🕷️ Crawler Inspector

URL Lookup

Direct Parameter Lookup

Raw Queries and Responses

1. Shard Calculation

Query:

Response:

Calculated Shard: 102 (from laksa133)

2. Crawled Status Check

Query:

curl -X POST \
  'http://laksa102.int.ahrefs:8124/' \
  -H 'Content-Type: text/plain' \
  -H 'X-ClickHouse-Database: crawler3' \
  -H 'Authorization: Basic YXBpOg==' \
  -d 'SELECT getAhrefsURLFromUnparsed(src_unparsed) AS found_url, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(download_stamp), 0) AS crawl_time, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(props_url_first_seen), 0) AS first_indexed_time, download_http_code AS http_code, src_unparsed AS src_unparsed, src_root_hash AS src_root_hash, history_drop_reason AS history_drop_reason, meta_title AS meta_title, meta_descriptions AS meta_descriptions, attrs_boilerpipe_text AS attrs_boilerpipe_text, attrs_markdown AS attrs_markdown, attrs_readable_markdown AS attrs_readable_markdown, meta_canonical AS meta_canonical FROM crawler3.page_info_local FINAL PREWHERE (src_root_hash, src_unparsed) IN ((getAhrefsRootHashFromUnparsed(getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://www.cfr.org/articles/what-trumps-trade-war-would-mean-nine-charts\')), getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://www.cfr.org/articles/what-trumps-trade-war-would-mean-nine-charts\'))) FORMAT JSONEachRow'

Response:

{"found_url":"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/what-trumps-trade-war-would-mean-nine-charts","crawl_time":1776146706,"first_indexed_time":1768897424,"http_code":200,"src_unparsed":"org,cfr!www,\/articles\/what-trumps-trade-war-would-mean-nine-charts s443","src_root_hash":"18151292984642721902","history_drop_reason":null,"meta_title":"What Trump’s Trade War Would Mean, in Nine Charts | Council on Foreign Relations","meta_descriptions":["President Trump’s tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico could upend U.S. trade. These nine charts show what’s at stake, what comes next, and why it matters."],"attrs_boilerpipe_text":"On February 4, President Donald Trump imposed 10 percent\ntariffs\non China, after reaching last-minute agreements with Canada and Mexico to delay tariffs by thirty days. Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports come as punishment for Beijing’s failure to rein in the\nsmuggling of fentanyl precursor chemicals\n, while the stay on tariffs for Ottawa and Mexico City comes after both countries promised greater cooperation on combatting drug smuggling. China\nhas responded\nwith 15 percent tariffs on U.S. coal, gas, and other goods, as well as restrictions on some minerals exports and the launch of an antitrust investigation into Google. \nHere are nine graphics that show the potential economic effects of such tariffs on all four countries.\nHow could tariffs affect the United States?\nNearly half of all U.S. imports—more than $1.3 trillion—come from Canada, China, and Mexico. However, analysis by Bloomberg Economics shows that the new tariffs could reduce overall U.S. imports by 15 percent. While the Washington, DC-based Tax Foundation estimates that the tariffs will generate around\n$100 billion\nper year in extra federal tax revenue, they could also impose significant costs on the broader economy: disrupting supply chains, raising costs for businesses, eliminating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and ultimately driving up consumer prices.\nCertain sectors of the U.S. economy will be hit particularly hard, including the automotive, energy, and food sectors. Gas prices could surge as much as 50 cents per gallon in the Midwest, as Canada and Mexico supply more than\n70 percent\n[PDF] of crude oil imports to U.S. refineries. Also at risk are cars and other vehicles, as the United States imports nearly half its auto parts from its northern and southern neighbors. \nA 25 percent tariff on Canada and Mexico will raise production costs for U.S. automakers,\nadding up to $3,000\nto the price of some of the roughly sixteen million cars sold in the United States each year. Grocery costs could rise, too, as Mexico is the United States’ biggest source of fresh produce, supplying more than\n60 percent\nof U.S. vegetable imports and nearly half of all fruit and nut imports.\nStill, the United States is less reliant on trade than many other industrialized economies, including Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Imports and exports make up just a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), and the United States sources what it does import from a fairly broad set of nations.\nHow could tariffs affect Canada and Mexico?\nTariffs will hit Canada and Mexico much harder, as trade makes up about 70 percent of both economies’ GDP. \nThe two countries are particularly dependent on trade with the United States. More than 80 percent of Mexico’s exports—including cars, machinery, fruits, vegetables, and medical equipment—head north, accounting for 15 percent of total U.S. imports. This dependence is especially pronounced on Mexico’s northern border. There, industrial states Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Baja California account for\nnearly half\nof Mexico’s exports to the United States, sending more than $200 billion worth of computers, electronics, transportation equipment, and other products each year.\nA unilateral 25 percent tariff on these goods could slash Mexico’s GDP by some 16 percent according to Bloomberg Economics, with Mexico’s auto industry bearing the brunt. Mexico sends nearly 80 percent of the cars it produces to the United States alone, amounting to some 2.5 million vehicles each year. Duties will also threaten Mexico’s energy sector; the United States is the recipient of roughly 60 percent of Mexico’s petroleum exports, most of which is crude oil bound for U.S. refineries. At the same time, Mexico is the top destination for U.S. refined oil exports, which\nmeet over 70 percent\nof domestic demand. U.S. tariffs will likely make fuel more expensive, raising prices at the pump and straining Mexico’s broader economy.\nCanada faces a similar challenge. The United States buys more than\n70 percent\n[PDF; in Spanish] of Canada’s exports, with these goods making up 14 percent of total U.S. imports. Under the new tariffs, Canada’s energy sector will take the biggest hit, as exporters\nsend 80 percent\nof their oil south. \nThese asymmetries in the cost of tariffs at home give the U.S. significant leverage over its North American partners in negotiations.\nHow could tariffs affect China?\nChina is comparatively less dependent on the United States and less reliant on trade overall. Over the past two decades, the country has steadily reduced the importance of trade to its economy as Beijing has ramped up domestic production. Today, imports and exports account for only about 37 percent of China’s GDP, compared to more than 60 percent in the early 2000s. \nIn recent years,\nU.S.-China trade\nhas declined\n, particularly in sectors hit by previous tariffs and export controls, such as auto parts, data servers, furniture, and semiconductors. China has instead ramped up trade with other partners including the European Union, Mexico, and Vietnam. The country’s share of global trade\nhas climbed\nroughly 4 percent since 2016, when President Trump first took office, even as the United States’ share\nhas dipped\n. Combined, these factors will lessen the shock of an additional 10 percent tariff on Chinese exports to the United States.\nWhat could happen the day after?\nEach country’s currency could weaken further, lessening the bite of tariffs on imports and raising the effective price of U.S. exports to other nations. A weakened yuan has already softened the blow for Chinese producers, helping their exports remain competitive around the world. The roughly 30 percent depreciation of Mexico’s peso since April and the Canadian dollar’s 8 percent drop since September also lessens the potential impact. Markets could potentially drive the peso, as well as the Canadian dollar, further down not that tariffs are in place.\nAdditionally, Canada, China, or Mexico could respond in kind, imposing tit-for-tat tariffs on the United States. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has already suggested that Mexico could retaliate with tariffs of its own, and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which underpins North American free trade,\nwould likely allow it\n.\nThis wouldn’t be the first time countries have reciprocated. In 2018, Mexico and Canada placed retaliatory tariffs on a combined more than $15 billion worth of U.S. goods—including steel, pork, yogurt, and tablecloths—after Trump imposed tariffs on their steel and aluminum. Likewise, the United States lost $20 billion in annual farm exports when China hit back against a slew of U.S. tariffs from 2018 to 2019.\nIf either Canada or Mexico retaliates, U.S. fuel exporters would likely take the biggest hit alongside automakers and other advanced manufacturers, including pharmaceutical producers.\nRetaliatory tariffs on the United States would predominantly affect manufacturing-heavy states. Mexico buys\n70 percent\n[PDF] of New Mexico’s exports, including billions of dollars in U.S. semiconductor chips and electrical components that later return to the United States in Mexican-made cars and appliances. Texas sends more than $20 billion in chips, auto parts, and electrical equipment to Mexico; overall, the state’s southbound exports account for 5 percent of its GDP. Tariffs would also dent Ohio’s $5 billion worth of auto and metal exports to Canada as well as Maine’s $320 million in northbound lumber and paper exports.\nWill Merrow created the graphics for this article.","attrs_markdown":"[Skip to content](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/what-trumps-trade-war-would-mean-nine-charts#content)\n\n- [Support CFR](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/support-cfr)\n- [Foreign Affairs](https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/)\n\n[Member Login](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/member)\n\n[Log In](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/login?redirectTo=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cfr.org%2Farticles%2Fwhat-trumps-trade-war-would-mean-nine-charts)\n\n- Regions\n- Topics\n- Research\n- Experts\n- [Events](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/events)\n\n1. [Articles](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles)\n2. What Trump’s Trade War Would Mean, in Nine Charts\n\nShare\n\n[United States](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/regions\/united-states)\n\n# What Trump’s Trade War Would Mean, in Nine Charts\nPresident Trump’s tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico could upend U.S. trade. These nine charts show what’s at stake, what comes next, and why it matters.\n\n## By experts and staff\nUpdated\n\nFebruary 5, 2025 10:57 a.m.\n\n### Experts\n- ![](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/w_1024\/t_cfr_2_3\/f_auto\/v1772036101\/0040_Shannon-ONeil_90-copy\/0040_Shannon-ONeil_90-copy.png)\n  \n  [By Shannon K. O'Neil](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/experts\/shannon-k-oneil)\n  \n  Senior Vice President of Studies and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair\n\n### By\n- Julia Huesa\n  \n  Special Assistant and Research Associate to the Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair\n\nShare\n\n[Log In](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/login?redirectTo=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cfr.org%2Farticles%2Fwhat-trumps-trade-war-would-mean-nine-charts)\n\nOn February 4, President Donald Trump imposed 10 percent [tariffs](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounders\/what-are-tariffs \"tariffs\") on China, after reaching last-minute agreements with Canada and Mexico to delay tariffs by thirty days. Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports come as punishment for Beijing’s failure to rein in the [smuggling of fentanyl precursor chemicals](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/these-eight-charts-show-why-fentanyl-huge-foreign-policy-problem \"smuggling of fentanyl precursor chemicals\"), while the stay on tariffs for Ottawa and Mexico City comes after both countries promised greater cooperation on combatting drug smuggling. China [has responded](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/02\/04\/business\/economy\/trump-tariffs-china.html \"has responded\") with 15 percent tariffs on U.S. coal, gas, and other goods, as well as restrictions on some minerals exports and the launch of an antitrust investigation into Google.\n\nHere are nine graphics that show the potential economic effects of such tariffs on all four countries.\n\n## How could tariffs affect the United States?\nNearly half of all U.S. imports—more than \\$1.3 trillion—come from Canada, China, and Mexico. However, analysis by Bloomberg Economics shows that the new tariffs could reduce overall U.S. imports by 15 percent. While the Washington, DC-based Tax Foundation estimates that the tariffs will generate around [\\$100 billion](https:\/\/taxfoundation.org\/research\/all\/federal\/trump-tariffs-trade-war\/ \"$100 billion\") per year in extra federal tax revenue, they could also impose significant costs on the broader economy: disrupting supply chains, raising costs for businesses, eliminating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and ultimately driving up consumer prices.\n\nCertain sectors of the U.S. economy will be hit particularly hard, including the automotive, energy, and food sectors. Gas prices could surge as much as 50 cents per gallon in the Midwest, as Canada and Mexico supply more than [70 percent](https:\/\/crsreports.congress.gov\/product\/pdf\/IN\/IN12488 \"70 percent\") \\[PDF\\] of crude oil imports to U.S. refineries. Also at risk are cars and other vehicles, as the United States imports nearly half its auto parts from its northern and southern neighbors.\n\nA 25 percent tariff on Canada and Mexico will raise production costs for U.S. automakers, [adding up to \\$3,000](https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/2024\/12\/02\/mexico-tariffs-beer-avocados-tomatoes-berries\/ \"adding up to $3,000\") to the price of some of the roughly sixteen million cars sold in the United States each year. Grocery costs could rise, too, as Mexico is the United States’ biggest source of fresh produce, supplying more than [60 percent](https:\/\/www.ers.usda.gov\/amber-waves\/2024\/october\/growth-in-mexico-s-horticultural-exports-to-the-united-states-continued-even-as-new-u-s-food-safety-laws-took-effect \"60 percent\") of U.S. vegetable imports and nearly half of all fruit and nut imports.\n\nStill, the United States is less reliant on trade than many other industrialized economies, including Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Imports and exports make up just a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), and the United States sources what it does import from a fairly broad set of nations.\n\n## How could tariffs affect Canada and Mexico?\nTariffs will hit Canada and Mexico much harder, as trade makes up about 70 percent of both economies’ GDP.\n\nThe two countries are particularly dependent on trade with the United States. More than 80 percent of Mexico’s exports—including cars, machinery, fruits, vegetables, and medical equipment—head north, accounting for 15 percent of total U.S. imports. This dependence is especially pronounced on Mexico’s northern border. There, industrial states Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Baja California account for [nearly half](https:\/\/www.voronoiapp.com\/economy\/These-Mexican-states-export-the-most-to-the-US-1523 \"nearly half\") of Mexico’s exports to the United States, sending more than \\$200 billion worth of computers, electronics, transportation equipment, and other products each year.\n\nA unilateral 25 percent tariff on these goods could slash Mexico’s GDP by some 16 percent according to Bloomberg Economics, with Mexico’s auto industry bearing the brunt. Mexico sends nearly 80 percent of the cars it produces to the United States alone, amounting to some 2.5 million vehicles each year. Duties will also threaten Mexico’s energy sector; the United States is the recipient of roughly 60 percent of Mexico’s petroleum exports, most of which is crude oil bound for U.S. refineries. At the same time, Mexico is the top destination for U.S. refined oil exports, which [meet over 70 percent](https:\/\/www.trade.gov\/country-commercial-guides\/mexico-oil-and-gas \"meet over 70 percent\") of domestic demand. U.S. tariffs will likely make fuel more expensive, raising prices at the pump and straining Mexico’s broader economy.\n\nCanada faces a similar challenge. The United States buys more than [70 percent](https:\/\/imco.org.mx\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/01\/Aranceles_enero2025-1.pdf \"70 percent\") \\[PDF; in Spanish\\] of Canada’s exports, with these goods making up 14 percent of total U.S. imports. Under the new tariffs, Canada’s energy sector will take the biggest hit, as exporters [send 80 percent](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/01\/21\/world\/canada\/trumps-tariffs-us-canada-mexico.html#link-58a6151 \"send 80 percent\") of their oil south.\n\nThese asymmetries in the cost of tariffs at home give the U.S. significant leverage over its North American partners in negotiations.\n\n## How could tariffs affect China?\nChina is comparatively less dependent on the United States and less reliant on trade overall. Over the past two decades, the country has steadily reduced the importance of trade to its economy as Beijing has ramped up domestic production. Today, imports and exports account for only about 37 percent of China’s GDP, compared to more than 60 percent in the early 2000s.\n\nIn recent years,U.S.-China trade [has declined](https:\/\/www.piie.com\/blogs\/realtime-economics\/2023\/five-years-trade-war-china-continues-its-slow-decoupling-us-exports \"has declined\"), particularly in sectors hit by previous tariffs and export controls, such as auto parts, data servers, furniture, and semiconductors. China has instead ramped up trade with other partners including the European Union, Mexico, and Vietnam. The country’s share of global trade [has climbed](https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/opinion\/article\/3294772\/robust-exports-show-china-embedded-global-supply-chain \"has climbed\") roughly 4 percent since 2016, when President Trump first took office, even as the United States’ share [has dipped](https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/07eac548-6607-4c88-bfe3-4f1d6e3b8cf2 \"has dipped\"). Combined, these factors will lessen the shock of an additional 10 percent tariff on Chinese exports to the United States.\n\n## What could happen the day after?\nEach country’s currency could weaken further, lessening the bite of tariffs on imports and raising the effective price of U.S. exports to other nations. A weakened yuan has already softened the blow for Chinese producers, helping their exports remain competitive around the world. The roughly 30 percent depreciation of Mexico’s peso since April and the Canadian dollar’s 8 percent drop since September also lessens the potential impact. Markets could potentially drive the peso, as well as the Canadian dollar, further down not that tariffs are in place.\n\nAdditionally, Canada, China, or Mexico could respond in kind, imposing tit-for-tat tariffs on the United States. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has already suggested that Mexico could retaliate with tariffs of its own, and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which underpins North American free trade, [would likely allow it](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/expert-brief\/trump-and-future-usmca \"would likely allow it\").\n\nThis wouldn’t be the first time countries have reciprocated. In 2018, Mexico and Canada placed retaliatory tariffs on a combined more than \\$15 billion worth of U.S. goods—including steel, pork, yogurt, and tablecloths—after Trump imposed tariffs on their steel and aluminum. Likewise, the United States lost \\$20 billion in annual farm exports when China hit back against a slew of U.S. tariffs from 2018 to 2019.\n\nIf either Canada or Mexico retaliates, U.S. fuel exporters would likely take the biggest hit alongside automakers and other advanced manufacturers, including pharmaceutical producers.\n\nRetaliatory tariffs on the United States would predominantly affect manufacturing-heavy states. Mexico buys [70 percent](https:\/\/www.progressivepolicy.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/Gresser-JEC-Testimony-12182024.pdf \"70 percent\") \\[PDF\\] of New Mexico’s exports, including billions of dollars in U.S. semiconductor chips and electrical components that later return to the United States in Mexican-made cars and appliances. Texas sends more than \\$20 billion in chips, auto parts, and electrical equipment to Mexico; overall, the state’s southbound exports account for 5 percent of its GDP. Tariffs would also dent Ohio’s \\$5 billion worth of auto and metal exports to Canada as well as Maine’s \\$320 million in northbound lumber and paper exports.\n\n*Will Merrow created the graphics for this article.*\n\n## Information\nFrom [Greenberg Center for Geoeconomics](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/programs\/greenberg-center-geoeconomic-studies)\n\n### Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.\nThis work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.\n\n- [United States](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/regions\/united-states)\n- [Canada](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/regions\/canada)\n- [China](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/regions\/china)\n- [Mexico](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/regions\/mexico)\n- [Trade](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/topics\/trade)\n\n- ![Peter Magyar waves the Hungarian flag after his speech during his party's election night event in Budapest on Sunday, April 12, 2026.](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/w_1920\/t_cfr_3_2\/f_auto\/v1776110329\/HungaryElection_A-1\/HungaryElection_A-1.jpg)\n  \n  ### [Orbán's Fall in Hungary Opens a Door for Europe — and Closes One for Russia](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/orbans-fall-in-hungary-opens-a-door-for-europe-and-closes-one-for-russia)\n  April 13, 2026\n- ![\\<p\\>Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, Special Envoy for Peace Missions, watch as Vice President JD Vance briefs the press after meeting with representatives from Pakistan and Iran, April 12, 2026.\\<\/p\\> ](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/w_1920\/t_cfr_3_2\/f_auto\/v1776105442\/2026-04-12T021416Z_86610405_RC2ENKANGVVF_RTRMADP_3_IRAN-CRISIS-CEASEFIRE-PAKISTAN\/2026-04-12T021416Z_86610405_RC2ENKANGVVF_RTRMADP_3_IRAN-CRISIS-CEASEFIRE-PAKISTAN.jpg)\n  \n  ### [U.S.-Iran Peace Talks Hit an Impasse. What Comes Next?](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/u-s-iran-peace-talks-hit-an-impasse-what-comes-next)\n  By James M. Lindsay\n  \n  April 13, 2026\n- ![\\<p\\>A vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, off the coast of Oman’s Musandam province, April 12, 2026.\\<\/p\\> ](https:\/\/assets.cfr.org\/images\/w_1920\/t_cfr_3_2\/f_auto\/v1776098655\/2026-04-13T142330Z_681433158_RC2GNKA4UO95_RTRMADP_3_IRAN-CRISIS-GLOBAL-ECONOMY\/2026-04-13T142330Z_681433158_RC2GNKA4UO95_RTRMADP_3_IRAN-CRISIS-GLOBAL-ECONOMY.jpg)\n  \n  ### [United States Blockades Strait of Hormuz After U.S.-Iran Talks](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/united-states-blockades-strait-of-hormuz-after-u-s-iran-talks)\n  April 13, 2026\n\nCouncil on Foreign Relations\n\n- [About CFR](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/about)\n- [Membership](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/membership)\n- [Support CFR](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/support-cfr)\n- [Fellowships](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/fellowships)\n- [Careers](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/career-opportunities)\n- [Newsletters](https:\/\/link.cfr.org\/join\/66n\/signup)\n- [CFR Education](https:\/\/education.cfr.org\/)\n- [CFR Store](https:\/\/store.cfr.org\/)\n- [Contact Us](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/contact-us)\n- [For Media](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/media)\n- [Privacy Policy](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/privacy-policy)\n\n©2026 Council on Foreign Relations","attrs_readable_markdown":"On February 4, President Donald Trump imposed 10 percent [tariffs](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounders\/what-are-tariffs \"tariffs\") on China, after reaching last-minute agreements with Canada and Mexico to delay tariffs by thirty days. Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports come as punishment for Beijing’s failure to rein in the [smuggling of fentanyl precursor chemicals](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/articles\/these-eight-charts-show-why-fentanyl-huge-foreign-policy-problem \"smuggling of fentanyl precursor chemicals\"), while the stay on tariffs for Ottawa and Mexico City comes after both countries promised greater cooperation on combatting drug smuggling. China [has responded](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/02\/04\/business\/economy\/trump-tariffs-china.html \"has responded\") with 15 percent tariffs on U.S. coal, gas, and other goods, as well as restrictions on some minerals exports and the launch of an antitrust investigation into Google.\n\nHere are nine graphics that show the potential economic effects of such tariffs on all four countries.\n\nHow could tariffs affect the United States?\n\nNearly half of all U.S. imports—more than \\$1.3 trillion—come from Canada, China, and Mexico. However, analysis by Bloomberg Economics shows that the new tariffs could reduce overall U.S. imports by 15 percent. While the Washington, DC-based Tax Foundation estimates that the tariffs will generate around [\\$100 billion](https:\/\/taxfoundation.org\/research\/all\/federal\/trump-tariffs-trade-war\/ \"$100 billion\") per year in extra federal tax revenue, they could also impose significant costs on the broader economy: disrupting supply chains, raising costs for businesses, eliminating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and ultimately driving up consumer prices.\n\nCertain sectors of the U.S. economy will be hit particularly hard, including the automotive, energy, and food sectors. Gas prices could surge as much as 50 cents per gallon in the Midwest, as Canada and Mexico supply more than [70 percent](https:\/\/crsreports.congress.gov\/product\/pdf\/IN\/IN12488 \"70 percent\") \\[PDF\\] of crude oil imports to U.S. refineries. Also at risk are cars and other vehicles, as the United States imports nearly half its auto parts from its northern and southern neighbors.\n\nA 25 percent tariff on Canada and Mexico will raise production costs for U.S. automakers, [adding up to \\$3,000](https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/2024\/12\/02\/mexico-tariffs-beer-avocados-tomatoes-berries\/ \"adding up to $3,000\") to the price of some of the roughly sixteen million cars sold in the United States each year. Grocery costs could rise, too, as Mexico is the United States’ biggest source of fresh produce, supplying more than [60 percent](https:\/\/www.ers.usda.gov\/amber-waves\/2024\/october\/growth-in-mexico-s-horticultural-exports-to-the-united-states-continued-even-as-new-u-s-food-safety-laws-took-effect \"60 percent\") of U.S. vegetable imports and nearly half of all fruit and nut imports.\n\nStill, the United States is less reliant on trade than many other industrialized economies, including Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Imports and exports make up just a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), and the United States sources what it does import from a fairly broad set of nations.\n\nHow could tariffs affect Canada and Mexico?\n\nTariffs will hit Canada and Mexico much harder, as trade makes up about 70 percent of both economies’ GDP.\n\nThe two countries are particularly dependent on trade with the United States. More than 80 percent of Mexico’s exports—including cars, machinery, fruits, vegetables, and medical equipment—head north, accounting for 15 percent of total U.S. imports. This dependence is especially pronounced on Mexico’s northern border. There, industrial states Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Baja California account for [nearly half](https:\/\/www.voronoiapp.com\/economy\/These-Mexican-states-export-the-most-to-the-US-1523 \"nearly half\") of Mexico’s exports to the United States, sending more than \\$200 billion worth of computers, electronics, transportation equipment, and other products each year.\n\nA unilateral 25 percent tariff on these goods could slash Mexico’s GDP by some 16 percent according to Bloomberg Economics, with Mexico’s auto industry bearing the brunt. Mexico sends nearly 80 percent of the cars it produces to the United States alone, amounting to some 2.5 million vehicles each year. Duties will also threaten Mexico’s energy sector; the United States is the recipient of roughly 60 percent of Mexico’s petroleum exports, most of which is crude oil bound for U.S. refineries. At the same time, Mexico is the top destination for U.S. refined oil exports, which [meet over 70 percent](https:\/\/www.trade.gov\/country-commercial-guides\/mexico-oil-and-gas \"meet over 70 percent\") of domestic demand. U.S. tariffs will likely make fuel more expensive, raising prices at the pump and straining Mexico’s broader economy.\n\nCanada faces a similar challenge. The United States buys more than [70 percent](https:\/\/imco.org.mx\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/01\/Aranceles_enero2025-1.pdf \"70 percent\") \\[PDF; in Spanish\\] of Canada’s exports, with these goods making up 14 percent of total U.S. imports. Under the new tariffs, Canada’s energy sector will take the biggest hit, as exporters [send 80 percent](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/01\/21\/world\/canada\/trumps-tariffs-us-canada-mexico.html#link-58a6151 \"send 80 percent\") of their oil south.\n\nThese asymmetries in the cost of tariffs at home give the U.S. significant leverage over its North American partners in negotiations.\n\nHow could tariffs affect China?\n\nChina is comparatively less dependent on the United States and less reliant on trade overall. Over the past two decades, the country has steadily reduced the importance of trade to its economy as Beijing has ramped up domestic production. Today, imports and exports account for only about 37 percent of China’s GDP, compared to more than 60 percent in the early 2000s.\n\nIn recent years,U.S.-China trade [has declined](https:\/\/www.piie.com\/blogs\/realtime-economics\/2023\/five-years-trade-war-china-continues-its-slow-decoupling-us-exports \"has declined\"), particularly in sectors hit by previous tariffs and export controls, such as auto parts, data servers, furniture, and semiconductors. China has instead ramped up trade with other partners including the European Union, Mexico, and Vietnam. The country’s share of global trade [has climbed](https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/opinion\/article\/3294772\/robust-exports-show-china-embedded-global-supply-chain \"has climbed\") roughly 4 percent since 2016, when President Trump first took office, even as the United States’ share [has dipped](https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/07eac548-6607-4c88-bfe3-4f1d6e3b8cf2 \"has dipped\"). Combined, these factors will lessen the shock of an additional 10 percent tariff on Chinese exports to the United States.\n\nWhat could happen the day after?\n\nEach country’s currency could weaken further, lessening the bite of tariffs on imports and raising the effective price of U.S. exports to other nations. A weakened yuan has already softened the blow for Chinese producers, helping their exports remain competitive around the world. The roughly 30 percent depreciation of Mexico’s peso since April and the Canadian dollar’s 8 percent drop since September also lessens the potential impact. Markets could potentially drive the peso, as well as the Canadian dollar, further down not that tariffs are in place.\n\nAdditionally, Canada, China, or Mexico could respond in kind, imposing tit-for-tat tariffs on the United States. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has already suggested that Mexico could retaliate with tariffs of its own, and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which underpins North American free trade, [would likely allow it](https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/expert-brief\/trump-and-future-usmca \"would likely allow it\").\n\nThis wouldn’t be the first time countries have reciprocated. In 2018, Mexico and Canada placed retaliatory tariffs on a combined more than \\$15 billion worth of U.S. goods—including steel, pork, yogurt, and tablecloths—after Trump imposed tariffs on their steel and aluminum. Likewise, the United States lost \\$20 billion in annual farm exports when China hit back against a slew of U.S. tariffs from 2018 to 2019.\n\nIf either Canada or Mexico retaliates, U.S. fuel exporters would likely take the biggest hit alongside automakers and other advanced manufacturers, including pharmaceutical producers.\n\nRetaliatory tariffs on the United States would predominantly affect manufacturing-heavy states. Mexico buys [70 percent](https:\/\/www.progressivepolicy.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/Gresser-JEC-Testimony-12182024.pdf \"70 percent\") \\[PDF\\] of New Mexico’s exports, including billions of dollars in U.S. semiconductor chips and electrical components that later return to the United States in Mexican-made cars and appliances. Texas sends more than \\$20 billion in chips, auto parts, and electrical equipment to Mexico; overall, the state’s southbound exports account for 5 percent of its GDP. Tariffs would also dent Ohio’s \\$5 billion worth of auto and metal exports to Canada as well as Maine’s \\$320 million in northbound lumber and paper exports.\n\n*Will Merrow created the graphics for this article.*","meta_canonical":null}

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Meta Title	What Trump’s Trade War Would Mean, in Nine Charts \| Council on Foreign Relations
Meta Description	President Trump’s tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico could upend U.S. trade. These nine charts show what’s at stake, what comes next, and why it matters.
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Boilerpipe Text	On February 4, President Donald Trump imposed 10 percent tariffs on China, after reaching last-minute agreements with Canada and Mexico to delay tariffs by thirty days. Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports come as punishment for Beijing’s failure to rein in the smuggling of fentanyl precursor chemicals , while the stay on tariffs for Ottawa and Mexico City comes after both countries promised greater cooperation on combatting drug smuggling. China has responded with 15 percent tariffs on U.S. coal, gas, and other goods, as well as restrictions on some minerals exports and the launch of an antitrust investigation into Google. Here are nine graphics that show the potential economic effects of such tariffs on all four countries. How could tariffs affect the United States? Nearly half of all U.S. imports—more than $1.3 trillion—come from Canada, China, and Mexico. However, analysis by Bloomberg Economics shows that the new tariffs could reduce overall U.S. imports by 15 percent. While the Washington, DC-based Tax Foundation estimates that the tariffs will generate around $100 billion per year in extra federal tax revenue, they could also impose significant costs on the broader economy: disrupting supply chains, raising costs for businesses, eliminating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and ultimately driving up consumer prices. Certain sectors of the U.S. economy will be hit particularly hard, including the automotive, energy, and food sectors. Gas prices could surge as much as 50 cents per gallon in the Midwest, as Canada and Mexico supply more than 70 percent [PDF] of crude oil imports to U.S. refineries. Also at risk are cars and other vehicles, as the United States imports nearly half its auto parts from its northern and southern neighbors. A 25 percent tariff on Canada and Mexico will raise production costs for U.S. automakers, adding up to $3,000 to the price of some of the roughly sixteen million cars sold in the United States each year. Grocery costs could rise, too, as Mexico is the United States’ biggest source of fresh produce, supplying more than 60 percent of U.S. vegetable imports and nearly half of all fruit and nut imports. Still, the United States is less reliant on trade than many other industrialized economies, including Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Imports and exports make up just a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), and the United States sources what it does import from a fairly broad set of nations. How could tariffs affect Canada and Mexico? Tariffs will hit Canada and Mexico much harder, as trade makes up about 70 percent of both economies’ GDP. The two countries are particularly dependent on trade with the United States. More than 80 percent of Mexico’s exports—including cars, machinery, fruits, vegetables, and medical equipment—head north, accounting for 15 percent of total U.S. imports. This dependence is especially pronounced on Mexico’s northern border. There, industrial states Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Baja California account for nearly half of Mexico’s exports to the United States, sending more than $200 billion worth of computers, electronics, transportation equipment, and other products each year. A unilateral 25 percent tariff on these goods could slash Mexico’s GDP by some 16 percent according to Bloomberg Economics, with Mexico’s auto industry bearing the brunt. Mexico sends nearly 80 percent of the cars it produces to the United States alone, amounting to some 2.5 million vehicles each year. Duties will also threaten Mexico’s energy sector; the United States is the recipient of roughly 60 percent of Mexico’s petroleum exports, most of which is crude oil bound for U.S. refineries. At the same time, Mexico is the top destination for U.S. refined oil exports, which meet over 70 percent of domestic demand. U.S. tariffs will likely make fuel more expensive, raising prices at the pump and straining Mexico’s broader economy. Canada faces a similar challenge. The United States buys more than 70 percent [PDF; in Spanish] of Canada’s exports, with these goods making up 14 percent of total U.S. imports. Under the new tariffs, Canada’s energy sector will take the biggest hit, as exporters send 80 percent of their oil south. These asymmetries in the cost of tariffs at home give the U.S. significant leverage over its North American partners in negotiations. How could tariffs affect China? China is comparatively less dependent on the United States and less reliant on trade overall. Over the past two decades, the country has steadily reduced the importance of trade to its economy as Beijing has ramped up domestic production. Today, imports and exports account for only about 37 percent of China’s GDP, compared to more than 60 percent in the early 2000s. In recent years, U.S.-China trade has declined , particularly in sectors hit by previous tariffs and export controls, such as auto parts, data servers, furniture, and semiconductors. China has instead ramped up trade with other partners including the European Union, Mexico, and Vietnam. The country’s share of global trade has climbed roughly 4 percent since 2016, when President Trump first took office, even as the United States’ share has dipped . Combined, these factors will lessen the shock of an additional 10 percent tariff on Chinese exports to the United States. What could happen the day after? Each country’s currency could weaken further, lessening the bite of tariffs on imports and raising the effective price of U.S. exports to other nations. A weakened yuan has already softened the blow for Chinese producers, helping their exports remain competitive around the world. The roughly 30 percent depreciation of Mexico’s peso since April and the Canadian dollar’s 8 percent drop since September also lessens the potential impact. Markets could potentially drive the peso, as well as the Canadian dollar, further down not that tariffs are in place. Additionally, Canada, China, or Mexico could respond in kind, imposing tit-for-tat tariffs on the United States. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has already suggested that Mexico could retaliate with tariffs of its own, and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which underpins North American free trade, would likely allow it . This wouldn’t be the first time countries have reciprocated. In 2018, Mexico and Canada placed retaliatory tariffs on a combined more than $15 billion worth of U.S. goods—including steel, pork, yogurt, and tablecloths—after Trump imposed tariffs on their steel and aluminum. Likewise, the United States lost $20 billion in annual farm exports when China hit back against a slew of U.S. tariffs from 2018 to 2019. If either Canada or Mexico retaliates, U.S. fuel exporters would likely take the biggest hit alongside automakers and other advanced manufacturers, including pharmaceutical producers. Retaliatory tariffs on the United States would predominantly affect manufacturing-heavy states. Mexico buys 70 percent [PDF] of New Mexico’s exports, including billions of dollars in U.S. semiconductor chips and electrical components that later return to the United States in Mexican-made cars and appliances. Texas sends more than $20 billion in chips, auto parts, and electrical equipment to Mexico; overall, the state’s southbound exports account for 5 percent of its GDP. Tariffs would also dent Ohio’s $5 billion worth of auto and metal exports to Canada as well as Maine’s $320 million in northbound lumber and paper exports. Will Merrow created the graphics for this article.
Markdown	[Skip to content](https://www.cfr.org/articles/what-trumps-trade-war-would-mean-nine-charts#content) - [Support CFR](https://www.cfr.org/support-cfr) - [Foreign Affairs](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/) [Member Login](https://www.cfr.org/member) [Log In](https://www.cfr.org/login?redirectTo=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cfr.org%2Farticles%2Fwhat-trumps-trade-war-would-mean-nine-charts) - Regions - Topics - Research - Experts - [Events](https://www.cfr.org/events) 1. [Articles](https://www.cfr.org/articles) 2. What Trump’s Trade War Would Mean, in Nine Charts Share [United States](https://www.cfr.org/regions/united-states) # What Trump’s Trade War Would Mean, in Nine Charts President Trump’s tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico could upend U.S. trade. These nine charts show what’s at stake, what comes next, and why it matters. ## By experts and staff Updated February 5, 2025 10:57 a.m. ### Experts - ![](https://assets.cfr.org/images/w_1024/t_cfr_2_3/f_auto/v1772036101/0040_Shannon-ONeil_90-copy/0040_Shannon-ONeil_90-copy.png) [By Shannon K. O'Neil](https://www.cfr.org/experts/shannon-k-oneil) Senior Vice President of Studies and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair ### By - Julia Huesa Special Assistant and Research Associate to the Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair Share [Log In](https://www.cfr.org/login?redirectTo=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cfr.org%2Farticles%2Fwhat-trumps-trade-war-would-mean-nine-charts) On February 4, President Donald Trump imposed 10 percent [tariffs](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/what-are-tariffs "tariffs") on China, after reaching last-minute agreements with Canada and Mexico to delay tariffs by thirty days. Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports come as punishment for Beijing’s failure to rein in the [smuggling of fentanyl precursor chemicals](https://www.cfr.org/articles/these-eight-charts-show-why-fentanyl-huge-foreign-policy-problem "smuggling of fentanyl precursor chemicals"), while the stay on tariffs for Ottawa and Mexico City comes after both countries promised greater cooperation on combatting drug smuggling. China [has responded](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/04/business/economy/trump-tariffs-china.html "has responded") with 15 percent tariffs on U.S. coal, gas, and other goods, as well as restrictions on some minerals exports and the launch of an antitrust investigation into Google. Here are nine graphics that show the potential economic effects of such tariffs on all four countries. ## How could tariffs affect the United States? Nearly half of all U.S. imports—more than \$1.3 trillion—come from Canada, China, and Mexico. However, analysis by Bloomberg Economics shows that the new tariffs could reduce overall U.S. imports by 15 percent. While the Washington, DC-based Tax Foundation estimates that the tariffs will generate around [\$100 billion](https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/trump-tariffs-trade-war/ "$100 billion") per year in extra federal tax revenue, they could also impose significant costs on the broader economy: disrupting supply chains, raising costs for businesses, eliminating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and ultimately driving up consumer prices. Certain sectors of the U.S. economy will be hit particularly hard, including the automotive, energy, and food sectors. Gas prices could surge as much as 50 cents per gallon in the Midwest, as Canada and Mexico supply more than [70 percent](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12488 "70 percent") \[PDF\] of crude oil imports to U.S. refineries. Also at risk are cars and other vehicles, as the United States imports nearly half its auto parts from its northern and southern neighbors. A 25 percent tariff on Canada and Mexico will raise production costs for U.S. automakers, [adding up to \$3,000](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/02/mexico-tariffs-beer-avocados-tomatoes-berries/ "adding up to $3,000") to the price of some of the roughly sixteen million cars sold in the United States each year. Grocery costs could rise, too, as Mexico is the United States’ biggest source of fresh produce, supplying more than [60 percent](https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2024/october/growth-in-mexico-s-horticultural-exports-to-the-united-states-continued-even-as-new-u-s-food-safety-laws-took-effect "60 percent") of U.S. vegetable imports and nearly half of all fruit and nut imports. Still, the United States is less reliant on trade than many other industrialized economies, including Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Imports and exports make up just a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), and the United States sources what it does import from a fairly broad set of nations. ## How could tariffs affect Canada and Mexico? Tariffs will hit Canada and Mexico much harder, as trade makes up about 70 percent of both economies’ GDP. The two countries are particularly dependent on trade with the United States. More than 80 percent of Mexico’s exports—including cars, machinery, fruits, vegetables, and medical equipment—head north, accounting for 15 percent of total U.S. imports. This dependence is especially pronounced on Mexico’s northern border. There, industrial states Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Baja California account for [nearly half](https://www.voronoiapp.com/economy/These-Mexican-states-export-the-most-to-the-US-1523 "nearly half") of Mexico’s exports to the United States, sending more than \$200 billion worth of computers, electronics, transportation equipment, and other products each year. A unilateral 25 percent tariff on these goods could slash Mexico’s GDP by some 16 percent according to Bloomberg Economics, with Mexico’s auto industry bearing the brunt. Mexico sends nearly 80 percent of the cars it produces to the United States alone, amounting to some 2.5 million vehicles each year. Duties will also threaten Mexico’s energy sector; the United States is the recipient of roughly 60 percent of Mexico’s petroleum exports, most of which is crude oil bound for U.S. refineries. At the same time, Mexico is the top destination for U.S. refined oil exports, which [meet over 70 percent](https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/mexico-oil-and-gas "meet over 70 percent") of domestic demand. U.S. tariffs will likely make fuel more expensive, raising prices at the pump and straining Mexico’s broader economy. Canada faces a similar challenge. The United States buys more than [70 percent](https://imco.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Aranceles_enero2025-1.pdf "70 percent") \[PDF; in Spanish\] of Canada’s exports, with these goods making up 14 percent of total U.S. imports. Under the new tariffs, Canada’s energy sector will take the biggest hit, as exporters [send 80 percent](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/21/world/canada/trumps-tariffs-us-canada-mexico.html#link-58a6151 "send 80 percent") of their oil south. These asymmetries in the cost of tariffs at home give the U.S. significant leverage over its North American partners in negotiations. ## How could tariffs affect China? China is comparatively less dependent on the United States and less reliant on trade overall. Over the past two decades, the country has steadily reduced the importance of trade to its economy as Beijing has ramped up domestic production. Today, imports and exports account for only about 37 percent of China’s GDP, compared to more than 60 percent in the early 2000s. In recent years,U.S.-China trade [has declined](https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2023/five-years-trade-war-china-continues-its-slow-decoupling-us-exports "has declined"), particularly in sectors hit by previous tariffs and export controls, such as auto parts, data servers, furniture, and semiconductors. China has instead ramped up trade with other partners including the European Union, Mexico, and Vietnam. The country’s share of global trade [has climbed](https://www.scmp.com/opinion/article/3294772/robust-exports-show-china-embedded-global-supply-chain "has climbed") roughly 4 percent since 2016, when President Trump first took office, even as the United States’ share [has dipped](https://www.ft.com/content/07eac548-6607-4c88-bfe3-4f1d6e3b8cf2 "has dipped"). Combined, these factors will lessen the shock of an additional 10 percent tariff on Chinese exports to the United States. ## What could happen the day after? Each country’s currency could weaken further, lessening the bite of tariffs on imports and raising the effective price of U.S. exports to other nations. A weakened yuan has already softened the blow for Chinese producers, helping their exports remain competitive around the world. The roughly 30 percent depreciation of Mexico’s peso since April and the Canadian dollar’s 8 percent drop since September also lessens the potential impact. Markets could potentially drive the peso, as well as the Canadian dollar, further down not that tariffs are in place. Additionally, Canada, China, or Mexico could respond in kind, imposing tit-for-tat tariffs on the United States. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has already suggested that Mexico could retaliate with tariffs of its own, and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which underpins North American free trade, [would likely allow it](https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/trump-and-future-usmca "would likely allow it"). This wouldn’t be the first time countries have reciprocated. In 2018, Mexico and Canada placed retaliatory tariffs on a combined more than \$15 billion worth of U.S. goods—including steel, pork, yogurt, and tablecloths—after Trump imposed tariffs on their steel and aluminum. Likewise, the United States lost \$20 billion in annual farm exports when China hit back against a slew of U.S. tariffs from 2018 to 2019. If either Canada or Mexico retaliates, U.S. fuel exporters would likely take the biggest hit alongside automakers and other advanced manufacturers, including pharmaceutical producers. Retaliatory tariffs on the United States would predominantly affect manufacturing-heavy states. Mexico buys [70 percent](https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Gresser-JEC-Testimony-12182024.pdf "70 percent") \[PDF\] of New Mexico’s exports, including billions of dollars in U.S. semiconductor chips and electrical components that later return to the United States in Mexican-made cars and appliances. Texas sends more than \$20 billion in chips, auto parts, and electrical equipment to Mexico; overall, the state’s southbound exports account for 5 percent of its GDP. Tariffs would also dent Ohio’s \$5 billion worth of auto and metal exports to Canada as well as Maine’s \$320 million in northbound lumber and paper exports. Will Merrow created the graphics for this article. ## Information From [Greenberg Center for Geoeconomics](https://www.cfr.org/programs/greenberg-center-geoeconomic-studies) ### Creative Commons: Some rights reserved. This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License. - [United States](https://www.cfr.org/regions/united-states) - [Canada](https://www.cfr.org/regions/canada) - [China](https://www.cfr.org/regions/china) - [Mexico](https://www.cfr.org/regions/mexico) - [Trade](https://www.cfr.org/topics/trade) - ![Peter Magyar waves the Hungarian flag after his speech during his party's election night event in Budapest on Sunday, April 12, 2026.](https://assets.cfr.org/images/w_1920/t_cfr_3_2/f_auto/v1776110329/HungaryElection_A-1/HungaryElection_A-1.jpg) ### [Orbán's Fall in Hungary Opens a Door for Europe — and Closes One for Russia](https://www.cfr.org/articles/orbans-fall-in-hungary-opens-a-door-for-europe-and-closes-one-for-russia) April 13, 2026 - ![\<p\>Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, Special Envoy for Peace Missions, watch as Vice President JD Vance briefs the press after meeting with representatives from Pakistan and Iran, April 12, 2026.\</p\> ](https://assets.cfr.org/images/w_1920/t_cfr_3_2/f_auto/v1776105442/2026-04-12T021416Z_86610405_RC2ENKANGVVF_RTRMADP_3_IRAN-CRISIS-CEASEFIRE-PAKISTAN/2026-04-12T021416Z_86610405_RC2ENKANGVVF_RTRMADP_3_IRAN-CRISIS-CEASEFIRE-PAKISTAN.jpg) ### [U.S.-Iran Peace Talks Hit an Impasse. What Comes Next?](https://www.cfr.org/articles/u-s-iran-peace-talks-hit-an-impasse-what-comes-next) By James M. Lindsay April 13, 2026 - ![\<p\>A vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, off the coast of Oman’s Musandam province, April 12, 2026.\</p\> ](https://assets.cfr.org/images/w_1920/t_cfr_3_2/f_auto/v1776098655/2026-04-13T142330Z_681433158_RC2GNKA4UO95_RTRMADP_3_IRAN-CRISIS-GLOBAL-ECONOMY/2026-04-13T142330Z_681433158_RC2GNKA4UO95_RTRMADP_3_IRAN-CRISIS-GLOBAL-ECONOMY.jpg) ### [United States Blockades Strait of Hormuz After U.S.-Iran Talks](https://www.cfr.org/articles/united-states-blockades-strait-of-hormuz-after-u-s-iran-talks) April 13, 2026 Council on Foreign Relations - [About CFR](https://www.cfr.org/about) - [Membership](https://www.cfr.org/membership) - [Support CFR](https://www.cfr.org/support-cfr) - [Fellowships](https://www.cfr.org/fellowships) - [Careers](https://www.cfr.org/career-opportunities) - [Newsletters](https://link.cfr.org/join/66n/signup) - [CFR Education](https://education.cfr.org/) - [CFR Store](https://store.cfr.org/) - [Contact Us](https://www.cfr.org/contact-us) - [For Media](https://www.cfr.org/media) - [Privacy Policy](https://www.cfr.org/privacy-policy) ©2026 Council on Foreign Relations
Readable Markdown	On February 4, President Donald Trump imposed 10 percent [tariffs](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/what-are-tariffs "tariffs") on China, after reaching last-minute agreements with Canada and Mexico to delay tariffs by thirty days. Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports come as punishment for Beijing’s failure to rein in the [smuggling of fentanyl precursor chemicals](https://www.cfr.org/articles/these-eight-charts-show-why-fentanyl-huge-foreign-policy-problem "smuggling of fentanyl precursor chemicals"), while the stay on tariffs for Ottawa and Mexico City comes after both countries promised greater cooperation on combatting drug smuggling. China [has responded](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/04/business/economy/trump-tariffs-china.html "has responded") with 15 percent tariffs on U.S. coal, gas, and other goods, as well as restrictions on some minerals exports and the launch of an antitrust investigation into Google. Here are nine graphics that show the potential economic effects of such tariffs on all four countries. How could tariffs affect the United States? Nearly half of all U.S. imports—more than \$1.3 trillion—come from Canada, China, and Mexico. However, analysis by Bloomberg Economics shows that the new tariffs could reduce overall U.S. imports by 15 percent. While the Washington, DC-based Tax Foundation estimates that the tariffs will generate around [\$100 billion](https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/trump-tariffs-trade-war/ "$100 billion") per year in extra federal tax revenue, they could also impose significant costs on the broader economy: disrupting supply chains, raising costs for businesses, eliminating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and ultimately driving up consumer prices. Certain sectors of the U.S. economy will be hit particularly hard, including the automotive, energy, and food sectors. Gas prices could surge as much as 50 cents per gallon in the Midwest, as Canada and Mexico supply more than [70 percent](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12488 "70 percent") \[PDF\] of crude oil imports to U.S. refineries. Also at risk are cars and other vehicles, as the United States imports nearly half its auto parts from its northern and southern neighbors. A 25 percent tariff on Canada and Mexico will raise production costs for U.S. automakers, [adding up to \$3,000](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/02/mexico-tariffs-beer-avocados-tomatoes-berries/ "adding up to $3,000") to the price of some of the roughly sixteen million cars sold in the United States each year. Grocery costs could rise, too, as Mexico is the United States’ biggest source of fresh produce, supplying more than [60 percent](https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2024/october/growth-in-mexico-s-horticultural-exports-to-the-united-states-continued-even-as-new-u-s-food-safety-laws-took-effect "60 percent") of U.S. vegetable imports and nearly half of all fruit and nut imports. Still, the United States is less reliant on trade than many other industrialized economies, including Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Imports and exports make up just a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), and the United States sources what it does import from a fairly broad set of nations. How could tariffs affect Canada and Mexico? Tariffs will hit Canada and Mexico much harder, as trade makes up about 70 percent of both economies’ GDP. The two countries are particularly dependent on trade with the United States. More than 80 percent of Mexico’s exports—including cars, machinery, fruits, vegetables, and medical equipment—head north, accounting for 15 percent of total U.S. imports. This dependence is especially pronounced on Mexico’s northern border. There, industrial states Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Baja California account for [nearly half](https://www.voronoiapp.com/economy/These-Mexican-states-export-the-most-to-the-US-1523 "nearly half") of Mexico’s exports to the United States, sending more than \$200 billion worth of computers, electronics, transportation equipment, and other products each year. A unilateral 25 percent tariff on these goods could slash Mexico’s GDP by some 16 percent according to Bloomberg Economics, with Mexico’s auto industry bearing the brunt. Mexico sends nearly 80 percent of the cars it produces to the United States alone, amounting to some 2.5 million vehicles each year. Duties will also threaten Mexico’s energy sector; the United States is the recipient of roughly 60 percent of Mexico’s petroleum exports, most of which is crude oil bound for U.S. refineries. At the same time, Mexico is the top destination for U.S. refined oil exports, which [meet over 70 percent](https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/mexico-oil-and-gas "meet over 70 percent") of domestic demand. U.S. tariffs will likely make fuel more expensive, raising prices at the pump and straining Mexico’s broader economy. Canada faces a similar challenge. The United States buys more than [70 percent](https://imco.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Aranceles_enero2025-1.pdf "70 percent") \[PDF; in Spanish\] of Canada’s exports, with these goods making up 14 percent of total U.S. imports. Under the new tariffs, Canada’s energy sector will take the biggest hit, as exporters [send 80 percent](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/21/world/canada/trumps-tariffs-us-canada-mexico.html#link-58a6151 "send 80 percent") of their oil south. These asymmetries in the cost of tariffs at home give the U.S. significant leverage over its North American partners in negotiations. How could tariffs affect China? China is comparatively less dependent on the United States and less reliant on trade overall. Over the past two decades, the country has steadily reduced the importance of trade to its economy as Beijing has ramped up domestic production. Today, imports and exports account for only about 37 percent of China’s GDP, compared to more than 60 percent in the early 2000s. In recent years,U.S.-China trade [has declined](https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2023/five-years-trade-war-china-continues-its-slow-decoupling-us-exports "has declined"), particularly in sectors hit by previous tariffs and export controls, such as auto parts, data servers, furniture, and semiconductors. China has instead ramped up trade with other partners including the European Union, Mexico, and Vietnam. The country’s share of global trade [has climbed](https://www.scmp.com/opinion/article/3294772/robust-exports-show-china-embedded-global-supply-chain "has climbed") roughly 4 percent since 2016, when President Trump first took office, even as the United States’ share [has dipped](https://www.ft.com/content/07eac548-6607-4c88-bfe3-4f1d6e3b8cf2 "has dipped"). Combined, these factors will lessen the shock of an additional 10 percent tariff on Chinese exports to the United States. What could happen the day after? Each country’s currency could weaken further, lessening the bite of tariffs on imports and raising the effective price of U.S. exports to other nations. A weakened yuan has already softened the blow for Chinese producers, helping their exports remain competitive around the world. The roughly 30 percent depreciation of Mexico’s peso since April and the Canadian dollar’s 8 percent drop since September also lessens the potential impact. Markets could potentially drive the peso, as well as the Canadian dollar, further down not that tariffs are in place. Additionally, Canada, China, or Mexico could respond in kind, imposing tit-for-tat tariffs on the United States. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has already suggested that Mexico could retaliate with tariffs of its own, and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which underpins North American free trade, [would likely allow it](https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/trump-and-future-usmca "would likely allow it"). This wouldn’t be the first time countries have reciprocated. In 2018, Mexico and Canada placed retaliatory tariffs on a combined more than \$15 billion worth of U.S. goods—including steel, pork, yogurt, and tablecloths—after Trump imposed tariffs on their steel and aluminum. Likewise, the United States lost \$20 billion in annual farm exports when China hit back against a slew of U.S. tariffs from 2018 to 2019. If either Canada or Mexico retaliates, U.S. fuel exporters would likely take the biggest hit alongside automakers and other advanced manufacturers, including pharmaceutical producers. Retaliatory tariffs on the United States would predominantly affect manufacturing-heavy states. Mexico buys [70 percent](https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Gresser-JEC-Testimony-12182024.pdf "70 percent") \[PDF\] of New Mexico’s exports, including billions of dollars in U.S. semiconductor chips and electrical components that later return to the United States in Mexican-made cars and appliances. Texas sends more than \$20 billion in chips, auto parts, and electrical equipment to Mexico; overall, the state’s southbound exports account for 5 percent of its GDP. Tariffs would also dent Ohio’s \$5 billion worth of auto and metal exports to Canada as well as Maine’s \$320 million in northbound lumber and paper exports. Will Merrow created the graphics for this article.
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