🕷️ Crawler Inspector

URL Lookup

Direct Parameter Lookup

Raw Queries and Responses

1. Shard Calculation

Query:

Response:

Calculated Shard: 102 (from laksa015)

2. Crawled Status Check

Query:

curl -X POST \
  'http://laksa102.int.ahrefs:8124/' \
  -H 'Content-Type: text/plain' \
  -H 'X-ClickHouse-Database: crawler3' \
  -H 'Authorization: Basic YXBpOg==' \
  -d 'SELECT getAhrefsURLFromUnparsed(src_unparsed) AS found_url, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(download_stamp), 0) AS crawl_time, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(props_url_first_seen), 0) AS first_indexed_time, download_http_code AS http_code, src_unparsed AS src_unparsed, src_root_hash AS src_root_hash, history_drop_reason AS history_drop_reason, meta_title AS meta_title, meta_descriptions AS meta_descriptions, attrs_boilerpipe_text AS attrs_boilerpipe_text, attrs_markdown AS attrs_markdown, attrs_readable_markdown AS attrs_readable_markdown, meta_canonical AS meta_canonical FROM crawler3.page_info_local FINAL PREWHERE (src_root_hash, src_unparsed) IN ((getAhrefsRootHashFromUnparsed(getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-over-taiwan\')), getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-over-taiwan\'))) FORMAT JSONEachRow'

Response:

{"found_url":"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/conflict\/confrontation-over-taiwan","crawl_time":1775555141,"first_indexed_time":1669074321,"http_code":200,"src_unparsed":"org,cfr!www,\/global-conflict-tracker\/conflict\/confrontation-over-taiwan s443","src_root_hash":"18151292984642721902","history_drop_reason":null,"meta_title":"Confrontation Over Taiwan | Global Conflict Tracker","meta_descriptions":["Background  Taiwan’s disputed status is a direct result of the Chinese Civil War, in which the defeated Nationalist (Kuomintang) government fled the mainland and moved its government to the island in 1949. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never exercised control over Taiwan, it claims that the island is an inalienable part of China that must be “reunified” with the mainland."],"attrs_boilerpipe_text":"Updated February 18, 2026\nBackground  \nTaiwan’s disputed status is a direct result of the Chinese Civil War, in which the defeated Nationalist (Kuomintang) government \nfled the mainland\n and moved its government to the island in 1949. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never exercised control over Taiwan, it claims that the island is an inalienable part of China that must be “reunified” with the mainland. In a \n2022 white paper\n, the PRC said the resolution of the Taiwan question is “indispensable for the realization of China’s rejuvenation” and a “historic mission” of the Chinese Communist Party. The PRC has a stated preference for seeking reunification through peaceful means but reserves the right \nto use force\n to achieve its aims. \nTaiwan’s main political parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), hold differing views regarding Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China. President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT (2008–16)\nchampioned\nthe “1992 Consensus,” in which both Taiwan and the PRC\nagreed\nthat there is only one China—while differing on what “China” means. This (non-consensus) consensus allowed for cross-strait relations to expand and deepen, but led to criticism in Taiwan, as many Taiwanese feared that growing interdependence would limit Taiwan’s choices in the future. Taiwan’s previous president, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP,\ndeclined\nto endorse the 1992 Consensus. As a result, the PRC\ncut off\nofficial communication in 2016 and has sought to punish Tsai through economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and heightened military activities.  \nWhile the DPP is seen as the “pro-independence” party, President Tsai\nstated\nthat there was no need for Taiwan to declare independence because it is already an independent country. In the wake of the PRC’s crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, Taiwan’s electorate has grown more skeptical of closer ties with the mainland, leading the “pro-China” KMT to struggle at the ballot box. In addition, \na 2022 poll from the National Chengchi University\n in Taipei suggests a growing sense of Taiwanese national identity among the population and an increase in support for Taiwan’s eventual independence. \nThe ongoing dispute has led to heightened military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, which geographically separates mainland China from the island of Taiwan. In the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–55, the PRC shelled the Kinmen and Matsu islands, situated close to the mainland, in an unsuccessful \nattempt to deter the United States\n from signing a mutual defense treaty with the Nationalist government. Following the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, Taipei and Beijing reached a tacit understanding of a “\nmedian line\n,” also called the center line, to guide rules of engagement and prevent miscalculation in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC repeated its artillery bombardment of Kinmen in 1958 during the \nSecond Taiwan Strait Crisis\n. In response, the United States drew up \nplans for a nuclear strike\n on mainland China, demonstrating the Dwight Eisenhower administration’s Cold War commitment to Taiwan. The PRC fired \nlive ammunition and missiles\n into Taiwan’s waters during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–96 to express disapproval of \nTaiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s visit\n to the United States. \nIn 1979, the United States abrogated the mutual defense treaty it had with Taiwan since 1954 and transferred its official diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. At that time, it acknowledged (but did not endorse) the PRC’s position that there is one China, and that Taiwan is a part of China. Rather, U.S. policy is to not take a position on Taiwan’s sovereignty and regard its ultimate status as undetermined. Also in 1979, President Jimmy Carter signed into law the \nTaiwan Relations Act\n (TRA), which commits the United States to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” The TRA also obligates the United States to maintain the capacity “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.” The TRA, however, does not obligate the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense, and for decades U.S. presidents have refused to say whether they would intervene on Taiwan’s behalf—a policy known as strategic ambiguity.  \nConcerns  \nTensions between China and the United States over Taiwan amount to a classic security dilemma: both are taking actions they view as defensive that the opposing side views as escalatory. A potential conflict between China and Taiwan has significant implications for U.S. security interests, as the United States would need to balance its desire to support Taiwan against the risks of a broader war with China. The United States has objected to China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan, which include \nblocking its participation\n in international organizations, \ninterfering in its elections\n, pressuring \nTaiwanese firms\n to oppose independence, and \nsanctioning its industries\n.  \nMilitary activities near Taiwan have grown significantly in recent years. China is \ndeveloping the military capabilities\n of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—the U.S. Department of Defense’s \n2021 Military Power Report\n highlighted China’s prioritization of “joint long-range precision strikes across domains, increasingly sophisticated space, counterspace, and cyber capabilities, and accelerating the large-scale expansion of its nuclear forces.” Moreover, China has integrated emerging technology into its military strategy through an approach known as \n“intelligentized” warfare\n. The Department of Defense’s aforementioned report notes China seeks to dominate technologies associated with the “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing. The PRC increasingly \nsends aircraft\n into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone as a show of force, and in 2020, Taiwan reported a Chinese \ncyberattack on ten government agencies\n to steal information. As the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has deteriorated, competition between the United States and China has intensified, and the prospect of China using force against Taiwan has risen. In an attempt to ensure Taiwan has the ability to defend itself and in response to a growing military gap, the Donald Trump administration sold more than \n$18 billion in arms\n to Taiwan, and in 2020 the State Department \neliminated long-standing restrictions\n on U.S. diplomatic engagement with Taiwanese officials. Moreover, officials now acknowledge that a small but\nexpanding contingent\nof Marines has been secretly training Taiwan’s forces since at least 2021.\nTaiwan is the leading global producer of advanced semiconductors. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company produces \n65 percent of the world’s semiconductors\n and 90 percent of the most advanced chips. If conflict between China and Taiwan were to break out, global supply chains would be severely disrupted to the \ndetriment of U.S. interests\n. Speaking in 2022 alongside MI5 General Director Ken McCallum in London, FBI Director Christopher Wray \nwarned\n that an invasion of Taiwan would “represent one of the most horrific business disruptions the world has ever seen,” as a potential sanctions regime against China would harm the global economy “at a much larger scale” than the current sanctions response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Bloomberg \nreports\n that the U.S. National Security Council anticipates that a Chinese attack and the corresponding loss of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company would cause a $1 trillion disruption to the global economy. \nA potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait also has implications for the territorial dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea. The PRC views the Senkaku\/Diaoyu Islands as a part of “Taiwan province” and may seek to take the islands during a conflict. If the PLA Navy were to occupy Taiwan, the Council on Foreign Relations’ \nDavid Sacks argues\n that Japan would struggle to defend its westernmost islands, as well as the Senkaku\/Diaoyu Islands, and even Okinawa. During its August 2022 military exercise aimed at Taiwan, China launched ballistic missiles over Taiwan that landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, in an attempt to warn Japan not to get involved during a Taiwan conflict. The late Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo stated that Japan and the United States \ncould not stand by\n if China invaded Taiwan. Current Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has pledged to \ndouble Japan’s defense spending\n in response to the tense security climate. Taiwan’s and Japan’s islands form a crucial link in the so-called\nfirst island chain\n; if China were to take these islands, it would constrain U.S. naval movements and its ability to contain China in potential future conflicts.\nRecent Developments  \nIn response to China’s growing assertiveness toward Taiwan, the Joe Biden administration has maintained many aspects of the Trump administration’s approach. In a seeming departure from strategic ambiguity, President Biden remarked in May 2022 that the United States had a commitment \nto come to Taiwan’s defense\n, if necessary, and that his administration would uphold that commitment. While the White House denied any formal change in U.S. policy, the president’s remarks \nreflected a move toward “strategic clarity,”\n a policy of explicit \ncommitment to defending Taiwan\n against the use of force by the PRC, rather than strategic ambiguity. President Biden has made \nat least three\n similar statements since 2021. Beijing, on the other hand, has accused Washington of \nbreaching its sovereignty\n and abandoning its \nOne China policy\n[PDF].  \nIn a further demonstration of support for Taiwan,\nU.S. Speaker of the House\nNancy Pelosi (D-CA) \nvisited Taipei in early August 2022\n and met with President Tsai Ing-wen and democracy and human rights activists. Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan provoked severe condemnation from PRC officials. The PLA launched a four-day military drill and surrounded Taiwan, \nsimulating a blockade\n. The \nlive-fire exercises\n were more extensive than those performed during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. Chinese military aircraft \ncrossed the median line\n over three hundred times during the demonstration and continue to cross it on a near-daily basis, effectively \nerasing the status quo\n. The PRC applied additional pressure through sanctions, halted exports, and, allegedly, \ncyberattacks\n.\nAfter Pelosi’s visit, several other U.S. delegations\nvisited\nTaiwan, and President Tsai\nmet\nwith Pelosi’s successor as U.S. Speaker of the House, Kevin McCarthy, on a stopover in the United States. Meanwhile, China has\nintensified\nthreatening air maneuvers, flying more frequently and closer to Taiwan, and Chinese warships have increasingly\njoined\nin the movements.\nMore on Confrontation Over Taiwan\nNearby Conflicts\nChina Reserves Airspace for Forty Days\nApril 5, 2026\nIn a report published by the\nWall Street Journal,\nChina has issued a forty-day restriction on its offshore airspace, issuing alerts similar to those used to inform aviation authorities of military exercises; the alerts, which are in effect from March 27 to May 6, were not previously reported, and China has not declared any exercises in the region\n(\nWSJ\n)\n. According to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, the restricted zones include areas north and south of Shanghai and extend from the Yellow Sea to the East China Sea\n(Taiwan News)\n.\nBudget Delays in Taiwan Threaten $2.4 Billion in Defense Spending\nApril 1, 2026\nA delay in passing Taiwan’s budget risks holding up NT$78 billion ($2.44 billion) in weapons procurement, maintenance, and training, according to a senior defense official; the holdup comes as Taipei pushes for a major defense spending increase to deter China, but faces resistance from an opposition-led parliament wary of approving large expenditures without oversight\n(Reuters)\n.\nJapan’s Long-Range Missiles\nMarch 31, 2026\nJapan deployed its first long-range missile—capable of reaching mainland China—at an army camp in the country’s southwest; it plans to deploy even longer range Tomahawk missiles on a destroyer ship later this year\n(AP)\n. The ability to strike enemy bases marks a departure from Tokyo’s postwar security doctrine, which has traditionally focused on self-defense\n(Chosun Daily)\n.\nTaiwan Opposition Leader to Visit China in April\nMarch 30, 2026\nCheng Li-wun, the leader of Taiwan’s largest opposition party will visit China from April 7–12, meeting in Beijing, Jiangsu, and Shanghai after accepting an invitation from Chinese President Xi Jinping, as her party signals a push toward closer cross-strait ties than her predecessor pursued; the visit comes one month before U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to travel to Beijing for his own summit, while Taiwan’s ruling party urged Cheng to press Xi on Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic elections\n(Reuters)\n.\nU.S. Senators in Taiwan\nMarch 28, 2026\nA bipartisan delegation of U.S. senators began a visit to Taipei to rally support inside Taiwan for a $40 billion defense bill; the trip is the first such visit by U.S. senators since last summer\n(\nFT\n)\n. The legislation has stalled amid resistance from opposition lawmakers\n(Reuters)\n.\nTaiwan Wary That China May Exploit U.S. Middle East Focus\nMarch 25, 2026\nTaiwanese officials warned that China is ramping up military pressure, including renewing large-scale air incursions near the island, to exploit U.S. force deployments to the Middle East to create perceptions of a weakened Indo-Pacific deterrence\n(Reuters)\n.\nTaipei Rejects Beijing’s Reunification Pitch\nMarch 19, 2026\nA spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said yesterday that “peaceful reunification” would ensure Taiwan’s energy security\n(\nSCMP\n)\n. A senior Taiwanese official told lawmakers today that the proposition was “impossible” and that Taiwan had its own means to withstand global energy strains, including its energy reserves\n(Reuters)\n.\nU.S.-China Talks in Preparation for Trump-Xi Summit\nMarch 16, 2026\nU.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Premier He Lifeng concluded a two-day meeting in Paris today, intended to lay the groundwork for Trump’s planned trip to China later this month; unnamed sources told Reuters the talks have been “remarkably stable”\n(Reuters)\n. But some bilateral tensions were visible in recent days: Trump said Sunday he might delay his trip as he urges China to help unblock the Strait of Hormuz, and China’s commerce ministry on Monday criticized the latest U.S. trade probe into China\n(\nFT\n)\n.\nChina Resumes Large-Scale Military Flights Near Taiwan\nMarch 15, 2026\nTaiwan reported that China resumed large-scale air force operations around the island after more than two weeks of unusually limited activity, with twenty-six Chinese military aircraft detected near the Taiwan Strait over a twenty-four-hour period; the renewed flights followed sharp criticism from Beijing after Taiwan President Lai Ching-te called for stronger defense spending and measures to protect the island’s democracy\n(Reuters)\n.\n$14 Billion U.S. Arms Package for Taiwan Awaits Trump’s Signature\nMarch 13, 2026\nA record $14 billion U.S. arms deal for Taiwan, including advanced interceptor missiles, is ready for Trump’s approval and could be announced after his March 31 Beijing summit with Xi Jinping, despite Chinese pressure to handle such sales with “prudence”\n(Reuters)\n.\nU.S. Aircraft Transits Taiwan Strait\nMarch 11, 2026\nA U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon aircraft transited through the Taiwan Strait; the move precedes U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to China later in the month as the U.S. Navy stated its commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific\n(Reuters)\n.\nChina Blasts Taiwan Premier’s Japan Trip as “Evil Designs”\nMarch 9, 2026\nChina condemned Taiwan Premier Cho Jung-tai’s weekend visit to Japan, his country’s first premier to travel there since 1972, calling it a covert act of provocation; Tokyo declined to comment, stating the trip was to support Taiwan’s baseball team and was private\n(Reuters)\n.\nChina’s Nuclear-Armed Submarines\nMarch 2, 2026\nChina is building submarines with capabilities to target the United States from waters close to the Chinese mainland, the head of U.S. naval intelligence said in testimony submitted to a congressional hearing\n(U.S.-China ESRC)\n. At present, Chinese ballistic-missile submarines need to be in the vicinity of an island chain that includes Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, to target parts of the United States, he said; China’s push for naval modernization comes in contrast to the United States, which has been slow to build new submarines\n(\nWSJ\n)\n.\nReported Delay on Taiwan Arms Announcement\nFebruary 27, 2026\nThe Trump administration has delayed announcing a weapons sale to Taiwan over concerns about Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reaction, unnamed U.S. officials told the\nNew York\nTimes; the State Department said it does not discuss pending arms sales but that “the enduring U.S. commitment to Taiwan continues”\n(\nNYT\n)\n. Trump is due to travel to Beijing next month\n(Reuters)\n.\nAustralian Warship Transits Taiwan Strait\nFebruary 23, 2026\nAn Australian warship passed through the Taiwan Strait; Chinese state-backed media reported that the ship was tracked and monitored by China’s military\n(Reuters)\n.\nU.S. Delays Taiwan Arms Package Amid Pressure Ahead of Beijing Visit\nFebruary 18, 2026\nU.S. officials are reconsidering a major arms sales package to Taiwan after Chinese President Xi Jinping urged President Trump to exercise caution during a recent phone call, raising concerns that approving the deal could disrupt Trump’s planned April visit to Beijing\n(\nWSJ\n)\n.\nTrump’s Taiwan Policy\nFebruary 17, 2026\nThe White House issued a clarification that its policy on Taiwan remains unchanged after Trump said he had discussed arms sales to Taipei with Chinese President Xi Jinping; under a 1982 U.S. policy known as the Six Assurances to Taiwan, the United States pledged not to consult with Beijing on arms sales to Taipei\n(FocusTaiwan)\n. The U.S. policy on Taiwan was a focus of a recent Trump-Xi call, the Chinese government said\n(Chinese MoFA)\n.\nTaiwan Parliament to Address Defense Spending Review After Holiday\nFebruary 16, 2026\nParliament speaker Han Kuo-Yu announced that the review of a $40 billion special defense spending budget will be prioritized after the week-long Lunar New Year holiday; the statement follows concerns expressed by U.S. lawmakers\n(Reuters)\n.\nU.S. Lawmakers Urge Taiwan to Advance Stalled Defense Spending Bill\nFebruary 13, 2026\nA bipartisan group of thirty-seven U.S. lawmakers warned Taiwanese political leaders that delaying a proposed $40 billion defense spending increase could undermine the island’s ability to deter growing threats from China; the letter urged parliament to approve higher military funding as concerns mount over Beijing’s expanding pressure and delays in U.S. weapons deliveries to Taiwan\n(Reuters)\n.\nTaiwan-U.S. Trade Details\nFebruary 12, 2026\nThe U.S. Trade Representative’s office published details of a U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement reached last month; the deal lowers Taiwan’s base U.S. tariff rate to 15 percent—less than rates for many of its neighbors in Asia—while committing Taiwan to removing or lowering 99 percent of its tariffs on U.S. goods\n(USTR)\n. Taiwan pledged to buy around $85 billion of U.S. goods, including liquefied natural gas and crude oil, aircraft, and power-generation equipment by 2029\n(Reuters)\n. It also won tariff exemptions for more than two thousand products, President Lai Ching-te wrote on social media\n(Facebook)\n. The deal requires Taiwanese congressional approval\n(AP)\n.\nChina Vows to Crack Down on “Separatists”\nFebruary 10, 2026\nChina stated its commitment towards supporting “patriotic pro-reunification forces” and cracking down on “separatists”; the comments were made during this year’s annual “Taiwan Work Conference”\n(Reuters)\n.\nJapan-Taiwan Chip Cooperation\nFebruary 5, 2026\nThe Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company announced it is selecting Japan as the first location outside Taiwan to produce 3-nanometer semiconductors, some of its most advanced models; Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae called the partnership a “model case” for Tokyo’s policy to boost strategic technologies\n(\nFT\n)\n.\nTrump-Xi Call\nFebruary 4, 2026\nTrump wrote on social media that he and Xi discussed Iran, Taiwan, and Chinese purchases of U.S. fuel and soybeans on a call today\n(Truth Social)\n. The Chinese readout of the call said Xi stressed that Washington’s position on Taiwan was “the most important issue” in U.S.-China relations and that the United States should handle arms sales to Taiwan “with prudence”\n(Chinese MoFA)\n.\nRussia Reaffirms Support For China’s Position on Taiwan\nFebruary 1, 2026\nRussian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shogu told Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that Moscow continues to support Beijing's position on Taiwan; Russia has repeatedly stated that it considers Taiwan part of China and opposes its independence in any capacity\n(Reuters)\n.\nU.S.-Taiwan Tech Talks\nJanuary 27, 2026\nSenior U.S. and Taiwanese officials held talks on economic cooperation in Washington focusing on the tech sector; the meeting was the sixth edition of an annual U.S.-Taiwan dialogue launched in 2020\n(State)\n. Taiwan’s diplomatic office in the United States endorsed the so-called Pax Silica, a Trump administration effort to ensure joint access to chip and artificial intelligence materials\n(Focus Taiwan)\n.\nChinese Military Purge\nJanuary 24, 2026\nChina’s top general was put under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law,” its defense ministry said, in an apparent extension of a purge within the senior ranks of the military; only one of the six generals that President Xi Jinping appointed to the country’s top military commission in 2022 has so far avoided removal\n(\nNYT\n)\n.\nJournalist Detained in Taiwan\nJanuary 18, 2026\nA journalist was detained on suspicion of bribing army officers to obtain military information allegedly passed to individuals in mainland China; his detention comes as Taiwan intensifies efforts to curb infiltration from Beijing\n(AP)\n.\nNew Trade and Technology Agreement Between U.S. and Taiwan\nJanuary 15, 2026\nA new bilateral trade agreement will see Taiwan invest $250 billion in U.S. chip and technology manufacturing, while the United States lowers its base tariff on Taiwanese goods from 20 to 15 percent; under the deal announced by the U.S. Commerce Department, Taiwan will also guarantee at least $250 billion in credit to Taiwanese businesses for their growth in the United States\n(Commerce)\n. Much of today’s\nglobal chip wafer\nproduction is based in Taiwan, where some officials argue that its status as a global chipmaking hub serves as an incentive for partners to defend the island against China’s threats\n(CFR)\n.\nTaiwan’s Tech Exports\nJanuary 10, 2026\nAccording to new data. Taiwan’s exports to the United States surpassed those to China last year for the first time in twenty-six years, driven by U.S. demand for high-tech products related to artificial intelligence systems\n(\nNikkei\n)\n.  Taiwan is currently negotiating to reduce a 20 percent U.S. tariff on its exports; semiconductors are already excluded from that levy\n(Reuters)\n.\nSign Up for Our Newsletter\nReceive the Center for Preventive Action's quarterly snapshot of global hot spots with expert analysis on ways to prevent and mitigate deadly conflict.","attrs_markdown":"[Skip to main content](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/conflict\/confrontation-over-taiwan#main-content)\n\n[Global Conflict Tracker](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker)\n\n## Main navigation\n- [Methodology](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/methodology)\n- [Center for Preventive Action](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/programs\/center-preventive-action)\n\n[Global Conflict Tracker](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker)\n\n## Main navigation\n- [Methodology](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/methodology)\n- [Center for Preventive Action](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/programs\/center-preventive-action)\n\n[Back to Map](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker)\n\n# Confrontation Over Taiwan\n*By the*\n\n[Center for Preventive Action](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/programs\/center-preventive-action)\n\nUpdated February 18, 2026\n\n[![icon\\_expand](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/images\/icons\/expand.svg)]()\n\n![Two soldiers run through sand.](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/t_gct_w1200\/v1755541607\/globalconflicttracker\/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_18\/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_18.jpg?_i=AA)\n\nThe PLA Navy and the PLA Army conduct a cross-day and all-factor live-fire red-blue confrontation drill in Zhangzhou City, Fujian Province, China, on August 24, 2022.\n\nCFOTO\/Future Publishing via Getty Images\n\n![Large naval vessel moves through Taiwan Strait.](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/t_gct_w1200\/v1755541612\/globalconflicttracker\/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_20\/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_20.jpg?_i=AA)\n\nLegend-class U.S. Coast Guard National Security Cutter Munro transits the Taiwan Strait during a routine transit with Arleigh-burke class guided-missile destroyer USS Kidd on August 27, 2021\n\nKaylianna Genier\/U.S. 7th Fleet Public Affairs\n\n![Tanks move on beach](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/t_gct_w1200\/v1755541602\/globalconflicttracker\/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_14_0\/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_14_0.jpg?_i=AA)\n\nThe PLA Navy and the PLA Army conduct a cross-day and all-factor live-fire red-blue confrontation drill in Zhangzhou City, Fujian Province, China, on August 24, 2022.\n\nCFOTO\/Future Publishing via Getty Images\n\n![Amphibious vehicles land on beach.](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/t_gct_w1200\/v1755541596\/globalconflicttracker\/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_06\/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_06.jpg?_i=AA)\n\nAmphibious armoured vehicles under Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theatre Command take part in an assault wave formation training exercise in Zhangzhou, Fujian Province, China, on August 14, 2022.\n\nCNS Photo via Reuters\n\n![Tank shoots missile in front of mountain.](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/t_gct_w1200\/v1755541616\/globalconflicttracker\/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_17\/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_17.jpg?_i=AA)\n\nThe PLA Navy and the PLA Army conduct a cross-day and all-factor live-fire red-blue confrontation drill in Zhangzhou City, Fujian Province, China, on August 24, 2022.\n\nCFOTO\/Future Publishing via Getty Images\n\nPrevious\n\nNext\n\n## Background\nTaiwan’s disputed status is a direct result of the Chinese Civil War, in which the defeated Nationalist (Kuomintang) government [fled the mainland](https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-asia-34729538) and moved its government to the island in 1949. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never exercised control over Taiwan, it claims that the island is an inalienable part of China that must be “reunified” with the mainland. In a [2022 white paper](https:\/\/english.news.cn\/20220810\/df9d3b8702154b34bbf1d451b99bf64a\/c.html), the PRC said the resolution of the Taiwan question is “indispensable for the realization of China’s rejuvenation” and a “historic mission” of the Chinese Communist Party. The PRC has a stated preference for seeking reunification through peaceful means but reserves the right [to use force](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden) to achieve its aims.\n\nTaiwan’s main political parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), hold differing views regarding Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China. President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT (2008–16) [championed](https:\/\/globaltaiwan.org\/2022\/09\/the-kmt-continues-to-grapple-with-its-1992-consensus\/) the “1992 Consensus,” in which both Taiwan and the PRC [agreed](https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2022\/07\/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart\/) that there is only one China—while differing on what “China” means. This (non-consensus) consensus allowed for cross-strait relations to expand and deepen, but led to criticism in Taiwan, as many Taiwanese feared that growing interdependence would limit Taiwan’s choices in the future. Taiwan’s previous president, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP, [declined](https:\/\/www.rand.org\/blog\/2020\/06\/is-the-1992-consensus-fading-away-in-the-taiwan-strait.html) to endorse the 1992 Consensus. As a result, the PRC [cut off](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2016\/06\/26\/world\/asia\/china-suspends-diplomatic-contact-with-taiwan.html) official communication in 2016 and has sought to punish Tsai through economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and heightened military activities.\n\nWhile the DPP is seen as the “pro-independence” party, President Tsai [stated](https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2021\/09\/taiwanese-presidents-will-not-and-can-not-unilaterally-change-taiwans-status\/) that there was no need for Taiwan to declare independence because it is already an independent country. In the wake of the PRC’s crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, Taiwan’s electorate has grown more skeptical of closer ties with the mainland, leading the “pro-China” KMT to struggle at the ballot box. In addition, [a 2022 poll from the National Chengchi University](https:\/\/esc.nccu.edu.tw\/PageDoc\/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963) in Taipei suggests a growing sense of Taiwanese national identity among the population and an increase in support for Taiwan’s eventual independence.\n\nThe ongoing dispute has led to heightened military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, which geographically separates mainland China from the island of Taiwan. In the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–55, the PRC shelled the Kinmen and Matsu islands, situated close to the mainland, in an unsuccessful [attempt to deter the United States](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/2022\/08\/02\/1115234980\/what-3-past-taiwan-strait-crises-can-teach-us-about-u-s-china-tensions-today) from signing a mutual defense treaty with the Nationalist government. Following the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, Taipei and Beijing reached a tacit understanding of a “[median line](https:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/news\/2022\/09\/07\/asia-pacific\/china-taiwan-median-line\/),” also called the center line, to guide rules of engagement and prevent miscalculation in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC repeated its artillery bombardment of Kinmen in 1958 during the [Second Taiwan Strait Crisis](https:\/\/www.rand.org\/pubs\/research_memoranda\/RM4900.html). In response, the United States drew up [plans for a nuclear strike](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2021\/05\/22\/us\/politics\/nuclear-war-risk-1958-us-china.html) on mainland China, demonstrating the Dwight Eisenhower administration’s Cold War commitment to Taiwan. The PRC fired [live ammunition and missiles](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/live\/2022\/08\/02\/world\/pelosi-taiwan) into Taiwan’s waters during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–96 to express disapproval of [Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s visit](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2022\/08\/05\/taiwan-pelosi-visit-china-miliary-exercises\/) to the United States.\n\nIn 1979, the United States abrogated the mutual defense treaty it had with Taiwan since 1954 and transferred its official diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. At that time, it acknowledged (but did not endorse) the PRC’s position that there is one China, and that Taiwan is a part of China. Rather, U.S. policy is to not take a position on Taiwan’s sovereignty and regard its ultimate status as undetermined. Also in 1979, President Jimmy Carter signed into law the [Taiwan Relations Act](https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/bill\/96th-congress\/house-bill\/2479) (TRA), which commits the United States to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” The TRA also obligates the United States to maintain the capacity “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.” The TRA, however, does not obligate the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense, and for decades U.S. presidents have refused to say whether they would intervene on Taiwan’s behalf—a policy known as strategic ambiguity.\n\n## Concerns\nTensions between China and the United States over Taiwan amount to a classic security dilemma: both are taking actions they view as defensive that the opposing side views as escalatory. A potential conflict between China and Taiwan has significant implications for U.S. security interests, as the United States would need to balance its desire to support Taiwan against the risks of a broader war with China. The United States has objected to China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan, which include [blocking its participation](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2022\/03\/24\/us\/politics\/china-taiwan-un.html) in international organizations, [interfering in its elections](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/taiwan-local-elections-are-where-chinas-disinformation-strategies-begin), pressuring [Taiwanese firms](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/markets\/commodities\/choose-side-china-tells-taiwan-firms-it-punishes-conglomerate-2021-11-22\/) to oppose independence, and [sanctioning its industries](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2022\/08\/12\/business\/china-taiwan-economy.html).\n\nMilitary activities near Taiwan have grown significantly in recent years. China is [developing the military capabilities](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/dods-2021-china-military-power-report-how-advances-ai-and-emerging-technologies-will-shape) of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—the U.S. Department of Defense’s [2021 Military Power Report](https:\/\/www.defense.gov\/News\/Releases\/Release\/Article\/2831819\/dod-releases-2021-report-on-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-pe\/) highlighted China’s prioritization of “joint long-range precision strikes across domains, increasingly sophisticated space, counterspace, and cyber capabilities, and accelerating the large-scale expansion of its nuclear forces.” Moreover, China has integrated emerging technology into its military strategy through an approach known as [“intelligentized” warfare](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/dods-2021-china-military-power-report-how-advances-ai-and-emerging-technologies-will-shape). The Department of Defense’s aforementioned report notes China seeks to dominate technologies associated with the “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing. The PRC increasingly [sends aircraft](https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/asia\/north-east-asia\/china\/chinas-military-activities-near-taiwan-aim-impress-home-and-abroad) into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone as a show of force, and in 2020, Taiwan reported a Chinese [cyberattack on ten government agencies](https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/news\/china\/diplomacy\/article\/3098012\/mainland-chinese-hackers-attacked-government-agencies-steal) to steal information. As the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has deteriorated, competition between the United States and China has intensified, and the prospect of China using force against Taiwan has risen. In an attempt to ensure Taiwan has the ability to defend itself and in response to a growing military gap, the Donald Trump administration sold more than [\\$18 billion in arms](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden) to Taiwan, and in 2020 the State Department [eliminated long-standing restrictions](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden) on U.S. diplomatic engagement with Taiwanese officials. Moreover, officials now acknowledge that a small but [expanding contingent](https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2023\/02\/23\/politics\/us-taiwan-forces-training\/index.html) of Marines has been secretly training Taiwan’s forces since at least 2021.\n\nTaiwan is the leading global producer of advanced semiconductors. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company produces [65 percent of the world’s semiconductors](https:\/\/www.voanews.com\/a\/race-for-semiconductors-influences-taiwan-conflict-\/6696432.html) and 90 percent of the most advanced chips. If conflict between China and Taiwan were to break out, global supply chains would be severely disrupted to the [detriment of U.S. interests](https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2021\/11\/how-taiwan-underwrites-the-us-defense-industrial-complex\/). Speaking in 2022 alongside MI5 General Director Ken McCallum in London, FBI Director Christopher Wray [warned](https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/national-security\/2022\/07\/06\/china-taiwan-fbi-wray-sanctions\/) that an invasion of Taiwan would “represent one of the most horrific business disruptions the world has ever seen,” as a potential sanctions regime against China would harm the global economy “at a much larger scale” than the current sanctions response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Bloomberg [reports](https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2022-10-07\/taiwan-tensions-spark-new-round-of-us-war-gaming-on-risk-to-tsmc#xj4y7vzkg) that the U.S. National Security Council anticipates that a Chinese attack and the corresponding loss of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company would cause a \\$1 trillion disruption to the global economy.\n\nA potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait also has implications for the territorial dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea. The PRC views the Senkaku\/Diaoyu Islands as a part of “Taiwan province” and may seek to take the islands during a conflict. If the PLA Navy were to occupy Taiwan, the Council on Foreign Relations’ [David Sacks argues](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/report\/enhancing-us-japan-coordination-taiwan-conflict) that Japan would struggle to defend its westernmost islands, as well as the Senkaku\/Diaoyu Islands, and even Okinawa. During its August 2022 military exercise aimed at Taiwan, China launched ballistic missiles over Taiwan that landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, in an attempt to warn Japan not to get involved during a Taiwan conflict. The late Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo stated that Japan and the United States [could not stand by](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/former-pm-abe-says-japan-us-could-not-stand-by-if-china-attacked-taiwan-2021-12-01\/) if China invaded Taiwan. Current Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has pledged to [double Japan’s defense spending](https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2022-08-25\/japan-set-to-become-one-of-world-s-biggest-defense-spenders) in response to the tense security climate. Taiwan’s and Japan’s islands form a crucial link in the so-called [first island chain](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/why-taiwan-important-united-states); if China were to take these islands, it would constrain U.S. naval movements and its ability to contain China in potential future conflicts.\n\n## Recent Developments\nIn response to China’s growing assertiveness toward Taiwan, the Joe Biden administration has maintained many aspects of the Trump administration’s approach. In a seeming departure from strategic ambiguity, President Biden remarked in May 2022 that the United States had a commitment [to come to Taiwan’s defense](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2022\/05\/23\/world\/asia\/biden-taiwan-china.html), if necessary, and that his administration would uphold that commitment. While the White House denied any formal change in U.S. policy, the president’s remarks [reflected a move toward “strategic clarity,”](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/what-bidens-big-shift-taiwan-means) a policy of explicit [commitment to defending Taiwan](https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/articles\/united-states\/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous) against the use of force by the PRC, rather than strategic ambiguity. President Biden has made [at least three](https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/news\/world\/joe-biden-china-us-forces-defend-taiwan-rcna48271?utm_source=dailybrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2022Sept19&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief) similar statements since 2021. Beijing, on the other hand, has accused Washington of [breaching its sovereignty](https:\/\/www.fmprc.gov.cn\/mfa_eng\/zxxx_662805\/202208\/t20220803_10732743.html) and abandoning its [One China policy](https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/one-china-policy-primer-web-final.pdf) \\[PDF\\].\n\nIn a further demonstration of support for Taiwan, [U.S. Speaker of the House]() Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) [visited Taipei in early August 2022](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/china-punishes-taiwan-pelosis-visit-what-comes-next) and met with President Tsai Ing-wen and democracy and human rights activists. Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan provoked severe condemnation from PRC officials. The PLA launched a four-day military drill and surrounded Taiwan, [simulating a blockade](https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2022-08-25\/japan-set-to-become-one-of-world-s-biggest-defense-spenders). The [live-fire exercises](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/china-punishes-taiwan-pelosis-visit-what-comes-next) were more extensive than those performed during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. Chinese military aircraft [crossed the median line](https:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/news\/2022\/09\/07\/asia-pacific\/china-taiwan-median-line\/) over three hundred times during the demonstration and continue to cross it on a near-daily basis, effectively [erasing the status quo](https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/2022\/09\/01\/chinas-violations-suggest-taiwan-decapitation-rehearsal-00054568). The PRC applied additional pressure through sanctions, halted exports, and, allegedly, [cyberattacks](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/taiwan-defence-ministry-website-hit-by-cyber-attacks-amid-china-tensions-2022-08-04\/).\n\nAfter Pelosi’s visit, several other U.S. delegations [visited](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/us-lawmaker-delegation-visiting-taiwan-this-week-2022-09-07\/) Taiwan, and President Tsai [met](https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/asia\/north-east-asia\/taiwan-strait\/assessing-implications-taiwanese-presidents-trip-us) with Pelosi’s successor as U.S. Speaker of the House, Kevin McCarthy, on a stopover in the United States. Meanwhile, China has [intensified](https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/f7922fdb-01bf-4ffd-9c5c-79f15468aa71) threatening air maneuvers, flying more frequently and closer to Taiwan, and Chinese warships have increasingly [joined](https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2023\/07\/17\/china\/china-navy-warships-around-taiwan-intl-hnk-ml\/index.html) in the movements.\n\nMore on Confrontation Over Taiwan\n\n[U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era CFR Independent Task Force Report June 1, 2023](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/task-force-report\/us-taiwan-relations-in-a-new-era)\n\n[Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense CFR Backgrounder August 3, 2022](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden)\n\n[Why China Would Struggle to Invade Taiwan CFR Article January 10, 2024](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/article\/why-china-would-struggle-invade-taiwan)\n\n[Taiwan Prepares To Be Invaded The Atlantic November 7, 2022](https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/magazine\/archive\/2022\/12\/china-takeover-taiwan-xi-tsai-ing-wen\/671895\/)\n\n[How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan Carnegie Endowment for International Peace October 3, 2022](https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/2022\/10\/03\/how-we-would-know-when-china-is-preparing-to-invade-taiwan-pub-88053)\n\n[How Taiwan’s Diplomacy Aims to Keep the Island Safe The New York Times October 20, 2022](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2022\/10\/20\/world\/asia\/taiwan-diplomacy-china.html?searchResultPosition=4)\n\n[Trump’s Trade Policy Feeds Taiwan’s Growing U.S. Skepticism CFR Expert Brief May 29, 2025](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/expert-brief\/trump-trade-policy-feeds-taiwan-growing-us-skepticism)\n\n[How Silicon Chips Rule the World The New York Times September 9, 2022](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2022\/09\/09\/business\/silicon-markets-china-taiwan.html?searchResultPosition=28)\n\nNearby Conflicts\n\n- [![Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/t_gct-400x266\/v1755540687\/globalconflicttracker\/Territorial-Disputes-in-the-South-China-Sea\/Territorial-Disputes-in-the-South-China-Sea.jpg?_i=AA)](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/conflict\/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea)\n  \n  [![Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/t_gct-100x100\/v1755540687\/globalconflicttracker\/Territorial-Disputes-in-the-South-China-Sea\/Territorial-Disputes-in-the-South-China-Sea.jpg?_i=AA)](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/conflict\/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea)\n  \n  [Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/conflict\/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea)\n- [![North Korea Crisis](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/t_gct-400x266\/v1755541861\/globalconflicttracker\/North-Korea-Crisis\/North-Korea-Crisis.jpg?_i=AA)](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/conflict\/north-korea-crisis)\n  \n  [![North Korea Crisis](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/t_gct-100x100\/v1755541861\/globalconflicttracker\/North-Korea-Crisis\/North-Korea-Crisis.jpg?_i=AA)](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/conflict\/north-korea-crisis)\n  \n  [North Korea Crisis](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/conflict\/north-korea-crisis)\n- [![A woman walks past a burnt Islamic school in Meikhtila.](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/t_gct-400x266\/v1755541270\/globalconflicttracker\/Civil-War-in-Myanmar\/Civil-War-in-Myanmar.jpg?_i=AA)](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/conflict\/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n  \n  [![A woman walks past a burnt Islamic school in Meikhtila.](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/t_gct-100x100\/v1755541270\/globalconflicttracker\/Civil-War-in-Myanmar\/Civil-War-in-Myanmar.jpg?_i=AA)](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/conflict\/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n  \n  [Civil War in Myanmar](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/conflict\/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n\nLatest News\n\n##### China Reserves Airspace for Forty Days\nApril 5, 2026\n\nIn a report published by the *Wall Street Journal,* China has issued a forty-day restriction on its offshore airspace, issuing alerts similar to those used to inform aviation authorities of military exercises; the alerts, which are in effect from March 27 to May 6, were not previously reported, and China has not declared any exercises in the region [(*WSJ*)](https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/china\/china-creates-new-aviation-mystery-with-offshore-warning-zones-128b1ce5). According to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, the restricted zones include areas north and south of Shanghai and extend from the Yellow Sea to the East China Sea [(Taiwan News)](https:\/\/www.taiwannews.com.tw\/news\/6335025).\n\n##### Budget Delays in Taiwan Threaten \\$2.4 Billion in Defense Spending\nApril 1, 2026\n\nA delay in passing Taiwan’s budget risks holding up NT\\$78 billion (\\$2.44 billion) in weapons procurement, maintenance, and training, according to a senior defense official; the holdup comes as Taipei pushes for a major defense spending increase to deter China, but faces resistance from an opposition-led parliament wary of approving large expenditures without oversight [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/taiwan-military-says-budget-delay-threatens-24-billion-weapons-buying-training-2026-04-02\/).\n\n##### Japan’s Long-Range Missiles\nMarch 31, 2026\n\nJapan deployed its first long-range missile—capable of reaching mainland China—at an army camp in the country’s southwest; it plans to deploy even longer range Tomahawk missiles on a destroyer ship later this year [(AP)](https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/japan-china-taiwan-missile-longrange-40322ab51735b2ce17ce6f02d224d14f). The ability to strike enemy bases marks a departure from Tokyo’s postwar security doctrine, which has traditionally focused on self-defense [(Chosun Daily)](https:\/\/www.chosun.com\/english\/world-en\/2026\/04\/01\/GNGUW77H6ZDKBJLAZPHYJRLO5E\/).\n\n##### Taiwan Opposition Leader to Visit China in April\nMarch 30, 2026\n\nCheng Li-wun, the leader of Taiwan’s largest opposition party will visit China from April 7–12, meeting in Beijing, Jiangsu, and Shanghai after accepting an invitation from Chinese President Xi Jinping, as her party signals a push toward closer cross-strait ties than her predecessor pursued; the visit comes one month before U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to travel to Beijing for his own summit, while Taiwan’s ruling party urged Cheng to press Xi on Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic elections [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/taiwans-opposition-leader-visit-china-next-month-2026-03-30\/).\n\n##### U.S. Senators in Taiwan\nMarch 28, 2026\n\nA bipartisan delegation of U.S. senators began a visit to Taipei to rally support inside Taiwan for a \\$40 billion defense bill; the trip is the first such visit by U.S. senators since last summer [(*FT*)](https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/4e013aab-4e78-4368-aa06-940b3187e778). The legislation has stalled amid resistance from opposition lawmakers [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/taiwan-parliament-authorises-government-sign-stalled-us-arms-deals-2026-03-13\/).\n\n##### Taiwan Wary That China May Exploit U.S. Middle East Focus\nMarch 25, 2026\n\nTaiwanese officials warned that China is ramping up military pressure, including renewing large-scale air incursions near the island, to exploit U.S. force deployments to the Middle East to create perceptions of a weakened Indo-Pacific deterrence [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/taiwan-wary-that-china-could-exploit-us-distraction-over-middle-east-war-2026-03-25\/).\n\n##### Taipei Rejects Beijing’s Reunification Pitch\nMarch 19, 2026\n\nA spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said yesterday that “peaceful reunification” would ensure Taiwan’s energy security [(*SCMP*)](https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/news\/china\/politics\/article\/3347012\/mainland-china-says-taiwan-can-ease-iran-energy-supply-anxiety-peaceful-reunification). A senior Taiwanese official told lawmakers today that the proposition was “impossible” and that Taiwan had its own means to withstand global energy strains, including its energy reserves [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/taiwan-rejects-chinas-energy-security-reunification-offer-amid-middle-east-war-2026-03-19).\n\n##### U.S.-China Talks in Preparation for Trump-Xi Summit\nMarch 16, 2026\n\nU.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Premier He Lifeng concluded a two-day meeting in Paris today, intended to lay the groundwork for Trump’s planned trip to China later this month; unnamed sources told Reuters the talks have been “remarkably stable” [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/us-china-seek-wrap-paris-talks-managed-trade-agriculture-deals-xi-trump-summit-2026-03-16\/). But some bilateral tensions were visible in recent days: Trump said Sunday he might delay his trip as he urges China to help unblock the Strait of Hormuz, and China’s commerce ministry on Monday criticized the latest U.S. trade probe into China [(*FT*)](https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/1ca6d121-760b-4ec5-b6ad-514fdaa94873).\n\n##### China Resumes Large-Scale Military Flights Near Taiwan\nMarch 15, 2026\n\nTaiwan reported that China resumed large-scale air force operations around the island after more than two weeks of unusually limited activity, with twenty-six Chinese military aircraft detected near the Taiwan Strait over a twenty-four-hour period; the renewed flights followed sharp criticism from Beijing after Taiwan President Lai Ching-te called for stronger defense spending and measures to protect the island’s democracy [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/taiwan-says-large-scale-chinese-military-flights-return-after-unusual-absence-2026-03-15\/).\n\n##### \\$14 Billion U.S. Arms Package for Taiwan Awaits Trump’s Signature\nMarch 13, 2026\n\nA record \\$14 billion U.S. arms deal for Taiwan, including advanced interceptor missiles, is ready for Trump’s approval and could be announced after his March 31 Beijing summit with Xi Jinping, despite Chinese pressure to handle such sales with “prudence” [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/new-us-weapons-taiwan-could-be-approved-after-trumps-china-trip-sources-say-2026-03-13).\n\n##### U.S. Aircraft Transits Taiwan Strait\nMarch 11, 2026\n\nA U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon aircraft transited through the Taiwan Strait; the move precedes U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to China later in the month as the U.S. Navy stated its commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/us-navy-aircraft-transits-taiwan-strait-ahead-trumps-planned-china-visit-2026-03-11\/).\n\n##### China Blasts Taiwan Premier’s Japan Trip as “Evil Designs”\nMarch 9, 2026\n\nChina condemned Taiwan Premier Cho Jung-tai’s weekend visit to Japan, his country’s first premier to travel there since 1972, calling it a covert act of provocation; Tokyo declined to comment, stating the trip was to support Taiwan’s baseball team and was private [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/china-says-taiwan-premiers-japan-visit-harbours-evil-designs-2026-03-09).\n\n##### China’s Nuclear-Armed Submarines\nMarch 2, 2026\n\nChina is building submarines with capabilities to target the United States from waters close to the Chinese mainland, the head of U.S. naval intelligence said in testimony submitted to a congressional hearing [(U.S.-China ESRC)](https:\/\/www.uscc.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/2026-03\/RADM_Brookes_Testimony.pdf). At present, Chinese ballistic-missile submarines need to be in the vicinity of an island chain that includes Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, to target parts of the United States, he said; China’s push for naval modernization comes in contrast to the United States, which has been slow to build new submarines [(*WSJ*)](https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/china\/china-building-subs-that-can-strike-u-s-from-closer-to-home-u-s-navy-warns-f574c483).\n\n##### Reported Delay on Taiwan Arms Announcement\nFebruary 27, 2026\n\nThe Trump administration has delayed announcing a weapons sale to Taiwan over concerns about Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reaction, unnamed U.S. officials told the *New York* Times; the State Department said it does not discuss pending arms sales but that “the enduring U.S. commitment to Taiwan continues” [(*NYT*)](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/02\/27\/us\/politics\/trump-taiwan-arms-sale.html). Trump is due to travel to Beijing next month [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/trump-travel-china-march-31-april-2-amid-trade-tensions-2026-02-20\/).\n\n##### Australian Warship Transits Taiwan Strait\nFebruary 23, 2026\n\nAn Australian warship passed through the Taiwan Strait; Chinese state-backed media reported that the ship was tracked and monitored by China’s military [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/australian-warship-transits-taiwan-strait-tracked-by-chinas-navy-2026-02-22\/).\n\n##### U.S. Delays Taiwan Arms Package Amid Pressure Ahead of Beijing Visit\nFebruary 18, 2026\n\nU.S. officials are reconsidering a major arms sales package to Taiwan after Chinese President Xi Jinping urged President Trump to exercise caution during a recent phone call, raising concerns that approving the deal could disrupt Trump’s planned April visit to Beijing [(*WSJ*)](https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/china\/u-s-arms-sale-to-taiwan-in-limbo-amid-pressure-campaign-from-china-d228f912?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqd80QlinSYFlJ9k2wd5YNUZT-ON75HprobJpEmMdXgSgS0faH-efAki981q8pA%3D&gaa_ts=6998791f&gaa_sig=8CYmPaWGTAq5YyBheuuFWGdpPFyvaiMlaYxxb-zcByx_FyKiMOrql-wse5fa3POmE-YF4ybzeV_xSxV0aA8rKw%3D%3D).\n\n##### Trump’s Taiwan Policy\nFebruary 17, 2026\n\nThe White House issued a clarification that its policy on Taiwan remains unchanged after Trump said he had discussed arms sales to Taipei with Chinese President Xi Jinping; under a 1982 U.S. policy known as the Six Assurances to Taiwan, the United States pledged not to consult with Beijing on arms sales to Taipei [(FocusTaiwan)](https:\/\/focustaiwan.tw\/politics\/202602180005). The U.S. policy on Taiwan was a focus of a recent Trump-Xi call, the Chinese government said [(Chinese MoFA)](https:\/\/www.fmprc.gov.cn\/eng\/xw\/zyxw\/202602\/t20260205_11851262.html).\n\n##### Taiwan Parliament to Address Defense Spending Review After Holiday\nFebruary 16, 2026\n\nParliament speaker Han Kuo-Yu announced that the review of a \\$40 billion special defense spending budget will be prioritized after the week-long Lunar New Year holiday; the statement follows concerns expressed by U.S. lawmakers [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/taiwan-parliament-tackle-defence-spending-review-after-lunar-new-year-holiday-2026-02-16\/).\n\n##### U.S. Lawmakers Urge Taiwan to Advance Stalled Defense Spending Bill\nFebruary 13, 2026\n\nA bipartisan group of thirty-seven U.S. lawmakers warned Taiwanese political leaders that delaying a proposed \\$40 billion defense spending increase could undermine the island’s ability to deter growing threats from China; the letter urged parliament to approve higher military funding as concerns mount over Beijing’s expanding pressure and delays in U.S. weapons deliveries to Taiwan [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/us-lawmakers-step-up-pressure-taiwan-parliament-approve-defence-spending-2026-02-13\/).\n\n##### Taiwan-U.S. Trade Details\nFebruary 12, 2026\n\nThe U.S. Trade Representative’s office published details of a U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement reached last month; the deal lowers Taiwan’s base U.S. tariff rate to 15 percent—less than rates for many of its neighbors in Asia—while committing Taiwan to removing or lowering 99 percent of its tariffs on U.S. goods [(USTR)](https:\/\/ustr.gov\/about\/policy-offices\/press-office\/fact-sheets\/2026\/february\/fact-sheet-us-taiwan-agreement-reciprocal-trade). Taiwan pledged to buy around \\$85 billion of U.S. goods, including liquefied natural gas and crude oil, aircraft, and power-generation equipment by 2029 [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/us-taiwan-finalize-deal-cut-tariffs-boost-purchases-us-goods-2026-02-12\/). It also won tariff exemptions for more than two thousand products, President Lai Ching-te wrote on social media [(Facebook)](https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/chingte\/posts\/pfbid02ZHuRcs3XcpUb4Bm73fTSSnLvwb4adwqRN52tp7V3rxSVPWxaofLHvC8tnRyRmLpgl). The deal requires Taiwanese congressional approval [(AP)](https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/trump-taiwan-china-trade-deal-2b1743397ba33010463d41132b75ce53).\n\n##### China Vows to Crack Down on “Separatists”\nFebruary 10, 2026\n\nChina stated its commitment towards supporting “patriotic pro-reunification forces” and cracking down on “separatists”; the comments were made during this year’s annual “Taiwan Work Conference” [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/senior-chinese-official-calls-resolutely-cracking-down-taiwan-independence-2026-02-10\/).\n\n##### Japan-Taiwan Chip Cooperation\nFebruary 5, 2026\n\nThe Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company announced it is selecting Japan as the first location outside Taiwan to produce 3-nanometer semiconductors, some of its most advanced models; Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae called the partnership a “model case” for Tokyo’s policy to boost strategic technologies [(*FT*)](https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/83e0fd2a-1fa4-4004-9ffb-ef929075a497).\n\n##### Trump-Xi Call\nFebruary 4, 2026\n\nTrump wrote on social media that he and Xi discussed Iran, Taiwan, and Chinese purchases of U.S. fuel and soybeans on a call today [(Truth Social)](https:\/\/truthsocial.com\/@realDonaldTrump\/posts\/116013105630663812). The Chinese readout of the call said Xi stressed that Washington’s position on Taiwan was “the most important issue” in U.S.-China relations and that the United States should handle arms sales to Taiwan “with prudence” [(Chinese MoFA)](https:\/\/www.fmprc.gov.cn\/eng\/xw\/zyxw\/202602\/t20260205_11851262.html).\n\n##### Russia Reaffirms Support For China’s Position on Taiwan\nFebruary 1, 2026\n\nRussian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shogu told Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that Moscow continues to support Beijing's position on Taiwan; Russia has repeatedly stated that it considers Taiwan part of China and opposes its independence in any capacity [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/russias-shoigu-chinas-wang-yi-discuss-security-issues-2026-02-01\/).\n\n##### U.S.-Taiwan Tech Talks\nJanuary 27, 2026\n\nSenior U.S. and Taiwanese officials held talks on economic cooperation in Washington focusing on the tech sector; the meeting was the sixth edition of an annual U.S.-Taiwan dialogue launched in 2020 [(State)](https:\/\/www.state.gov\/releases\/2026\/01\/2026-u-s-taiwan-economic-prosperity-partnership-dialogue\/). Taiwan’s diplomatic office in the United States endorsed the so-called Pax Silica, a Trump administration effort to ensure joint access to chip and artificial intelligence materials [(Focus Taiwan)](https:\/\/focustaiwan.tw\/business\/202601280009).\n\n##### Chinese Military Purge\nJanuary 24, 2026\n\nChina’s top general was put under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law,” its defense ministry said, in an apparent extension of a purge within the senior ranks of the military; only one of the six generals that President Xi Jinping appointed to the country’s top military commission in 2022 has so far avoided removal [(*NYT*)](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/01\/24\/world\/asia\/china-top-general-xi-military-purge.html).\n\n##### Journalist Detained in Taiwan\nJanuary 18, 2026\n\nA journalist was detained on suspicion of bribing army officers to obtain military information allegedly passed to individuals in mainland China; his detention comes as Taiwan intensifies efforts to curb infiltration from Beijing [(AP)](https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/taiwan-national-security-journalist-cti-78a8064cc0efa1cf1644ef0676329293).\n\n##### New Trade and Technology Agreement Between U.S. and Taiwan\nJanuary 15, 2026\n\nA new bilateral trade agreement will see Taiwan invest \\$250 billion in U.S. chip and technology manufacturing, while the United States lowers its base tariff on Taiwanese goods from 20 to 15 percent; under the deal announced by the U.S. Commerce Department, Taiwan will also guarantee at least \\$250 billion in credit to Taiwanese businesses for their growth in the United States [(Commerce)](https:\/\/www.commerce.gov\/news\/fact-sheets\/2026\/01\/fact-sheet-restoring-american-semiconductor-manufacturing-leadership). Much of today’s global chip wafer production is based in Taiwan, where some officials argue that its status as a global chipmaking hub serves as an incentive for partners to defend the island against China’s threats [(CFR)](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/expert-brief\/trump-trade-policy-feeds-taiwan-growing-us-skepticism).\n\n##### Taiwan’s Tech Exports\nJanuary 10, 2026\n\nAccording to new data. Taiwan’s exports to the United States surpassed those to China last year for the first time in twenty-six years, driven by U.S. demand for high-tech products related to artificial intelligence systems [(*Nikkei*)](https:\/\/asia.nikkei.com\/economy\/trade\/taiwan-exports-to-us-overtake-those-to-china-on-ai-tech-demand). Taiwan is currently negotiating to reduce a 20 percent U.S. tariff on its exports; semiconductors are already excluded from that levy [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/taiwan-2025-exports-hit-record-strong-ai-demand-2026-01-09\/).\n\n### Sign Up for Our Newsletter\n#### Receive the Center for Preventive Action's quarterly snapshot of global hot spots with expert analysis on ways to prevent and mitigate deadly conflict.\n[Sign Up]()\n\n## Footer\n- [About](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/about)\n- [Member Programs](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/member-programs)\n- [Contact](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/contact-us)\n- [Support](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/support-cfr)\n- [For Media](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/media)\n- [Newsletters](https:\/\/link.cfr.org\/join\/66n\/signup&hash=2d4c5929e9e04cc42f5cd375fb8dcfb1)\n- [Membership](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/membership)\n- [Careers](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/career-opportunities)\n\n## Social Nav\n©2025 Council on Foreign Relations. All rights reserved. [Privacy Policy](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/privacy-policy) and [Terms of Use](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/terms-use).","attrs_readable_markdown":"Updated February 18, 2026\n\n[![icon\\_expand](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/images\/icons\/expand.svg)]()\n\n## Background\nTaiwan’s disputed status is a direct result of the Chinese Civil War, in which the defeated Nationalist (Kuomintang) government [fled the mainland](https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-asia-34729538) and moved its government to the island in 1949. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never exercised control over Taiwan, it claims that the island is an inalienable part of China that must be “reunified” with the mainland. In a [2022 white paper](https:\/\/english.news.cn\/20220810\/df9d3b8702154b34bbf1d451b99bf64a\/c.html), the PRC said the resolution of the Taiwan question is “indispensable for the realization of China’s rejuvenation” and a “historic mission” of the Chinese Communist Party. The PRC has a stated preference for seeking reunification through peaceful means but reserves the right [to use force](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden) to achieve its aims.\n\nTaiwan’s main political parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), hold differing views regarding Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China. President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT (2008–16) [championed](https:\/\/globaltaiwan.org\/2022\/09\/the-kmt-continues-to-grapple-with-its-1992-consensus\/) the “1992 Consensus,” in which both Taiwan and the PRC [agreed](https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2022\/07\/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart\/) that there is only one China—while differing on what “China” means. This (non-consensus) consensus allowed for cross-strait relations to expand and deepen, but led to criticism in Taiwan, as many Taiwanese feared that growing interdependence would limit Taiwan’s choices in the future. Taiwan’s previous president, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP, [declined](https:\/\/www.rand.org\/blog\/2020\/06\/is-the-1992-consensus-fading-away-in-the-taiwan-strait.html) to endorse the 1992 Consensus. As a result, the PRC [cut off](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2016\/06\/26\/world\/asia\/china-suspends-diplomatic-contact-with-taiwan.html) official communication in 2016 and has sought to punish Tsai through economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and heightened military activities.\n\nWhile the DPP is seen as the “pro-independence” party, President Tsai [stated](https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2021\/09\/taiwanese-presidents-will-not-and-can-not-unilaterally-change-taiwans-status\/) that there was no need for Taiwan to declare independence because it is already an independent country. In the wake of the PRC’s crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, Taiwan’s electorate has grown more skeptical of closer ties with the mainland, leading the “pro-China” KMT to struggle at the ballot box. In addition, [a 2022 poll from the National Chengchi University](https:\/\/esc.nccu.edu.tw\/PageDoc\/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963) in Taipei suggests a growing sense of Taiwanese national identity among the population and an increase in support for Taiwan’s eventual independence.\n\nThe ongoing dispute has led to heightened military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, which geographically separates mainland China from the island of Taiwan. In the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–55, the PRC shelled the Kinmen and Matsu islands, situated close to the mainland, in an unsuccessful [attempt to deter the United States](https:\/\/www.npr.org\/2022\/08\/02\/1115234980\/what-3-past-taiwan-strait-crises-can-teach-us-about-u-s-china-tensions-today) from signing a mutual defense treaty with the Nationalist government. Following the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, Taipei and Beijing reached a tacit understanding of a “[median line](https:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/news\/2022\/09\/07\/asia-pacific\/china-taiwan-median-line\/),” also called the center line, to guide rules of engagement and prevent miscalculation in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC repeated its artillery bombardment of Kinmen in 1958 during the [Second Taiwan Strait Crisis](https:\/\/www.rand.org\/pubs\/research_memoranda\/RM4900.html). In response, the United States drew up [plans for a nuclear strike](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2021\/05\/22\/us\/politics\/nuclear-war-risk-1958-us-china.html) on mainland China, demonstrating the Dwight Eisenhower administration’s Cold War commitment to Taiwan. The PRC fired [live ammunition and missiles](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/live\/2022\/08\/02\/world\/pelosi-taiwan) into Taiwan’s waters during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–96 to express disapproval of [Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s visit](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2022\/08\/05\/taiwan-pelosi-visit-china-miliary-exercises\/) to the United States.\n\nIn 1979, the United States abrogated the mutual defense treaty it had with Taiwan since 1954 and transferred its official diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. At that time, it acknowledged (but did not endorse) the PRC’s position that there is one China, and that Taiwan is a part of China. Rather, U.S. policy is to not take a position on Taiwan’s sovereignty and regard its ultimate status as undetermined. Also in 1979, President Jimmy Carter signed into law the [Taiwan Relations Act](https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/bill\/96th-congress\/house-bill\/2479) (TRA), which commits the United States to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” The TRA also obligates the United States to maintain the capacity “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.” The TRA, however, does not obligate the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense, and for decades U.S. presidents have refused to say whether they would intervene on Taiwan’s behalf—a policy known as strategic ambiguity.\n\n## Concerns\nTensions between China and the United States over Taiwan amount to a classic security dilemma: both are taking actions they view as defensive that the opposing side views as escalatory. A potential conflict between China and Taiwan has significant implications for U.S. security interests, as the United States would need to balance its desire to support Taiwan against the risks of a broader war with China. The United States has objected to China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan, which include [blocking its participation](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2022\/03\/24\/us\/politics\/china-taiwan-un.html) in international organizations, [interfering in its elections](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/taiwan-local-elections-are-where-chinas-disinformation-strategies-begin), pressuring [Taiwanese firms](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/markets\/commodities\/choose-side-china-tells-taiwan-firms-it-punishes-conglomerate-2021-11-22\/) to oppose independence, and [sanctioning its industries](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2022\/08\/12\/business\/china-taiwan-economy.html).\n\nMilitary activities near Taiwan have grown significantly in recent years. China is [developing the military capabilities](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/dods-2021-china-military-power-report-how-advances-ai-and-emerging-technologies-will-shape) of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—the U.S. Department of Defense’s [2021 Military Power Report](https:\/\/www.defense.gov\/News\/Releases\/Release\/Article\/2831819\/dod-releases-2021-report-on-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-pe\/) highlighted China’s prioritization of “joint long-range precision strikes across domains, increasingly sophisticated space, counterspace, and cyber capabilities, and accelerating the large-scale expansion of its nuclear forces.” Moreover, China has integrated emerging technology into its military strategy through an approach known as [“intelligentized” warfare](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/dods-2021-china-military-power-report-how-advances-ai-and-emerging-technologies-will-shape). The Department of Defense’s aforementioned report notes China seeks to dominate technologies associated with the “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing. The PRC increasingly [sends aircraft](https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/asia\/north-east-asia\/china\/chinas-military-activities-near-taiwan-aim-impress-home-and-abroad) into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone as a show of force, and in 2020, Taiwan reported a Chinese [cyberattack on ten government agencies](https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/news\/china\/diplomacy\/article\/3098012\/mainland-chinese-hackers-attacked-government-agencies-steal) to steal information. As the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has deteriorated, competition between the United States and China has intensified, and the prospect of China using force against Taiwan has risen. In an attempt to ensure Taiwan has the ability to defend itself and in response to a growing military gap, the Donald Trump administration sold more than [\\$18 billion in arms](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden) to Taiwan, and in 2020 the State Department [eliminated long-standing restrictions](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden) on U.S. diplomatic engagement with Taiwanese officials. Moreover, officials now acknowledge that a small but [expanding contingent](https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2023\/02\/23\/politics\/us-taiwan-forces-training\/index.html) of Marines has been secretly training Taiwan’s forces since at least 2021.\n\nTaiwan is the leading global producer of advanced semiconductors. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company produces [65 percent of the world’s semiconductors](https:\/\/www.voanews.com\/a\/race-for-semiconductors-influences-taiwan-conflict-\/6696432.html) and 90 percent of the most advanced chips. If conflict between China and Taiwan were to break out, global supply chains would be severely disrupted to the [detriment of U.S. interests](https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2021\/11\/how-taiwan-underwrites-the-us-defense-industrial-complex\/). Speaking in 2022 alongside MI5 General Director Ken McCallum in London, FBI Director Christopher Wray [warned](https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/national-security\/2022\/07\/06\/china-taiwan-fbi-wray-sanctions\/) that an invasion of Taiwan would “represent one of the most horrific business disruptions the world has ever seen,” as a potential sanctions regime against China would harm the global economy “at a much larger scale” than the current sanctions response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Bloomberg [reports](https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2022-10-07\/taiwan-tensions-spark-new-round-of-us-war-gaming-on-risk-to-tsmc#xj4y7vzkg) that the U.S. National Security Council anticipates that a Chinese attack and the corresponding loss of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company would cause a \\$1 trillion disruption to the global economy.\n\nA potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait also has implications for the territorial dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea. The PRC views the Senkaku\/Diaoyu Islands as a part of “Taiwan province” and may seek to take the islands during a conflict. If the PLA Navy were to occupy Taiwan, the Council on Foreign Relations’ [David Sacks argues](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/report\/enhancing-us-japan-coordination-taiwan-conflict) that Japan would struggle to defend its westernmost islands, as well as the Senkaku\/Diaoyu Islands, and even Okinawa. During its August 2022 military exercise aimed at Taiwan, China launched ballistic missiles over Taiwan that landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, in an attempt to warn Japan not to get involved during a Taiwan conflict. The late Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo stated that Japan and the United States [could not stand by](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/former-pm-abe-says-japan-us-could-not-stand-by-if-china-attacked-taiwan-2021-12-01\/) if China invaded Taiwan. Current Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has pledged to [double Japan’s defense spending](https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2022-08-25\/japan-set-to-become-one-of-world-s-biggest-defense-spenders) in response to the tense security climate. Taiwan’s and Japan’s islands form a crucial link in the so-called [first island chain](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/why-taiwan-important-united-states); if China were to take these islands, it would constrain U.S. naval movements and its ability to contain China in potential future conflicts.\n\n## Recent Developments\nIn response to China’s growing assertiveness toward Taiwan, the Joe Biden administration has maintained many aspects of the Trump administration’s approach. In a seeming departure from strategic ambiguity, President Biden remarked in May 2022 that the United States had a commitment [to come to Taiwan’s defense](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2022\/05\/23\/world\/asia\/biden-taiwan-china.html), if necessary, and that his administration would uphold that commitment. While the White House denied any formal change in U.S. policy, the president’s remarks [reflected a move toward “strategic clarity,”](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/what-bidens-big-shift-taiwan-means) a policy of explicit [commitment to defending Taiwan](https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/articles\/united-states\/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous) against the use of force by the PRC, rather than strategic ambiguity. President Biden has made [at least three](https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/news\/world\/joe-biden-china-us-forces-defend-taiwan-rcna48271?utm_source=dailybrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2022Sept19&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief) similar statements since 2021. Beijing, on the other hand, has accused Washington of [breaching its sovereignty](https:\/\/www.fmprc.gov.cn\/mfa_eng\/zxxx_662805\/202208\/t20220803_10732743.html) and abandoning its [One China policy](https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/one-china-policy-primer-web-final.pdf) \\[PDF\\].\n\nIn a further demonstration of support for Taiwan, [U.S. Speaker of the House]() Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) [visited Taipei in early August 2022](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/china-punishes-taiwan-pelosis-visit-what-comes-next) and met with President Tsai Ing-wen and democracy and human rights activists. Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan provoked severe condemnation from PRC officials. The PLA launched a four-day military drill and surrounded Taiwan, [simulating a blockade](https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2022-08-25\/japan-set-to-become-one-of-world-s-biggest-defense-spenders). The [live-fire exercises](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/china-punishes-taiwan-pelosis-visit-what-comes-next) were more extensive than those performed during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. Chinese military aircraft [crossed the median line](https:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/news\/2022\/09\/07\/asia-pacific\/china-taiwan-median-line\/) over three hundred times during the demonstration and continue to cross it on a near-daily basis, effectively [erasing the status quo](https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/2022\/09\/01\/chinas-violations-suggest-taiwan-decapitation-rehearsal-00054568). The PRC applied additional pressure through sanctions, halted exports, and, allegedly, [cyberattacks](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/taiwan-defence-ministry-website-hit-by-cyber-attacks-amid-china-tensions-2022-08-04\/).\n\nAfter Pelosi’s visit, several other U.S. delegations [visited](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/us-lawmaker-delegation-visiting-taiwan-this-week-2022-09-07\/) Taiwan, and President Tsai [met](https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/asia\/north-east-asia\/taiwan-strait\/assessing-implications-taiwanese-presidents-trip-us) with Pelosi’s successor as U.S. Speaker of the House, Kevin McCarthy, on a stopover in the United States. Meanwhile, China has [intensified](https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/f7922fdb-01bf-4ffd-9c5c-79f15468aa71) threatening air maneuvers, flying more frequently and closer to Taiwan, and Chinese warships have increasingly [joined](https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2023\/07\/17\/china\/china-navy-warships-around-taiwan-intl-hnk-ml\/index.html) in the movements.\n\nMore on Confrontation Over Taiwan\n\nNearby Conflicts\n\n##### China Reserves Airspace for Forty Days\nApril 5, 2026\n\nIn a report published by the *Wall Street Journal,* China has issued a forty-day restriction on its offshore airspace, issuing alerts similar to those used to inform aviation authorities of military exercises; the alerts, which are in effect from March 27 to May 6, were not previously reported, and China has not declared any exercises in the region [(*WSJ*)](https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/china\/china-creates-new-aviation-mystery-with-offshore-warning-zones-128b1ce5). According to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, the restricted zones include areas north and south of Shanghai and extend from the Yellow Sea to the East China Sea [(Taiwan News)](https:\/\/www.taiwannews.com.tw\/news\/6335025).\n\n##### Budget Delays in Taiwan Threaten \\$2.4 Billion in Defense Spending\nApril 1, 2026\n\nA delay in passing Taiwan’s budget risks holding up NT\\$78 billion (\\$2.44 billion) in weapons procurement, maintenance, and training, according to a senior defense official; the holdup comes as Taipei pushes for a major defense spending increase to deter China, but faces resistance from an opposition-led parliament wary of approving large expenditures without oversight [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/taiwan-military-says-budget-delay-threatens-24-billion-weapons-buying-training-2026-04-02\/).\n\n##### Japan’s Long-Range Missiles\nMarch 31, 2026\n\nJapan deployed its first long-range missile—capable of reaching mainland China—at an army camp in the country’s southwest; it plans to deploy even longer range Tomahawk missiles on a destroyer ship later this year [(AP)](https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/japan-china-taiwan-missile-longrange-40322ab51735b2ce17ce6f02d224d14f). The ability to strike enemy bases marks a departure from Tokyo’s postwar security doctrine, which has traditionally focused on self-defense [(Chosun Daily)](https:\/\/www.chosun.com\/english\/world-en\/2026\/04\/01\/GNGUW77H6ZDKBJLAZPHYJRLO5E\/).\n\n##### Taiwan Opposition Leader to Visit China in April\nMarch 30, 2026\n\nCheng Li-wun, the leader of Taiwan’s largest opposition party will visit China from April 7–12, meeting in Beijing, Jiangsu, and Shanghai after accepting an invitation from Chinese President Xi Jinping, as her party signals a push toward closer cross-strait ties than her predecessor pursued; the visit comes one month before U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to travel to Beijing for his own summit, while Taiwan’s ruling party urged Cheng to press Xi on Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic elections [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/taiwans-opposition-leader-visit-china-next-month-2026-03-30\/).\n\n##### U.S. Senators in Taiwan\nMarch 28, 2026\n\nA bipartisan delegation of U.S. senators began a visit to Taipei to rally support inside Taiwan for a \\$40 billion defense bill; the trip is the first such visit by U.S. senators since last summer [(*FT*)](https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/4e013aab-4e78-4368-aa06-940b3187e778). The legislation has stalled amid resistance from opposition lawmakers [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/taiwan-parliament-authorises-government-sign-stalled-us-arms-deals-2026-03-13\/).\n\n##### Taiwan Wary That China May Exploit U.S. Middle East Focus\nMarch 25, 2026\n\nTaiwanese officials warned that China is ramping up military pressure, including renewing large-scale air incursions near the island, to exploit U.S. force deployments to the Middle East to create perceptions of a weakened Indo-Pacific deterrence [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/taiwan-wary-that-china-could-exploit-us-distraction-over-middle-east-war-2026-03-25\/).\n\n##### Taipei Rejects Beijing’s Reunification Pitch\nMarch 19, 2026\n\nA spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said yesterday that “peaceful reunification” would ensure Taiwan’s energy security [(*SCMP*)](https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/news\/china\/politics\/article\/3347012\/mainland-china-says-taiwan-can-ease-iran-energy-supply-anxiety-peaceful-reunification). A senior Taiwanese official told lawmakers today that the proposition was “impossible” and that Taiwan had its own means to withstand global energy strains, including its energy reserves [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/taiwan-rejects-chinas-energy-security-reunification-offer-amid-middle-east-war-2026-03-19).\n\n##### U.S.-China Talks in Preparation for Trump-Xi Summit\nMarch 16, 2026\n\nU.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Premier He Lifeng concluded a two-day meeting in Paris today, intended to lay the groundwork for Trump’s planned trip to China later this month; unnamed sources told Reuters the talks have been “remarkably stable” [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/us-china-seek-wrap-paris-talks-managed-trade-agriculture-deals-xi-trump-summit-2026-03-16\/). But some bilateral tensions were visible in recent days: Trump said Sunday he might delay his trip as he urges China to help unblock the Strait of Hormuz, and China’s commerce ministry on Monday criticized the latest U.S. trade probe into China [(*FT*)](https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/1ca6d121-760b-4ec5-b6ad-514fdaa94873).\n\n##### China Resumes Large-Scale Military Flights Near Taiwan\nMarch 15, 2026\n\nTaiwan reported that China resumed large-scale air force operations around the island after more than two weeks of unusually limited activity, with twenty-six Chinese military aircraft detected near the Taiwan Strait over a twenty-four-hour period; the renewed flights followed sharp criticism from Beijing after Taiwan President Lai Ching-te called for stronger defense spending and measures to protect the island’s democracy [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/taiwan-says-large-scale-chinese-military-flights-return-after-unusual-absence-2026-03-15\/).\n\n##### \\$14 Billion U.S. Arms Package for Taiwan Awaits Trump’s Signature\nMarch 13, 2026\n\nA record \\$14 billion U.S. arms deal for Taiwan, including advanced interceptor missiles, is ready for Trump’s approval and could be announced after his March 31 Beijing summit with Xi Jinping, despite Chinese pressure to handle such sales with “prudence” [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/new-us-weapons-taiwan-could-be-approved-after-trumps-china-trip-sources-say-2026-03-13).\n\n##### U.S. Aircraft Transits Taiwan Strait\nMarch 11, 2026\n\nA U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon aircraft transited through the Taiwan Strait; the move precedes U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to China later in the month as the U.S. Navy stated its commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/us-navy-aircraft-transits-taiwan-strait-ahead-trumps-planned-china-visit-2026-03-11\/).\n\n##### China Blasts Taiwan Premier’s Japan Trip as “Evil Designs”\nMarch 9, 2026\n\nChina condemned Taiwan Premier Cho Jung-tai’s weekend visit to Japan, his country’s first premier to travel there since 1972, calling it a covert act of provocation; Tokyo declined to comment, stating the trip was to support Taiwan’s baseball team and was private [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/china-says-taiwan-premiers-japan-visit-harbours-evil-designs-2026-03-09).\n\n##### China’s Nuclear-Armed Submarines\nMarch 2, 2026\n\nChina is building submarines with capabilities to target the United States from waters close to the Chinese mainland, the head of U.S. naval intelligence said in testimony submitted to a congressional hearing [(U.S.-China ESRC)](https:\/\/www.uscc.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/2026-03\/RADM_Brookes_Testimony.pdf). At present, Chinese ballistic-missile submarines need to be in the vicinity of an island chain that includes Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, to target parts of the United States, he said; China’s push for naval modernization comes in contrast to the United States, which has been slow to build new submarines [(*WSJ*)](https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/china\/china-building-subs-that-can-strike-u-s-from-closer-to-home-u-s-navy-warns-f574c483).\n\n##### Reported Delay on Taiwan Arms Announcement\nFebruary 27, 2026\n\nThe Trump administration has delayed announcing a weapons sale to Taiwan over concerns about Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reaction, unnamed U.S. officials told the *New York* Times; the State Department said it does not discuss pending arms sales but that “the enduring U.S. commitment to Taiwan continues” [(*NYT*)](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/02\/27\/us\/politics\/trump-taiwan-arms-sale.html). Trump is due to travel to Beijing next month [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/trump-travel-china-march-31-april-2-amid-trade-tensions-2026-02-20\/).\n\n##### Australian Warship Transits Taiwan Strait\nFebruary 23, 2026\n\nAn Australian warship passed through the Taiwan Strait; Chinese state-backed media reported that the ship was tracked and monitored by China’s military [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/australian-warship-transits-taiwan-strait-tracked-by-chinas-navy-2026-02-22\/).\n\n##### U.S. Delays Taiwan Arms Package Amid Pressure Ahead of Beijing Visit\nFebruary 18, 2026\n\nU.S. officials are reconsidering a major arms sales package to Taiwan after Chinese President Xi Jinping urged President Trump to exercise caution during a recent phone call, raising concerns that approving the deal could disrupt Trump’s planned April visit to Beijing [(*WSJ*)](https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/china\/u-s-arms-sale-to-taiwan-in-limbo-amid-pressure-campaign-from-china-d228f912?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqd80QlinSYFlJ9k2wd5YNUZT-ON75HprobJpEmMdXgSgS0faH-efAki981q8pA%3D&gaa_ts=6998791f&gaa_sig=8CYmPaWGTAq5YyBheuuFWGdpPFyvaiMlaYxxb-zcByx_FyKiMOrql-wse5fa3POmE-YF4ybzeV_xSxV0aA8rKw%3D%3D).\n\n##### Trump’s Taiwan Policy\nFebruary 17, 2026\n\nThe White House issued a clarification that its policy on Taiwan remains unchanged after Trump said he had discussed arms sales to Taipei with Chinese President Xi Jinping; under a 1982 U.S. policy known as the Six Assurances to Taiwan, the United States pledged not to consult with Beijing on arms sales to Taipei [(FocusTaiwan)](https:\/\/focustaiwan.tw\/politics\/202602180005). The U.S. policy on Taiwan was a focus of a recent Trump-Xi call, the Chinese government said [(Chinese MoFA)](https:\/\/www.fmprc.gov.cn\/eng\/xw\/zyxw\/202602\/t20260205_11851262.html).\n\n##### Taiwan Parliament to Address Defense Spending Review After Holiday\nFebruary 16, 2026\n\nParliament speaker Han Kuo-Yu announced that the review of a \\$40 billion special defense spending budget will be prioritized after the week-long Lunar New Year holiday; the statement follows concerns expressed by U.S. lawmakers [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/taiwan-parliament-tackle-defence-spending-review-after-lunar-new-year-holiday-2026-02-16\/).\n\n##### U.S. Lawmakers Urge Taiwan to Advance Stalled Defense Spending Bill\nFebruary 13, 2026\n\nA bipartisan group of thirty-seven U.S. lawmakers warned Taiwanese political leaders that delaying a proposed \\$40 billion defense spending increase could undermine the island’s ability to deter growing threats from China; the letter urged parliament to approve higher military funding as concerns mount over Beijing’s expanding pressure and delays in U.S. weapons deliveries to Taiwan [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/us-lawmakers-step-up-pressure-taiwan-parliament-approve-defence-spending-2026-02-13\/).\n\n##### Taiwan-U.S. Trade Details\nFebruary 12, 2026\n\nThe U.S. Trade Representative’s office published details of a U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement reached last month; the deal lowers Taiwan’s base U.S. tariff rate to 15 percent—less than rates for many of its neighbors in Asia—while committing Taiwan to removing or lowering 99 percent of its tariffs on U.S. goods [(USTR)](https:\/\/ustr.gov\/about\/policy-offices\/press-office\/fact-sheets\/2026\/february\/fact-sheet-us-taiwan-agreement-reciprocal-trade). Taiwan pledged to buy around \\$85 billion of U.S. goods, including liquefied natural gas and crude oil, aircraft, and power-generation equipment by 2029 [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/us-taiwan-finalize-deal-cut-tariffs-boost-purchases-us-goods-2026-02-12\/). It also won tariff exemptions for more than two thousand products, President Lai Ching-te wrote on social media [(Facebook)](https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/chingte\/posts\/pfbid02ZHuRcs3XcpUb4Bm73fTSSnLvwb4adwqRN52tp7V3rxSVPWxaofLHvC8tnRyRmLpgl). The deal requires Taiwanese congressional approval [(AP)](https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/trump-taiwan-china-trade-deal-2b1743397ba33010463d41132b75ce53).\n\n##### China Vows to Crack Down on “Separatists”\nFebruary 10, 2026\n\nChina stated its commitment towards supporting “patriotic pro-reunification forces” and cracking down on “separatists”; the comments were made during this year’s annual “Taiwan Work Conference” [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/senior-chinese-official-calls-resolutely-cracking-down-taiwan-independence-2026-02-10\/).\n\n##### Japan-Taiwan Chip Cooperation\nFebruary 5, 2026\n\nThe Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company announced it is selecting Japan as the first location outside Taiwan to produce 3-nanometer semiconductors, some of its most advanced models; Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae called the partnership a “model case” for Tokyo’s policy to boost strategic technologies [(*FT*)](https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/83e0fd2a-1fa4-4004-9ffb-ef929075a497).\n\n##### Trump-Xi Call\nFebruary 4, 2026\n\nTrump wrote on social media that he and Xi discussed Iran, Taiwan, and Chinese purchases of U.S. fuel and soybeans on a call today [(Truth Social)](https:\/\/truthsocial.com\/@realDonaldTrump\/posts\/116013105630663812). The Chinese readout of the call said Xi stressed that Washington’s position on Taiwan was “the most important issue” in U.S.-China relations and that the United States should handle arms sales to Taiwan “with prudence” [(Chinese MoFA)](https:\/\/www.fmprc.gov.cn\/eng\/xw\/zyxw\/202602\/t20260205_11851262.html).\n\n##### Russia Reaffirms Support For China’s Position on Taiwan\nFebruary 1, 2026\n\nRussian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shogu told Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that Moscow continues to support Beijing's position on Taiwan; Russia has repeatedly stated that it considers Taiwan part of China and opposes its independence in any capacity [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/russias-shoigu-chinas-wang-yi-discuss-security-issues-2026-02-01\/).\n\n##### U.S.-Taiwan Tech Talks\nJanuary 27, 2026\n\nSenior U.S. and Taiwanese officials held talks on economic cooperation in Washington focusing on the tech sector; the meeting was the sixth edition of an annual U.S.-Taiwan dialogue launched in 2020 [(State)](https:\/\/www.state.gov\/releases\/2026\/01\/2026-u-s-taiwan-economic-prosperity-partnership-dialogue\/). Taiwan’s diplomatic office in the United States endorsed the so-called Pax Silica, a Trump administration effort to ensure joint access to chip and artificial intelligence materials [(Focus Taiwan)](https:\/\/focustaiwan.tw\/business\/202601280009).\n\n##### Chinese Military Purge\nJanuary 24, 2026\n\nChina’s top general was put under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law,” its defense ministry said, in an apparent extension of a purge within the senior ranks of the military; only one of the six generals that President Xi Jinping appointed to the country’s top military commission in 2022 has so far avoided removal [(*NYT*)](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/01\/24\/world\/asia\/china-top-general-xi-military-purge.html).\n\n##### Journalist Detained in Taiwan\nJanuary 18, 2026\n\nA journalist was detained on suspicion of bribing army officers to obtain military information allegedly passed to individuals in mainland China; his detention comes as Taiwan intensifies efforts to curb infiltration from Beijing [(AP)](https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/taiwan-national-security-journalist-cti-78a8064cc0efa1cf1644ef0676329293).\n\n##### New Trade and Technology Agreement Between U.S. and Taiwan\nJanuary 15, 2026\n\nA new bilateral trade agreement will see Taiwan invest \\$250 billion in U.S. chip and technology manufacturing, while the United States lowers its base tariff on Taiwanese goods from 20 to 15 percent; under the deal announced by the U.S. Commerce Department, Taiwan will also guarantee at least \\$250 billion in credit to Taiwanese businesses for their growth in the United States [(Commerce)](https:\/\/www.commerce.gov\/news\/fact-sheets\/2026\/01\/fact-sheet-restoring-american-semiconductor-manufacturing-leadership). Much of today’s global chip wafer production is based in Taiwan, where some officials argue that its status as a global chipmaking hub serves as an incentive for partners to defend the island against China’s threats [(CFR)](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/expert-brief\/trump-trade-policy-feeds-taiwan-growing-us-skepticism).\n\n##### Taiwan’s Tech Exports\nJanuary 10, 2026\n\nAccording to new data. Taiwan’s exports to the United States surpassed those to China last year for the first time in twenty-six years, driven by U.S. demand for high-tech products related to artificial intelligence systems [(*Nikkei*)](https:\/\/asia.nikkei.com\/economy\/trade\/taiwan-exports-to-us-overtake-those-to-china-on-ai-tech-demand). Taiwan is currently negotiating to reduce a 20 percent U.S. tariff on its exports; semiconductors are already excluded from that levy [(Reuters)](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/taiwan-2025-exports-hit-record-strong-ai-demand-2026-01-09\/).\n\n### Sign Up for Our Newsletter\nReceive the Center for Preventive Action's quarterly snapshot of global hot spots with expert analysis on ways to prevent and mitigate deadly conflict.","meta_canonical":null}

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URL	https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-over-taiwan
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Meta Title	Confrontation Over Taiwan \| Global Conflict Tracker
Meta Description	Background  Taiwan’s disputed status is a direct result of the Chinese Civil War, in which the defeated Nationalist (Kuomintang) government fled the mainland and moved its government to the island in 1949. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never exercised control over Taiwan, it claims that the island is an inalienable part of China that must be “reunified” with the mainland.
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Boilerpipe Text	Updated February 18, 2026 Background  Taiwan’s disputed status is a direct result of the Chinese Civil War, in which the defeated Nationalist (Kuomintang) government fled the mainland and moved its government to the island in 1949. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never exercised control over Taiwan, it claims that the island is an inalienable part of China that must be “reunified” with the mainland. In a 2022 white paper , the PRC said the resolution of the Taiwan question is “indispensable for the realization of China’s rejuvenation” and a “historic mission” of the Chinese Communist Party. The PRC has a stated preference for seeking reunification through peaceful means but reserves the right to use force to achieve its aims. Taiwan’s main political parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), hold differing views regarding Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China. President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT (2008–16) championed the “1992 Consensus,” in which both Taiwan and the PRC agreed that there is only one China—while differing on what “China” means. This (non-consensus) consensus allowed for cross-strait relations to expand and deepen, but led to criticism in Taiwan, as many Taiwanese feared that growing interdependence would limit Taiwan’s choices in the future. Taiwan’s previous president, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP, declined to endorse the 1992 Consensus. As a result, the PRC cut off official communication in 2016 and has sought to punish Tsai through economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and heightened military activities. While the DPP is seen as the “pro-independence” party, President Tsai stated that there was no need for Taiwan to declare independence because it is already an independent country. In the wake of the PRC’s crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, Taiwan’s electorate has grown more skeptical of closer ties with the mainland, leading the “pro-China” KMT to struggle at the ballot box. In addition, a 2022 poll from the National Chengchi University in Taipei suggests a growing sense of Taiwanese national identity among the population and an increase in support for Taiwan’s eventual independence. The ongoing dispute has led to heightened military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, which geographically separates mainland China from the island of Taiwan. In the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–55, the PRC shelled the Kinmen and Matsu islands, situated close to the mainland, in an unsuccessful attempt to deter the United States from signing a mutual defense treaty with the Nationalist government. Following the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, Taipei and Beijing reached a tacit understanding of a “ median line ,” also called the center line, to guide rules of engagement and prevent miscalculation in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC repeated its artillery bombardment of Kinmen in 1958 during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis . In response, the United States drew up plans for a nuclear strike on mainland China, demonstrating the Dwight Eisenhower administration’s Cold War commitment to Taiwan. The PRC fired live ammunition and missiles into Taiwan’s waters during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–96 to express disapproval of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States. In 1979, the United States abrogated the mutual defense treaty it had with Taiwan since 1954 and transferred its official diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. At that time, it acknowledged (but did not endorse) the PRC’s position that there is one China, and that Taiwan is a part of China. Rather, U.S. policy is to not take a position on Taiwan’s sovereignty and regard its ultimate status as undetermined. Also in 1979, President Jimmy Carter signed into law the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which commits the United States to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” The TRA also obligates the United States to maintain the capacity “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.” The TRA, however, does not obligate the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense, and for decades U.S. presidents have refused to say whether they would intervene on Taiwan’s behalf—a policy known as strategic ambiguity. Concerns  Tensions between China and the United States over Taiwan amount to a classic security dilemma: both are taking actions they view as defensive that the opposing side views as escalatory. A potential conflict between China and Taiwan has significant implications for U.S. security interests, as the United States would need to balance its desire to support Taiwan against the risks of a broader war with China. The United States has objected to China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan, which include blocking its participation in international organizations, interfering in its elections , pressuring Taiwanese firms to oppose independence, and sanctioning its industries . Military activities near Taiwan have grown significantly in recent years. China is developing the military capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2021 Military Power Report highlighted China’s prioritization of “joint long-range precision strikes across domains, increasingly sophisticated space, counterspace, and cyber capabilities, and accelerating the large-scale expansion of its nuclear forces.” Moreover, China has integrated emerging technology into its military strategy through an approach known as “intelligentized” warfare . The Department of Defense’s aforementioned report notes China seeks to dominate technologies associated with the “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing. The PRC increasingly sends aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone as a show of force, and in 2020, Taiwan reported a Chinese cyberattack on ten government agencies to steal information. As the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has deteriorated, competition between the United States and China has intensified, and the prospect of China using force against Taiwan has risen. In an attempt to ensure Taiwan has the ability to defend itself and in response to a growing military gap, the Donald Trump administration sold more than $18 billion in arms to Taiwan, and in 2020 the State Department eliminated long-standing restrictions on U.S. diplomatic engagement with Taiwanese officials. Moreover, officials now acknowledge that a small but expanding contingent of Marines has been secretly training Taiwan’s forces since at least 2021. Taiwan is the leading global producer of advanced semiconductors. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company produces 65 percent of the world’s semiconductors and 90 percent of the most advanced chips. If conflict between China and Taiwan were to break out, global supply chains would be severely disrupted to the detriment of U.S. interests . Speaking in 2022 alongside MI5 General Director Ken McCallum in London, FBI Director Christopher Wray warned that an invasion of Taiwan would “represent one of the most horrific business disruptions the world has ever seen,” as a potential sanctions regime against China would harm the global economy “at a much larger scale” than the current sanctions response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Bloomberg reports that the U.S. National Security Council anticipates that a Chinese attack and the corresponding loss of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company would cause a $1 trillion disruption to the global economy. A potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait also has implications for the territorial dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea. The PRC views the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as a part of “Taiwan province” and may seek to take the islands during a conflict. If the PLA Navy were to occupy Taiwan, the Council on Foreign Relations’ David Sacks argues that Japan would struggle to defend its westernmost islands, as well as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and even Okinawa. During its August 2022 military exercise aimed at Taiwan, China launched ballistic missiles over Taiwan that landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, in an attempt to warn Japan not to get involved during a Taiwan conflict. The late Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo stated that Japan and the United States could not stand by if China invaded Taiwan. Current Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has pledged to double Japan’s defense spending in response to the tense security climate. Taiwan’s and Japan’s islands form a crucial link in the so-called first island chain ; if China were to take these islands, it would constrain U.S. naval movements and its ability to contain China in potential future conflicts. Recent Developments  In response to China’s growing assertiveness toward Taiwan, the Joe Biden administration has maintained many aspects of the Trump administration’s approach. In a seeming departure from strategic ambiguity, President Biden remarked in May 2022 that the United States had a commitment to come to Taiwan’s defense , if necessary, and that his administration would uphold that commitment. While the White House denied any formal change in U.S. policy, the president’s remarks reflected a move toward “strategic clarity,” a policy of explicit commitment to defending Taiwan against the use of force by the PRC, rather than strategic ambiguity. President Biden has made at least three similar statements since 2021. Beijing, on the other hand, has accused Washington of breaching its sovereignty and abandoning its One China policy [PDF]. In a further demonstration of support for Taiwan, U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) visited Taipei in early August 2022 and met with President Tsai Ing-wen and democracy and human rights activists. Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan provoked severe condemnation from PRC officials. The PLA launched a four-day military drill and surrounded Taiwan, simulating a blockade . The live-fire exercises were more extensive than those performed during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. Chinese military aircraft crossed the median line over three hundred times during the demonstration and continue to cross it on a near-daily basis, effectively erasing the status quo . The PRC applied additional pressure through sanctions, halted exports, and, allegedly, cyberattacks . After Pelosi’s visit, several other U.S. delegations visited Taiwan, and President Tsai met with Pelosi’s successor as U.S. Speaker of the House, Kevin McCarthy, on a stopover in the United States. Meanwhile, China has intensified threatening air maneuvers, flying more frequently and closer to Taiwan, and Chinese warships have increasingly joined in the movements. More on Confrontation Over Taiwan Nearby Conflicts China Reserves Airspace for Forty Days April 5, 2026 In a report published by the Wall Street Journal, China has issued a forty-day restriction on its offshore airspace, issuing alerts similar to those used to inform aviation authorities of military exercises; the alerts, which are in effect from March 27 to May 6, were not previously reported, and China has not declared any exercises in the region ( WSJ ) . According to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, the restricted zones include areas north and south of Shanghai and extend from the Yellow Sea to the East China Sea (Taiwan News) . Budget Delays in Taiwan Threaten $2.4 Billion in Defense Spending April 1, 2026 A delay in passing Taiwan’s budget risks holding up NT$78 billion ($2.44 billion) in weapons procurement, maintenance, and training, according to a senior defense official; the holdup comes as Taipei pushes for a major defense spending increase to deter China, but faces resistance from an opposition-led parliament wary of approving large expenditures without oversight (Reuters) . Japan’s Long-Range Missiles March 31, 2026 Japan deployed its first long-range missile—capable of reaching mainland China—at an army camp in the country’s southwest; it plans to deploy even longer range Tomahawk missiles on a destroyer ship later this year (AP) . The ability to strike enemy bases marks a departure from Tokyo’s postwar security doctrine, which has traditionally focused on self-defense (Chosun Daily) . Taiwan Opposition Leader to Visit China in April March 30, 2026 Cheng Li-wun, the leader of Taiwan’s largest opposition party will visit China from April 7–12, meeting in Beijing, Jiangsu, and Shanghai after accepting an invitation from Chinese President Xi Jinping, as her party signals a push toward closer cross-strait ties than her predecessor pursued; the visit comes one month before U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to travel to Beijing for his own summit, while Taiwan’s ruling party urged Cheng to press Xi on Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic elections (Reuters) . U.S. Senators in Taiwan March 28, 2026 A bipartisan delegation of U.S. senators began a visit to Taipei to rally support inside Taiwan for a $40 billion defense bill; the trip is the first such visit by U.S. senators since last summer ( FT ) . The legislation has stalled amid resistance from opposition lawmakers (Reuters) . Taiwan Wary That China May Exploit U.S. Middle East Focus March 25, 2026 Taiwanese officials warned that China is ramping up military pressure, including renewing large-scale air incursions near the island, to exploit U.S. force deployments to the Middle East to create perceptions of a weakened Indo-Pacific deterrence (Reuters) . Taipei Rejects Beijing’s Reunification Pitch March 19, 2026 A spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said yesterday that “peaceful reunification” would ensure Taiwan’s energy security ( SCMP ) . A senior Taiwanese official told lawmakers today that the proposition was “impossible” and that Taiwan had its own means to withstand global energy strains, including its energy reserves (Reuters) . U.S.-China Talks in Preparation for Trump-Xi Summit March 16, 2026 U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Premier He Lifeng concluded a two-day meeting in Paris today, intended to lay the groundwork for Trump’s planned trip to China later this month; unnamed sources told Reuters the talks have been “remarkably stable” (Reuters) . But some bilateral tensions were visible in recent days: Trump said Sunday he might delay his trip as he urges China to help unblock the Strait of Hormuz, and China’s commerce ministry on Monday criticized the latest U.S. trade probe into China ( FT ) . China Resumes Large-Scale Military Flights Near Taiwan March 15, 2026 Taiwan reported that China resumed large-scale air force operations around the island after more than two weeks of unusually limited activity, with twenty-six Chinese military aircraft detected near the Taiwan Strait over a twenty-four-hour period; the renewed flights followed sharp criticism from Beijing after Taiwan President Lai Ching-te called for stronger defense spending and measures to protect the island’s democracy (Reuters) . $14 Billion U.S. Arms Package for Taiwan Awaits Trump’s Signature March 13, 2026 A record $14 billion U.S. arms deal for Taiwan, including advanced interceptor missiles, is ready for Trump’s approval and could be announced after his March 31 Beijing summit with Xi Jinping, despite Chinese pressure to handle such sales with “prudence” (Reuters) . U.S. Aircraft Transits Taiwan Strait March 11, 2026 A U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon aircraft transited through the Taiwan Strait; the move precedes U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to China later in the month as the U.S. Navy stated its commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific (Reuters) . China Blasts Taiwan Premier’s Japan Trip as “Evil Designs” March 9, 2026 China condemned Taiwan Premier Cho Jung-tai’s weekend visit to Japan, his country’s first premier to travel there since 1972, calling it a covert act of provocation; Tokyo declined to comment, stating the trip was to support Taiwan’s baseball team and was private (Reuters) . China’s Nuclear-Armed Submarines March 2, 2026 China is building submarines with capabilities to target the United States from waters close to the Chinese mainland, the head of U.S. naval intelligence said in testimony submitted to a congressional hearing (U.S.-China ESRC) . At present, Chinese ballistic-missile submarines need to be in the vicinity of an island chain that includes Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, to target parts of the United States, he said; China’s push for naval modernization comes in contrast to the United States, which has been slow to build new submarines ( WSJ ) . Reported Delay on Taiwan Arms Announcement February 27, 2026 The Trump administration has delayed announcing a weapons sale to Taiwan over concerns about Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reaction, unnamed U.S. officials told the New York Times; the State Department said it does not discuss pending arms sales but that “the enduring U.S. commitment to Taiwan continues” ( NYT ) . Trump is due to travel to Beijing next month (Reuters) . Australian Warship Transits Taiwan Strait February 23, 2026 An Australian warship passed through the Taiwan Strait; Chinese state-backed media reported that the ship was tracked and monitored by China’s military (Reuters) . U.S. Delays Taiwan Arms Package Amid Pressure Ahead of Beijing Visit February 18, 2026 U.S. officials are reconsidering a major arms sales package to Taiwan after Chinese President Xi Jinping urged President Trump to exercise caution during a recent phone call, raising concerns that approving the deal could disrupt Trump’s planned April visit to Beijing ( WSJ ) . Trump’s Taiwan Policy February 17, 2026 The White House issued a clarification that its policy on Taiwan remains unchanged after Trump said he had discussed arms sales to Taipei with Chinese President Xi Jinping; under a 1982 U.S. policy known as the Six Assurances to Taiwan, the United States pledged not to consult with Beijing on arms sales to Taipei (FocusTaiwan) . The U.S. policy on Taiwan was a focus of a recent Trump-Xi call, the Chinese government said (Chinese MoFA) . Taiwan Parliament to Address Defense Spending Review After Holiday February 16, 2026 Parliament speaker Han Kuo-Yu announced that the review of a $40 billion special defense spending budget will be prioritized after the week-long Lunar New Year holiday; the statement follows concerns expressed by U.S. lawmakers (Reuters) . U.S. Lawmakers Urge Taiwan to Advance Stalled Defense Spending Bill February 13, 2026 A bipartisan group of thirty-seven U.S. lawmakers warned Taiwanese political leaders that delaying a proposed $40 billion defense spending increase could undermine the island’s ability to deter growing threats from China; the letter urged parliament to approve higher military funding as concerns mount over Beijing’s expanding pressure and delays in U.S. weapons deliveries to Taiwan (Reuters) . Taiwan-U.S. Trade Details February 12, 2026 The U.S. Trade Representative’s office published details of a U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement reached last month; the deal lowers Taiwan’s base U.S. tariff rate to 15 percent—less than rates for many of its neighbors in Asia—while committing Taiwan to removing or lowering 99 percent of its tariffs on U.S. goods (USTR) . Taiwan pledged to buy around $85 billion of U.S. goods, including liquefied natural gas and crude oil, aircraft, and power-generation equipment by 2029 (Reuters) . It also won tariff exemptions for more than two thousand products, President Lai Ching-te wrote on social media (Facebook) . The deal requires Taiwanese congressional approval (AP) . China Vows to Crack Down on “Separatists” February 10, 2026 China stated its commitment towards supporting “patriotic pro-reunification forces” and cracking down on “separatists”; the comments were made during this year’s annual “Taiwan Work Conference” (Reuters) . Japan-Taiwan Chip Cooperation February 5, 2026 The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company announced it is selecting Japan as the first location outside Taiwan to produce 3-nanometer semiconductors, some of its most advanced models; Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae called the partnership a “model case” for Tokyo’s policy to boost strategic technologies ( FT ) . Trump-Xi Call February 4, 2026 Trump wrote on social media that he and Xi discussed Iran, Taiwan, and Chinese purchases of U.S. fuel and soybeans on a call today (Truth Social) . The Chinese readout of the call said Xi stressed that Washington’s position on Taiwan was “the most important issue” in U.S.-China relations and that the United States should handle arms sales to Taiwan “with prudence” (Chinese MoFA) . Russia Reaffirms Support For China’s Position on Taiwan February 1, 2026 Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shogu told Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that Moscow continues to support Beijing's position on Taiwan; Russia has repeatedly stated that it considers Taiwan part of China and opposes its independence in any capacity (Reuters) . U.S.-Taiwan Tech Talks January 27, 2026 Senior U.S. and Taiwanese officials held talks on economic cooperation in Washington focusing on the tech sector; the meeting was the sixth edition of an annual U.S.-Taiwan dialogue launched in 2020 (State) . Taiwan’s diplomatic office in the United States endorsed the so-called Pax Silica, a Trump administration effort to ensure joint access to chip and artificial intelligence materials (Focus Taiwan) . Chinese Military Purge January 24, 2026 China’s top general was put under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law,” its defense ministry said, in an apparent extension of a purge within the senior ranks of the military; only one of the six generals that President Xi Jinping appointed to the country’s top military commission in 2022 has so far avoided removal ( NYT ) . Journalist Detained in Taiwan January 18, 2026 A journalist was detained on suspicion of bribing army officers to obtain military information allegedly passed to individuals in mainland China; his detention comes as Taiwan intensifies efforts to curb infiltration from Beijing (AP) . New Trade and Technology Agreement Between U.S. and Taiwan January 15, 2026 A new bilateral trade agreement will see Taiwan invest $250 billion in U.S. chip and technology manufacturing, while the United States lowers its base tariff on Taiwanese goods from 20 to 15 percent; under the deal announced by the U.S. Commerce Department, Taiwan will also guarantee at least $250 billion in credit to Taiwanese businesses for their growth in the United States (Commerce) . Much of today’s global chip wafer production is based in Taiwan, where some officials argue that its status as a global chipmaking hub serves as an incentive for partners to defend the island against China’s threats (CFR) . Taiwan’s Tech Exports January 10, 2026 According to new data. Taiwan’s exports to the United States surpassed those to China last year for the first time in twenty-six years, driven by U.S. demand for high-tech products related to artificial intelligence systems ( Nikkei ) . Taiwan is currently negotiating to reduce a 20 percent U.S. tariff on its exports; semiconductors are already excluded from that levy (Reuters) . Sign Up for Our Newsletter Receive the Center for Preventive Action's quarterly snapshot of global hot spots with expert analysis on ways to prevent and mitigate deadly conflict.
Markdown	[Skip to main content](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-over-taiwan#main-content) [Global Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker) ## Main navigation - [Methodology](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/methodology) - [Center for Preventive Action](https://www.cfr.org/programs/center-preventive-action) [Global Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker) ## Main navigation - [Methodology](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/methodology) - [Center for Preventive Action](https://www.cfr.org/programs/center-preventive-action) [Back to Map](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker) # Confrontation Over Taiwan By the [Center for Preventive Action](https://www.cfr.org/programs/center-preventive-action) Updated February 18, 2026 [![icon\_expand](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/images/icons/expand.svg)]() ![Two soldiers run through sand.](https://assets.cfr.org/images/t_gct_w1200/v1755541607/globalconflicttracker/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_18/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_18.jpg?_i=AA) The PLA Navy and the PLA Army conduct a cross-day and all-factor live-fire red-blue confrontation drill in Zhangzhou City, Fujian Province, China, on August 24, 2022. CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images ![Large naval vessel moves through Taiwan Strait.](https://assets.cfr.org/images/t_gct_w1200/v1755541612/globalconflicttracker/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_20/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_20.jpg?_i=AA) Legend-class U.S. Coast Guard National Security Cutter Munro transits the Taiwan Strait during a routine transit with Arleigh-burke class guided-missile destroyer USS Kidd on August 27, 2021 Kaylianna Genier/U.S. 7th Fleet Public Affairs ![Tanks move on beach](https://assets.cfr.org/images/t_gct_w1200/v1755541602/globalconflicttracker/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_14_0/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_14_0.jpg?_i=AA) The PLA Navy and the PLA Army conduct a cross-day and all-factor live-fire red-blue confrontation drill in Zhangzhou City, Fujian Province, China, on August 24, 2022. CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images ![Amphibious vehicles land on beach.](https://assets.cfr.org/images/t_gct_w1200/v1755541596/globalconflicttracker/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_06/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_06.jpg?_i=AA) Amphibious armoured vehicles under Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theatre Command take part in an assault wave formation training exercise in Zhangzhou, Fujian Province, China, on August 14, 2022. CNS Photo via Reuters ![Tank shoots missile in front of mountain.](https://assets.cfr.org/images/t_gct_w1200/v1755541616/globalconflicttracker/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_17/Confrontation-Over-Taiwan-Taiwan_17.jpg?_i=AA) The PLA Navy and the PLA Army conduct a cross-day and all-factor live-fire red-blue confrontation drill in Zhangzhou City, Fujian Province, China, on August 24, 2022. CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images Previous Next ## Background Taiwan’s disputed status is a direct result of the Chinese Civil War, in which the defeated Nationalist (Kuomintang) government [fled the mainland](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34729538) and moved its government to the island in 1949. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never exercised control over Taiwan, it claims that the island is an inalienable part of China that must be “reunified” with the mainland. In a [2022 white paper](https://english.news.cn/20220810/df9d3b8702154b34bbf1d451b99bf64a/c.html), the PRC said the resolution of the Taiwan question is “indispensable for the realization of China’s rejuvenation” and a “historic mission” of the Chinese Communist Party. The PRC has a stated preference for seeking reunification through peaceful means but reserves the right [to use force](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden) to achieve its aims. Taiwan’s main political parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), hold differing views regarding Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China. President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT (2008–16) [championed](https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/09/the-kmt-continues-to-grapple-with-its-1992-consensus/) the “1992 Consensus,” in which both Taiwan and the PRC [agreed](https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart/) that there is only one China—while differing on what “China” means. This (non-consensus) consensus allowed for cross-strait relations to expand and deepen, but led to criticism in Taiwan, as many Taiwanese feared that growing interdependence would limit Taiwan’s choices in the future. Taiwan’s previous president, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP, [declined](https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/is-the-1992-consensus-fading-away-in-the-taiwan-strait.html) to endorse the 1992 Consensus. As a result, the PRC [cut off](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/world/asia/china-suspends-diplomatic-contact-with-taiwan.html) official communication in 2016 and has sought to punish Tsai through economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and heightened military activities. While the DPP is seen as the “pro-independence” party, President Tsai [stated](https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/taiwanese-presidents-will-not-and-can-not-unilaterally-change-taiwans-status/) that there was no need for Taiwan to declare independence because it is already an independent country. In the wake of the PRC’s crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, Taiwan’s electorate has grown more skeptical of closer ties with the mainland, leading the “pro-China” KMT to struggle at the ballot box. In addition, [a 2022 poll from the National Chengchi University](https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963) in Taipei suggests a growing sense of Taiwanese national identity among the population and an increase in support for Taiwan’s eventual independence. The ongoing dispute has led to heightened military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, which geographically separates mainland China from the island of Taiwan. In the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–55, the PRC shelled the Kinmen and Matsu islands, situated close to the mainland, in an unsuccessful [attempt to deter the United States](https://www.npr.org/2022/08/02/1115234980/what-3-past-taiwan-strait-crises-can-teach-us-about-u-s-china-tensions-today) from signing a mutual defense treaty with the Nationalist government. Following the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, Taipei and Beijing reached a tacit understanding of a “[median line](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/09/07/asia-pacific/china-taiwan-median-line/),” also called the center line, to guide rules of engagement and prevent miscalculation in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC repeated its artillery bombardment of Kinmen in 1958 during the [Second Taiwan Strait Crisis](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM4900.html). In response, the United States drew up [plans for a nuclear strike](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/22/us/politics/nuclear-war-risk-1958-us-china.html) on mainland China, demonstrating the Dwight Eisenhower administration’s Cold War commitment to Taiwan. The PRC fired [live ammunition and missiles](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/08/02/world/pelosi-taiwan) into Taiwan’s waters during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–96 to express disapproval of [Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s visit](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/05/taiwan-pelosi-visit-china-miliary-exercises/) to the United States. In 1979, the United States abrogated the mutual defense treaty it had with Taiwan since 1954 and transferred its official diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. At that time, it acknowledged (but did not endorse) the PRC’s position that there is one China, and that Taiwan is a part of China. Rather, U.S. policy is to not take a position on Taiwan’s sovereignty and regard its ultimate status as undetermined. Also in 1979, President Jimmy Carter signed into law the [Taiwan Relations Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479) (TRA), which commits the United States to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” The TRA also obligates the United States to maintain the capacity “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.” The TRA, however, does not obligate the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense, and for decades U.S. presidents have refused to say whether they would intervene on Taiwan’s behalf—a policy known as strategic ambiguity. ## Concerns Tensions between China and the United States over Taiwan amount to a classic security dilemma: both are taking actions they view as defensive that the opposing side views as escalatory. A potential conflict between China and Taiwan has significant implications for U.S. security interests, as the United States would need to balance its desire to support Taiwan against the risks of a broader war with China. The United States has objected to China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan, which include [blocking its participation](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/us/politics/china-taiwan-un.html) in international organizations, [interfering in its elections](https://www.cfr.org/articles/taiwan-local-elections-are-where-chinas-disinformation-strategies-begin), pressuring [Taiwanese firms](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/choose-side-china-tells-taiwan-firms-it-punishes-conglomerate-2021-11-22/) to oppose independence, and [sanctioning its industries](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/12/business/china-taiwan-economy.html). Military activities near Taiwan have grown significantly in recent years. China is [developing the military capabilities](https://www.cfr.org/articles/dods-2021-china-military-power-report-how-advances-ai-and-emerging-technologies-will-shape) of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—the U.S. Department of Defense’s [2021 Military Power Report](https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2831819/dod-releases-2021-report-on-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-pe/) highlighted China’s prioritization of “joint long-range precision strikes across domains, increasingly sophisticated space, counterspace, and cyber capabilities, and accelerating the large-scale expansion of its nuclear forces.” Moreover, China has integrated emerging technology into its military strategy through an approach known as [“intelligentized” warfare](https://www.cfr.org/articles/dods-2021-china-military-power-report-how-advances-ai-and-emerging-technologies-will-shape). The Department of Defense’s aforementioned report notes China seeks to dominate technologies associated with the “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing. The PRC increasingly [sends aircraft](https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/chinas-military-activities-near-taiwan-aim-impress-home-and-abroad) into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone as a show of force, and in 2020, Taiwan reported a Chinese [cyberattack on ten government agencies](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3098012/mainland-chinese-hackers-attacked-government-agencies-steal) to steal information. As the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has deteriorated, competition between the United States and China has intensified, and the prospect of China using force against Taiwan has risen. In an attempt to ensure Taiwan has the ability to defend itself and in response to a growing military gap, the Donald Trump administration sold more than [\$18 billion in arms](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden) to Taiwan, and in 2020 the State Department [eliminated long-standing restrictions](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden) on U.S. diplomatic engagement with Taiwanese officials. Moreover, officials now acknowledge that a small but [expanding contingent](https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/23/politics/us-taiwan-forces-training/index.html) of Marines has been secretly training Taiwan’s forces since at least 2021. Taiwan is the leading global producer of advanced semiconductors. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company produces [65 percent of the world’s semiconductors](https://www.voanews.com/a/race-for-semiconductors-influences-taiwan-conflict-/6696432.html) and 90 percent of the most advanced chips. If conflict between China and Taiwan were to break out, global supply chains would be severely disrupted to the [detriment of U.S. interests](https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/how-taiwan-underwrites-the-us-defense-industrial-complex/). Speaking in 2022 alongside MI5 General Director Ken McCallum in London, FBI Director Christopher Wray [warned](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/07/06/china-taiwan-fbi-wray-sanctions/) that an invasion of Taiwan would “represent one of the most horrific business disruptions the world has ever seen,” as a potential sanctions regime against China would harm the global economy “at a much larger scale” than the current sanctions response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Bloomberg [reports](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-07/taiwan-tensions-spark-new-round-of-us-war-gaming-on-risk-to-tsmc#xj4y7vzkg) that the U.S. National Security Council anticipates that a Chinese attack and the corresponding loss of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company would cause a \$1 trillion disruption to the global economy. A potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait also has implications for the territorial dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea. The PRC views the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as a part of “Taiwan province” and may seek to take the islands during a conflict. If the PLA Navy were to occupy Taiwan, the Council on Foreign Relations’ [David Sacks argues](https://www.cfr.org/report/enhancing-us-japan-coordination-taiwan-conflict) that Japan would struggle to defend its westernmost islands, as well as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and even Okinawa. During its August 2022 military exercise aimed at Taiwan, China launched ballistic missiles over Taiwan that landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, in an attempt to warn Japan not to get involved during a Taiwan conflict. The late Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo stated that Japan and the United States [could not stand by](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/former-pm-abe-says-japan-us-could-not-stand-by-if-china-attacked-taiwan-2021-12-01/) if China invaded Taiwan. Current Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has pledged to [double Japan’s defense spending](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-25/japan-set-to-become-one-of-world-s-biggest-defense-spenders) in response to the tense security climate. Taiwan’s and Japan’s islands form a crucial link in the so-called [first island chain](https://www.cfr.org/articles/why-taiwan-important-united-states); if China were to take these islands, it would constrain U.S. naval movements and its ability to contain China in potential future conflicts. ## Recent Developments In response to China’s growing assertiveness toward Taiwan, the Joe Biden administration has maintained many aspects of the Trump administration’s approach. In a seeming departure from strategic ambiguity, President Biden remarked in May 2022 that the United States had a commitment [to come to Taiwan’s defense](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/23/world/asia/biden-taiwan-china.html), if necessary, and that his administration would uphold that commitment. While the White House denied any formal change in U.S. policy, the president’s remarks [reflected a move toward “strategic clarity,”](https://www.cfr.org/articles/what-bidens-big-shift-taiwan-means) a policy of explicit [commitment to defending Taiwan](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous) against the use of force by the PRC, rather than strategic ambiguity. President Biden has made [at least three](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/joe-biden-china-us-forces-defend-taiwan-rcna48271?utm_source=dailybrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2022Sept19&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief) similar statements since 2021. Beijing, on the other hand, has accused Washington of [breaching its sovereignty](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202208/t20220803_10732743.html) and abandoning its [One China policy](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/one-china-policy-primer-web-final.pdf) \[PDF\]. In a further demonstration of support for Taiwan, [U.S. Speaker of the House]() Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) [visited Taipei in early August 2022](https://www.cfr.org/articles/china-punishes-taiwan-pelosis-visit-what-comes-next) and met with President Tsai Ing-wen and democracy and human rights activists. Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan provoked severe condemnation from PRC officials. The PLA launched a four-day military drill and surrounded Taiwan, [simulating a blockade](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-25/japan-set-to-become-one-of-world-s-biggest-defense-spenders). The [live-fire exercises](https://www.cfr.org/articles/china-punishes-taiwan-pelosis-visit-what-comes-next) were more extensive than those performed during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. Chinese military aircraft [crossed the median line](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/09/07/asia-pacific/china-taiwan-median-line/) over three hundred times during the demonstration and continue to cross it on a near-daily basis, effectively [erasing the status quo](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/01/chinas-violations-suggest-taiwan-decapitation-rehearsal-00054568). The PRC applied additional pressure through sanctions, halted exports, and, allegedly, [cyberattacks](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-defence-ministry-website-hit-by-cyber-attacks-amid-china-tensions-2022-08-04/). After Pelosi’s visit, several other U.S. delegations [visited](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-lawmaker-delegation-visiting-taiwan-this-week-2022-09-07/) Taiwan, and President Tsai [met](https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/taiwan-strait/assessing-implications-taiwanese-presidents-trip-us) with Pelosi’s successor as U.S. Speaker of the House, Kevin McCarthy, on a stopover in the United States. Meanwhile, China has [intensified](https://www.ft.com/content/f7922fdb-01bf-4ffd-9c5c-79f15468aa71) threatening air maneuvers, flying more frequently and closer to Taiwan, and Chinese warships have increasingly [joined](https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/17/china/china-navy-warships-around-taiwan-intl-hnk-ml/index.html) in the movements. More on Confrontation Over Taiwan [U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era CFR Independent Task Force Report June 1, 2023](https://www.cfr.org/task-force-report/us-taiwan-relations-in-a-new-era) [Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense CFR Backgrounder August 3, 2022](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden) [Why China Would Struggle to Invade Taiwan CFR Article January 10, 2024](https://www.cfr.org/article/why-china-would-struggle-invade-taiwan) [Taiwan Prepares To Be Invaded The Atlantic November 7, 2022](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/12/china-takeover-taiwan-xi-tsai-ing-wen/671895/) [How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan Carnegie Endowment for International Peace October 3, 2022](https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/03/how-we-would-know-when-china-is-preparing-to-invade-taiwan-pub-88053) [How Taiwan’s Diplomacy Aims to Keep the Island Safe The New York Times October 20, 2022](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/20/world/asia/taiwan-diplomacy-china.html?searchResultPosition=4) [Trump’s Trade Policy Feeds Taiwan’s Growing U.S. Skepticism CFR Expert Brief May 29, 2025](https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/trump-trade-policy-feeds-taiwan-growing-us-skepticism) [How Silicon Chips Rule the World The New York Times September 9, 2022](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/09/business/silicon-markets-china-taiwan.html?searchResultPosition=28) Nearby Conflicts - [![Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea](https://assets.cfr.org/images/t_gct-400x266/v1755540687/globalconflicttracker/Territorial-Disputes-in-the-South-China-Sea/Territorial-Disputes-in-the-South-China-Sea.jpg?_i=AA)](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea) [![Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea](https://assets.cfr.org/images/t_gct-100x100/v1755540687/globalconflicttracker/Territorial-Disputes-in-the-South-China-Sea/Territorial-Disputes-in-the-South-China-Sea.jpg?_i=AA)](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea) [Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea) - [![North Korea Crisis](https://assets.cfr.org/images/t_gct-400x266/v1755541861/globalconflicttracker/North-Korea-Crisis/North-Korea-Crisis.jpg?_i=AA)](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/north-korea-crisis) [![North Korea Crisis](https://assets.cfr.org/images/t_gct-100x100/v1755541861/globalconflicttracker/North-Korea-Crisis/North-Korea-Crisis.jpg?_i=AA)](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/north-korea-crisis) [North Korea Crisis](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/north-korea-crisis) - [![A woman walks past a burnt Islamic school in Meikhtila.](https://assets.cfr.org/images/t_gct-400x266/v1755541270/globalconflicttracker/Civil-War-in-Myanmar/Civil-War-in-Myanmar.jpg?_i=AA)](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar) [![A woman walks past a burnt Islamic school in Meikhtila.](https://assets.cfr.org/images/t_gct-100x100/v1755541270/globalconflicttracker/Civil-War-in-Myanmar/Civil-War-in-Myanmar.jpg?_i=AA)](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar) [Civil War in Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar) Latest News ##### China Reserves Airspace for Forty Days April 5, 2026 In a report published by the Wall Street Journal, China has issued a forty-day restriction on its offshore airspace, issuing alerts similar to those used to inform aviation authorities of military exercises; the alerts, which are in effect from March 27 to May 6, were not previously reported, and China has not declared any exercises in the region [(WSJ)](https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-creates-new-aviation-mystery-with-offshore-warning-zones-128b1ce5). According to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, the restricted zones include areas north and south of Shanghai and extend from the Yellow Sea to the East China Sea [(Taiwan News)](https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6335025). ##### Budget Delays in Taiwan Threaten \$2.4 Billion in Defense Spending April 1, 2026 A delay in passing Taiwan’s budget risks holding up NT\$78 billion (\$2.44 billion) in weapons procurement, maintenance, and training, according to a senior defense official; the holdup comes as Taipei pushes for a major defense spending increase to deter China, but faces resistance from an opposition-led parliament wary of approving large expenditures without oversight [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-military-says-budget-delay-threatens-24-billion-weapons-buying-training-2026-04-02/). ##### Japan’s Long-Range Missiles March 31, 2026 Japan deployed its first long-range missile—capable of reaching mainland China—at an army camp in the country’s southwest; it plans to deploy even longer range Tomahawk missiles on a destroyer ship later this year [(AP)](https://apnews.com/article/japan-china-taiwan-missile-longrange-40322ab51735b2ce17ce6f02d224d14f). The ability to strike enemy bases marks a departure from Tokyo’s postwar security doctrine, which has traditionally focused on self-defense [(Chosun Daily)](https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2026/04/01/GNGUW77H6ZDKBJLAZPHYJRLO5E/). ##### Taiwan Opposition Leader to Visit China in April March 30, 2026 Cheng Li-wun, the leader of Taiwan’s largest opposition party will visit China from April 7–12, meeting in Beijing, Jiangsu, and Shanghai after accepting an invitation from Chinese President Xi Jinping, as her party signals a push toward closer cross-strait ties than her predecessor pursued; the visit comes one month before U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to travel to Beijing for his own summit, while Taiwan’s ruling party urged Cheng to press Xi on Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic elections [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwans-opposition-leader-visit-china-next-month-2026-03-30/). ##### U.S. Senators in Taiwan March 28, 2026 A bipartisan delegation of U.S. senators began a visit to Taipei to rally support inside Taiwan for a \$40 billion defense bill; the trip is the first such visit by U.S. senators since last summer [(FT)](https://www.ft.com/content/4e013aab-4e78-4368-aa06-940b3187e778). The legislation has stalled amid resistance from opposition lawmakers [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-parliament-authorises-government-sign-stalled-us-arms-deals-2026-03-13/). ##### Taiwan Wary That China May Exploit U.S. Middle East Focus March 25, 2026 Taiwanese officials warned that China is ramping up military pressure, including renewing large-scale air incursions near the island, to exploit U.S. force deployments to the Middle East to create perceptions of a weakened Indo-Pacific deterrence [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/taiwan-wary-that-china-could-exploit-us-distraction-over-middle-east-war-2026-03-25/). ##### Taipei Rejects Beijing’s Reunification Pitch March 19, 2026 A spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said yesterday that “peaceful reunification” would ensure Taiwan’s energy security [(SCMP)](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3347012/mainland-china-says-taiwan-can-ease-iran-energy-supply-anxiety-peaceful-reunification). A senior Taiwanese official told lawmakers today that the proposition was “impossible” and that Taiwan had its own means to withstand global energy strains, including its energy reserves [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/taiwan-rejects-chinas-energy-security-reunification-offer-amid-middle-east-war-2026-03-19). ##### U.S.-China Talks in Preparation for Trump-Xi Summit March 16, 2026 U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Premier He Lifeng concluded a two-day meeting in Paris today, intended to lay the groundwork for Trump’s planned trip to China later this month; unnamed sources told Reuters the talks have been “remarkably stable” [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-china-seek-wrap-paris-talks-managed-trade-agriculture-deals-xi-trump-summit-2026-03-16/). But some bilateral tensions were visible in recent days: Trump said Sunday he might delay his trip as he urges China to help unblock the Strait of Hormuz, and China’s commerce ministry on Monday criticized the latest U.S. trade probe into China [(FT)](https://www.ft.com/content/1ca6d121-760b-4ec5-b6ad-514fdaa94873). ##### China Resumes Large-Scale Military Flights Near Taiwan March 15, 2026 Taiwan reported that China resumed large-scale air force operations around the island after more than two weeks of unusually limited activity, with twenty-six Chinese military aircraft detected near the Taiwan Strait over a twenty-four-hour period; the renewed flights followed sharp criticism from Beijing after Taiwan President Lai Ching-te called for stronger defense spending and measures to protect the island’s democracy [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/taiwan-says-large-scale-chinese-military-flights-return-after-unusual-absence-2026-03-15/). ##### \$14 Billion U.S. Arms Package for Taiwan Awaits Trump’s Signature March 13, 2026 A record \$14 billion U.S. arms deal for Taiwan, including advanced interceptor missiles, is ready for Trump’s approval and could be announced after his March 31 Beijing summit with Xi Jinping, despite Chinese pressure to handle such sales with “prudence” [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/new-us-weapons-taiwan-could-be-approved-after-trumps-china-trip-sources-say-2026-03-13). ##### U.S. Aircraft Transits Taiwan Strait March 11, 2026 A U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon aircraft transited through the Taiwan Strait; the move precedes U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to China later in the month as the U.S. Navy stated its commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-navy-aircraft-transits-taiwan-strait-ahead-trumps-planned-china-visit-2026-03-11/). ##### China Blasts Taiwan Premier’s Japan Trip as “Evil Designs” March 9, 2026 China condemned Taiwan Premier Cho Jung-tai’s weekend visit to Japan, his country’s first premier to travel there since 1972, calling it a covert act of provocation; Tokyo declined to comment, stating the trip was to support Taiwan’s baseball team and was private [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-says-taiwan-premiers-japan-visit-harbours-evil-designs-2026-03-09). ##### China’s Nuclear-Armed Submarines March 2, 2026 China is building submarines with capabilities to target the United States from waters close to the Chinese mainland, the head of U.S. naval intelligence said in testimony submitted to a congressional hearing [(U.S.-China ESRC)](https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2026-03/RADM_Brookes_Testimony.pdf). At present, Chinese ballistic-missile submarines need to be in the vicinity of an island chain that includes Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, to target parts of the United States, he said; China’s push for naval modernization comes in contrast to the United States, which has been slow to build new submarines [(WSJ)](https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-building-subs-that-can-strike-u-s-from-closer-to-home-u-s-navy-warns-f574c483). ##### Reported Delay on Taiwan Arms Announcement February 27, 2026 The Trump administration has delayed announcing a weapons sale to Taiwan over concerns about Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reaction, unnamed U.S. officials told the New York Times; the State Department said it does not discuss pending arms sales but that “the enduring U.S. commitment to Taiwan continues” [(NYT)](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/27/us/politics/trump-taiwan-arms-sale.html). Trump is due to travel to Beijing next month [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-travel-china-march-31-april-2-amid-trade-tensions-2026-02-20/). ##### Australian Warship Transits Taiwan Strait February 23, 2026 An Australian warship passed through the Taiwan Strait; Chinese state-backed media reported that the ship was tracked and monitored by China’s military [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/australian-warship-transits-taiwan-strait-tracked-by-chinas-navy-2026-02-22/). ##### U.S. Delays Taiwan Arms Package Amid Pressure Ahead of Beijing Visit February 18, 2026 U.S. officials are reconsidering a major arms sales package to Taiwan after Chinese President Xi Jinping urged President Trump to exercise caution during a recent phone call, raising concerns that approving the deal could disrupt Trump’s planned April visit to Beijing [(WSJ)](https://www.wsj.com/world/china/u-s-arms-sale-to-taiwan-in-limbo-amid-pressure-campaign-from-china-d228f912?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqd80QlinSYFlJ9k2wd5YNUZT-ON75HprobJpEmMdXgSgS0faH-efAki981q8pA%3D&gaa_ts=6998791f&gaa_sig=8CYmPaWGTAq5YyBheuuFWGdpPFyvaiMlaYxxb-zcByx_FyKiMOrql-wse5fa3POmE-YF4ybzeV_xSxV0aA8rKw%3D%3D). ##### Trump’s Taiwan Policy February 17, 2026 The White House issued a clarification that its policy on Taiwan remains unchanged after Trump said he had discussed arms sales to Taipei with Chinese President Xi Jinping; under a 1982 U.S. policy known as the Six Assurances to Taiwan, the United States pledged not to consult with Beijing on arms sales to Taipei [(FocusTaiwan)](https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202602180005). The U.S. policy on Taiwan was a focus of a recent Trump-Xi call, the Chinese government said [(Chinese MoFA)](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202602/t20260205_11851262.html). ##### Taiwan Parliament to Address Defense Spending Review After Holiday February 16, 2026 Parliament speaker Han Kuo-Yu announced that the review of a \$40 billion special defense spending budget will be prioritized after the week-long Lunar New Year holiday; the statement follows concerns expressed by U.S. lawmakers [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-parliament-tackle-defence-spending-review-after-lunar-new-year-holiday-2026-02-16/). ##### U.S. Lawmakers Urge Taiwan to Advance Stalled Defense Spending Bill February 13, 2026 A bipartisan group of thirty-seven U.S. lawmakers warned Taiwanese political leaders that delaying a proposed \$40 billion defense spending increase could undermine the island’s ability to deter growing threats from China; the letter urged parliament to approve higher military funding as concerns mount over Beijing’s expanding pressure and delays in U.S. weapons deliveries to Taiwan [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-lawmakers-step-up-pressure-taiwan-parliament-approve-defence-spending-2026-02-13/). ##### Taiwan-U.S. Trade Details February 12, 2026 The U.S. Trade Representative’s office published details of a U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement reached last month; the deal lowers Taiwan’s base U.S. tariff rate to 15 percent—less than rates for many of its neighbors in Asia—while committing Taiwan to removing or lowering 99 percent of its tariffs on U.S. goods [(USTR)](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2026/february/fact-sheet-us-taiwan-agreement-reciprocal-trade). Taiwan pledged to buy around \$85 billion of U.S. goods, including liquefied natural gas and crude oil, aircraft, and power-generation equipment by 2029 [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-taiwan-finalize-deal-cut-tariffs-boost-purchases-us-goods-2026-02-12/). It also won tariff exemptions for more than two thousand products, President Lai Ching-te wrote on social media [(Facebook)](https://www.facebook.com/chingte/posts/pfbid02ZHuRcs3XcpUb4Bm73fTSSnLvwb4adwqRN52tp7V3rxSVPWxaofLHvC8tnRyRmLpgl). The deal requires Taiwanese congressional approval [(AP)](https://apnews.com/article/trump-taiwan-china-trade-deal-2b1743397ba33010463d41132b75ce53). ##### China Vows to Crack Down on “Separatists” February 10, 2026 China stated its commitment towards supporting “patriotic pro-reunification forces” and cracking down on “separatists”; the comments were made during this year’s annual “Taiwan Work Conference” [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/senior-chinese-official-calls-resolutely-cracking-down-taiwan-independence-2026-02-10/). ##### Japan-Taiwan Chip Cooperation February 5, 2026 The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company announced it is selecting Japan as the first location outside Taiwan to produce 3-nanometer semiconductors, some of its most advanced models; Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae called the partnership a “model case” for Tokyo’s policy to boost strategic technologies [(FT)](https://www.ft.com/content/83e0fd2a-1fa4-4004-9ffb-ef929075a497). ##### Trump-Xi Call February 4, 2026 Trump wrote on social media that he and Xi discussed Iran, Taiwan, and Chinese purchases of U.S. fuel and soybeans on a call today [(Truth Social)](https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116013105630663812). The Chinese readout of the call said Xi stressed that Washington’s position on Taiwan was “the most important issue” in U.S.-China relations and that the United States should handle arms sales to Taiwan “with prudence” [(Chinese MoFA)](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202602/t20260205_11851262.html). ##### Russia Reaffirms Support For China’s Position on Taiwan February 1, 2026 Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shogu told Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that Moscow continues to support Beijing's position on Taiwan; Russia has repeatedly stated that it considers Taiwan part of China and opposes its independence in any capacity [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/russias-shoigu-chinas-wang-yi-discuss-security-issues-2026-02-01/). ##### U.S.-Taiwan Tech Talks January 27, 2026 Senior U.S. and Taiwanese officials held talks on economic cooperation in Washington focusing on the tech sector; the meeting was the sixth edition of an annual U.S.-Taiwan dialogue launched in 2020 [(State)](https://www.state.gov/releases/2026/01/2026-u-s-taiwan-economic-prosperity-partnership-dialogue/). Taiwan’s diplomatic office in the United States endorsed the so-called Pax Silica, a Trump administration effort to ensure joint access to chip and artificial intelligence materials [(Focus Taiwan)](https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202601280009). ##### Chinese Military Purge January 24, 2026 China’s top general was put under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law,” its defense ministry said, in an apparent extension of a purge within the senior ranks of the military; only one of the six generals that President Xi Jinping appointed to the country’s top military commission in 2022 has so far avoided removal [(NYT)](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/24/world/asia/china-top-general-xi-military-purge.html). ##### Journalist Detained in Taiwan January 18, 2026 A journalist was detained on suspicion of bribing army officers to obtain military information allegedly passed to individuals in mainland China; his detention comes as Taiwan intensifies efforts to curb infiltration from Beijing [(AP)](https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-national-security-journalist-cti-78a8064cc0efa1cf1644ef0676329293). ##### New Trade and Technology Agreement Between U.S. and Taiwan January 15, 2026 A new bilateral trade agreement will see Taiwan invest \$250 billion in U.S. chip and technology manufacturing, while the United States lowers its base tariff on Taiwanese goods from 20 to 15 percent; under the deal announced by the U.S. Commerce Department, Taiwan will also guarantee at least \$250 billion in credit to Taiwanese businesses for their growth in the United States [(Commerce)](https://www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-restoring-american-semiconductor-manufacturing-leadership). Much of today’s global chip wafer production is based in Taiwan, where some officials argue that its status as a global chipmaking hub serves as an incentive for partners to defend the island against China’s threats [(CFR)](https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/trump-trade-policy-feeds-taiwan-growing-us-skepticism). ##### Taiwan’s Tech Exports January 10, 2026 According to new data. Taiwan’s exports to the United States surpassed those to China last year for the first time in twenty-six years, driven by U.S. demand for high-tech products related to artificial intelligence systems [(Nikkei)](https://asia.nikkei.com/economy/trade/taiwan-exports-to-us-overtake-those-to-china-on-ai-tech-demand). Taiwan is currently negotiating to reduce a 20 percent U.S. tariff on its exports; semiconductors are already excluded from that levy [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-2025-exports-hit-record-strong-ai-demand-2026-01-09/). ### Sign Up for Our Newsletter #### Receive the Center for Preventive Action's quarterly snapshot of global hot spots with expert analysis on ways to prevent and mitigate deadly conflict. [Sign Up]() ## Footer - [About](https://www.cfr.org/about) - [Member Programs](https://www.cfr.org/member-programs) - [Contact](https://www.cfr.org/contact-us) - [Support](https://www.cfr.org/support-cfr) - [For Media](https://www.cfr.org/media) - [Newsletters](https://link.cfr.org/join/66n/signup&hash=2d4c5929e9e04cc42f5cd375fb8dcfb1) - [Membership](https://www.cfr.org/membership) - [Careers](https://www.cfr.org/career-opportunities) ## Social Nav ©2025 Council on Foreign Relations. All rights reserved. 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Readable Markdown	Updated February 18, 2026 [![icon\_expand](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/images/icons/expand.svg)]() ## Background Taiwan’s disputed status is a direct result of the Chinese Civil War, in which the defeated Nationalist (Kuomintang) government [fled the mainland](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34729538) and moved its government to the island in 1949. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never exercised control over Taiwan, it claims that the island is an inalienable part of China that must be “reunified” with the mainland. In a [2022 white paper](https://english.news.cn/20220810/df9d3b8702154b34bbf1d451b99bf64a/c.html), the PRC said the resolution of the Taiwan question is “indispensable for the realization of China’s rejuvenation” and a “historic mission” of the Chinese Communist Party. The PRC has a stated preference for seeking reunification through peaceful means but reserves the right [to use force](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden) to achieve its aims. Taiwan’s main political parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), hold differing views regarding Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China. President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT (2008–16) [championed](https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/09/the-kmt-continues-to-grapple-with-its-1992-consensus/) the “1992 Consensus,” in which both Taiwan and the PRC [agreed](https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart/) that there is only one China—while differing on what “China” means. This (non-consensus) consensus allowed for cross-strait relations to expand and deepen, but led to criticism in Taiwan, as many Taiwanese feared that growing interdependence would limit Taiwan’s choices in the future. Taiwan’s previous president, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP, [declined](https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/is-the-1992-consensus-fading-away-in-the-taiwan-strait.html) to endorse the 1992 Consensus. As a result, the PRC [cut off](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/world/asia/china-suspends-diplomatic-contact-with-taiwan.html) official communication in 2016 and has sought to punish Tsai through economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and heightened military activities. While the DPP is seen as the “pro-independence” party, President Tsai [stated](https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/taiwanese-presidents-will-not-and-can-not-unilaterally-change-taiwans-status/) that there was no need for Taiwan to declare independence because it is already an independent country. In the wake of the PRC’s crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, Taiwan’s electorate has grown more skeptical of closer ties with the mainland, leading the “pro-China” KMT to struggle at the ballot box. In addition, [a 2022 poll from the National Chengchi University](https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963) in Taipei suggests a growing sense of Taiwanese national identity among the population and an increase in support for Taiwan’s eventual independence. The ongoing dispute has led to heightened military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, which geographically separates mainland China from the island of Taiwan. In the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–55, the PRC shelled the Kinmen and Matsu islands, situated close to the mainland, in an unsuccessful [attempt to deter the United States](https://www.npr.org/2022/08/02/1115234980/what-3-past-taiwan-strait-crises-can-teach-us-about-u-s-china-tensions-today) from signing a mutual defense treaty with the Nationalist government. Following the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, Taipei and Beijing reached a tacit understanding of a “[median line](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/09/07/asia-pacific/china-taiwan-median-line/),” also called the center line, to guide rules of engagement and prevent miscalculation in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC repeated its artillery bombardment of Kinmen in 1958 during the [Second Taiwan Strait Crisis](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM4900.html). In response, the United States drew up [plans for a nuclear strike](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/22/us/politics/nuclear-war-risk-1958-us-china.html) on mainland China, demonstrating the Dwight Eisenhower administration’s Cold War commitment to Taiwan. The PRC fired [live ammunition and missiles](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/08/02/world/pelosi-taiwan) into Taiwan’s waters during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–96 to express disapproval of [Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s visit](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/05/taiwan-pelosi-visit-china-miliary-exercises/) to the United States. In 1979, the United States abrogated the mutual defense treaty it had with Taiwan since 1954 and transferred its official diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. At that time, it acknowledged (but did not endorse) the PRC’s position that there is one China, and that Taiwan is a part of China. Rather, U.S. policy is to not take a position on Taiwan’s sovereignty and regard its ultimate status as undetermined. Also in 1979, President Jimmy Carter signed into law the [Taiwan Relations Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479) (TRA), which commits the United States to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” The TRA also obligates the United States to maintain the capacity “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.” The TRA, however, does not obligate the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense, and for decades U.S. presidents have refused to say whether they would intervene on Taiwan’s behalf—a policy known as strategic ambiguity. ## Concerns Tensions between China and the United States over Taiwan amount to a classic security dilemma: both are taking actions they view as defensive that the opposing side views as escalatory. A potential conflict between China and Taiwan has significant implications for U.S. security interests, as the United States would need to balance its desire to support Taiwan against the risks of a broader war with China. The United States has objected to China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan, which include [blocking its participation](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/us/politics/china-taiwan-un.html) in international organizations, [interfering in its elections](https://www.cfr.org/articles/taiwan-local-elections-are-where-chinas-disinformation-strategies-begin), pressuring [Taiwanese firms](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/choose-side-china-tells-taiwan-firms-it-punishes-conglomerate-2021-11-22/) to oppose independence, and [sanctioning its industries](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/12/business/china-taiwan-economy.html). Military activities near Taiwan have grown significantly in recent years. China is [developing the military capabilities](https://www.cfr.org/articles/dods-2021-china-military-power-report-how-advances-ai-and-emerging-technologies-will-shape) of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—the U.S. Department of Defense’s [2021 Military Power Report](https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2831819/dod-releases-2021-report-on-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-pe/) highlighted China’s prioritization of “joint long-range precision strikes across domains, increasingly sophisticated space, counterspace, and cyber capabilities, and accelerating the large-scale expansion of its nuclear forces.” Moreover, China has integrated emerging technology into its military strategy through an approach known as [“intelligentized” warfare](https://www.cfr.org/articles/dods-2021-china-military-power-report-how-advances-ai-and-emerging-technologies-will-shape). The Department of Defense’s aforementioned report notes China seeks to dominate technologies associated with the “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing. The PRC increasingly [sends aircraft](https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/chinas-military-activities-near-taiwan-aim-impress-home-and-abroad) into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone as a show of force, and in 2020, Taiwan reported a Chinese [cyberattack on ten government agencies](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3098012/mainland-chinese-hackers-attacked-government-agencies-steal) to steal information. As the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has deteriorated, competition between the United States and China has intensified, and the prospect of China using force against Taiwan has risen. In an attempt to ensure Taiwan has the ability to defend itself and in response to a growing military gap, the Donald Trump administration sold more than [\$18 billion in arms](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden) to Taiwan, and in 2020 the State Department [eliminated long-standing restrictions](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden) on U.S. diplomatic engagement with Taiwanese officials. Moreover, officials now acknowledge that a small but [expanding contingent](https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/23/politics/us-taiwan-forces-training/index.html) of Marines has been secretly training Taiwan’s forces since at least 2021. Taiwan is the leading global producer of advanced semiconductors. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company produces [65 percent of the world’s semiconductors](https://www.voanews.com/a/race-for-semiconductors-influences-taiwan-conflict-/6696432.html) and 90 percent of the most advanced chips. If conflict between China and Taiwan were to break out, global supply chains would be severely disrupted to the [detriment of U.S. interests](https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/how-taiwan-underwrites-the-us-defense-industrial-complex/). Speaking in 2022 alongside MI5 General Director Ken McCallum in London, FBI Director Christopher Wray [warned](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/07/06/china-taiwan-fbi-wray-sanctions/) that an invasion of Taiwan would “represent one of the most horrific business disruptions the world has ever seen,” as a potential sanctions regime against China would harm the global economy “at a much larger scale” than the current sanctions response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Bloomberg [reports](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-07/taiwan-tensions-spark-new-round-of-us-war-gaming-on-risk-to-tsmc#xj4y7vzkg) that the U.S. National Security Council anticipates that a Chinese attack and the corresponding loss of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company would cause a \$1 trillion disruption to the global economy. A potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait also has implications for the territorial dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea. The PRC views the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as a part of “Taiwan province” and may seek to take the islands during a conflict. If the PLA Navy were to occupy Taiwan, the Council on Foreign Relations’ [David Sacks argues](https://www.cfr.org/report/enhancing-us-japan-coordination-taiwan-conflict) that Japan would struggle to defend its westernmost islands, as well as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and even Okinawa. During its August 2022 military exercise aimed at Taiwan, China launched ballistic missiles over Taiwan that landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, in an attempt to warn Japan not to get involved during a Taiwan conflict. The late Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo stated that Japan and the United States [could not stand by](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/former-pm-abe-says-japan-us-could-not-stand-by-if-china-attacked-taiwan-2021-12-01/) if China invaded Taiwan. Current Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has pledged to [double Japan’s defense spending](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-25/japan-set-to-become-one-of-world-s-biggest-defense-spenders) in response to the tense security climate. Taiwan’s and Japan’s islands form a crucial link in the so-called [first island chain](https://www.cfr.org/articles/why-taiwan-important-united-states); if China were to take these islands, it would constrain U.S. naval movements and its ability to contain China in potential future conflicts. ## Recent Developments In response to China’s growing assertiveness toward Taiwan, the Joe Biden administration has maintained many aspects of the Trump administration’s approach. In a seeming departure from strategic ambiguity, President Biden remarked in May 2022 that the United States had a commitment [to come to Taiwan’s defense](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/23/world/asia/biden-taiwan-china.html), if necessary, and that his administration would uphold that commitment. While the White House denied any formal change in U.S. policy, the president’s remarks [reflected a move toward “strategic clarity,”](https://www.cfr.org/articles/what-bidens-big-shift-taiwan-means) a policy of explicit [commitment to defending Taiwan](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous) against the use of force by the PRC, rather than strategic ambiguity. President Biden has made [at least three](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/joe-biden-china-us-forces-defend-taiwan-rcna48271?utm_source=dailybrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2022Sept19&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief) similar statements since 2021. Beijing, on the other hand, has accused Washington of [breaching its sovereignty](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202208/t20220803_10732743.html) and abandoning its [One China policy](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/one-china-policy-primer-web-final.pdf) \[PDF\]. In a further demonstration of support for Taiwan, [U.S. Speaker of the House]() Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) [visited Taipei in early August 2022](https://www.cfr.org/articles/china-punishes-taiwan-pelosis-visit-what-comes-next) and met with President Tsai Ing-wen and democracy and human rights activists. Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan provoked severe condemnation from PRC officials. The PLA launched a four-day military drill and surrounded Taiwan, [simulating a blockade](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-25/japan-set-to-become-one-of-world-s-biggest-defense-spenders). The [live-fire exercises](https://www.cfr.org/articles/china-punishes-taiwan-pelosis-visit-what-comes-next) were more extensive than those performed during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. Chinese military aircraft [crossed the median line](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/09/07/asia-pacific/china-taiwan-median-line/) over three hundred times during the demonstration and continue to cross it on a near-daily basis, effectively [erasing the status quo](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/01/chinas-violations-suggest-taiwan-decapitation-rehearsal-00054568). The PRC applied additional pressure through sanctions, halted exports, and, allegedly, [cyberattacks](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-defence-ministry-website-hit-by-cyber-attacks-amid-china-tensions-2022-08-04/). After Pelosi’s visit, several other U.S. delegations [visited](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-lawmaker-delegation-visiting-taiwan-this-week-2022-09-07/) Taiwan, and President Tsai [met](https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/taiwan-strait/assessing-implications-taiwanese-presidents-trip-us) with Pelosi’s successor as U.S. Speaker of the House, Kevin McCarthy, on a stopover in the United States. Meanwhile, China has [intensified](https://www.ft.com/content/f7922fdb-01bf-4ffd-9c5c-79f15468aa71) threatening air maneuvers, flying more frequently and closer to Taiwan, and Chinese warships have increasingly [joined](https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/17/china/china-navy-warships-around-taiwan-intl-hnk-ml/index.html) in the movements. More on Confrontation Over Taiwan Nearby Conflicts ##### China Reserves Airspace for Forty Days April 5, 2026 In a report published by the Wall Street Journal, China has issued a forty-day restriction on its offshore airspace, issuing alerts similar to those used to inform aviation authorities of military exercises; the alerts, which are in effect from March 27 to May 6, were not previously reported, and China has not declared any exercises in the region [(WSJ)](https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-creates-new-aviation-mystery-with-offshore-warning-zones-128b1ce5). According to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, the restricted zones include areas north and south of Shanghai and extend from the Yellow Sea to the East China Sea [(Taiwan News)](https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6335025). ##### Budget Delays in Taiwan Threaten \$2.4 Billion in Defense Spending April 1, 2026 A delay in passing Taiwan’s budget risks holding up NT\$78 billion (\$2.44 billion) in weapons procurement, maintenance, and training, according to a senior defense official; the holdup comes as Taipei pushes for a major defense spending increase to deter China, but faces resistance from an opposition-led parliament wary of approving large expenditures without oversight [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-military-says-budget-delay-threatens-24-billion-weapons-buying-training-2026-04-02/). ##### Japan’s Long-Range Missiles March 31, 2026 Japan deployed its first long-range missile—capable of reaching mainland China—at an army camp in the country’s southwest; it plans to deploy even longer range Tomahawk missiles on a destroyer ship later this year [(AP)](https://apnews.com/article/japan-china-taiwan-missile-longrange-40322ab51735b2ce17ce6f02d224d14f). The ability to strike enemy bases marks a departure from Tokyo’s postwar security doctrine, which has traditionally focused on self-defense [(Chosun Daily)](https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2026/04/01/GNGUW77H6ZDKBJLAZPHYJRLO5E/). ##### Taiwan Opposition Leader to Visit China in April March 30, 2026 Cheng Li-wun, the leader of Taiwan’s largest opposition party will visit China from April 7–12, meeting in Beijing, Jiangsu, and Shanghai after accepting an invitation from Chinese President Xi Jinping, as her party signals a push toward closer cross-strait ties than her predecessor pursued; the visit comes one month before U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to travel to Beijing for his own summit, while Taiwan’s ruling party urged Cheng to press Xi on Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic elections [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwans-opposition-leader-visit-china-next-month-2026-03-30/). ##### U.S. Senators in Taiwan March 28, 2026 A bipartisan delegation of U.S. senators began a visit to Taipei to rally support inside Taiwan for a \$40 billion defense bill; the trip is the first such visit by U.S. senators since last summer [(FT)](https://www.ft.com/content/4e013aab-4e78-4368-aa06-940b3187e778). The legislation has stalled amid resistance from opposition lawmakers [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-parliament-authorises-government-sign-stalled-us-arms-deals-2026-03-13/). ##### Taiwan Wary That China May Exploit U.S. Middle East Focus March 25, 2026 Taiwanese officials warned that China is ramping up military pressure, including renewing large-scale air incursions near the island, to exploit U.S. force deployments to the Middle East to create perceptions of a weakened Indo-Pacific deterrence [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/taiwan-wary-that-china-could-exploit-us-distraction-over-middle-east-war-2026-03-25/). ##### Taipei Rejects Beijing’s Reunification Pitch March 19, 2026 A spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said yesterday that “peaceful reunification” would ensure Taiwan’s energy security [(SCMP)](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3347012/mainland-china-says-taiwan-can-ease-iran-energy-supply-anxiety-peaceful-reunification). A senior Taiwanese official told lawmakers today that the proposition was “impossible” and that Taiwan had its own means to withstand global energy strains, including its energy reserves [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/taiwan-rejects-chinas-energy-security-reunification-offer-amid-middle-east-war-2026-03-19). ##### U.S.-China Talks in Preparation for Trump-Xi Summit March 16, 2026 U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Premier He Lifeng concluded a two-day meeting in Paris today, intended to lay the groundwork for Trump’s planned trip to China later this month; unnamed sources told Reuters the talks have been “remarkably stable” [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-china-seek-wrap-paris-talks-managed-trade-agriculture-deals-xi-trump-summit-2026-03-16/). But some bilateral tensions were visible in recent days: Trump said Sunday he might delay his trip as he urges China to help unblock the Strait of Hormuz, and China’s commerce ministry on Monday criticized the latest U.S. trade probe into China [(FT)](https://www.ft.com/content/1ca6d121-760b-4ec5-b6ad-514fdaa94873). ##### China Resumes Large-Scale Military Flights Near Taiwan March 15, 2026 Taiwan reported that China resumed large-scale air force operations around the island after more than two weeks of unusually limited activity, with twenty-six Chinese military aircraft detected near the Taiwan Strait over a twenty-four-hour period; the renewed flights followed sharp criticism from Beijing after Taiwan President Lai Ching-te called for stronger defense spending and measures to protect the island’s democracy [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/taiwan-says-large-scale-chinese-military-flights-return-after-unusual-absence-2026-03-15/). ##### \$14 Billion U.S. Arms Package for Taiwan Awaits Trump’s Signature March 13, 2026 A record \$14 billion U.S. arms deal for Taiwan, including advanced interceptor missiles, is ready for Trump’s approval and could be announced after his March 31 Beijing summit with Xi Jinping, despite Chinese pressure to handle such sales with “prudence” [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/new-us-weapons-taiwan-could-be-approved-after-trumps-china-trip-sources-say-2026-03-13). ##### U.S. Aircraft Transits Taiwan Strait March 11, 2026 A U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon aircraft transited through the Taiwan Strait; the move precedes U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to China later in the month as the U.S. Navy stated its commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-navy-aircraft-transits-taiwan-strait-ahead-trumps-planned-china-visit-2026-03-11/). ##### China Blasts Taiwan Premier’s Japan Trip as “Evil Designs” March 9, 2026 China condemned Taiwan Premier Cho Jung-tai’s weekend visit to Japan, his country’s first premier to travel there since 1972, calling it a covert act of provocation; Tokyo declined to comment, stating the trip was to support Taiwan’s baseball team and was private [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-says-taiwan-premiers-japan-visit-harbours-evil-designs-2026-03-09). ##### China’s Nuclear-Armed Submarines March 2, 2026 China is building submarines with capabilities to target the United States from waters close to the Chinese mainland, the head of U.S. naval intelligence said in testimony submitted to a congressional hearing [(U.S.-China ESRC)](https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2026-03/RADM_Brookes_Testimony.pdf). At present, Chinese ballistic-missile submarines need to be in the vicinity of an island chain that includes Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, to target parts of the United States, he said; China’s push for naval modernization comes in contrast to the United States, which has been slow to build new submarines [(WSJ)](https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-building-subs-that-can-strike-u-s-from-closer-to-home-u-s-navy-warns-f574c483). ##### Reported Delay on Taiwan Arms Announcement February 27, 2026 The Trump administration has delayed announcing a weapons sale to Taiwan over concerns about Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reaction, unnamed U.S. officials told the New York Times; the State Department said it does not discuss pending arms sales but that “the enduring U.S. commitment to Taiwan continues” [(NYT)](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/27/us/politics/trump-taiwan-arms-sale.html). Trump is due to travel to Beijing next month [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-travel-china-march-31-april-2-amid-trade-tensions-2026-02-20/). ##### Australian Warship Transits Taiwan Strait February 23, 2026 An Australian warship passed through the Taiwan Strait; Chinese state-backed media reported that the ship was tracked and monitored by China’s military [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/australian-warship-transits-taiwan-strait-tracked-by-chinas-navy-2026-02-22/). ##### U.S. Delays Taiwan Arms Package Amid Pressure Ahead of Beijing Visit February 18, 2026 U.S. officials are reconsidering a major arms sales package to Taiwan after Chinese President Xi Jinping urged President Trump to exercise caution during a recent phone call, raising concerns that approving the deal could disrupt Trump’s planned April visit to Beijing [(WSJ)](https://www.wsj.com/world/china/u-s-arms-sale-to-taiwan-in-limbo-amid-pressure-campaign-from-china-d228f912?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqd80QlinSYFlJ9k2wd5YNUZT-ON75HprobJpEmMdXgSgS0faH-efAki981q8pA%3D&gaa_ts=6998791f&gaa_sig=8CYmPaWGTAq5YyBheuuFWGdpPFyvaiMlaYxxb-zcByx_FyKiMOrql-wse5fa3POmE-YF4ybzeV_xSxV0aA8rKw%3D%3D). ##### Trump’s Taiwan Policy February 17, 2026 The White House issued a clarification that its policy on Taiwan remains unchanged after Trump said he had discussed arms sales to Taipei with Chinese President Xi Jinping; under a 1982 U.S. policy known as the Six Assurances to Taiwan, the United States pledged not to consult with Beijing on arms sales to Taipei [(FocusTaiwan)](https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202602180005). The U.S. policy on Taiwan was a focus of a recent Trump-Xi call, the Chinese government said [(Chinese MoFA)](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202602/t20260205_11851262.html). ##### Taiwan Parliament to Address Defense Spending Review After Holiday February 16, 2026 Parliament speaker Han Kuo-Yu announced that the review of a \$40 billion special defense spending budget will be prioritized after the week-long Lunar New Year holiday; the statement follows concerns expressed by U.S. lawmakers [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-parliament-tackle-defence-spending-review-after-lunar-new-year-holiday-2026-02-16/). ##### U.S. Lawmakers Urge Taiwan to Advance Stalled Defense Spending Bill February 13, 2026 A bipartisan group of thirty-seven U.S. lawmakers warned Taiwanese political leaders that delaying a proposed \$40 billion defense spending increase could undermine the island’s ability to deter growing threats from China; the letter urged parliament to approve higher military funding as concerns mount over Beijing’s expanding pressure and delays in U.S. weapons deliveries to Taiwan [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-lawmakers-step-up-pressure-taiwan-parliament-approve-defence-spending-2026-02-13/). ##### Taiwan-U.S. Trade Details February 12, 2026 The U.S. Trade Representative’s office published details of a U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement reached last month; the deal lowers Taiwan’s base U.S. tariff rate to 15 percent—less than rates for many of its neighbors in Asia—while committing Taiwan to removing or lowering 99 percent of its tariffs on U.S. goods [(USTR)](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2026/february/fact-sheet-us-taiwan-agreement-reciprocal-trade). Taiwan pledged to buy around \$85 billion of U.S. goods, including liquefied natural gas and crude oil, aircraft, and power-generation equipment by 2029 [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-taiwan-finalize-deal-cut-tariffs-boost-purchases-us-goods-2026-02-12/). It also won tariff exemptions for more than two thousand products, President Lai Ching-te wrote on social media [(Facebook)](https://www.facebook.com/chingte/posts/pfbid02ZHuRcs3XcpUb4Bm73fTSSnLvwb4adwqRN52tp7V3rxSVPWxaofLHvC8tnRyRmLpgl). The deal requires Taiwanese congressional approval [(AP)](https://apnews.com/article/trump-taiwan-china-trade-deal-2b1743397ba33010463d41132b75ce53). ##### China Vows to Crack Down on “Separatists” February 10, 2026 China stated its commitment towards supporting “patriotic pro-reunification forces” and cracking down on “separatists”; the comments were made during this year’s annual “Taiwan Work Conference” [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/senior-chinese-official-calls-resolutely-cracking-down-taiwan-independence-2026-02-10/). ##### Japan-Taiwan Chip Cooperation February 5, 2026 The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company announced it is selecting Japan as the first location outside Taiwan to produce 3-nanometer semiconductors, some of its most advanced models; Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae called the partnership a “model case” for Tokyo’s policy to boost strategic technologies [(FT)](https://www.ft.com/content/83e0fd2a-1fa4-4004-9ffb-ef929075a497). ##### Trump-Xi Call February 4, 2026 Trump wrote on social media that he and Xi discussed Iran, Taiwan, and Chinese purchases of U.S. fuel and soybeans on a call today [(Truth Social)](https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116013105630663812). The Chinese readout of the call said Xi stressed that Washington’s position on Taiwan was “the most important issue” in U.S.-China relations and that the United States should handle arms sales to Taiwan “with prudence” [(Chinese MoFA)](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202602/t20260205_11851262.html). ##### Russia Reaffirms Support For China’s Position on Taiwan February 1, 2026 Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shogu told Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that Moscow continues to support Beijing's position on Taiwan; Russia has repeatedly stated that it considers Taiwan part of China and opposes its independence in any capacity [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/russias-shoigu-chinas-wang-yi-discuss-security-issues-2026-02-01/). ##### U.S.-Taiwan Tech Talks January 27, 2026 Senior U.S. and Taiwanese officials held talks on economic cooperation in Washington focusing on the tech sector; the meeting was the sixth edition of an annual U.S.-Taiwan dialogue launched in 2020 [(State)](https://www.state.gov/releases/2026/01/2026-u-s-taiwan-economic-prosperity-partnership-dialogue/). Taiwan’s diplomatic office in the United States endorsed the so-called Pax Silica, a Trump administration effort to ensure joint access to chip and artificial intelligence materials [(Focus Taiwan)](https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202601280009). ##### Chinese Military Purge January 24, 2026 China’s top general was put under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law,” its defense ministry said, in an apparent extension of a purge within the senior ranks of the military; only one of the six generals that President Xi Jinping appointed to the country’s top military commission in 2022 has so far avoided removal [(NYT)](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/24/world/asia/china-top-general-xi-military-purge.html). ##### Journalist Detained in Taiwan January 18, 2026 A journalist was detained on suspicion of bribing army officers to obtain military information allegedly passed to individuals in mainland China; his detention comes as Taiwan intensifies efforts to curb infiltration from Beijing [(AP)](https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-national-security-journalist-cti-78a8064cc0efa1cf1644ef0676329293). ##### New Trade and Technology Agreement Between U.S. and Taiwan January 15, 2026 A new bilateral trade agreement will see Taiwan invest \$250 billion in U.S. chip and technology manufacturing, while the United States lowers its base tariff on Taiwanese goods from 20 to 15 percent; under the deal announced by the U.S. Commerce Department, Taiwan will also guarantee at least \$250 billion in credit to Taiwanese businesses for their growth in the United States [(Commerce)](https://www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-restoring-american-semiconductor-manufacturing-leadership). Much of today’s global chip wafer production is based in Taiwan, where some officials argue that its status as a global chipmaking hub serves as an incentive for partners to defend the island against China’s threats [(CFR)](https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/trump-trade-policy-feeds-taiwan-growing-us-skepticism). ##### Taiwan’s Tech Exports January 10, 2026 According to new data. Taiwan’s exports to the United States surpassed those to China last year for the first time in twenty-six years, driven by U.S. demand for high-tech products related to artificial intelligence systems [(Nikkei)](https://asia.nikkei.com/economy/trade/taiwan-exports-to-us-overtake-those-to-china-on-ai-tech-demand). Taiwan is currently negotiating to reduce a 20 percent U.S. tariff on its exports; semiconductors are already excluded from that levy [(Reuters)](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-2025-exports-hit-record-strong-ai-demand-2026-01-09/). ### Sign Up for Our Newsletter Receive the Center for Preventive Action's quarterly snapshot of global hot spots with expert analysis on ways to prevent and mitigate deadly conflict.
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