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1. Shard Calculation

Query:

Response:

Calculated Shard: 128 (from laksa006)

2. Crawled Status Check

Query:

curl -X POST \
  'http://laksa128.int.ahrefs:8124/' \
  -H 'Content-Type: text/plain' \
  -H 'X-ClickHouse-Database: crawler3' \
  -H 'Authorization: Basic YXBpOg==' \
  -d 'SELECT getAhrefsURLFromUnparsed(src_unparsed) AS found_url, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(download_stamp), 0) AS crawl_time, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(props_url_first_seen), 0) AS first_indexed_time, download_http_code AS http_code, src_unparsed AS src_unparsed, src_root_hash AS src_root_hash, history_drop_reason AS history_drop_reason, meta_title AS meta_title, meta_descriptions AS meta_descriptions, attrs_boilerpipe_text AS attrs_boilerpipe_text, attrs_markdown AS attrs_markdown, attrs_readable_markdown AS attrs_readable_markdown, meta_canonical AS meta_canonical, ml_categories_json AS ml_categories_json, ml_types_json AS ml_types_json, ml_intent_types_json AS ml_intent_types_json, meta_language AS meta_language, attrs_author AS attrs_author, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(attrs_publish_time), 0) AS attrs_publish_time, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(attrs_original_publish_time), 0) AS attrs_original_publish_time, ifNull(attrs_is_republished, 0) AS attrs_is_republished, ifNull(attrs_nr_words, 0) AS attrs_nr_words, ifNull(attrs_boilerpipe_nr_words, 0) AS attrs_boilerpipe_nr_words, ifNull(body_ext_links_number, 0) AS body_ext_links_number, ifNull(body_int_links_number, 0) AS body_int_links_number, ifNull(meta_nofollow, 0) AS meta_nofollow, ifNull(meta_noarchive, 0) AS meta_noarchive, ifNull(props_was_rendered, 0) AS props_was_rendered, ifNull(src_redirect, \'\') AS src_redirect, ifNull(download_time_msec, 0) AS download_time_msec, ifNull(download_ttfb_msec, 0) AS download_ttfb_msec, ifNull(download_size, 0) AS download_size FROM crawler3.page_info_local FINAL PREWHERE (src_root_hash, src_unparsed) IN ((getAhrefsRootHashFromUnparsed(getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://itif.org/publications/2020/01/24/huawei-export-ban-shooting-us-technology-exporters-foot/\')), getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://itif.org/publications/2020/01/24/huawei-export-ban-shooting-us-technology-exporters-foot/\'))) FORMAT JSONEachRow'

Response:

{"found_url":"https:\/\/itif.org\/publications\/2020\/01\/24\/huawei-export-ban-shooting-us-technology-exporters-foot\/","crawl_time":1776662596,"first_indexed_time":1654529778,"http_code":200,"src_unparsed":"org,itif!\/publications\/2020\/01\/24\/huawei-export-ban-shooting-us-technology-exporters-foot\/ s443","src_root_hash":"10087173698332722728","history_drop_reason":null,"meta_title":"The Huawei Export Ban: Shooting U.S. Tech Exporters in the Foot | Blogs | Jan 24, 2020 | ITIF","meta_descriptions":["It makes little sense for the administration to say the phase one deal is going to increase U.S. exports of high-tech goods while simultaneously erecting new barriers to those very same sales."],"attrs_boilerpipe_text":"Information Technology\n& Innovation Foundation\n700 K Street NW, Suite 600\nWashington, DC 20001\n[email protected]\n| (202) 449-1351\nMap & Directions","attrs_markdown":"[Skip to content](https:\/\/itif.org\/publications\/2020\/01\/24\/huawei-export-ban-shooting-us-technology-exporters-foot\/#main-content)\n\n[![ITIF Logo](https:\/\/itif.org\/_next\/image\/?url=%2Fimages%2Flogo-itif-normal.png&w=2048&q=75)](https:\/\/itif.org\/ \"Home\")\n\n[![ITIF Search](https:\/\/itif.org\/images\/icons\/search-icon.svg)](https:\/\/itif.org\/search\/ \"search\")\n\n![Menu](https:\/\/itif.org\/images\/icons\/menu-icon.svg)\n\n- [News](https:\/\/itif.org\/news-room\/ \"News\")\n  - 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[Canada](https:\/\/itif.org\/regions\/canada\/ \"Canada\")\n    - [China](https:\/\/itif.org\/regions\/china\/ \"China\")\n    - [Europe](https:\/\/itif.org\/regions\/europe\/ \"Europe\")\n    - [Global](https:\/\/itif.org\/regions\/global\/ \"Global\")\n    - [Latin America](https:\/\/itif.org\/regions\/latin-america\/ \"Latin America\")\n    - [United Kingdom](https:\/\/itif.org\/regions\/uk\/ \"United Kingdom\")\n  - [Non-Tariff Attack Tracker](https:\/\/itif.org\/publications\/knowledge-bases\/attack-tracker\/ \"Non-Tariff Attack Tracker\")\n  - [Tech Policy To-Do List](https:\/\/itif.org\/publications\/knowledge-bases\/to-do-list\/ \"Tech Policy To-Do List\")\n  - [Technology Explainers](https:\/\/itif.org\/publications\/knowledge-bases\/technology-explainers\/ \"Technology Explainers\")\n- [Centers](https:\/\/itif.org\/centers\/ \"Centers\")\n  - [Aegis Project for Defending U.S. Tech Leadership](https:\/\/itif.org\/centers\/aegis-project\/ \"Aegis Project for Defending U.S. Tech Leadership\")\n  - [Center for Clean Energy Innovation](https:\/\/itif.org\/centers\/clean-energy-innovation\/ \"Center for Clean Energy Innovation\")\n  - [Center for Data Innovation](https:\/\/itif.org\/centers\/data-innovation\/ \"Center for Data Innovation\")\n  - [Center for Life Sciences Innovation](https:\/\/itif.org\/centers\/life-sciences-innovation\/ \"Center for Life Sciences Innovation\")\n  - [Center for Korean Innovation and Competitiveness](https:\/\/itif.org\/centers\/korea\/ \"Center for Korean Innovation and Competitiveness\")\n  - [Centre for Canadian Innovation and Competitiveness](https:\/\/itif.org\/centers\/canada\/ \"Centre for Canadian Innovation and Competitiveness\")\n  - [Hamilton Center on Industrial Strategy](https:\/\/itif.org\/centers\/hamilton\/ \"Hamilton Center on Industrial Strategy\")\n  - [Schumpeter Project on Competition Policy](https:\/\/itif.org\/centers\/schumpeter\/ \"Schumpeter Project on Competition Policy\")\n- [About](https:\/\/itif.org\/about\/ \"About\")\n  - [About ITIF](https:\/\/itif.org\/about\/ \"About ITIF\")\n  - [Staff](https:\/\/itif.org\/people\/itif-staff\/ \"Staff\")\n  - [Board](https:\/\/itif.org\/people\/board\/ \"Board\")\n  - [Affiliated Experts](https:\/\/itif.org\/people\/affiliated-experts\/ \"Affiliated Experts\")\n  - [Supporters](https:\/\/itif.org\/our-supporters\/ \"Supporters\")\n  - [Jobs](https:\/\/itif.org\/jobs\/ \"Jobs\")\n- [Donate](https:\/\/itif.org\/donate\/ \"Donate\")\n\n[![The Huawei Export Ban: Shooting U.S. Tech Exporters in the Foot](https:\/\/cdn.sanity.io\/images\/03hnmfyj\/production\/86f6dbce913575f90aa48e1748ad619c31e3c06b-4184x630.png)](https:\/\/itif.org\/publication-brands\/innovation-files-blog\/)\n\n# The Huawei Export Ban: Shooting U.S. Tech Exporters in the Foot\nBy [Robert D. Atkinson](https:\/\/itif.org\/person\/robert-d-atkinson\/ \"Robert D. Atkinson\")\n\n\\|\n\nJanuary 24, 2020\n\nUnder the pretext of national security, the U.S. Commerce Department is [reportedly](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-usa-huawei\/trump-administration-moves-toward-blocking-more-sales-to-huawei-sources-idUSKBN1ZD2VD) close to publishing a rule to significantly limit U.S. firms’ ability to sell products to Chinese technology giant Huawei. But the truth is the ban will do virtually nothing to help U.S. national security. In fact, it will harm America by weakening the competitive position of U.S. technology firms as their foreign sales erode.\n\nUnder U.S. law, the Commerce Department can limit exports to a foreign company if it determines the company constitutes a national security risk. That’s what the Department’s Bureau of Industry Security did in May 2019 when it placed Huawei on a restricted trade blacklist. But it’s never been exactly clear what the Trump administration’s real motivation is for the ban. At the time, the Department cited the fact that Huawei was providing prohibited financial services to Iran. Others in the administration have pointed to concerns with the security of Huawei’s 5G networking equipment. Still other government officials want to cripple the company commercially to slow its rise in the global 5G space. But troublingly, the Department refuses to provide a clear rationale for its actions.\n\nUnder current rules, Commerce can require a license or block the sale of certain products shipped to Huawei if U.S.-made components controlled for national security constitute more than 25 percent of their value. Under the proposed new threshold, this would be lowered to 10 percent, or even lower, and remove the national security component so non-sensitive, commercial technologies would be in Commerce’s regulatory grip as well. If approved, there would be no ability for the public to comment until after the revisions became the law of the land.\n\nWhat’s behind this tougher move? Some in the administration appear to believe that Huawei represents a threat—however undefined—and that the U.S. should seek to cripple, if not kill the company by any means necessary. But if the real concern is ensuring the security of U.S. telecom networks, then the president has effectively addressed the problem by imposing an *import ban.* U.S. telecom carriers are not allowed to buy Huawei equipment going forward, and there are even plans to require carriers (mostly smaller, rural ones) to rip out existing Huawei equipment and replace it with non-Chinese gear. (This equipment would still be foreign, as no U.S. company has made wireless equipment since the mid-2000s when the U.S. provider Lucent was sold to Alcatel, a French company.)\n\nThere is certainly a debate about whether Huawei equipment can be trusted, especially since Chinese policy mandates that companies can be compelled to turn over data at any time for any reason. But as long as there is a ban on Huawei imports, it doesn’t pose a direct security threat to U.S. telecommunications networks.\n\nSo, what does that leave as most plausible explanation for the administration’s actions? It is likely that they see the export ban as a way to sideline Huawei and force allies to buy 5G equipment from other non-U.S. companies like Ericsson and Nokia. But if that’s the case, then it is delusional thinking. Even with the partial ban that has been in place since May, Huawei sales were up 18 percent overall in 2019. Moreover, even without full access to U.S. technology, Huawei is able to buy non-U.S. inputs from firms in other nations and increasingly is able to produce its own inputs, including computer chips. As a strategic matter, the ban thus will be fruitless. And worse, it will cut off U.S. technology sales to Huawei—\\$11 billion last year—making U.S. technology firms that much weaker, with less revenue to invest in cutting-edge R\\&D.\n\nThis is why some in the Defense Department—historically the agency most in favor of strict controls—are said to oppose a tightened ban: They worry America’s own semiconductor supply chain could be hurt. Indeed, such an action appears to be contrary to Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross’s own views, as when he [said](https:\/\/www.commerce.gov\/news\/speeches\/2019\/07\/remarks-us-commerce-secretary-wilbur-l-ross-bureau-industry-and-security), “The future prosperity of the United States depends on our strategic advantage in advanced technologies. ECRA \\[Export Control Reform Act\\] also clearly states that the United States must remain globally competitive in science, technology, engineering and—specifically—‘manufacturing sectors.’ It directs agencies like BIS to continually evaluate the impact of export controls on U.S. scientific and industrial leadership in order to ‘avoid negatively affecting such leadership’.”\n\nClearly, if the administration goes forward with this ban, it will be “negatively affecting such leadership.” And let’s not forget the significant chilling effect the Huawei ban is having on other Chinese customers, who have been furiously seeking out other, more politically reliable—non-American—suppliers. Moreover, it will reduce the likelihood that China will increase its imports of U.S. manufactured goods by the \\$45 billion it committed to in [the new “phase one” deal](https:\/\/ustr.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/files\/agreements\/phase%20one%20agreement\/Economic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between_The_United_States_And_China_Text.pdf). It makes little sense for the administration to say the phase one deal is going to increase U.S. exports of high-tech goods while simultaneously erecting new barriers to those very same sales.\n\nAs president Trump [stated](https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefings-statements\/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-modi-india-bilateral-meeting-osaka-japan\/), “We actually sell Huawei many of its parts… We have great companies that are the leaders of a lot of what Huawei does, and we sell them a lot.” That’s true—but not if the new Commerce rules go through.\n\n## Editors’ Recommendations\nJune 29, 2019\n\n[Trump Was Right to (Temporarily) Lift the Huawei Export Ban](https:\/\/itif.org\/publications\/2019\/06\/29\/trump-was-right-temporarily-lift-huawei-export-ban\/)\n\nMay 23, 2019\n\n[Why Limiting U.S. Tech Exports to Chinese Companies Like Huawei Is a Risky Strategy](https:\/\/itif.org\/publications\/2019\/05\/23\/why-limiting-us-tech-exports-chinese-companies-huawei-risky-strategy\/)\n\nJanuary 13, 2020\n\n[Why and How to Mount a Strong, Trilateral Response to China’s Innovation Mercantilism](https:\/\/itif.org\/publications\/2020\/01\/13\/why-and-how-mount-strong-trilateral-response-chinas-innovation-mercantilism\/)\n\n![Accessibility](https:\/\/itif.org\/images\/accessibility.svg)\n\n![Information Technology and Innovation Foundation](https:\/\/cdn.sanity.io\/images\/03hnmfyj\/production\/0181f751563166009fcf7e9b4b84b84dedc15e58-153x153.svg)\n\n## Information Technology & Innovation Foundation\n700 K Street NW, Suite 600  \nWashington, DC 20001  \n[\\[email protected\\]](https:\/\/itif.org\/cdn-cgi\/l\/email-protection#c2afa3abae82abb6aba4ecadb0a5) \\| (202) 449-1351\n\n[Map & Directions](https:\/\/itif.org\/map-directions)\n\n## Affiliated Projects\n[Global Trade & Innovation Policy Alliance](https:\/\/www.gtipa.org\/ \"Global Trade & Innovation Policy Alliance\")  \n[Innovate4Health](https:\/\/medium.com\/innovate4health \"Innovate4Health\")\n\n## [Support Our Work](https:\/\/itif.org\/donate\/)\n\n[![Close](https:\/\/itif.org\/_next\/image\/?url=%2Fimages%2Ficons%2Fx-logo.png&w=96&q=75)](https:\/\/twitter.com\/ITIFdc)[![Close](https:\/\/itif.org\/images\/icons\/Instagramlogo.svg)](https:\/\/www.instagram.com\/itifdc\/)[![Close](https:\/\/itif.org\/images\/icons\/facebooklogo.svg)](https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/innovationpolicy)[![Close](https:\/\/itif.org\/images\/icons\/linkedinlogo.svg)](https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/company\/information-technology-and-innovation-foundation\/)[![Close](https:\/\/itif.org\/images\/icons\/youtubelogo.svg)](https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/@itif)\n\n[Structured content powered by Sanity.io](https:\/\/www.sanity.io\/)\n\n[Copyright Notice](https:\/\/itif.org\/publications\/2015\/01\/10\/copyright\/) \\| [Privacy Policy](https:\/\/itif.org\/publications\/2015\/01\/10\/privacy\/)\n\n[Sitemap](https:\/\/itif.org\/sitemap)\n\n![Back to Top](https:\/\/itif.org\/images\/back-to-top.svg)","attrs_readable_markdown":"## Information Technology & Innovation Foundation\n700 K Street NW, Suite 600  \nWashington, DC 20001  \n[\\[email protected\\]](https:\/\/itif.org\/cdn-cgi\/l\/email-protection#c2afa3abae82abb6aba4ecadb0a5) \\| (202) 449-1351\n\n[Map & Directions](https:\/\/itif.org\/map-directions)","meta_canonical":null,"ml_categories_json":"{\"\/Business_and_Industrial\":671,\"\/Law_and_Government\":433,\"\/Business_and_Industrial\/Business_Operations\":407,\"\/Law_and_Government\/Legal\":232,\"\/Law_and_Government\/Legal\/Business_and_Corporate_Law\":211,\"\/Business_and_Industrial\/Business_Operations\/Business_Plans_and_Presentations\":199,\"\/News\":148,\"\/Finance\":117,\"\/Computers_and_Electronics\":117}","ml_types_json":"{\"\/Article\":998,\"\/Article\/Opinion_Piece\":733}","ml_intent_types_json":"{\"Informational\":999}","meta_language":"en","attrs_author":"Robert D. Atkinson","attrs_publish_time":1579824000,"attrs_original_publish_time":1579824000,"attrs_is_republished":0,"attrs_nr_words":"1122","attrs_boilerpipe_nr_words":"22","body_ext_links_number":14,"body_int_links_number":64,"meta_nofollow":0,"meta_noarchive":0,"props_was_rendered":0,"src_redirect":"","download_time_msec":1338,"download_ttfb_msec":1338,"download_size":13571}

3. Robots.txt Check

Query:

Response:

4. Spam/Ban Check

Query:

Response:

5. Seen Status Check

ℹ️ Skipped - page is already crawled

📄

INDEXABLE

✅

CRAWLED

2 days ago

🤖

ROBOTS ALLOWED

Page Info Filters

Filter	Status	Condition	Details
HTTP status	PASS	`download_http_code = 200`	HTTP 200
Age cutoff	PASS	`download_stamp > now() - 6 MONTH`	0.1 months ago
History drop	PASS	`isNull(history_drop_reason)`	No drop reason
Spam/ban	PASS	`fh_dont_index != 1 AND ml_spam_score = 0`	ml_spam_score=0
Canonical	PASS	`meta_canonical IS NULL OR = '' OR = src_unparsed`	Not set

Page Details

Property

Value

URL

https://itif.org/publications/2020/01/24/huawei-export-ban-shooting-us-technology-exporters-foot/

Last Crawled

2026-04-20 05:23:16 (2 days ago)

First Indexed

2022-06-06 15:36:18 (3 years ago)

HTTP Status Code

200

Content

Meta Title

The Huawei Export Ban: Shooting U.S. Tech Exporters in the Foot | Blogs | Jan 24, 2020 | ITIF

Meta Description

It makes little sense for the administration to say the phase one deal is going to increase U.S. exports of high-tech goods while simultaneously erecting new barriers to those very same sales.

Meta Canonical

null

Boilerpipe Text

Information Technology & Innovation Foundation 700 K Street NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20001 [email protected] | (202) 449-1351 Map & Directions

Markdown

[Skip to content](https://itif.org/publications/2020/01/24/huawei-export-ban-shooting-us-technology-exporters-foot/#main-content) [![ITIF Logo](https://itif.org/_next/image/?url=%2Fimages%2Flogo-itif-normal.png&w=2048&q=75)](https://itif.org/ "Home") [![ITIF Search](https://itif.org/images/icons/search-icon.svg)](https://itif.org/search/ "search") ![Menu](https://itif.org/images/icons/menu-icon.svg) - [News](https://itif.org/news-room/ "News") - [Press Releases](https://itif.org/publications/press-releases/ "Press Releases") - [News Clips](https://itif.org/publications/external/ "News Clips") - [Media Contacts](https://itif.org/media-contacts/ "Media Contacts") - [Get Our Newsletters](https://itif.org/get-our-newsletters/ "Get Our Newsletters") - [Events](https://itif.org/events/ "Events") - [Events](https://itif.org/events/ "Events") - [Presentations](https://itif.org/events/presentations/ "Presentations") - [Publications](https://itif.org/publications/ "Publications") - [Publication Types](https://itif.org/publications/ "Publication Types") - [Reports & Briefings](https://itif.org/publications/reports-briefings/ "Reports & Briefings") - [Commentary](https://itif.org/publications/commentary/ "Commentary") - [Testimonies & Filings](https://itif.org/publications/testimonies-filings/ "Testimonies & Filings") - [Books & Edited Volumes](https://itif.org/publications/books/ "Books & Edited Volumes") - [Knowledge Bases](https://itif.org/publications/knowledge-bases/ "Knowledge Bases") - [Podcasts](https://itif.org/publications/podcasts/ "Podcasts") - [Issue Areas](https://itif.org/issues/ "Issue Areas") - [Clean Energy](https://itif.org/issues/clean-energy/ "Clean Energy") - [Innovation & Competitiveness](https://itif.org/issues/innovation-competitiveness/ "Innovation & Competitiveness") - [IT & Data](https://itif.org/issues/it-data/ "IT & Data") - [Life Sciences](https://itif.org/issues/life-sciences/ "Life Sciences") - [Broadband & Spectrum](https://itif.org/issues/broadband-spectrum/ "Broadband & Spectrum") - [Trade & Globalization](https://itif.org/issues/trade-globalization/ "Trade & Globalization") - [Regions](https://itif.org/regions/ "Regions") - [Africa](https://itif.org/regions/africa/ "Africa") - [Asia-Pacific](https://itif.org/regions/asia-pacific/ "Asia-Pacific") - [Canada](https://itif.org/regions/canada/ "Canada") - [China](https://itif.org/regions/china/ "China") - [Europe](https://itif.org/regions/europe/ "Europe") - [Global](https://itif.org/regions/global/ "Global") - [Latin America](https://itif.org/regions/latin-america/ "Latin America") - [United Kingdom](https://itif.org/regions/uk/ "United Kingdom") - [Non-Tariff Attack Tracker](https://itif.org/publications/knowledge-bases/attack-tracker/ "Non-Tariff Attack Tracker") - [Tech Policy To-Do List](https://itif.org/publications/knowledge-bases/to-do-list/ "Tech Policy To-Do List") - [Technology Explainers](https://itif.org/publications/knowledge-bases/technology-explainers/ "Technology Explainers") - [Centers](https://itif.org/centers/ "Centers") - [Aegis Project for Defending U.S. Tech Leadership](https://itif.org/centers/aegis-project/ "Aegis Project for Defending U.S. Tech Leadership") - [Center for Clean Energy Innovation](https://itif.org/centers/clean-energy-innovation/ "Center for Clean Energy Innovation") - [Center for Data Innovation](https://itif.org/centers/data-innovation/ "Center for Data Innovation") - [Center for Life Sciences Innovation](https://itif.org/centers/life-sciences-innovation/ "Center for Life Sciences Innovation") - [Center for Korean Innovation and Competitiveness](https://itif.org/centers/korea/ "Center for Korean Innovation and Competitiveness") - [Centre for Canadian Innovation and Competitiveness](https://itif.org/centers/canada/ "Centre for Canadian Innovation and Competitiveness") - [Hamilton Center on Industrial Strategy](https://itif.org/centers/hamilton/ "Hamilton Center on Industrial Strategy") - [Schumpeter Project on Competition Policy](https://itif.org/centers/schumpeter/ "Schumpeter Project on Competition Policy") - [About](https://itif.org/about/ "About") - [About ITIF](https://itif.org/about/ "About ITIF") - [Staff](https://itif.org/people/itif-staff/ "Staff") - [Board](https://itif.org/people/board/ "Board") - [Affiliated Experts](https://itif.org/people/affiliated-experts/ "Affiliated Experts") - [Supporters](https://itif.org/our-supporters/ "Supporters") - [Jobs](https://itif.org/jobs/ "Jobs") - [Donate](https://itif.org/donate/ "Donate") [![The Huawei Export Ban: Shooting U.S. Tech Exporters in the Foot](https://cdn.sanity.io/images/03hnmfyj/production/86f6dbce913575f90aa48e1748ad619c31e3c06b-4184x630.png)](https://itif.org/publication-brands/innovation-files-blog/) # The Huawei Export Ban: Shooting U.S. Tech Exporters in the Foot By [Robert D. Atkinson](https://itif.org/person/robert-d-atkinson/ "Robert D. Atkinson") \| January 24, 2020 Under the pretext of national security, the U.S. Commerce Department is [reportedly](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-huawei/trump-administration-moves-toward-blocking-more-sales-to-huawei-sources-idUSKBN1ZD2VD) close to publishing a rule to significantly limit U.S. firms’ ability to sell products to Chinese technology giant Huawei. But the truth is the ban will do virtually nothing to help U.S. national security. In fact, it will harm America by weakening the competitive position of U.S. technology firms as their foreign sales erode. Under U.S. law, the Commerce Department can limit exports to a foreign company if it determines the company constitutes a national security risk. That’s what the Department’s Bureau of Industry Security did in May 2019 when it placed Huawei on a restricted trade blacklist. But it’s never been exactly clear what the Trump administration’s real motivation is for the ban. At the time, the Department cited the fact that Huawei was providing prohibited financial services to Iran. Others in the administration have pointed to concerns with the security of Huawei’s 5G networking equipment. Still other government officials want to cripple the company commercially to slow its rise in the global 5G space. But troublingly, the Department refuses to provide a clear rationale for its actions. Under current rules, Commerce can require a license or block the sale of certain products shipped to Huawei if U.S.-made components controlled for national security constitute more than 25 percent of their value. Under the proposed new threshold, this would be lowered to 10 percent, or even lower, and remove the national security component so non-sensitive, commercial technologies would be in Commerce’s regulatory grip as well. If approved, there would be no ability for the public to comment until after the revisions became the law of the land. What’s behind this tougher move? Some in the administration appear to believe that Huawei represents a threat—however undefined—and that the U.S. should seek to cripple, if not kill the company by any means necessary. But if the real concern is ensuring the security of U.S. telecom networks, then the president has effectively addressed the problem by imposing an *import ban.* U.S. telecom carriers are not allowed to buy Huawei equipment going forward, and there are even plans to require carriers (mostly smaller, rural ones) to rip out existing Huawei equipment and replace it with non-Chinese gear. (This equipment would still be foreign, as no U.S. company has made wireless equipment since the mid-2000s when the U.S. provider Lucent was sold to Alcatel, a French company.) There is certainly a debate about whether Huawei equipment can be trusted, especially since Chinese policy mandates that companies can be compelled to turn over data at any time for any reason. But as long as there is a ban on Huawei imports, it doesn’t pose a direct security threat to U.S. telecommunications networks. So, what does that leave as most plausible explanation for the administration’s actions? It is likely that they see the export ban as a way to sideline Huawei and force allies to buy 5G equipment from other non-U.S. companies like Ericsson and Nokia. But if that’s the case, then it is delusional thinking. Even with the partial ban that has been in place since May, Huawei sales were up 18 percent overall in 2019. Moreover, even without full access to U.S. technology, Huawei is able to buy non-U.S. inputs from firms in other nations and increasingly is able to produce its own inputs, including computer chips. As a strategic matter, the ban thus will be fruitless. And worse, it will cut off U.S. technology sales to Huawei—\$11 billion last year—making U.S. technology firms that much weaker, with less revenue to invest in cutting-edge R\&D. This is why some in the Defense Department—historically the agency most in favor of strict controls—are said to oppose a tightened ban: They worry America’s own semiconductor supply chain could be hurt. Indeed, such an action appears to be contrary to Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross’s own views, as when he [said](https://www.commerce.gov/news/speeches/2019/07/remarks-us-commerce-secretary-wilbur-l-ross-bureau-industry-and-security), “The future prosperity of the United States depends on our strategic advantage in advanced technologies. ECRA \[Export Control Reform Act\] also clearly states that the United States must remain globally competitive in science, technology, engineering and—specifically—‘manufacturing sectors.’ It directs agencies like BIS to continually evaluate the impact of export controls on U.S. scientific and industrial leadership in order to ‘avoid negatively affecting such leadership’.” Clearly, if the administration goes forward with this ban, it will be “negatively affecting such leadership.” And let’s not forget the significant chilling effect the Huawei ban is having on other Chinese customers, who have been furiously seeking out other, more politically reliable—non-American—suppliers. Moreover, it will reduce the likelihood that China will increase its imports of U.S. manufactured goods by the \$45 billion it committed to in [the new “phase one” deal](https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/Economic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between_The_United_States_And_China_Text.pdf). It makes little sense for the administration to say the phase one deal is going to increase U.S. exports of high-tech goods while simultaneously erecting new barriers to those very same sales. As president Trump [stated](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-modi-india-bilateral-meeting-osaka-japan/), “We actually sell Huawei many of its parts… We have great companies that are the leaders of a lot of what Huawei does, and we sell them a lot.” That’s true—but not if the new Commerce rules go through. ## Editors’ Recommendations June 29, 2019 [Trump Was Right to (Temporarily) Lift the Huawei Export Ban](https://itif.org/publications/2019/06/29/trump-was-right-temporarily-lift-huawei-export-ban/) May 23, 2019 [Why Limiting U.S. Tech Exports to Chinese Companies Like Huawei Is a Risky Strategy](https://itif.org/publications/2019/05/23/why-limiting-us-tech-exports-chinese-companies-huawei-risky-strategy/) January 13, 2020 [Why and How to Mount a Strong, Trilateral Response to China’s Innovation Mercantilism](https://itif.org/publications/2020/01/13/why-and-how-mount-strong-trilateral-response-chinas-innovation-mercantilism/) ![Accessibility](https://itif.org/images/accessibility.svg) ![Information Technology and Innovation Foundation](https://cdn.sanity.io/images/03hnmfyj/production/0181f751563166009fcf7e9b4b84b84dedc15e58-153x153.svg) ## Information Technology & Innovation Foundation 700 K Street NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20001 [\[email protected\]](https://itif.org/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c2afa3abae82abb6aba4ecadb0a5) \| (202) 449-1351 [Map & Directions](https://itif.org/map-directions) ## Affiliated Projects [Global Trade & Innovation Policy Alliance](https://www.gtipa.org/ "Global Trade & Innovation Policy Alliance") [Innovate4Health](https://medium.com/innovate4health "Innovate4Health") ## [Support Our Work](https://itif.org/donate/) [![Close](https://itif.org/_next/image/?url=%2Fimages%2Ficons%2Fx-logo.png&w=96&q=75)](https://twitter.com/ITIFdc)[![Close](https://itif.org/images/icons/Instagramlogo.svg)](https://www.instagram.com/itifdc/)[![Close](https://itif.org/images/icons/facebooklogo.svg)](https://www.facebook.com/innovationpolicy)[![Close](https://itif.org/images/icons/linkedinlogo.svg)](https://www.linkedin.com/company/information-technology-and-innovation-foundation/)[![Close](https://itif.org/images/icons/youtubelogo.svg)](https://www.youtube.com/@itif) [Structured content powered by Sanity.io](https://www.sanity.io/) [Copyright Notice](https://itif.org/publications/2015/01/10/copyright/) \| [Privacy Policy](https://itif.org/publications/2015/01/10/privacy/) [Sitemap](https://itif.org/sitemap) ![Back to Top](https://itif.org/images/back-to-top.svg)

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## Information Technology & Innovation Foundation 700 K Street NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20001 [\[email protected\]](https://itif.org/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c2afa3abae82abb6aba4ecadb0a5) \| (202) 449-1351 [Map & Directions](https://itif.org/map-directions)

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Robert D. Atkinson

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