexpected-consequences-in-syria%2F&via=JNS_org) - [WhatsApp](https://api.whatsapp.com/send?text=Jewish%20News%20Syndicate:%20Unexpected+consequences+in+Syria%20https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jns.org%2Funexpected-consequences-in-syria%2F) - [Email](<mailto:?subject=Jewish News Syndicate: Unexpected consequences in Syria&body=I found this on Jewish News Syndicate and thought it might interest you: https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jns.org%2Funexpected-consequences-in-syria%2F>) - Print (Sept. 10, 2025 / JNS) Syria has remained formally at war with Israel since 1973. Knowing it could not win a direct confrontation, Damascus waged war by proxy—arming Hezbollah and inviting Iran to entrench itself on Syrian soil. After the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, President Bashar Assad became consumed with clinging to power. For Israel, the immediate concern was no longer Syrian aggression but the risk of violence spilling across the border. Syria and Iran had signed a mutual defense pact in 2005, and Assad became more dependent on Tehran as his regime tottered. At one point, Iran was believed to have more than 13 military bases with five divisions of troops in Syria, provoking Israel to repeatedly bomb targets to prevent a buildup of troops and weaponry. Israel was less at war *with* Syria than at war *in* Syria. Before the Hamas-led terrorist attacks in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, Jerusalem was primarily engaged in interdicting Iranian smuggling of weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, preventing the construction of weapons factories or destroying those it discovered and ensuring Iranian-backed forces could not establish a toehold near the border with Israel. Early on, Israel decided that it was not interested in overthrowing the Assad regime because it was difficult, and they preferred the devil they knew to what they feared might be a radical Islamist alternative. Syria entered the current conflict when Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists based there fired rockets into Israel on Oct. 14, 2023. Israel responded by bombing the airports in Damascus and Aleppo. Israel kept up a steady diet of airstrikes afterward. On Sept. 8, 2024, Israel destroyed Iran’s nearly operational “Deep Layer” missile plant in Masyaf, Syria. In a two-hour raid, Israeli forces blew up planetary mixers vital for solid rocket fuel, crippling Iran’s missile program. After Israel launched its ground campaign in Lebanon on Sept. 30, 2024, airstrikes on targets in Syria intensified. Israel bombed areas along the border used to smuggle Iranian weapons from Syria to Hezbollah. Israel also repeatedly attacked arms warehouses and bases of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In November, the Israel Defense Forces destroyed buildings used as command centers by Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israel’s success against Hezbollah in Lebanon and its airstrikes on Iran earlier that year, in April, weakened and distracted Assad’s allies in his war with rebel forces. More significantly, his strongest patron, Russia, was absorbed with its war with Ukraine. On Dec. 8, a coalition of [Syrian rebel forces](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/syria-s-rebel-factions), led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), broke through to the Presidential Palace in Damascus. On the same day, a Kremlin official confirmed that Assad had fled to Moscow, seeking political asylum along with his family. The Assad family regime’s 54-year rule came to an end without Israel firing a shot. A new autocrat, Ahmad al-Sharaa (nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), claimed authority over the fractured nation. Iran withdrew its forces and diplomats from Syria. The leadership downplayed the damage to its interests, but Iran’s top-ranking general in Syria, Behrouz Esbati, acknowledged that “we were defeated, and defeated very badly.” Even before the fall of Assad, Esbati said the president had refused to allow Iranian-backed militias to attack Israel from Syria after the Hamas invasion. As Assad’s regime crumbled and rebel forces edged toward Israel’s frontier, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to take control of the buffer zone inside Syria established by the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, while reinforcing positions on Israel’s side of the border. In January, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz declared the IDF would remain in the zone indefinitely. With Israeli troops now entrenched beyond the Golan, the long-discussed notion of trading any part of the Heights for peace has all but vanished. Exploiting the chaos and the collapse of Assad’s army, Israel launched hundreds of airstrikes to demolish critical infrastructure and to prevent weapons from reaching hostile rebel groups. Israel destroyed a security complex in Damascus, along with research centers where it had previously said Iranian scientists developed missiles and chemical weapons. Strikes neutralized the Damascus International Airport’s air-defense systems, weakening Syria’s ability to interfere with Israeli air operations. Additional airstrikes eliminated almost the entire Syrian air force, as well as struck strategic missile depots and weapons-storage sites. The Israeli Navy destroyed Syrian naval vessels. Several weeks ago, the IDF estimated it had eliminated 80% of the former regime’s military capabilities. Netanyahu boasted that Assad’s collapse was “a direct result of the blows we inflicted on Iran and Hezbollah.” Yet Israel never aimed to topple the regime, nor did it anticipate the takeover by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led by al-Sharaa. What emerged was an unintended consequence—one that may prove far from a victory. While the removal of Assad was universally cheered, some analysts cautioned against embracing the rebels or taking their word that they would implement a more democratic regime. HTS and the other factions are radical Sunni Muslims. Taking a page from the Taliban playbook, the leaders want everyone to believe they have abandoned their more extreme views, but, as Col. (ret.) Richard Kemp cautioned, “In 2021, the Taliban tried to convince the world that they had changed from the group that inflicted such brutality on the country before being ejected 20 years earlier. Their spokesman said they would not seek revenge on those who had collaborated with Coalition forces and the U.S.-backed government and would even respect women’s rights and press freedom. We know how that worked out.” In July, al-Sharaa sent troops into the Druze village of [Sweida](https://www.jns.org/israel-warns-syria-over-threats-to-druze-in-sweida/) in southern Syria, mistakenly assuming U.S. and Israeli acquiescence. Viewing the move as a threat to the Druze, Jerusalem launched airstrikes after clashes between regime forces, allied Bedouin fighters, and Druze militias spiraled into massacres and atrocities that killed more than 1,100 people, mostly Druze civilians. The violence sparked international outrage, Israeli calls for al-Sharaa’s removal, and U.S.-brokered ceasefire efforts with Turkey and Jordan. Israel has pledged to protect the Druze in Syria. As unlikely as it seemed a few months earlier, the United States believes it can convince Syria to join the [Abraham Accords](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-abraham-accords). When U.S. President Donald Trump met with al-Sharaa in May, he specifically requested that Syria sign on to them. Even as reports indicate that Israel is talking with the new regime about defense agreements and possible normalization is dangled by Trump, Israeli officials continue to demonize the new leadership. Katz has called al-Sharaa a jihadist terrorist, disguising himself as a moderate. Whether Israel lost the war will depend not on the fall of Assad, but on what follows. If the new regime abandons its radical Islamic roots and joins the Abraham Accords, then Israel may achieve the unimaginable: turning its longest-standing foe into a partner. If Kemp is correct, as seems more likely, Israel may have another jihadi enemy on its border. ***[Part I: Gaza and the illusion of victory](https://www.jns.org/has-israel-lost-the-war-gaza-and-the-illusion-of-victory/)*** ***[Part II: Israel bloodied Hezbollah, but only Lebanon can defeat it](https://www.jns.org/israel-bloodied-hezbollah-but-only-lebanon-can-defeat-it/)*** ***[Part III: Houthis keep the rockets coming](https://www.jns.org/houthis-keep-the-rockets-coming/)*** ***Next week: Part V: A ravaged economy*** The opinions and facts presented in this article are those of the author, and neither JNS nor its partners assume any responsibility for them. ## In a world full of spin, truth matters. Help JNS share honest reporting about Israel. - [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jns.org%2Funexpected-consequences-in-syria%2F) - [Twitter](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Unexpected+consequences+in+Syria&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jns.org%2Funexpected-consequences-in-syria%2F&via=JNS_org) - [WhatsApp](https://api.whatsapp.com/send?text=Jewish%20News%20Syndicate:%20Unexpected+consequences+in+Syria%20https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jns.org%2Funexpected-consequences-in-syria%2F) - [Email](<mailto:?subject=Jewish News Syndicate: Unexpected consequences in Syria&body=I found this on Jewish News Syndicate and thought it might interest you: https%3A%2F%2Fwww.jns.org%2Funexpected-consequences-in-syria%2F>) - Print [Republish this article in your newspaper or website](https://crm.jns.org/sign-up-press?referral=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuam5zLm9yZy91bmV4cGVjdGVkLWNvbnNlcXVlbmNlcy1pbi1zeXJpYS8=) Topics - [Defense and Security](https://www.jns.org/topic/defense-and-security/) - [Israeli Foreign Policy](https://www.jns.org/topic/israeli-foreign-policy/) - [Middle East](https://www.jns.org/topic/middle-east/) - [Syria](https://www.jns.org/topic/syria/) - [Bashar Assad](https://www.jns.org/topic/bashar-assad/) - [Ahmed al-Sharaa](https://www.jns.org/topic/ahmed-al-sharaa/) - [Hayat Tahrir al-Sham](https://www.jns.org/topic/hayat-tahrir-al-sham/)
Readable Markdown
(Sept. 10, 2025 / JNS) Syria has remained formally at war with Israel since 1973. Knowing it could not win a direct confrontation, Damascus waged war by proxy—arming Hezbollah and inviting Iran to entrench itself on Syrian soil. After the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, President Bashar Assad became consumed with clinging to power. For Israel, the immediate concern was no longer Syrian aggression but the risk of violence spilling across the border. Syria and Iran had signed a mutual defense pact in 2005, and Assad became more dependent on Tehran as his regime tottered. At one point, Iran was believed to have more than 13 military bases with five divisions of troops in Syria, provoking Israel to repeatedly bomb targets to prevent a buildup of troops and weaponry. Israel was less at war *with* Syria than at war *in* Syria. Before the Hamas-led terrorist attacks in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, Jerusalem was primarily engaged in interdicting Iranian smuggling of weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, preventing the construction of weapons factories or destroying those it discovered and ensuring Iranian-backed forces could not establish a toehold near the border with Israel. Early on, Israel decided that it was not interested in overthrowing the Assad regime because it was difficult, and they preferred the devil they knew to what they feared might be a radical Islamist alternative. Syria entered the current conflict when Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists based there fired rockets into Israel on Oct. 14, 2023. Israel responded by bombing the airports in Damascus and Aleppo. Israel kept up a steady diet of airstrikes afterward. On Sept. 8, 2024, Israel destroyed Iran’s nearly operational “Deep Layer” missile plant in Masyaf, Syria. In a two-hour raid, Israeli forces blew up planetary mixers vital for solid rocket fuel, crippling Iran’s missile program. After Israel launched its ground campaign in Lebanon on Sept. 30, 2024, airstrikes on targets in Syria intensified. Israel bombed areas along the border used to smuggle Iranian weapons from Syria to Hezbollah. Israel also repeatedly attacked arms warehouses and bases of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In November, the Israel Defense Forces destroyed buildings used as command centers by Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israel’s success against Hezbollah in Lebanon and its airstrikes on Iran earlier that year, in April, weakened and distracted Assad’s allies in his war with rebel forces. More significantly, his strongest patron, Russia, was absorbed with its war with Ukraine. On Dec. 8, a coalition of [Syrian rebel forces](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/syria-s-rebel-factions), led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), broke through to the Presidential Palace in Damascus. On the same day, a Kremlin official confirmed that Assad had fled to Moscow, seeking political asylum along with his family. The Assad family regime’s 54-year rule came to an end without Israel firing a shot. A new autocrat, Ahmad al-Sharaa (nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), claimed authority over the fractured nation. Iran withdrew its forces and diplomats from Syria. The leadership downplayed the damage to its interests, but Iran’s top-ranking general in Syria, Behrouz Esbati, acknowledged that “we were defeated, and defeated very badly.” Even before the fall of Assad, Esbati said the president had refused to allow Iranian-backed militias to attack Israel from Syria after the Hamas invasion. As Assad’s regime crumbled and rebel forces edged toward Israel’s frontier, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to take control of the buffer zone inside Syria established by the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, while reinforcing positions on Israel’s side of the border. In January, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz declared the IDF would remain in the zone indefinitely. With Israeli troops now entrenched beyond the Golan, the long-discussed notion of trading any part of the Heights for peace has all but vanished. Exploiting the chaos and the collapse of Assad’s army, Israel launched hundreds of airstrikes to demolish critical infrastructure and to prevent weapons from reaching hostile rebel groups. Israel destroyed a security complex in Damascus, along with research centers where it had previously said Iranian scientists developed missiles and chemical weapons. Strikes neutralized the Damascus International Airport’s air-defense systems, weakening Syria’s ability to interfere with Israeli air operations. Additional airstrikes eliminated almost the entire Syrian air force, as well as struck strategic missile depots and weapons-storage sites. The Israeli Navy destroyed Syrian naval vessels. Several weeks ago, the IDF estimated it had eliminated 80% of the former regime’s military capabilities. Netanyahu boasted that Assad’s collapse was “a direct result of the blows we inflicted on Iran and Hezbollah.” Yet Israel never aimed to topple the regime, nor did it anticipate the takeover by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led by al-Sharaa. What emerged was an unintended consequence—one that may prove far from a victory. While the removal of Assad was universally cheered, some analysts cautioned against embracing the rebels or taking their word that they would implement a more democratic regime. HTS and the other factions are radical Sunni Muslims. Taking a page from the Taliban playbook, the leaders want everyone to believe they have abandoned their more extreme views, but, as Col. (ret.) Richard Kemp cautioned, “In 2021, the Taliban tried to convince the world that they had changed from the group that inflicted such brutality on the country before being ejected 20 years earlier. Their spokesman said they would not seek revenge on those who had collaborated with Coalition forces and the U.S.-backed government and would even respect women’s rights and press freedom. We know how that worked out.” In July, al-Sharaa sent troops into the Druze village of [Sweida](https://www.jns.org/israel-warns-syria-over-threats-to-druze-in-sweida/) in southern Syria, mistakenly assuming U.S. and Israeli acquiescence. Viewing the move as a threat to the Druze, Jerusalem launched airstrikes after clashes between regime forces, allied Bedouin fighters, and Druze militias spiraled into massacres and atrocities that killed more than 1,100 people, mostly Druze civilians. The violence sparked international outrage, Israeli calls for al-Sharaa’s removal, and U.S.-brokered ceasefire efforts with Turkey and Jordan. Israel has pledged to protect the Druze in Syria. As unlikely as it seemed a few months earlier, the United States believes it can convince Syria to join the [Abraham Accords](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-abraham-accords). When U.S. President Donald Trump met with al-Sharaa in May, he specifically requested that Syria sign on to them. Even as reports indicate that Israel is talking with the new regime about defense agreements and possible normalization is dangled by Trump, Israeli officials continue to demonize the new leadership. Katz has called al-Sharaa a jihadist terrorist, disguising himself as a moderate. Whether Israel lost the war will depend not on the fall of Assad, but on what follows. If the new regime abandons its radical Islamic roots and joins the Abraham Accords, then Israel may achieve the unimaginable: turning its longest-standing foe into a partner. If Kemp is correct, as seems more likely, Israel may have another jihadi enemy on its border. ***[Part I: Gaza and the illusion of victory](https://www.jns.org/has-israel-lost-the-war-gaza-and-the-illusion-of-victory/)*** ***[Part II: Israel bloodied Hezbollah, but only Lebanon can defeat it](https://www.jns.org/israel-bloodied-hezbollah-but-only-lebanon-can-defeat-it/)*** ***[Part III: Houthis keep the rockets coming](https://www.jns.org/houthis-keep-the-rockets-coming/)*** ***Next week: Part V: A ravaged economy*** The opinions and facts presented in this article are those of the author, and neither JNS nor its partners assume any responsibility for them. ## In a world full of spin, truth matters. Help JNS share honest reporting about Israel.
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