🕷️ Crawler Inspector

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1. Shard Calculation

Query:

Response:

Calculated Shard: 191 (from laksa039)

2. Crawled Status Check

Query:

curl -X POST \
  'http://laksa191.int.ahrefs:8124/' \
  -H 'Content-Type: text/plain' \
  -H 'X-ClickHouse-Database: crawler3' \
  -H 'Authorization: Basic YXBpOg==' \
  -d 'SELECT getAhrefsURLFromUnparsed(src_unparsed) AS found_url, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(download_stamp), 0) AS crawl_time, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(props_url_first_seen), 0) AS first_indexed_time, download_http_code AS http_code, src_unparsed AS src_unparsed, src_root_hash AS src_root_hash, history_drop_reason AS history_drop_reason, meta_title AS meta_title, meta_descriptions AS meta_descriptions, attrs_boilerpipe_text AS attrs_boilerpipe_text, attrs_markdown AS attrs_markdown, attrs_readable_markdown AS attrs_readable_markdown, meta_canonical AS meta_canonical FROM crawler3.page_info_local FINAL PREWHERE (src_root_hash, src_unparsed) IN ((getAhrefsRootHashFromUnparsed(getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-impact-of-brexit-on-immigration-to-the-uk/\')), getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-impact-of-brexit-on-immigration-to-the-uk/\'))) FORMAT JSONEachRow'

Response:

{"found_url":"https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/the-impact-of-brexit-on-immigration-to-the-uk\/","crawl_time":1776150911,"first_indexed_time":1773059398,"http_code":200,"src_unparsed":"uk,ac,ukandeu!\/the-impact-of-brexit-on-immigration-to-the-uk\/ s443","src_root_hash":"8298431369252940991","history_drop_reason":null,"meta_title":"The impact of Brexit on immigration to the UK - UK in a changing Europe","meta_descriptions":["Jonathan Portes and John Springford share their new analysis that estimates how the number of foreign-born workers would have evolved had the UK remained in the EU."],"attrs_boilerpipe_text":"Jonathan Portes and John Springford share their new analysis that estimates how the number of foreign-born workers would have evolved had the UK remained in the EU. They argue that while leaving changed the composition of migration flows dramatically, it did not materially alter the underlying balance between labour demand, demographic pressures and political constraints.\nWhen the UK voted to leave the EU, much of the economic debate focused on two channels: trade and migration. While there has been extensive work on Brexit’s effects on trade and GDP, its impact on immigration – particularly on the size and composition of the workforce – has been less systematically examined.\nIn a new analysis, we estimate how the number of foreign-born workers in the UK would have evolved had the country remained in the EU. The results suggest that ending free movement and introducing a new immigration system in 2021 led to a modest rise in the number of foreign born workers in the UK, but a dramatic shift in their countries of origin.\nBefore and immediately after the 2016 referendum, most forecasts suggested that Brexit would reduce overall immigration. The end of free movement was expected to cut EU inflows, only partially offset by a more liberal regime for non-EU workers. The Home Office, for example, estimated that the post-Brexit system would reduce work-related migration by around 40,000 per year.\nWhat happened instead was more complex. Following the introduction of the new system in January 2021, net migration rose sharply, reaching record levels in 2023. That surge prompted successive Home Secretaries to tighten visa rules. Combined with a weakening labour market, this has led to a sharp fall in work visas issued, including dependants – from 541,100 in 2023 to 186,000 in 2025, with further declines in recent months.\nThe political debate has often treated these developments as clear evidence either of regained “control” or of policy failure. Our findings point to a more nuanced picture.\nIt is not possible simply to attribute post-2016 changes in migration to Brexit. The pandemic, post-pandemic labour shortages, the war in Ukraine and the visa route for Hong Kong British Nationals (Overseas) all influenced flows. To isolate the effect of Brexit, we apply a synthetic difference-in-differences approach. In essence, we construct a “counterfactual UK” using a weighted average of comparable EU-15 and EEA countries that closely matched UK trends in foreign-born employment before the referendum. This method improves on simply assuming existing trends continue, and avoids relying on a single comparator country such as Germany.\nWe focus on foreign-born employees rather than immigration flows. UK flow data have been repeatedly revised, and the Labour Force Survey has had well-documented sampling issues for migrants. Instead, we use HMRC data on non-national employees for the UK and Eurostat data on foreign-born employees for comparator countries. Concentrating on workers also reduces the influence of country-specific shocks to asylum and refugee numbers, which might distort the results.\nWe estimate effects separately for EU-origin and non-EU-origin workers. For EU workers, we treat the referendum in June 2016 as the start of the “treatment”, reflecting the immediate political and economic uncertainty, including sterling’s depreciation. For non-EU workers, we treat January 2021 – when the new system came into force – as the relevant break point. However, using either 2016 or 2021 for both does not hugely change results\nFor EU-origin workers, the divergence between the UK and its counterfactual is substantial. By 2024, the number of EU-origin workers in the UK had returned roughly to its 2016 level. In our counterfactual UK, it had risen by around 30 per cent. That implies that Brexit reduced the number of EU-origin employees by about 785,000 by 2024 – equivalent to roughly 2.6 per cent of the total UK workforce. Most of this effect had materialised by 2023, with both the actual and counterfactual series flattening thereafter.\nThis confirms that ending free movement had a substantial and lasting effect on EU labour supply to the UK.\nThe story for non-EU workers runs in the opposite direction. After 2021, non-EU employment rose sharply in the UK – far more than in the counterfactual. By the end of 2024, non-EU employment in the UK had reached about 225 per cent of its 2016 level, compared with about 150 per cent in the synthetic control. We estimate that Brexit increased the number of non-EU employees by around 992,000 in 2024. Unlike the EU effect, this divergence continued to grow through 2024, consistent with a sustained increase in work-related migration under the new system.\nHowever, more recent data, not included in our analysis, suggests that this expansion appears to have peaked. Visa data indicate that work-related non-EU migration slowed sharply in 2025 as the government tightened rules and labour shortages eased. The additional boost to non-EU employment seen in 2024 is therefore unlikely to persist at the same pace.\nCombining these two large but offsetting shifts, we estimate that the net effect of Brexit in 2024 was an increase of around 207,000 non-UK-origin employees – approximately 0.6 per cent of the total workforce. In other words, Brexit substantially reduced EU-origin employment and substantially increased non-EU-origin employment. But the overall number of foreign-born workers in the UK was only modestly, although significantly, higher than it would have been had the UK remained in the EU.\nThe broader political economy challenge remains. Across Europe, ageing populations are increasing demand for migrant labour, even as public and political pressures push governments to reduce immigration. The UK is not unique in facing this tension.\nOur analysis suggests that leaving the EU did not resolve that dilemma. It changed the composition of migration flows dramatically, and it restored nominal “control” over the nature of those flows, but it did not materially alter the underlying balance between labour demand, demographic pressures and political constraints.\nBy Professor\nJonathan Portes\n, Senior Fellow, UK in a Changing Europe and\nJohn Springford\n, Associate Fellow, Centre for European Reform.\nMORE FROM THIS THEME\nBlogs\nDoes the ban on asylum seekers working actually work?\nBlogs\nUnsettled status: the policy and politics of indefinite leave to remain\nBlogs\n‘Not our war’: NATO and the Iran crisis\nBlogs\nInternational recruitment and the NHS post-Brexit\nBlogs\nClosing asylum hotels: What will the policy mean in practice?\nSubscribe to the UKICE newsletter\nWe will not sell or distribute your email address to any third party at any time. View our\nPrivacy Policy\n.\nStay informed\nEvery Friday\nDirect to your inbox","attrs_markdown":"Making social science accessible\n\n[![](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/logo\/logo-white.svg) ![](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/logo\/logo-white.svg)](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/)\n\n![search icon](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/icons\/search--white.svg)\n\n![search icon](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/icons\/search--white.svg)\n\n- [About](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/about-us\/)\n  - About\n  - [About overview](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/about-us\/about-overview\/)\n  - [People](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/about-us\/people\/)\n  - [Corporate membership](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/about-us\/corporate-membership\/)\n  - [Announcements](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/about-us\/announcements\/)\n  - Back\n- [Analysis](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/analysis\/)\n  - Analysis\n  - [Blogs](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/analysis\/blogs\/)\n  - [Explainers](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/explainers\/)\n  - [Insights](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/insight\/)\n  - Back\n- [Events](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/all-events\/)\n- [Reports](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/reports\/)\n- [Resources](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/the-impact-of-brexit-on-immigration-to-the-uk\/)\n  - Resources\n  - [Brexit Witness Archive](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/the-brexit-witness-archive\/)\n  - [Working Papers](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/working-papers\/)\n  - [The Facts](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/the-facts\/)\n  - Back\n- [Press](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/press)\n- [Videos](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/videos\/)\n- [Podcasts](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/podcast\/)\n- [Archive](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/the-impact-of-brexit-on-immigration-to-the-uk\/)\n  - Archive\n  - [Research Projects](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/research-project\/)\n  - [Governance after Brexit](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/governance\/)\n  - [Other publications](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/other-publication\/)\n  - Back\n- [Browse themes](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/the-impact-of-brexit-on-immigration-to-the-uk\/)\n  - Browse themes\n  - [Constitution and governance](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/theme\/constitution-and-goverance\/)\n  - [Devolution and the Union](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/theme\/devolution-and-the-union\/)\n  - [Economy](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/theme\/the-economics-of-brexit\/)\n  - [Europe](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/theme\/europe\/)\n  - [Policies](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/theme\/brexit-and-public-policy\/)\n  - [Politics and Society](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/theme\/the-politics-of-brexit\/)\n  - [Public Opinion](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/theme\/public-opinion\/)\n  - [UK in the world](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/theme\/uk-world\/)\n  - [UK-EU Relations](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/theme\/uk-eu-relations\/)\n  - Back\n\nThe authoritative source for independent research on UK-EU relations\n\nClose search\n\nBlogs\n\n# The impact of Brexit on immigration to the UK\n\n![](https:\/\/media.ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Impact-of-Brexit-on-immigration-1024x576.png)\n\n![](https:\/\/media.ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Impact-of-Brexit-on-immigration-1024x576.png)\n\nDATE\n\n09 Mar 2026\n\nAUTHORS\n\n[John Springford](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/author-profile\/john-springford\/)[Professor Jonathan Portes](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/author-profile\/jonathan-portes\/)\n\nTHEME\n\n[Policies](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/theme\/brexit-and-public-policy\/)\n\n*Jonathan Portes and John Springford share their new analysis that estimates how the number of foreign-born workers would have evolved had the UK remained in the EU. They argue that while leaving changed the composition of migration flows dramatically, it did not materially alter the underlying balance between labour demand, demographic pressures and political constraints.*\n\nWhen the UK voted to leave the EU, much of the economic debate focused on two channels: trade and migration. While there has been extensive work on Brexit’s effects on trade and GDP, its impact on immigration – particularly on the size and composition of the workforce – has been less systematically examined.\n\nIn a new analysis, we estimate how the number of foreign-born workers in the UK would have evolved had the country remained in the EU. The results suggest that ending free movement and introducing a new immigration system in 2021 led to a modest rise in the number of foreign born workers in the UK, but a dramatic shift in their countries of origin.\n\nBefore and immediately after the 2016 referendum, most forecasts suggested that Brexit would reduce overall immigration. The end of free movement was expected to cut EU inflows, only partially offset by a more liberal regime for non-EU workers. The Home Office, for example, estimated that the post-Brexit system would reduce work-related migration by around 40,000 per year.\n\nWhat happened instead was more complex. Following the introduction of the new system in January 2021, net migration rose sharply, reaching record levels in 2023. That surge prompted successive Home Secretaries to tighten visa rules. Combined with a weakening labour market, this has led to a sharp fall in work visas issued, including dependants – from 541,100 in 2023 to 186,000 in 2025, with further declines in recent months.\n\nThe political debate has often treated these developments as clear evidence either of regained “control” or of policy failure. Our findings point to a more nuanced picture.\n\nIt is not possible simply to attribute post-2016 changes in migration to Brexit. The pandemic, post-pandemic labour shortages, the war in Ukraine and the visa route for Hong Kong British Nationals (Overseas) all influenced flows. To isolate the effect of Brexit, we apply a synthetic difference-in-differences approach. In essence, we construct a “counterfactual UK” using a weighted average of comparable EU-15 and EEA countries that closely matched UK trends in foreign-born employment before the referendum. This method improves on simply assuming existing trends continue, and avoids relying on a single comparator country such as Germany.\n\nWe focus on foreign-born employees rather than immigration flows. UK flow data have been repeatedly revised, and the Labour Force Survey has had well-documented sampling issues for migrants. Instead, we use HMRC data on non-national employees for the UK and Eurostat data on foreign-born employees for comparator countries. Concentrating on workers also reduces the influence of country-specific shocks to asylum and refugee numbers, which might distort the results.\n\nWe estimate effects separately for EU-origin and non-EU-origin workers. For EU workers, we treat the referendum in June 2016 as the start of the “treatment”, reflecting the immediate political and economic uncertainty, including sterling’s depreciation. For non-EU workers, we treat January 2021 – when the new system came into force – as the relevant break point. However, using either 2016 or 2021 for both does not hugely change results\n\nFor EU-origin workers, the divergence between the UK and its counterfactual is substantial. By 2024, the number of EU-origin workers in the UK had returned roughly to its 2016 level. In our counterfactual UK, it had risen by around 30 per cent. That implies that Brexit reduced the number of EU-origin employees by about 785,000 by 2024 – equivalent to roughly 2.6 per cent of the total UK workforce. Most of this effect had materialised by 2023, with both the actual and counterfactual series flattening thereafter.\n\nThis confirms that ending free movement had a substantial and lasting effect on EU labour supply to the UK.\n\nThe story for non-EU workers runs in the opposite direction. After 2021, non-EU employment rose sharply in the UK – far more than in the counterfactual. By the end of 2024, non-EU employment in the UK had reached about 225 per cent of its 2016 level, compared with about 150 per cent in the synthetic control. We estimate that Brexit increased the number of non-EU employees by around 992,000 in 2024. Unlike the EU effect, this divergence continued to grow through 2024, consistent with a sustained increase in work-related migration under the new system.\n\nHowever, more recent data, not included in our analysis, suggests that this expansion appears to have peaked. Visa data indicate that work-related non-EU migration slowed sharply in 2025 as the government tightened rules and labour shortages eased. The additional boost to non-EU employment seen in 2024 is therefore unlikely to persist at the same pace.\n\nCombining these two large but offsetting shifts, we estimate that the net effect of Brexit in 2024 was an increase of around 207,000 non-UK-origin employees – approximately 0.6 per cent of the total workforce. In other words, Brexit substantially reduced EU-origin employment and substantially increased non-EU-origin employment. But the overall number of foreign-born workers in the UK was only modestly, although significantly, higher than it would have been had the UK remained in the EU.\n\nThe broader political economy challenge remains. Across Europe, ageing populations are increasing demand for migrant labour, even as public and political pressures push governments to reduce immigration. The UK is not unique in facing this tension.\n\nOur analysis suggests that leaving the EU did not resolve that dilemma. It changed the composition of migration flows dramatically, and it restored nominal “control” over the nature of those flows, but it did not materially alter the underlying balance between labour demand, demographic pressures and political constraints.\n\n**By Professor [Jonathan Portes](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/author-profile\/jonathan-portes\/), Senior Fellow, UK in a Changing Europe and [John Springford](https:\/\/www.cer.eu\/personnel\/john-springford), Associate Fellow, Centre for European Reform.**\n\n### MORE FROM THIS THEME\nBlogs\n\n### Does the ban on asylum seekers working actually work?\n\nBlogs\n\n### Unsettled status: the policy and politics of indefinite leave to remain\n\nBlogs\n\n### ‘Not our war’: NATO and the Iran crisis\n\nBlogs\n\n### International recruitment and the NHS post-Brexit\n\nBlogs\n\n### Closing asylum hotels: What will the policy mean in practice?\n\n## Subscribe to the UKICE newsletter\nWe will not sell or distribute your email address to any third party at any time. View our [Privacy Policy](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/privacy-policy\/).\n\n![](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/icons\/icon-tick--blue.svg)\n\n![](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/icons\/icon-tick--blue.svg)\n\nStay informed\n\n![](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/icons\/icon-tick--blue.svg)\n\n![](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/icons\/icon-tick--blue.svg)\n\nEvery Friday\n\n![](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/icons\/icon-tick--blue.svg)\n\n![](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/icons\/icon-tick--blue.svg)\n\nDirect to your inbox\n\n[Subscribe](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/the-impact-of-brexit-on-immigration-to-the-uk\/#newsletter-popup)\n\n## Recent Articles\n![British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at a press conference](https:\/\/media.ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/UK-DE-blog-1024x576.png)\n\n![British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at a press conference](https:\/\/media.ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/UK-DE-blog-1024x576.png)\n\nBlogs\n\n### [How to unleash the potential of the UK-German relationship](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/how-to-unleash-the-potential-of-the-uk-german-relationship\/)\nVarious\n\n13 Apr 2026\n\n[UK-EU Relations](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/theme\/uk-eu-relations)\n\n![Two Eurostar trains at the platform at London St Pancras station.](https:\/\/media.ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Youth-mobility-blog-1024x576.png)\n\n![Two Eurostar trains at the platform at London St Pancras station.](https:\/\/media.ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Youth-mobility-blog-1024x576.png)\n\nBlogs\n\n### [Youth mobility negotiations](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/youth-mobility-negotiations\/)\n[Denzil Davidson](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/author-profile\/denzil-davidson\/) and [Professor Catherine Barnard](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/author-profile\/catherine-barnard\/)\n\n08 Apr 2026\n\n[UK-EU Relations](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/theme\/uk-eu-relations)\n\n![](https:\/\/media.ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Aston-UK-EU-blog-1024x576.png)\n\n![](https:\/\/media.ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Aston-UK-EU-blog-1024x576.png)\n\nBlogs\n\n### [What does ‘greater ambition’ in UK-EU relations look like – and what are the chances of it?](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/what-does-greater-ambition-in-uk-eu-relations-look-like\/)\nVarious\n\n07 Apr 2026\n\n[UK-EU Relations](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/theme\/uk-eu-relations)\n\nViews expressed in this piece are those of the author(s) and are not necessarily those of UK in a Changing Europe\n\n![](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/logo\/logo-white.svg)\n\n![](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/logo\/logo-white.svg)\n\n### Quick links\n- [About Us](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/about-us\/about-overview\/)\n- [Analysis](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/analysis\/)\n- [Events](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/all-events\/)\n- [Contact](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/contact\/)\n\n### Get in touch\nE: [info@ukandeu.ac.uk](mailto:info@ukandeu.ac.uk)\n\n[![x Icon](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/social\/x--white.svg)![x Icon](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/social\/x--white.svg)](https:\/\/twitter.com\/ukandeu)\n\n[![youtube Icon](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/wp-content\/themes\/ukice-new\/assets\/img\/social\/youtube--white.svg)![youtube 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in the EU. They argue that while leaving changed the composition of migration flows dramatically, it did not materially alter the underlying balance between labour demand, demographic pressures and political constraints.*\n\nWhen the UK voted to leave the EU, much of the economic debate focused on two channels: trade and migration. While there has been extensive work on Brexit’s effects on trade and GDP, its impact on immigration – particularly on the size and composition of the workforce – has been less systematically examined.\n\nIn a new analysis, we estimate how the number of foreign-born workers in the UK would have evolved had the country remained in the EU. The results suggest that ending free movement and introducing a new immigration system in 2021 led to a modest rise in the number of foreign born workers in the UK, but a dramatic shift in their countries of origin.\n\nBefore and immediately after the 2016 referendum, most forecasts suggested that Brexit would reduce overall immigration. The end of free movement was expected to cut EU inflows, only partially offset by a more liberal regime for non-EU workers. The Home Office, for example, estimated that the post-Brexit system would reduce work-related migration by around 40,000 per year.\n\nWhat happened instead was more complex. Following the introduction of the new system in January 2021, net migration rose sharply, reaching record levels in 2023. That surge prompted successive Home Secretaries to tighten visa rules. Combined with a weakening labour market, this has led to a sharp fall in work visas issued, including dependants – from 541,100 in 2023 to 186,000 in 2025, with further declines in recent months.\n\nThe political debate has often treated these developments as clear evidence either of regained “control” or of policy failure. Our findings point to a more nuanced picture.\n\nIt is not possible simply to attribute post-2016 changes in migration to Brexit. The pandemic, post-pandemic labour shortages, the war in Ukraine and the visa route for Hong Kong British Nationals (Overseas) all influenced flows. To isolate the effect of Brexit, we apply a synthetic difference-in-differences approach. In essence, we construct a “counterfactual UK” using a weighted average of comparable EU-15 and EEA countries that closely matched UK trends in foreign-born employment before the referendum. This method improves on simply assuming existing trends continue, and avoids relying on a single comparator country such as Germany.\n\nWe focus on foreign-born employees rather than immigration flows. UK flow data have been repeatedly revised, and the Labour Force Survey has had well-documented sampling issues for migrants. Instead, we use HMRC data on non-national employees for the UK and Eurostat data on foreign-born employees for comparator countries. Concentrating on workers also reduces the influence of country-specific shocks to asylum and refugee numbers, which might distort the results.\n\nWe estimate effects separately for EU-origin and non-EU-origin workers. For EU workers, we treat the referendum in June 2016 as the start of the “treatment”, reflecting the immediate political and economic uncertainty, including sterling’s depreciation. For non-EU workers, we treat January 2021 – when the new system came into force – as the relevant break point. However, using either 2016 or 2021 for both does not hugely change results\n\nFor EU-origin workers, the divergence between the UK and its counterfactual is substantial. By 2024, the number of EU-origin workers in the UK had returned roughly to its 2016 level. In our counterfactual UK, it had risen by around 30 per cent. That implies that Brexit reduced the number of EU-origin employees by about 785,000 by 2024 – equivalent to roughly 2.6 per cent of the total UK workforce. Most of this effect had materialised by 2023, with both the actual and counterfactual series flattening thereafter.\n\nThis confirms that ending free movement had a substantial and lasting effect on EU labour supply to the UK.\n\nThe story for non-EU workers runs in the opposite direction. After 2021, non-EU employment rose sharply in the UK – far more than in the counterfactual. By the end of 2024, non-EU employment in the UK had reached about 225 per cent of its 2016 level, compared with about 150 per cent in the synthetic control. We estimate that Brexit increased the number of non-EU employees by around 992,000 in 2024. Unlike the EU effect, this divergence continued to grow through 2024, consistent with a sustained increase in work-related migration under the new system.\n\nHowever, more recent data, not included in our analysis, suggests that this expansion appears to have peaked. Visa data indicate that work-related non-EU migration slowed sharply in 2025 as the government tightened rules and labour shortages eased. The additional boost to non-EU employment seen in 2024 is therefore unlikely to persist at the same pace.\n\nCombining these two large but offsetting shifts, we estimate that the net effect of Brexit in 2024 was an increase of around 207,000 non-UK-origin employees – approximately 0.6 per cent of the total workforce. In other words, Brexit substantially reduced EU-origin employment and substantially increased non-EU-origin employment. But the overall number of foreign-born workers in the UK was only modestly, although significantly, higher than it would have been had the UK remained in the EU.\n\nThe broader political economy challenge remains. Across Europe, ageing populations are increasing demand for migrant labour, even as public and political pressures push governments to reduce immigration. The UK is not unique in facing this tension.\n\nOur analysis suggests that leaving the EU did not resolve that dilemma. It changed the composition of migration flows dramatically, and it restored nominal “control” over the nature of those flows, but it did not materially alter the underlying balance between labour demand, demographic pressures and political constraints.\n\n**By Professor [Jonathan Portes](https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/author-profile\/jonathan-portes\/), Senior Fellow, UK in a Changing Europe and [John Springford](https:\/\/www.cer.eu\/personnel\/john-springford), Associate Fellow, Centre for European Reform.**\n\n### MORE FROM THIS THEME\nBlogs\n\n### Does the ban on asylum seekers working actually work?\n\nBlogs\n\n### Unsettled status: the policy and politics of indefinite leave to remain\n\nBlogs\n\n### ‘Not our war’: NATO and the Iran crisis\n\nBlogs\n\n### International recruitment and the NHS post-Brexit\n\nBlogs\n\n### Closing asylum hotels: What will the policy mean in practice?\n\n## Subscribe to the UKICE newsletter\nWe will not sell or distribute your email address to any third party at any time. 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Meta Title	The impact of Brexit on immigration to the UK - UK in a changing Europe
Meta Description	Jonathan Portes and John Springford share their new analysis that estimates how the number of foreign-born workers would have evolved had the UK remained in the EU.
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Boilerpipe Text	Jonathan Portes and John Springford share their new analysis that estimates how the number of foreign-born workers would have evolved had the UK remained in the EU. They argue that while leaving changed the composition of migration flows dramatically, it did not materially alter the underlying balance between labour demand, demographic pressures and political constraints. When the UK voted to leave the EU, much of the economic debate focused on two channels: trade and migration. While there has been extensive work on Brexit’s effects on trade and GDP, its impact on immigration – particularly on the size and composition of the workforce – has been less systematically examined. In a new analysis, we estimate how the number of foreign-born workers in the UK would have evolved had the country remained in the EU. The results suggest that ending free movement and introducing a new immigration system in 2021 led to a modest rise in the number of foreign born workers in the UK, but a dramatic shift in their countries of origin. Before and immediately after the 2016 referendum, most forecasts suggested that Brexit would reduce overall immigration. The end of free movement was expected to cut EU inflows, only partially offset by a more liberal regime for non-EU workers. The Home Office, for example, estimated that the post-Brexit system would reduce work-related migration by around 40,000 per year. What happened instead was more complex. Following the introduction of the new system in January 2021, net migration rose sharply, reaching record levels in 2023. That surge prompted successive Home Secretaries to tighten visa rules. Combined with a weakening labour market, this has led to a sharp fall in work visas issued, including dependants – from 541,100 in 2023 to 186,000 in 2025, with further declines in recent months. The political debate has often treated these developments as clear evidence either of regained “control” or of policy failure. Our findings point to a more nuanced picture. It is not possible simply to attribute post-2016 changes in migration to Brexit. The pandemic, post-pandemic labour shortages, the war in Ukraine and the visa route for Hong Kong British Nationals (Overseas) all influenced flows. To isolate the effect of Brexit, we apply a synthetic difference-in-differences approach. In essence, we construct a “counterfactual UK” using a weighted average of comparable EU-15 and EEA countries that closely matched UK trends in foreign-born employment before the referendum. This method improves on simply assuming existing trends continue, and avoids relying on a single comparator country such as Germany. We focus on foreign-born employees rather than immigration flows. UK flow data have been repeatedly revised, and the Labour Force Survey has had well-documented sampling issues for migrants. Instead, we use HMRC data on non-national employees for the UK and Eurostat data on foreign-born employees for comparator countries. Concentrating on workers also reduces the influence of country-specific shocks to asylum and refugee numbers, which might distort the results. We estimate effects separately for EU-origin and non-EU-origin workers. For EU workers, we treat the referendum in June 2016 as the start of the “treatment”, reflecting the immediate political and economic uncertainty, including sterling’s depreciation. For non-EU workers, we treat January 2021 – when the new system came into force – as the relevant break point. However, using either 2016 or 2021 for both does not hugely change results For EU-origin workers, the divergence between the UK and its counterfactual is substantial. By 2024, the number of EU-origin workers in the UK had returned roughly to its 2016 level. In our counterfactual UK, it had risen by around 30 per cent. That implies that Brexit reduced the number of EU-origin employees by about 785,000 by 2024 – equivalent to roughly 2.6 per cent of the total UK workforce. Most of this effect had materialised by 2023, with both the actual and counterfactual series flattening thereafter. This confirms that ending free movement had a substantial and lasting effect on EU labour supply to the UK. The story for non-EU workers runs in the opposite direction. After 2021, non-EU employment rose sharply in the UK – far more than in the counterfactual. By the end of 2024, non-EU employment in the UK had reached about 225 per cent of its 2016 level, compared with about 150 per cent in the synthetic control. We estimate that Brexit increased the number of non-EU employees by around 992,000 in 2024. Unlike the EU effect, this divergence continued to grow through 2024, consistent with a sustained increase in work-related migration under the new system. However, more recent data, not included in our analysis, suggests that this expansion appears to have peaked. Visa data indicate that work-related non-EU migration slowed sharply in 2025 as the government tightened rules and labour shortages eased. The additional boost to non-EU employment seen in 2024 is therefore unlikely to persist at the same pace. Combining these two large but offsetting shifts, we estimate that the net effect of Brexit in 2024 was an increase of around 207,000 non-UK-origin employees – approximately 0.6 per cent of the total workforce. In other words, Brexit substantially reduced EU-origin employment and substantially increased non-EU-origin employment. But the overall number of foreign-born workers in the UK was only modestly, although significantly, higher than it would have been had the UK remained in the EU. The broader political economy challenge remains. Across Europe, ageing populations are increasing demand for migrant labour, even as public and political pressures push governments to reduce immigration. The UK is not unique in facing this tension. Our analysis suggests that leaving the EU did not resolve that dilemma. It changed the composition of migration flows dramatically, and it restored nominal “control” over the nature of those flows, but it did not materially alter the underlying balance between labour demand, demographic pressures and political constraints. By Professor Jonathan Portes , Senior Fellow, UK in a Changing Europe and John Springford , Associate Fellow, Centre for European Reform. MORE FROM THIS THEME Blogs Does the ban on asylum seekers working actually work? Blogs Unsettled status: the policy and politics of indefinite leave to remain Blogs ‘Not our war’: NATO and the Iran crisis Blogs International recruitment and the NHS post-Brexit Blogs Closing asylum hotels: What will the policy mean in practice? Subscribe to the UKICE newsletter We will not sell or distribute your email address to any third party at any time. View our Privacy Policy . Stay informed Every Friday Direct to your inbox
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They argue that while leaving changed the composition of migration flows dramatically, it did not materially alter the underlying balance between labour demand, demographic pressures and political constraints. When the UK voted to leave the EU, much of the economic debate focused on two channels: trade and migration. While there has been extensive work on Brexit’s effects on trade and GDP, its impact on immigration – particularly on the size and composition of the workforce – has been less systematically examined. In a new analysis, we estimate how the number of foreign-born workers in the UK would have evolved had the country remained in the EU. The results suggest that ending free movement and introducing a new immigration system in 2021 led to a modest rise in the number of foreign born workers in the UK, but a dramatic shift in their countries of origin. Before and immediately after the 2016 referendum, most forecasts suggested that Brexit would reduce overall immigration. The end of free movement was expected to cut EU inflows, only partially offset by a more liberal regime for non-EU workers. The Home Office, for example, estimated that the post-Brexit system would reduce work-related migration by around 40,000 per year. What happened instead was more complex. Following the introduction of the new system in January 2021, net migration rose sharply, reaching record levels in 2023. That surge prompted successive Home Secretaries to tighten visa rules. Combined with a weakening labour market, this has led to a sharp fall in work visas issued, including dependants – from 541,100 in 2023 to 186,000 in 2025, with further declines in recent months. The political debate has often treated these developments as clear evidence either of regained “control” or of policy failure. Our findings point to a more nuanced picture. It is not possible simply to attribute post-2016 changes in migration to Brexit. The pandemic, post-pandemic labour shortages, the war in Ukraine and the visa route for Hong Kong British Nationals (Overseas) all influenced flows. To isolate the effect of Brexit, we apply a synthetic difference-in-differences approach. In essence, we construct a “counterfactual UK” using a weighted average of comparable EU-15 and EEA countries that closely matched UK trends in foreign-born employment before the referendum. This method improves on simply assuming existing trends continue, and avoids relying on a single comparator country such as Germany. We focus on foreign-born employees rather than immigration flows. UK flow data have been repeatedly revised, and the Labour Force Survey has had well-documented sampling issues for migrants. Instead, we use HMRC data on non-national employees for the UK and Eurostat data on foreign-born employees for comparator countries. Concentrating on workers also reduces the influence of country-specific shocks to asylum and refugee numbers, which might distort the results. We estimate effects separately for EU-origin and non-EU-origin workers. For EU workers, we treat the referendum in June 2016 as the start of the “treatment”, reflecting the immediate political and economic uncertainty, including sterling’s depreciation. For non-EU workers, we treat January 2021 – when the new system came into force – as the relevant break point. However, using either 2016 or 2021 for both does not hugely change results For EU-origin workers, the divergence between the UK and its counterfactual is substantial. By 2024, the number of EU-origin workers in the UK had returned roughly to its 2016 level. In our counterfactual UK, it had risen by around 30 per cent. That implies that Brexit reduced the number of EU-origin employees by about 785,000 by 2024 – equivalent to roughly 2.6 per cent of the total UK workforce. Most of this effect had materialised by 2023, with both the actual and counterfactual series flattening thereafter. This confirms that ending free movement had a substantial and lasting effect on EU labour supply to the UK. The story for non-EU workers runs in the opposite direction. After 2021, non-EU employment rose sharply in the UK – far more than in the counterfactual. By the end of 2024, non-EU employment in the UK had reached about 225 per cent of its 2016 level, compared with about 150 per cent in the synthetic control. We estimate that Brexit increased the number of non-EU employees by around 992,000 in 2024. Unlike the EU effect, this divergence continued to grow through 2024, consistent with a sustained increase in work-related migration under the new system. However, more recent data, not included in our analysis, suggests that this expansion appears to have peaked. Visa data indicate that work-related non-EU migration slowed sharply in 2025 as the government tightened rules and labour shortages eased. The additional boost to non-EU employment seen in 2024 is therefore unlikely to persist at the same pace. Combining these two large but offsetting shifts, we estimate that the net effect of Brexit in 2024 was an increase of around 207,000 non-UK-origin employees – approximately 0.6 per cent of the total workforce. In other words, Brexit substantially reduced EU-origin employment and substantially increased non-EU-origin employment. But the overall number of foreign-born workers in the UK was only modestly, although significantly, higher than it would have been had the UK remained in the EU. The broader political economy challenge remains. Across Europe, ageing populations are increasing demand for migrant labour, even as public and political pressures push governments to reduce immigration. The UK is not unique in facing this tension. Our analysis suggests that leaving the EU did not resolve that dilemma. It changed the composition of migration flows dramatically, and it restored nominal “control” over the nature of those flows, but it did not materially alter the underlying balance between labour demand, demographic pressures and political constraints. By Professor [Jonathan Portes](https://ukandeu.ac.uk/author-profile/jonathan-portes/), Senior Fellow, UK in a Changing Europe and [John Springford](https://www.cer.eu/personnel/john-springford), Associate Fellow, Centre for European Reform. ### MORE FROM THIS THEME Blogs ### Does the ban on asylum seekers working actually work? Blogs ### Unsettled status: the policy and politics of indefinite leave to remain Blogs ### ‘Not our war’: NATO and the Iran crisis Blogs ### International recruitment and the NHS post-Brexit Blogs ### Closing asylum hotels: What will the policy mean in practice? ## Subscribe to the UKICE newsletter We will not sell or distribute your email address to any third party at any time. 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Readable Markdown	Jonathan Portes and John Springford share their new analysis that estimates how the number of foreign-born workers would have evolved had the UK remained in the EU. They argue that while leaving changed the composition of migration flows dramatically, it did not materially alter the underlying balance between labour demand, demographic pressures and political constraints. When the UK voted to leave the EU, much of the economic debate focused on two channels: trade and migration. While there has been extensive work on Brexit’s effects on trade and GDP, its impact on immigration – particularly on the size and composition of the workforce – has been less systematically examined. In a new analysis, we estimate how the number of foreign-born workers in the UK would have evolved had the country remained in the EU. The results suggest that ending free movement and introducing a new immigration system in 2021 led to a modest rise in the number of foreign born workers in the UK, but a dramatic shift in their countries of origin. Before and immediately after the 2016 referendum, most forecasts suggested that Brexit would reduce overall immigration. The end of free movement was expected to cut EU inflows, only partially offset by a more liberal regime for non-EU workers. The Home Office, for example, estimated that the post-Brexit system would reduce work-related migration by around 40,000 per year. What happened instead was more complex. Following the introduction of the new system in January 2021, net migration rose sharply, reaching record levels in 2023. That surge prompted successive Home Secretaries to tighten visa rules. Combined with a weakening labour market, this has led to a sharp fall in work visas issued, including dependants – from 541,100 in 2023 to 186,000 in 2025, with further declines in recent months. The political debate has often treated these developments as clear evidence either of regained “control” or of policy failure. Our findings point to a more nuanced picture. It is not possible simply to attribute post-2016 changes in migration to Brexit. The pandemic, post-pandemic labour shortages, the war in Ukraine and the visa route for Hong Kong British Nationals (Overseas) all influenced flows. To isolate the effect of Brexit, we apply a synthetic difference-in-differences approach. In essence, we construct a “counterfactual UK” using a weighted average of comparable EU-15 and EEA countries that closely matched UK trends in foreign-born employment before the referendum. This method improves on simply assuming existing trends continue, and avoids relying on a single comparator country such as Germany. We focus on foreign-born employees rather than immigration flows. UK flow data have been repeatedly revised, and the Labour Force Survey has had well-documented sampling issues for migrants. Instead, we use HMRC data on non-national employees for the UK and Eurostat data on foreign-born employees for comparator countries. Concentrating on workers also reduces the influence of country-specific shocks to asylum and refugee numbers, which might distort the results. We estimate effects separately for EU-origin and non-EU-origin workers. For EU workers, we treat the referendum in June 2016 as the start of the “treatment”, reflecting the immediate political and economic uncertainty, including sterling’s depreciation. For non-EU workers, we treat January 2021 – when the new system came into force – as the relevant break point. However, using either 2016 or 2021 for both does not hugely change results For EU-origin workers, the divergence between the UK and its counterfactual is substantial. By 2024, the number of EU-origin workers in the UK had returned roughly to its 2016 level. In our counterfactual UK, it had risen by around 30 per cent. That implies that Brexit reduced the number of EU-origin employees by about 785,000 by 2024 – equivalent to roughly 2.6 per cent of the total UK workforce. Most of this effect had materialised by 2023, with both the actual and counterfactual series flattening thereafter. This confirms that ending free movement had a substantial and lasting effect on EU labour supply to the UK. The story for non-EU workers runs in the opposite direction. After 2021, non-EU employment rose sharply in the UK – far more than in the counterfactual. By the end of 2024, non-EU employment in the UK had reached about 225 per cent of its 2016 level, compared with about 150 per cent in the synthetic control. We estimate that Brexit increased the number of non-EU employees by around 992,000 in 2024. Unlike the EU effect, this divergence continued to grow through 2024, consistent with a sustained increase in work-related migration under the new system. However, more recent data, not included in our analysis, suggests that this expansion appears to have peaked. Visa data indicate that work-related non-EU migration slowed sharply in 2025 as the government tightened rules and labour shortages eased. The additional boost to non-EU employment seen in 2024 is therefore unlikely to persist at the same pace. Combining these two large but offsetting shifts, we estimate that the net effect of Brexit in 2024 was an increase of around 207,000 non-UK-origin employees – approximately 0.6 per cent of the total workforce. In other words, Brexit substantially reduced EU-origin employment and substantially increased non-EU-origin employment. But the overall number of foreign-born workers in the UK was only modestly, although significantly, higher than it would have been had the UK remained in the EU. The broader political economy challenge remains. Across Europe, ageing populations are increasing demand for migrant labour, even as public and political pressures push governments to reduce immigration. The UK is not unique in facing this tension. Our analysis suggests that leaving the EU did not resolve that dilemma. It changed the composition of migration flows dramatically, and it restored nominal “control” over the nature of those flows, but it did not materially alter the underlying balance between labour demand, demographic pressures and political constraints. By Professor [Jonathan Portes](https://ukandeu.ac.uk/author-profile/jonathan-portes/), Senior Fellow, UK in a Changing Europe and [John Springford](https://www.cer.eu/personnel/john-springford), Associate Fellow, Centre for European Reform. ### MORE FROM THIS THEME Blogs ### Does the ban on asylum seekers working actually work? Blogs ### Unsettled status: the policy and politics of indefinite leave to remain Blogs ### ‘Not our war’: NATO and the Iran crisis Blogs ### International recruitment and the NHS post-Brexit Blogs ### Closing asylum hotels: What will the policy mean in practice? ## Subscribe to the UKICE newsletter We will not sell or distribute your email address to any third party at any time. 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