🕷️ Crawler Inspector

URL Lookup

Direct Parameter Lookup

Raw Queries and Responses

1. Shard Calculation

Query:

Response:

Calculated Shard: 96 (from laksa130)

2. Crawled Status Check

Query:

curl -X POST \
  'http://laksa096.int.ahrefs:8124/' \
  -H 'Content-Type: text/plain' \
  -H 'X-ClickHouse-Database: crawler3' \
  -H 'Authorization: Basic YXBpOg==' \
  -d 'SELECT getAhrefsURLFromUnparsed(src_unparsed) AS found_url, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(download_stamp), 0) AS crawl_time, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(props_url_first_seen), 0) AS first_indexed_time, download_http_code AS http_code, src_unparsed AS src_unparsed, src_root_hash AS src_root_hash, history_drop_reason AS history_drop_reason, meta_title AS meta_title, meta_descriptions AS meta_descriptions, attrs_boilerpipe_text AS attrs_boilerpipe_text, attrs_markdown AS attrs_markdown, attrs_readable_markdown AS attrs_readable_markdown, meta_canonical AS meta_canonical FROM crawler3.page_info_local FINAL PREWHERE (src_root_hash, src_unparsed) IN ((getAhrefsRootHashFromUnparsed(getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/25/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs/\')), getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/25/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs/\'))) FORMAT JSONEachRow'

Response:

{"found_url":"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/25\/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs\/","crawl_time":1776132426,"first_indexed_time":1772035159,"http_code":200,"src_unparsed":"com,foreignpolicy!\/2026\/02\/25\/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs\/ s443","src_root_hash":"6089014433239620496","history_drop_reason":null,"meta_title":"Thanks to Trump, Xi Has Time on His Side With Taiwan","meta_descriptions":[],"attrs_boilerpipe_text":"Beijing is less likely to risk an invasion while Trump is facilitating its pressure campaign against Taipei.\nBy\nAli Wyne\n, the senior research and advocacy advisor for U.S.-China relations at the International Crisis Group.\nTwo people are seen from behind stand with their necks craned to look up at a TV screen showing a news broadcast. On the screen, a video shows Trump and Xi shaking hands.\nPeople watch a news program showing a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea, seen in Taipei on Oct. 30, 2025.\nI-Hwa Cheng \/ AFP via Getty Images\nMy FP:\nFollow topics and authors to get straight to what you like. Exclusively for FP subscribers.\nSubscribe Now\n|\nLog In\nFebruary 25, 2026, 10:48 AM\nAt his January 2025 confirmation hearing to become the U.S. secretary of state, Marco Rubio\nassessed\nthat “unless something dramatic changes” in Asia’s military balance, China would attempt to invade Taiwan before the end of the decade. This view is widely shared. In May, for example, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party\nwarned\nthat “the clock is ticking to stop a war in the Indo-Pacific—and this Congress may be America’s last full chance to do it.”\nThe good news is that the short-term likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan has diminished, even as it remains too high. The cause of this development, however, is not exactly reassuring. The events of the past year give Chinese leader Xi Jinping good reason to believe that his U.S. counterpart, President Donald Trump, will facilitate his attempt to extend China’s influence over the island without having to gamble on an invasion.\nStories Readers Liked\nGo to slide 1\nGo to slide 2\nGo to slide 3\nGo to slide 4\nGo to slide 5\nGo to slide 6\nGo to slide 7\nGo to slide 8\nGo to slide 9\nGo to slide 10\nAn illustration with a world map background texture and fire cutting through three rings in the map with three human figures inside.\nAn illustration shows semiconductor chips structured like a house of cards with a tiny city with government buildings atop it, ready to topple.\nTwo dozen or so scattered pedestrians walking on a large plaza are seen from overhead. There is a giant world map embedded in the pavement, with China highlighted in a dark red and all the other countries in pale gray.\nA photo illustration shows fractured colored shard revealing images of nation states in decline: an upside down U.S. Capitol building, the EU building in Brussels, broken columns, part of Donald Trump's head, explosions in the Middle East, and a tank in Ukraine.\nAfter the Nation-State\nBy\nMichael Hirsh\nA photo illustration showing six classical Greek or Roman-style columns, plus a stack of televisions as the seventh pillar of populism. The TVs show images of Victor Orban, Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Donald Trump.\nThe Seven Pillars of Populist Foreign Policy\nBy\nLisel Hintz\n,\nBerk Esen\n,\nTudor Onea\nAn illustration of a tombstone reading \"RIP\" appears in place of a globe on a circular stand.\nCentral American migrant children play on a seesaw at a shelter in Ciudad Juárez, state of Chihuahua, Mexico.\nAn illustration shows two men against a bright yellow background. One man wears a Western-style business suit and the other wears a black robe and white head covering. The men are shaking hands. Each holds a briefcase with money spilling out, the left man's briefcase shaped like the United States' and the right man's like the Arabian Peninsula.\nA man in a coat outside of a glass office building, with high rise buildings under construction in the background.\nChina’s Tech Obsession Is Weighing Down Its Economy\nBy\nScott Kennedy\n,\nScott Rozelle\nPhotos of two men speaking each shown as a negative color inside a red and blue circle.\nIran War\nA police officer stands near a poster featuring the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 28 in Tehran, Iran.\nDoes Iran’s Future Look Like Cuba, Syria, or North Korea?\nThe Gulf and Israel are pursuing rival strategies toward Iran, but neither is likely to get what they want.\nMissiles are seen in the skies over Doha on March 3.\nA billboard displaying pictures of nuclear scientists, centrifuges and a sentence reading in Farsi: \" Science is the power\", at the Enqelab square in Tehran, on August 29, 2025.\nThe Albina Bulk carrier sits anchored on March 22, 2026 at Sultan Qaboos Port in Muscat, Oman.","attrs_markdown":"## There appears to be a technical issue with your browser\nThis issue is preventing our website from loading properly. 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All contents (c) 2026, Graham Digital Holding Company. All rights reserved. Foreign Policy, 1099 14th St NW, Suite 500 East, Washington, D.C., 20005.\n\nPowered by [WordPress VIP](https:\/\/wpvip.com\/?utm_source=vip_powered_wpcom&utm_medium=web&utm_campaign=VIP%20Footer%20Credit&utm_term=foreignpolicy.com)\n\n[Analysis](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/channel\/analysis\/)\n\n# Thanks to Trump, Xi Has Time on His Side With Taiwan\n## Beijing is less likely to risk an invasion while Trump is facilitating its pressure campaign against Taipei.\nBy [**Ali Wyne**](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/ali-wyne\/), the senior research and advocacy advisor for U.S.-China relations at the International Crisis Group.\n\n![Two people are seen from behind stand with their necks craned to look up at a TV screen showing a news broadcast. On the screen, a video shows Trump and Xi shaking hands.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs-2243556773.jpg?quality=90)\n\nTwo people are seen from behind stand with their necks craned to look up at a TV screen showing a news broadcast. On the screen, a video shows Trump and Xi shaking hands.\n\nPeople watch a news program showing a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea, seen in Taipei on Oct. 30, 2025. I-Hwa Cheng \/ AFP via Getty Images\n\n[My FP:](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/myfp) Follow topics and authors to get straight to what you like. Exclusively for FP subscribers. [Subscribe Now](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/25\/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs\/) \\| [Log In](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/25\/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs\/)\n\n- U.S. Foreign Policy\n- Military\n- China\n- Taiwan\n\nFebruary 25, 2026, 10:48 AM\n\nAt his January 2025 confirmation hearing to become the U.S. secretary of state, Marco Rubio [assessed](https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=r3sl7TtBUjI) that “unless something dramatic changes” in Asia’s military balance, China would attempt to invade Taiwan before the end of the decade. This view is widely shared. In May, for example, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party [warned](https:\/\/chinaselectcommittee.house.gov\/media\/press-releases\/house-select-committee-warns-window-deter-war-china-closing-fast) that “the clock is ticking to stop a war in the Indo-Pacific—and this Congress may be America’s last full chance to do it.”\n\n[Trump’s Second Term](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/projects\/trump-presidency-personnel-cabinet-policy-issues\/)\n\n[Ongoing reports and analysis](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/projects\/trump-presidency-personnel-cabinet-policy-issues\/)\n\nThe good news is that the short-term likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan has diminished, even as it remains too high. The cause of this development, however, is not exactly reassuring. The events of the past year give Chinese leader Xi Jinping good reason to believe that his U.S. counterpart, President Donald Trump, will facilitate his attempt to extend China’s influence over the island without having to gamble on an invasion.\n\nAt his January 2025 confirmation hearing to become the U.S. secretary of state, Marco Rubio [assessed](https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=r3sl7TtBUjI) that “unless something dramatic changes” in Asia’s military balance, China would attempt to invade Taiwan before the end of the decade. This view is widely shared. In May, for example, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party [warned](https:\/\/chinaselectcommittee.house.gov\/media\/press-releases\/house-select-committee-warns-window-deter-war-china-closing-fast) that “the clock is ticking to stop a war in the Indo-Pacific—and this Congress may be America’s last full chance to do it.”\n\n[Trump’s Second Term](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/projects\/trump-presidency-personnel-cabinet-policy-issues\/)\n\n[Ongoing reports and analysis](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/projects\/trump-presidency-personnel-cabinet-policy-issues\/)\n\nThe good news is that the short-term likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan has diminished, even as it remains too high. The cause of this development, however, is not exactly reassuring. The events of the past year give Chinese leader Xi Jinping good reason to believe that his U.S. counterpart, President Donald Trump, will facilitate his attempt to extend China’s influence over the island without having to gamble on an invasion.\n\nAny Chinese invasion attempt would be a risky endeavor. Even though China’s military modernization is accelerating, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is in turmoil. Meanwhile, the United States and Taiwan are fielding new capabilities and deepening their security cooperation, and Washington is moving to deploy missile and unmanned systems to the Philippines and nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Against this backdrop, Beijing surely appreciates that any “victory” that it might win could be a Pyrrhic one—especially given the potential for nuclear escalation and the likelihood that a conflict would prove to be protracted.\n\nBy contrast, the political trends in both Washington and Taipei are presently in China’s favor. As a result, Xi is justified in thinking that he can make progress toward reunification without incurring the military, economic, and political uncertainties that would attend an invasion attempt.\n***\nDespite authorizing several high-profile, high-value arms sales to Taiwan during his first term and in the first year of his second term, Trump has, on the whole, evinced little concern for the island’s security.\n\nHe [said](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/01\/11\/us\/politics\/trump-interview-transcript.html) in a January interview that Taiwan is “a source of pride for him \\[Xi\\]. He considers it to be a part of China, and that’s up to him, what he’s going to be doing.” Trump, for his part, appears to view the island principally through [the lens of its chipmaking capacity](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2025\/11\/03\/taiwan-silicon-shield-tsmc-semiconductor-chips\/). He [declared](https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/features\/2024-trump-interview-transcript\/) in July 2024 that Taiwan had stolen the U.S. semiconductor industry and “doesn’t give us anything” (and [repeated](https:\/\/x.com\/clashreport\/status\/2024918460795380113) that charge after the Supreme Court’s tariff ruling on Friday).\n\nIn March 2025, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company announced that it would increase its investment in the United States by \\$100 billion. Trump subsequently [remarked](https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=kQO50OiUcrw) that while a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be “a catastrophic event,” he believed that the company’s investment would leave “a very big part” of the company’s business in the United States, where it would theoretically be safe in the event of a cross-strait war.\n\nXi also has a stick that has proved effective with Trump—and a carrot that could entice the president. On account of its rare-earths leverage, China can inflict significant pain across the U.S. economy, as it amply [showcased during last year’s trade standoff](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2025\/10\/27\/rare-earths-price-export-controls\/) with the United States. At the same time, Xi could continue playing up Trump’s perception of himself as the supposed peacemaker in chief, as he [began](https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=po3kIThzQ6k) to do when the two met in South Korea in October.\n\n“Mr. President, you care a lot about world peace,” Xi said, “and you are very enthusiastic about settling various regional hot spot issues.” Xi could well convince Trump that the best way to be a global peacemaker would be empathizing with Xi’s vision of Asian security and supporting Taiwanese lawmakers who aim to facilitate negotiations between Taipei and Beijing on cross-strait issues.\n\nOne could also imagine that over time, in exchange for economic pledges from Xi, Trump might be willing to make security concessions that steadily afford China more breathing room to intensify its multifaceted pressure campaign against Taiwan. It is telling that the two leaders reportedly [discussed](https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2026-02-17\/trump-says-he-ll-soon-make-decision-on-weapon-sales-to-taiwan) future U.S. arms sales to the island. Regardless of what decision Trump ultimately makes, he has now signaled a willingness to negotiate a topic that U.S. officials had effectively taken off the table with the second of the “[six assurances](https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/crs-product\/IF11665)” that the Reagan administration gave to Taiwan in 1982.\n\nBeijing also sees auspicious political dynamics in Taipei. Chinese officials have made no secret of their contempt for Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, whom they [regard as more separatist-minded](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2024\/01\/17\/taiwan-president-election-china-policy\/) than his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen. But he oversees a divided legislature; the informal opposition coalition of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party controls 60 of its 113 seats, while his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) only controls 51.\n\n## Read More\n- [![A Chinese flag is seen in the foreground with container ships, cranes, and shipping containers in Shenzhen, China, on April 12, 2025.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/GettyImages-2209907770_49a810.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/20\/kurt-campbell-trump-xi-china-policy\/)\n  \n  A Chinese flag is seen in the foreground with container ships, cranes, and shipping containers in Shenzhen, China, on April 12, 2025.\n  \n  [What Is Trump’s China Policy?](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/20\/kurt-campbell-trump-xi-china-policy\/)\n  \n  Kurt Campbell: “The president clearly wants short-term deals.” ![This article has an audio recording](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/themes\/foreign-policy-2017\/assets\/src\/images\/icons\/audio.svg)\n  \n  [Insider](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/insider)\n  \n  \\|\n  \n  [Ravi Agrawal](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/ravi-agrawal\/)\n- [![Then-National Tsinghua University sociology professor Chen Ming-chi speaks to journalists in Taipei, Taiwan, on Jan. 14, 2024.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/Chen-Ming-chi-Taiwan-2024-01-14T075025Z_1705218621_DPAF240114X99X602953_RTRFIPP_4_ELECTIONS-GOVERNMENT-PARLIAMENT-ECONOMY-HEADOFSTATE.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/11\/taiwan-defense-budget-semiconductors-china-trump-chen-ming-chi\/)\n  \n  Then-National Tsinghua University sociology professor Chen Ming-chi speaks to journalists in Taipei, Taiwan, on Jan. 14, 2024.\n  \n  [How Taiwan Sees the World](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/11\/taiwan-defense-budget-semiconductors-china-trump-chen-ming-chi\/)\n  \n  The island’s deputy foreign minister on Trump, defense, and why he thinks countries shouldn’t trust China. ![This article has an audio recording](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/themes\/foreign-policy-2017\/assets\/src\/images\/icons\/audio.svg)\n  \n  [Interview](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/category\/interview\/)\n  \n  \\|\n  \n  [Rishi Iyengar](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/rishi-iyengar\/)\n\nAnother key player in shaping political dynamics within Taiwan—and between China and Taiwan—is Cheng Li-wun, a former DPP member who now leads the KMT, the main opposition party. She has said that she would like to meet with Xi early this year, potentially ahead of Trump’s scheduled meeting with the Chinese leader in April.\n\nCheng contends that Taiwan cannot depend on a United States that has elected Trump twice. Shortly before she was tapped to lead the KMT, she [warned](https:\/\/asia.nikkei.com\/politics\/kmt-picks-upstart-cheng-li-wun-as-new-leader-jolting-taiwan-s-old-guard) that Taiwan “must not become a sacrifice or Trump’s bargaining chip,” lest it “become another Ukraine.” She has gone further since taking the helm of the party, [declaring](https:\/\/focustaiwan.tw\/politics\/202601290004) that Taiwan will not “be involved in an internecine struggle” between the United States and China and even suggesting that a detente between Beijing and Taipei could “bring about cooperation between the U.S. and China.”\n\nCheng has also [cited](https:\/\/www.economist.com\/asia\/2026\/01\/29\/taiwans-new-opposition-leader-wants-to-talk-to-xi-jinping) unreasonable demands that the Trump administration is placing on Taipei: Trump [wants](https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/opinions\/2024\/09\/30\/donald-trump-2024-interview-immigration-ukraine\/) Taiwan to spend 10 percent of its gross domestic product on defense (for context, Lai [hopes](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/taiwan-president-ups-defence-spending-target-5-gdp-2025-08-22\/) that that figure will reach 5 percent by 2030), and U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick [wants](https:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2026\/01\/15\/us-taiwan-chips-deal-china.html) Washington to have onshored 40 percent of Taipei’s semiconductor production by the end of Trump’s second term. While her DPP counterparts cast Cheng as misguided, even unpatriotic, her pronouncements align with multiple polls that [confirm](https:\/\/www.gmfus.org\/news\/taiwans-growing-distrust-united-states) growing misgivings among the Taiwanese public about U.S. reliability. Cheng is far from a political juggernaut, but she has helped catalyze political sentiment that Beijing can only find encouraging.\n\nFinally, notwithstanding domestic challenges and turmoil in the PLA, China’s overall power is growing, whether one considers its military capabilities, its technological strides, or its diplomatic footprint. Thus, it can continue to build a steadily more favorable correlation of forces across the Taiwan Strait while strengthening its pressure campaign, which aims to wear down Taipei psychologically. China is now competing more confidently than it was when Trump retook office, having withstood the administration’s tariff fusillade last year.\n\nMoreover, Washington [continues to alienate](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/17\/trump-europe-munich-vance-rubio-good-bad-cop\/) [allies and partners in Europe](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/01\/15\/europe-trump-denmark-greenland-rasmussen-nato\/)—and sow doubt in Asia—with its “America first” foreign policy. It would be foolish for Beijing to get in Trump’s way while he is eroding the diplomatic network that has long been a pillar of the United States’ global influence.\n***\nNo one in Washington should breathe a sigh of relief, though, for there remain ample grounds for concern. There are numerous provocations that China could undertake short of an invasion, including restricting maritime access to Taiwan. [Some observers](https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/fall-top-chinese-general-stirs-us-uncertainty-about-chinas-military-2026-01-28\/) fear that the PLA’s emerging leaders, lacking actual combat experience, might be less capable of providing realistic military assessments to Xi—and might be even more willing to advocate an invasion attempt than the commanders who have been [purged in recent months](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/01\/27\/china-military-purge-generals-pla-xi-jinping-zhang-youxia-liu-zhenli\/).\n\nFinally, Asia’s waters and the skies above it are becoming ever more crowded, raising the risk of a clash between U.S. and Chinese military assets. The recent disruptions to the PLA’s chain of command have also, in turn, heightened the prospect of a ham-fisted response by Beijing that fuels rather than dampens escalatory dynamics.\n\nAs Russian President Vladimir [Putin’s hubris has demonstrated](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/20\/ukraine-russia-war-anniversary-trump-europe-nato-geopolitics-global-order\/), leaders can make disastrous decisions if they sit atop sclerotic bureaucracies wherein top officials are reluctant to offer candid advice. U.S. officials should not project their conceptions of “rationality” onto their counterparts in other countries. China might decide that it has no choice but to attempt an invasion if it assesses that Taiwan would otherwise slip away.\n\nThe most likely triggers would be political, such as an indication by Taiwan that it is poised to declare independence or by the United States that it is set to make an explicit defensive commitment to the island. Alternatively, Xi might conclude that the next three years offer the most propitious window for China to achieve reunification since Trump’s successor may be much more proactively supportive of Taiwan.\n\nFor now, though, Xi has little reason to abandon the pressure campaign that he has been overseeing. Neil Thomas, a specialist in China’s elite politics, has [observed](https:\/\/chinesepolitics.substack.com\/p\/xis-military-purge-what-happened) that Xi is “a calculated risk-taker rather than a reckless gambler,” one who, during nearly a decade and a half at the helm of his country, has focused on “strengthening China’s position incrementally rather than chancing on a decisive clash.”\n\nAnd Xi has seen the dividends of incrementalism elsewhere, whether one considers Hong Kong’s evolution into a financial appendage of China or China’s steady militarization of the South China Sea. At least for now, Xi seems willing to stick with incrementalism on Taiwan as well.\n\n**This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration**.* Follow along [here](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/projects\/trump-presidential-transition-personnel-cabinet-policy-issues\/).*\n\n**Ali Wyne** is the senior research and advocacy advisor for U.S.-China relations at the International Crisis Group.\n\nRead More On  [China](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/tag\/china\/) \\| [Military](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/tag\/military\/) \\| [Taiwan](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/tag\/taiwan\/) \\| [U.S. Foreign Policy](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/tag\/u-s-foreign-policy\/)\n\n## Join the Conversation\nCommenting is a benefit of a *Foreign Policy* subscription.\n\n[Subscribe Subscribe](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/subscribe)\n\nAlready a subscriber? **[Log In]()**.\n\n[View 3 Comments]()\n\n## Join the Conversation\nJoin the conversation on this and other recent *Foreign Policy* articles when you subscribe now.\n\n[Subscribe Subscribe](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/subscribe)\n\nNot your account? **[Log out]()**\n\n[View 3 Comments]()\n\n## Join the Conversation\nPlease follow our [comment guidelines](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/comment-guidelines), stay on topic, and be civil, courteous, and respectful of others’ beliefs.\n\n[View 3 Comments]()\n\n**You are commenting as .**  [Change your username]() \\| [Log out]()\n\n### OTHER SUBSCRIPTION OPTIONS\n#### [Academic Rates](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/subscribe-academic\/?tpcc=hardwall_academic)\n[Specialty rates for students and faculty.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/subscribe-academic\/?tpcc=hardwall_academic)\n\n#### [Multi-year](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/multi-year\/?tpcc=hardwall_multiyear)\n[Lock in your rates for longer.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/multi-year\/?tpcc=hardwall_multiyear)\n\n#### [Groups](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/group-subscriptions\/?tpcc=hardwall_groups)\n[Equip your organization with powerful global intelligence.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/group-subscriptions\/?tpcc=hardwall_groups)\n\n## Stories Readers Liked\n- Go to slide 1\n- Go to slide 2\n- Go to slide 3\n- Go to slide 4\n- Go to slide 5\n- Go to slide 6\n- Go to slide 7\n- Go to slide 8\n- Go to slide 9\n- Go to slide 10\n\n- [![An illustration with a world map background texture and fire cutting through three rings in the map with three human figures inside.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/1-world-after-trump-brian-stauffer-illustration.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/03\/23\/post-trump-world-order-cold-war-spheres-of-influence\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  An illustration with a world map background texture and fire cutting through three rings in the map with three human figures inside.\n  \n  [Three Scenarios for a Post-Trump World ![This article has an audio recording](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/themes\/foreign-policy-2017\/assets\/src\/images\/icons\/audio.svg)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/03\/23\/post-trump-world-order-cold-war-spheres-of-influence\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  By  [Hal Brands](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/hal-brands\/)\n- [![An illustration shows semiconductor chips structured like a house of cards with a tiny city with government buildings atop it, ready to topple.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/1-AI-doomsday-house-of-cards-doug-chayka-illustration.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/03\/24\/ai-artificial-intelligence-doomsday-iran-war\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  An illustration shows semiconductor chips structured like a house of cards with a tiny city with government buildings atop it, ready to topple.\n  \n  [As an AI Scholar, I Am Now Putting a High Probability on an AI Doomsday ![This article has an audio recording](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/themes\/foreign-policy-2017\/assets\/src\/images\/icons\/audio.svg)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/03\/24\/ai-artificial-intelligence-doomsday-iran-war\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  By  [Bhaskar Chakravorti](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/bhaskar-chakravorti\/)\n- [![Two dozen or so scattered pedestrians walking on a large plaza are seen from overhead. There is a giant world map embedded in the pavement, with China highlighted in a dark red and all the other countries in pale gray.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/china-map-GettyImages-2262840218.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/03\/25\/china-us-russia-sphere-influence-geopolitics-competition\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  Two dozen or so scattered pedestrians walking on a large plaza are seen from overhead. There is a giant world map embedded in the pavement, with China highlighted in a dark red and all the other countries in pale gray.\n  \n  [No, China Doesn’t Want Spheres of Influence ![This article has an audio recording](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/themes\/foreign-policy-2017\/assets\/src\/images\/icons\/audio.svg)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/03\/25\/china-us-russia-sphere-influence-geopolitics-competition\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  By  [Aaron Glasserman](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/aaron-glasserman\/)\n- [![A photo illustration shows fractured colored shard revealing images of nation states in decline: an upside down U.S. Capitol building, the EU building in Brussels, broken columns, part of Donald Trump's head, explosions in the Middle East, and a tank in Ukraine.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/1-doomsday-books-nation-state-illustration-2188671579.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/03\/27\/book-review-after-nations-dasgupta-westad-prasad-milanovic\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  A photo illustration shows fractured colored shard revealing images of nation states in decline: an upside down U.S. Capitol building, the EU building in Brussels, broken columns, part of Donald Trump's head, explosions in the Middle East, and a tank in Ukraine.\n  \n  [After the Nation-State](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/03\/27\/book-review-after-nations-dasgupta-westad-prasad-milanovic\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  By  [Michael Hirsh](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/michael-hirsh\/)\n- [![A photo illustration showing six classical Greek or Roman-style columns, plus a stack of televisions as the seventh pillar of populism. The TVs show images of Victor Orban, Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Donald Trump.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/1-trump-orban-modi-erdogan-Pillars-populism-2026.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/19\/trump-erdogan-orban-modi-india-hungary-turkey-populism-corruptionthe-seven-pillars-of-populist-foreign-policy\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  A photo illustration showing six classical Greek or Roman-style columns, plus a stack of televisions as the seventh pillar of populism. The TVs show images of Victor Orban, Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Donald Trump.\n  \n  [The Seven Pillars of Populist Foreign Policy](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/19\/trump-erdogan-orban-modi-india-hungary-turkey-populism-corruptionthe-seven-pillars-of-populist-foreign-policy\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  By  [Lisel Hintz](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/lisel-hintz\/),  [Berk Esen](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/berk-esen\/),  [Tudor Onea](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/tudor-onea\/)\n- [![An illustration of a tombstone reading \"RIP\" appears in place of a globe on a circular stand.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/International-order-dead-foreign-policy-illustration.png?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/09\/liberal-international-order-death-trump-greenland\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  An illustration of a tombstone reading \"RIP\" appears in place of a globe on a circular stand.\n  \n  [Who Killed the Liberal International Order? ![This article has an audio recording](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/themes\/foreign-policy-2017\/assets\/src\/images\/icons\/audio.svg)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/09\/liberal-international-order-death-trump-greenland\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  By  [Nick Danforth](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/nick-danforth\/)\n- [![Central American migrant children play on a seesaw at a shelter in Ciudad Juárez, state of Chihuahua, Mexico.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/GettyImages-1231954938.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/01\/23\/trump-threats-europe-greenland-balance-power\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  Central American migrant children play on a seesaw at a shelter in Ciudad Juárez, state of Chihuahua, Mexico.\n  \n  [The Balance-of-Power Theory Strikes Again ![This article has an audio recording](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/themes\/foreign-policy-2017\/assets\/src\/images\/icons\/audio.svg)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/01\/23\/trump-threats-europe-greenland-balance-power\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  By  [Stephen M. Walt](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/stephen-m-walt\/)\n- [![An illustration shows two men against a bright yellow background. One man wears a Western-style business suit and the other wears a black robe and white head covering. The men are shaking hands. Each holds a briefcase with money spilling out, the left man's briefcase shaped like the United States' and the right man's like the Arabian Peninsula.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/1-instrumental-capital-sovereign-wealth-sebastien-thibault.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2025\/12\/03\/instrumental-capital-sovereign-wealth-funds-gulf\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  An illustration shows two men against a bright yellow background. One man wears a Western-style business suit and the other wears a black robe and white head covering. The men are shaking hands. Each holds a briefcase with money spilling out, the left man's briefcase shaped like the United States' and the right man's like the Arabian Peninsula.\n  \n  [The New Wealth of Nations ![This article has an audio recording](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/themes\/foreign-policy-2017\/assets\/src\/images\/icons\/audio.svg)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2025\/12\/03\/instrumental-capital-sovereign-wealth-funds-gulf\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  By  [Jared Cohen](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/jared-cohen\/),  [George Lee](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/george-lee\/)\n- [![A man in a coat outside of a glass office building, with high rise buildings under construction in the background.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/China-tech-dragon-development-tech-GettyImages-2187442299.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2025\/10\/10\/china-tech-ai-innovation-economy-stagnation\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  A man in a coat outside of a glass office building, with high rise buildings under construction in the background.\n  \n  [China’s Tech Obsession Is Weighing Down Its Economy](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2025\/10\/10\/china-tech-ai-innovation-economy-stagnation\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  By  [Scott Kennedy](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/scott-kennedy\/),  [Scott Rozelle](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/scott-rozelle\/)\n- [![Photos of two men speaking each shown as a negative color inside a red and blue circle.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Kissinger-brzezinski-realism-foreign-policy-illustratrion.png?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2025\/08\/01\/kissinger-brzezinski-trump-realism-realist-democracy-human-rights-us\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  Photos of two men speaking each shown as a negative color inside a red and blue circle.\n  \n  [Kissinger, Brzezinski, and the Promise of Realism ![This article has an audio recording](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/themes\/foreign-policy-2017\/assets\/src\/images\/icons\/audio.svg)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2025\/08\/01\/kissinger-brzezinski-trump-realism-realist-democracy-human-rights-us\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  By  [Daniel Fried](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/daniel-fried\/)\n\n## Iran War\n- [![Missiles are seen in the skies over Doha on March 3.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/GettyImages-2263948504.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/04\/07\/iran-united-states-gulf-uae-qatar-bahrain-saudi-oman-war\/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524)\n  \n  Missiles are seen in the skies over Doha on March 3.\n  \n  [The Gulf’s Wartime Unity Is Unraveling ![This article has an audio recording](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/themes\/foreign-policy-2017\/assets\/src\/images\/icons\/audio.svg)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/04\/07\/iran-united-states-gulf-uae-qatar-bahrain-saudi-oman-war\/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524)\n  \n  [Analysis](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/channel\/analysis\/)\n  \n  \\|\n  \n  [Omar H. Rahman](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/omar-h-rahman\/)\n- [![A billboard displaying pictures of nuclear scientists, centrifuges and a sentence reading in Farsi: \" Science is the power\", at the Enqelab square in Tehran, on August 29, 2025.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/iran-bomb-nuclear-trump-war-ayatollah-khamenei-2231892170.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/04\/07\/iran-bomb-nuclear-trump-war-ayatollah-khamenei\/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524)\n  \n  A billboard displaying pictures of nuclear scientists, centrifuges and a sentence reading in Farsi: \" Science is the power\", at the Enqelab square in Tehran, on August 29, 2025.\n  \n  [Preventing an Iranian Bomb Is Only Getting Harder](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/04\/07\/iran-bomb-nuclear-trump-war-ayatollah-khamenei\/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524)\n  \n  [Argument](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/category\/analysis\/argument\/)\n  \n  \\|\n  \n  [Eric Brewer](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/eric-brewer\/)\n- [![The Albina Bulk carrier sits anchored on March 22, 2026 at Sultan Qaboos Port in Muscat, Oman.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/GettyImages-2267954580.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/04\/07\/iran-war-hormuz-toll-booth-peace\/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524)\n  \n  The Albina Bulk carrier sits anchored on March 22, 2026 at Sultan Qaboos Port in Muscat, Oman.\n  \n  [The War Will End With a Hormuz Toll Booth](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/04\/07\/iran-war-hormuz-toll-booth-peace\/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524)\n  \n  [Analysis](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/channel\/analysis\/)\n  \n  \\|\n  \n  [Amir Handjani](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/amir-handjani\/)\n\n## Trending\n- [Why Viktor Orban's Fidesz Party Lost](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/04\/12\/why-viktor-orbans-fidesz-party-lost\/?tpcc=recirc_right_rail051524)\n  \n  By  [Thomas Carothers](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/thomas-carothers\/)\n- [What Really Happened in Islamabad—and What Trump Is Trying Now](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/04\/13\/iran-negotiations-islamabad-pakistan-vance-trump-cease-fire\/?tpcc=recirc_right_rail051524)\n  \n  By  [David Ignatius](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/david-ignatius\/)\n- [What if the Ottomans Survived?](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/04\/10\/ottomans-middle-east-world-war-one\/?tpcc=recirc_right_rail051524)\n  \n  By  [Nick Danforth](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/nick-danforth\/)\n- [The Man Who Shaped Washington’s View of the Middle East ![This article has an audio recording](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/themes\/foreign-policy-2017\/assets\/src\/images\/icons\/audio.svg)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/04\/09\/brett-mcgurk-middle-east-israel-gaza-iran\/?tpcc=recirc_right_rail051524)\n  \n  By  [Dion Nissenbaum](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/dion-nissenbaum\/)\n- [America’s Problem With Diplomacy Predates Trump ![This article has an audio recording](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/themes\/foreign-policy-2017\/assets\/src\/images\/icons\/audio.svg)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/04\/10\/american-diplomacy-problem-witkoff-kushner-iran\/?tpcc=recirc_right_rail051524)\n  \n  By  [Emma Ashford](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/emma-ashford\/)\n\nLoading graphics\n\nFooter navigation\n\n[Back to Foreign Policy Magazine home page](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/)\n\n- [Follow FP on Bluesky](https:\/\/bsky.app\/profile\/foreignpolicy.com)\n- [Follow FP on X](https:\/\/twitter.com\/ForeignPolicy)\n- [Follow FP on LinkedIn](https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/company\/foreign-policy-magazine\/)\n- [Follow FP on Instagram](https:\/\/www.instagram.com\/foreignpolicymag\/)\n- [Follow FP on Facebook](https:\/\/facebook.com\/foreign.policy.magazine)\n\n## [FP SOLUTIONS](https:\/\/solutions.foreignpolicy.com\/)\n- [FP 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Education](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/fp-for-education\/)\n- [Institutional Access](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/group-subscriptions\/)\n\n## [ABOUT FP](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/staff\/)\n- [Writer's Guidelines](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.submittable.com\/submit)\n- [Contact FP](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/contact-us\/)\n- [Meet the Staff](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/staff\/)\n- [Work at FP](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/employment-opportunities\/)\n- [AI Policy](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/ai-policy\/)\n- [Privacy Policy](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/privacy\/)\n- [Do Not Sell My Personal Information](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/do-not-sell-or-share-my-personal-information\/)\n- [Terms of Use](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/termsofuse\/)\n- [Accessibility](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/accessibility\/)\n\n- [Follow FP on Bluesky](https:\/\/bsky.app\/profile\/foreignpolicy.com)\n- [Follow FP on X](https:\/\/twitter.com\/ForeignPolicy)\n- [Follow FP on 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All contents (c) 2026, Graham Digital Holding Company. All rights reserved. Foreign Policy, 1099 14th St NW, Suite 500 East, Washington, D.C., 20005.\n\nPowered by [WordPress VIP](https:\/\/wpvip.com\/?utm_source=vip_powered_wpcom&utm_medium=web&utm_campaign=VIP%20Footer%20Credit&utm_term=foreignpolicy.com)\n\n![](https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/tr?id=203988873637408&ev=PageView&noscript=1)\n\n![Quantcast](https:\/\/pixel.quantserve.com\/pixel\/p-FtKjv2mvnYjUe.gif)","attrs_readable_markdown":"## Beijing is less likely to risk an invasion while Trump is facilitating its pressure campaign against Taipei.\nBy [**Ali Wyne**](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/ali-wyne\/), the senior research and advocacy advisor for U.S.-China relations at the International Crisis Group.\n\n![Two people are seen from behind stand with their necks craned to look up at a TV screen showing a news broadcast. On the screen, a video shows Trump and Xi shaking hands.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs-2243556773.jpg?quality=90)\n\nTwo people are seen from behind stand with their necks craned to look up at a TV screen showing a news broadcast. On the screen, a video shows Trump and Xi shaking hands.\n\nPeople watch a news program showing a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea, seen in Taipei on Oct. 30, 2025. I-Hwa Cheng \/ AFP via Getty Images\n\n[My FP:](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/myfp) Follow topics and authors to get straight to what you like. Exclusively for FP subscribers. [Subscribe Now](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/25\/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs\/) \\| [Log In](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/25\/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs\/)\n\nFebruary 25, 2026, 10:48 AM\n\nAt his January 2025 confirmation hearing to become the U.S. secretary of state, Marco Rubio [assessed](https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=r3sl7TtBUjI) that “unless something dramatic changes” in Asia’s military balance, China would attempt to invade Taiwan before the end of the decade. This view is widely shared. In May, for example, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party [warned](https:\/\/chinaselectcommittee.house.gov\/media\/press-releases\/house-select-committee-warns-window-deter-war-china-closing-fast) that “the clock is ticking to stop a war in the Indo-Pacific—and this Congress may be America’s last full chance to do it.”\n\nThe good news is that the short-term likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan has diminished, even as it remains too high. The cause of this development, however, is not exactly reassuring. The events of the past year give Chinese leader Xi Jinping good reason to believe that his U.S. counterpart, President Donald Trump, will facilitate his attempt to extend China’s influence over the island without having to gamble on an invasion.\n\n## Stories Readers Liked\n- Go to slide 1\n- Go to slide 2\n- Go to slide 3\n- Go to slide 4\n- Go to slide 5\n- Go to slide 6\n- Go to slide 7\n- Go to slide 8\n- Go to slide 9\n- Go to slide 10\n\n- [![An illustration with a world map background texture and fire cutting through three rings in the map with three human figures inside.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/1-world-after-trump-brian-stauffer-illustration.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/03\/23\/post-trump-world-order-cold-war-spheres-of-influence\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  An illustration with a world map background texture and fire cutting through three rings in the map with three human figures inside.\n- [![An illustration shows semiconductor chips structured like a house of cards with a tiny city with government buildings atop it, ready to topple.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/1-AI-doomsday-house-of-cards-doug-chayka-illustration.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/03\/24\/ai-artificial-intelligence-doomsday-iran-war\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  An illustration shows semiconductor chips structured like a house of cards with a tiny city with government buildings atop it, ready to topple.\n- [![Two dozen or so scattered pedestrians walking on a large plaza are seen from overhead. There is a giant world map embedded in the pavement, with China highlighted in a dark red and all the other countries in pale gray.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/china-map-GettyImages-2262840218.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/03\/25\/china-us-russia-sphere-influence-geopolitics-competition\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  Two dozen or so scattered pedestrians walking on a large plaza are seen from overhead. There is a giant world map embedded in the pavement, with China highlighted in a dark red and all the other countries in pale gray.\n- [![A photo illustration shows fractured colored shard revealing images of nation states in decline: an upside down U.S. Capitol building, the EU building in Brussels, broken columns, part of Donald Trump's head, explosions in the Middle East, and a tank in Ukraine.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/1-doomsday-books-nation-state-illustration-2188671579.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/03\/27\/book-review-after-nations-dasgupta-westad-prasad-milanovic\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  A photo illustration shows fractured colored shard revealing images of nation states in decline: an upside down U.S. Capitol building, the EU building in Brussels, broken columns, part of Donald Trump's head, explosions in the Middle East, and a tank in Ukraine.\n  \n  [After the Nation-State](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/03\/27\/book-review-after-nations-dasgupta-westad-prasad-milanovic\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)By  [Michael Hirsh](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/michael-hirsh\/)\n- [![A photo illustration showing six classical Greek or Roman-style columns, plus a stack of televisions as the seventh pillar of populism. The TVs show images of Victor Orban, Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Donald Trump.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/1-trump-orban-modi-erdogan-Pillars-populism-2026.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/19\/trump-erdogan-orban-modi-india-hungary-turkey-populism-corruptionthe-seven-pillars-of-populist-foreign-policy\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  A photo illustration showing six classical Greek or Roman-style columns, plus a stack of televisions as the seventh pillar of populism. The TVs show images of Victor Orban, Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Donald Trump.\n  \n  [The Seven Pillars of Populist Foreign Policy](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/19\/trump-erdogan-orban-modi-india-hungary-turkey-populism-corruptionthe-seven-pillars-of-populist-foreign-policy\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)By  [Lisel Hintz](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/lisel-hintz\/),  [Berk Esen](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/berk-esen\/),  [Tudor Onea](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/author\/tudor-onea\/)\n- [![An illustration of a tombstone reading \"RIP\" appears in place of a globe on a circular stand.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/International-order-dead-foreign-policy-illustration.png?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/02\/09\/liberal-international-order-death-trump-greenland\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  An illustration of a tombstone reading \"RIP\" appears in place of a globe on a circular stand.\n- [![Central American migrant children play on a seesaw at a shelter in Ciudad Juárez, state of Chihuahua, Mexico.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/GettyImages-1231954938.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/01\/23\/trump-threats-europe-greenland-balance-power\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  Central American migrant children play on a seesaw at a shelter in Ciudad Juárez, state of Chihuahua, Mexico.\n- [![An illustration shows two men against a bright yellow background. One man wears a Western-style business suit and the other wears a black robe and white head covering. The men are shaking hands. Each holds a briefcase with money spilling out, the left man's briefcase shaped like the United States' and the right man's like the Arabian Peninsula.](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/1-instrumental-capital-sovereign-wealth-sebastien-thibault.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2025\/12\/03\/instrumental-capital-sovereign-wealth-funds-gulf\/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)\n  \n  An illustration shows two men against a bright yellow background. One man wears a Western-style business suit and the other wears a black robe and white head covering. The men are shaking hands. 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URL	https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/25/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs/
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Meta Title	Thanks to Trump, Xi Has Time on His Side With Taiwan
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Boilerpipe Text	Beijing is less likely to risk an invasion while Trump is facilitating its pressure campaign against Taipei. By Ali Wyne , the senior research and advocacy advisor for U.S.-China relations at the International Crisis Group. Two people are seen from behind stand with their necks craned to look up at a TV screen showing a news broadcast. On the screen, a video shows Trump and Xi shaking hands. People watch a news program showing a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea, seen in Taipei on Oct. 30, 2025. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP via Getty Images My FP: Follow topics and authors to get straight to what you like. Exclusively for FP subscribers. Subscribe Now \| Log In February 25, 2026, 10:48 AM At his January 2025 confirmation hearing to become the U.S. secretary of state, Marco Rubio assessed that “unless something dramatic changes” in Asia’s military balance, China would attempt to invade Taiwan before the end of the decade. This view is widely shared. In May, for example, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party warned that “the clock is ticking to stop a war in the Indo-Pacific—and this Congress may be America’s last full chance to do it.” The good news is that the short-term likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan has diminished, even as it remains too high. The cause of this development, however, is not exactly reassuring. The events of the past year give Chinese leader Xi Jinping good reason to believe that his U.S. counterpart, President Donald Trump, will facilitate his attempt to extend China’s influence over the island without having to gamble on an invasion. Stories Readers Liked Go to slide 1 Go to slide 2 Go to slide 3 Go to slide 4 Go to slide 5 Go to slide 6 Go to slide 7 Go to slide 8 Go to slide 9 Go to slide 10 An illustration with a world map background texture and fire cutting through three rings in the map with three human figures inside. An illustration shows semiconductor chips structured like a house of cards with a tiny city with government buildings atop it, ready to topple. Two dozen or so scattered pedestrians walking on a large plaza are seen from overhead. There is a giant world map embedded in the pavement, with China highlighted in a dark red and all the other countries in pale gray. A photo illustration shows fractured colored shard revealing images of nation states in decline: an upside down U.S. Capitol building, the EU building in Brussels, broken columns, part of Donald Trump's head, explosions in the Middle East, and a tank in Ukraine. After the Nation-State By Michael Hirsh A photo illustration showing six classical Greek or Roman-style columns, plus a stack of televisions as the seventh pillar of populism. The TVs show images of Victor Orban, Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Donald Trump. The Seven Pillars of Populist Foreign Policy By Lisel Hintz , Berk Esen , Tudor Onea An illustration of a tombstone reading "RIP" appears in place of a globe on a circular stand. Central American migrant children play on a seesaw at a shelter in Ciudad Juárez, state of Chihuahua, Mexico. An illustration shows two men against a bright yellow background. One man wears a Western-style business suit and the other wears a black robe and white head covering. The men are shaking hands. Each holds a briefcase with money spilling out, the left man's briefcase shaped like the United States' and the right man's like the Arabian Peninsula. A man in a coat outside of a glass office building, with high rise buildings under construction in the background. China’s Tech Obsession Is Weighing Down Its Economy By Scott Kennedy , Scott Rozelle Photos of two men speaking each shown as a negative color inside a red and blue circle. Iran War A police officer stands near a poster featuring the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 28 in Tehran, Iran. Does Iran’s Future Look Like Cuba, Syria, or North Korea? The Gulf and Israel are pursuing rival strategies toward Iran, but neither is likely to get what they want. Missiles are seen in the skies over Doha on March 3. A billboard displaying pictures of nuclear scientists, centrifuges and a sentence reading in Farsi: " Science is the power", at the Enqelab square in Tehran, on August 29, 2025. The Albina Bulk carrier sits anchored on March 22, 2026 at Sultan Qaboos Port in Muscat, Oman.
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All contents (c) 2026, Graham Digital Holding Company. All rights reserved. Foreign Policy, 1099 14th St NW, Suite 500 East, Washington, D.C., 20005. Powered by [WordPress VIP](https://wpvip.com/?utm_source=vip_powered_wpcom&utm_medium=web&utm_campaign=VIP%20Footer%20Credit&utm_term=foreignpolicy.com) [Analysis](https://foreignpolicy.com/channel/analysis/) # Thanks to Trump, Xi Has Time on His Side With Taiwan ## Beijing is less likely to risk an invasion while Trump is facilitating its pressure campaign against Taipei. By [Ali Wyne](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/ali-wyne/), the senior research and advocacy advisor for U.S.-China relations at the International Crisis Group. ![Two people are seen from behind stand with their necks craned to look up at a TV screen showing a news broadcast. On the screen, a video shows Trump and Xi shaking hands.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs-2243556773.jpg?quality=90) Two people are seen from behind stand with their necks craned to look up at a TV screen showing a news broadcast. On the screen, a video shows Trump and Xi shaking hands. People watch a news program showing a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea, seen in Taipei on Oct. 30, 2025. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP via Getty Images [My FP:](https://foreignpolicy.com/myfp) Follow topics and authors to get straight to what you like. Exclusively for FP subscribers. [Subscribe Now](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/25/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs/) \\| [Log In](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/25/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs/) - U.S. Foreign Policy - Military - China - Taiwan February 25, 2026, 10:48 AM At his January 2025 confirmation hearing to become the U.S. secretary of state, Marco Rubio [assessed](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r3sl7TtBUjI) that “unless something dramatic changes” in Asia’s military balance, China would attempt to invade Taiwan before the end of the decade. This view is widely shared. In May, for example, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party [warned](https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/media/press-releases/house-select-committee-warns-window-deter-war-china-closing-fast) that “the clock is ticking to stop a war in the Indo-Pacific—and this Congress may be America’s last full chance to do it.” [Trump’s Second Term](https://foreignpolicy.com/projects/trump-presidency-personnel-cabinet-policy-issues/) [Ongoing reports and analysis](https://foreignpolicy.com/projects/trump-presidency-personnel-cabinet-policy-issues/) The good news is that the short-term likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan has diminished, even as it remains too high. The cause of this development, however, is not exactly reassuring. The events of the past year give Chinese leader Xi Jinping good reason to believe that his U.S. counterpart, President Donald Trump, will facilitate his attempt to extend China’s influence over the island without having to gamble on an invasion. At his January 2025 confirmation hearing to become the U.S. secretary of state, Marco Rubio [assessed](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r3sl7TtBUjI) that “unless something dramatic changes” in Asia’s military balance, China would attempt to invade Taiwan before the end of the decade. This view is widely shared. In May, for example, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party [warned](https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/media/press-releases/house-select-committee-warns-window-deter-war-china-closing-fast) that “the clock is ticking to stop a war in the Indo-Pacific—and this Congress may be America’s last full chance to do it.” [Trump’s Second Term](https://foreignpolicy.com/projects/trump-presidency-personnel-cabinet-policy-issues/) [Ongoing reports and analysis](https://foreignpolicy.com/projects/trump-presidency-personnel-cabinet-policy-issues/) The good news is that the short-term likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan has diminished, even as it remains too high. The cause of this development, however, is not exactly reassuring. The events of the past year give Chinese leader Xi Jinping good reason to believe that his U.S. counterpart, President Donald Trump, will facilitate his attempt to extend China’s influence over the island without having to gamble on an invasion. Any Chinese invasion attempt would be a risky endeavor. Even though China’s military modernization is accelerating, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is in turmoil. Meanwhile, the United States and Taiwan are fielding new capabilities and deepening their security cooperation, and Washington is moving to deploy missile and unmanned systems to the Philippines and nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Against this backdrop, Beijing surely appreciates that any “victory” that it might win could be a Pyrrhic one—especially given the potential for nuclear escalation and the likelihood that a conflict would prove to be protracted. By contrast, the political trends in both Washington and Taipei are presently in China’s favor. As a result, Xi is justified in thinking that he can make progress toward reunification without incurring the military, economic, and political uncertainties that would attend an invasion attempt. * Despite authorizing several high-profile, high-value arms sales to Taiwan during his first term and in the first year of his second term, Trump has, on the whole, evinced little concern for the island’s security. He [said](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/11/us/politics/trump-interview-transcript.html) in a January interview that Taiwan is “a source of pride for him \[Xi\]. He considers it to be a part of China, and that’s up to him, what he’s going to be doing.” Trump, for his part, appears to view the island principally through [the lens of its chipmaking capacity](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/03/taiwan-silicon-shield-tsmc-semiconductor-chips/). He [declared](https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-trump-interview-transcript/) in July 2024 that Taiwan had stolen the U.S. semiconductor industry and “doesn’t give us anything” (and [repeated](https://x.com/clashreport/status/2024918460795380113) that charge after the Supreme Court’s tariff ruling on Friday). In March 2025, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company announced that it would increase its investment in the United States by \$100 billion. Trump subsequently [remarked](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kQO50OiUcrw) that while a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be “a catastrophic event,” he believed that the company’s investment would leave “a very big part” of the company’s business in the United States, where it would theoretically be safe in the event of a cross-strait war. Xi also has a stick that has proved effective with Trump—and a carrot that could entice the president. On account of its rare-earths leverage, China can inflict significant pain across the U.S. economy, as it amply [showcased during last year’s trade standoff](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/27/rare-earths-price-export-controls/) with the United States. At the same time, Xi could continue playing up Trump’s perception of himself as the supposed peacemaker in chief, as he [began](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=po3kIThzQ6k) to do when the two met in South Korea in October. “Mr. President, you care a lot about world peace,” Xi said, “and you are very enthusiastic about settling various regional hot spot issues.” Xi could well convince Trump that the best way to be a global peacemaker would be empathizing with Xi’s vision of Asian security and supporting Taiwanese lawmakers who aim to facilitate negotiations between Taipei and Beijing on cross-strait issues. One could also imagine that over time, in exchange for economic pledges from Xi, Trump might be willing to make security concessions that steadily afford China more breathing room to intensify its multifaceted pressure campaign against Taiwan. It is telling that the two leaders reportedly [discussed](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-17/trump-says-he-ll-soon-make-decision-on-weapon-sales-to-taiwan) future U.S. arms sales to the island. Regardless of what decision Trump ultimately makes, he has now signaled a willingness to negotiate a topic that U.S. officials had effectively taken off the table with the second of the “[six assurances](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11665)” that the Reagan administration gave to Taiwan in 1982. Beijing also sees auspicious political dynamics in Taipei. Chinese officials have made no secret of their contempt for Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, whom they [regard as more separatist-minded](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/17/taiwan-president-election-china-policy/) than his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen. But he oversees a divided legislature; the informal opposition coalition of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party controls 60 of its 113 seats, while his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) only controls 51. ## Read More - [![A Chinese flag is seen in the foreground with container ships, cranes, and shipping containers in Shenzhen, China, on April 12, 2025.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-2209907770_49a810.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/20/kurt-campbell-trump-xi-china-policy/) A Chinese flag is seen in the foreground with container ships, cranes, and shipping containers in Shenzhen, China, on April 12, 2025. [What Is Trump’s China Policy?](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/20/kurt-campbell-trump-xi-china-policy/) Kurt Campbell: “The president clearly wants short-term deals.” ![This article has an audio recording](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/themes/foreign-policy-2017/assets/src/images/icons/audio.svg) [Insider](https://foreignpolicy.com/insider) \\| [Ravi Agrawal](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/ravi-agrawal/) - [![Then-National Tsinghua University sociology professor Chen Ming-chi speaks to journalists in Taipei, Taiwan, on Jan. 14, 2024.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Chen-Ming-chi-Taiwan-2024-01-14T075025Z_1705218621_DPAF240114X99X602953_RTRFIPP_4_ELECTIONS-GOVERNMENT-PARLIAMENT-ECONOMY-HEADOFSTATE.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/11/taiwan-defense-budget-semiconductors-china-trump-chen-ming-chi/) Then-National Tsinghua University sociology professor Chen Ming-chi speaks to journalists in Taipei, Taiwan, on Jan. 14, 2024. [How Taiwan Sees the World](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/11/taiwan-defense-budget-semiconductors-china-trump-chen-ming-chi/) The island’s deputy foreign minister on Trump, defense, and why he thinks countries shouldn’t trust China. ![This article has an audio recording](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/themes/foreign-policy-2017/assets/src/images/icons/audio.svg) [Interview](https://foreignpolicy.com/category/interview/) \\| [Rishi Iyengar](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/rishi-iyengar/) Another key player in shaping political dynamics within Taiwan—and between China and Taiwan—is Cheng Li-wun, a former DPP member who now leads the KMT, the main opposition party. She has said that she would like to meet with Xi early this year, potentially ahead of Trump’s scheduled meeting with the Chinese leader in April. Cheng contends that Taiwan cannot depend on a United States that has elected Trump twice. Shortly before she was tapped to lead the KMT, she [warned](https://asia.nikkei.com/politics/kmt-picks-upstart-cheng-li-wun-as-new-leader-jolting-taiwan-s-old-guard) that Taiwan “must not become a sacrifice or Trump’s bargaining chip,” lest it “become another Ukraine.” She has gone further since taking the helm of the party, [declaring](https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202601290004) that Taiwan will not “be involved in an internecine struggle” between the United States and China and even suggesting that a detente between Beijing and Taipei could “bring about cooperation between the U.S. and China.” Cheng has also [cited](https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/01/29/taiwans-new-opposition-leader-wants-to-talk-to-xi-jinping) unreasonable demands that the Trump administration is placing on Taipei: Trump [wants](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/09/30/donald-trump-2024-interview-immigration-ukraine/) Taiwan to spend 10 percent of its gross domestic product on defense (for context, Lai [hopes](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-president-ups-defence-spending-target-5-gdp-2025-08-22/) that that figure will reach 5 percent by 2030), and U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick [wants](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/15/us-taiwan-chips-deal-china.html) Washington to have onshored 40 percent of Taipei’s semiconductor production by the end of Trump’s second term. While her DPP counterparts cast Cheng as misguided, even unpatriotic, her pronouncements align with multiple polls that [confirm](https://www.gmfus.org/news/taiwans-growing-distrust-united-states) growing misgivings among the Taiwanese public about U.S. reliability. Cheng is far from a political juggernaut, but she has helped catalyze political sentiment that Beijing can only find encouraging. Finally, notwithstanding domestic challenges and turmoil in the PLA, China’s overall power is growing, whether one considers its military capabilities, its technological strides, or its diplomatic footprint. Thus, it can continue to build a steadily more favorable correlation of forces across the Taiwan Strait while strengthening its pressure campaign, which aims to wear down Taipei psychologically. China is now competing more confidently than it was when Trump retook office, having withstood the administration’s tariff fusillade last year. Moreover, Washington [continues to alienate](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/17/trump-europe-munich-vance-rubio-good-bad-cop/) [allies and partners in Europe](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/15/europe-trump-denmark-greenland-rasmussen-nato/)—and sow doubt in Asia—with its “America first” foreign policy. It would be foolish for Beijing to get in Trump’s way while he is eroding the diplomatic network that has long been a pillar of the United States’ global influence. * No one in Washington should breathe a sigh of relief, though, for there remain ample grounds for concern. There are numerous provocations that China could undertake short of an invasion, including restricting maritime access to Taiwan. [Some observers](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/fall-top-chinese-general-stirs-us-uncertainty-about-chinas-military-2026-01-28/) fear that the PLA’s emerging leaders, lacking actual combat experience, might be less capable of providing realistic military assessments to Xi—and might be even more willing to advocate an invasion attempt than the commanders who have been [purged in recent months](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/27/china-military-purge-generals-pla-xi-jinping-zhang-youxia-liu-zhenli/). Finally, Asia’s waters and the skies above it are becoming ever more crowded, raising the risk of a clash between U.S. and Chinese military assets. The recent disruptions to the PLA’s chain of command have also, in turn, heightened the prospect of a ham-fisted response by Beijing that fuels rather than dampens escalatory dynamics. As Russian President Vladimir [Putin’s hubris has demonstrated](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/20/ukraine-russia-war-anniversary-trump-europe-nato-geopolitics-global-order/), leaders can make disastrous decisions if they sit atop sclerotic bureaucracies wherein top officials are reluctant to offer candid advice. U.S. officials should not project their conceptions of “rationality” onto their counterparts in other countries. China might decide that it has no choice but to attempt an invasion if it assesses that Taiwan would otherwise slip away. The most likely triggers would be political, such as an indication by Taiwan that it is poised to declare independence or by the United States that it is set to make an explicit defensive commitment to the island. Alternatively, Xi might conclude that the next three years offer the most propitious window for China to achieve reunification since Trump’s successor may be much more proactively supportive of Taiwan. For now, though, Xi has little reason to abandon the pressure campaign that he has been overseeing. Neil Thomas, a specialist in China’s elite politics, has [observed](https://chinesepolitics.substack.com/p/xis-military-purge-what-happened) that Xi is “a calculated risk-taker rather than a reckless gambler,” one who, during nearly a decade and a half at the helm of his country, has focused on “strengthening China’s position incrementally rather than chancing on a decisive clash.” And Xi has seen the dividends of incrementalism elsewhere, whether one considers Hong Kong’s evolution into a financial appendage of China or China’s steady militarization of the South China Sea. At least for now, Xi seems willing to stick with incrementalism on Taiwan as well. This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration.* Follow along [here](https://foreignpolicy.com/projects/trump-presidential-transition-personnel-cabinet-policy-issues/).* Ali Wyne is the senior research and advocacy advisor for U.S.-China relations at the International Crisis Group. Read More On [China](https://foreignpolicy.com/tag/china/) \\| [Military](https://foreignpolicy.com/tag/military/) \\| [Taiwan](https://foreignpolicy.com/tag/taiwan/) \\| [U.S. Foreign Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/tag/u-s-foreign-policy/) ## Join the Conversation Commenting is a benefit of a Foreign Policy subscription. [Subscribe Subscribe](https://foreignpolicy.com/subscribe) Already a subscriber? [Log In](). [View 3 Comments]() ## Join the Conversation Join the conversation on this and other recent Foreign Policy articles when you subscribe now. [Subscribe Subscribe](https://foreignpolicy.com/subscribe) Not your account? 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[Change your username]() \\| [Log out]() ### OTHER SUBSCRIPTION OPTIONS #### [Academic Rates](https://foreignpolicy.com/subscribe-academic/?tpcc=hardwall_academic) [Specialty rates for students and faculty.](https://foreignpolicy.com/subscribe-academic/?tpcc=hardwall_academic) #### [Multi-year](https://foreignpolicy.com/multi-year/?tpcc=hardwall_multiyear) [Lock in your rates for longer.](https://foreignpolicy.com/multi-year/?tpcc=hardwall_multiyear) #### [Groups](https://foreignpolicy.com/group-subscriptions/?tpcc=hardwall_groups) [Equip your organization with powerful global intelligence.](https://foreignpolicy.com/group-subscriptions/?tpcc=hardwall_groups) ## Stories Readers Liked - Go to slide 1 - Go to slide 2 - Go to slide 3 - Go to slide 4 - Go to slide 5 - Go to slide 6 - Go to slide 7 - Go to slide 8 - Go to slide 9 - Go to slide 10 - [![An illustration with a world map background texture and fire cutting through three rings in the map with three human figures inside.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/1-world-after-trump-brian-stauffer-illustration.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/23/post-trump-world-order-cold-war-spheres-of-influence/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) An illustration with a world map background texture and fire cutting through three rings in the map with three human figures inside. [Three Scenarios for a Post-Trump World ![This article has an audio recording](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/themes/foreign-policy-2017/assets/src/images/icons/audio.svg)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/23/post-trump-world-order-cold-war-spheres-of-influence/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) By [Hal Brands](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/hal-brands/) - [![An illustration shows semiconductor chips structured like a house of cards with a tiny city with government buildings atop it, ready to topple.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/1-AI-doomsday-house-of-cards-doug-chayka-illustration.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/24/ai-artificial-intelligence-doomsday-iran-war/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) An illustration shows semiconductor chips structured like a house of cards with a tiny city with government buildings atop it, ready to topple. [As an AI Scholar, I Am Now Putting a High Probability on an AI Doomsday ![This article has an audio recording](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/themes/foreign-policy-2017/assets/src/images/icons/audio.svg)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/24/ai-artificial-intelligence-doomsday-iran-war/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) By [Bhaskar Chakravorti](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/bhaskar-chakravorti/) - [![Two dozen or so scattered pedestrians walking on a large plaza are seen from overhead. There is a giant world map embedded in the pavement, with China highlighted in a dark red and all the other countries in pale gray.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/china-map-GettyImages-2262840218.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/25/china-us-russia-sphere-influence-geopolitics-competition/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) Two dozen or so scattered pedestrians walking on a large plaza are seen from overhead. There is a giant world map embedded in the pavement, with China highlighted in a dark red and all the other countries in pale gray. [No, China Doesn’t Want Spheres of Influence ![This article has an audio recording](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/themes/foreign-policy-2017/assets/src/images/icons/audio.svg)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/25/china-us-russia-sphere-influence-geopolitics-competition/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) By [Aaron Glasserman](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/aaron-glasserman/) - [![A photo illustration shows fractured colored shard revealing images of nation states in decline: an upside down U.S. Capitol building, the EU building in Brussels, broken columns, part of Donald Trump's head, explosions in the Middle East, and a tank in Ukraine.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/1-doomsday-books-nation-state-illustration-2188671579.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/27/book-review-after-nations-dasgupta-westad-prasad-milanovic/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) A photo illustration shows fractured colored shard revealing images of nation states in decline: an upside down U.S. Capitol building, the EU building in Brussels, broken columns, part of Donald Trump's head, explosions in the Middle East, and a tank in Ukraine. [After the Nation-State](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/27/book-review-after-nations-dasgupta-westad-prasad-milanovic/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) By [Michael Hirsh](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/michael-hirsh/) - [![A photo illustration showing six classical Greek or Roman-style columns, plus a stack of televisions as the seventh pillar of populism. The TVs show images of Victor Orban, Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Donald Trump.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/1-trump-orban-modi-erdogan-Pillars-populism-2026.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/19/trump-erdogan-orban-modi-india-hungary-turkey-populism-corruptionthe-seven-pillars-of-populist-foreign-policy/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) A photo illustration showing six classical Greek or Roman-style columns, plus a stack of televisions as the seventh pillar of populism. The TVs show images of Victor Orban, Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Donald Trump. [The Seven Pillars of Populist Foreign Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/19/trump-erdogan-orban-modi-india-hungary-turkey-populism-corruptionthe-seven-pillars-of-populist-foreign-policy/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) By [Lisel Hintz](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/lisel-hintz/), [Berk Esen](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/berk-esen/), [Tudor Onea](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/tudor-onea/) - [![An illustration of a tombstone reading "RIP" appears in place of a globe on a circular stand.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/International-order-dead-foreign-policy-illustration.png?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/09/liberal-international-order-death-trump-greenland/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) An illustration of a tombstone reading "RIP" appears in place of a globe on a circular stand. [Who Killed the Liberal International Order? ![This article has an audio recording](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/themes/foreign-policy-2017/assets/src/images/icons/audio.svg)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/09/liberal-international-order-death-trump-greenland/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) By [Nick Danforth](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/nick-danforth/) - [![Central American migrant children play on a seesaw at a shelter in Ciudad Juárez, state of Chihuahua, Mexico.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/GettyImages-1231954938.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/23/trump-threats-europe-greenland-balance-power/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) Central American migrant children play on a seesaw at a shelter in Ciudad Juárez, state of Chihuahua, Mexico. [The Balance-of-Power Theory Strikes Again ![This article has an audio recording](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/themes/foreign-policy-2017/assets/src/images/icons/audio.svg)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/23/trump-threats-europe-greenland-balance-power/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) By [Stephen M. Walt](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/stephen-m-walt/) - [![An illustration shows two men against a bright yellow background. One man wears a Western-style business suit and the other wears a black robe and white head covering. The men are shaking hands. Each holds a briefcase with money spilling out, the left man's briefcase shaped like the United States' and the right man's like the Arabian Peninsula.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/1-instrumental-capital-sovereign-wealth-sebastien-thibault.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/03/instrumental-capital-sovereign-wealth-funds-gulf/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) An illustration shows two men against a bright yellow background. One man wears a Western-style business suit and the other wears a black robe and white head covering. The men are shaking hands. Each holds a briefcase with money spilling out, the left man's briefcase shaped like the United States' and the right man's like the Arabian Peninsula. [The New Wealth of Nations ![This article has an audio recording](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/themes/foreign-policy-2017/assets/src/images/icons/audio.svg)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/03/instrumental-capital-sovereign-wealth-funds-gulf/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) By [Jared Cohen](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/jared-cohen/), [George Lee](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/george-lee/) - [![A man in a coat outside of a glass office building, with high rise buildings under construction in the background.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/China-tech-dragon-development-tech-GettyImages-2187442299.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/10/china-tech-ai-innovation-economy-stagnation/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) A man in a coat outside of a glass office building, with high rise buildings under construction in the background. [China’s Tech Obsession Is Weighing Down Its Economy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/10/china-tech-ai-innovation-economy-stagnation/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) By [Scott Kennedy](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/scott-kennedy/), [Scott Rozelle](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/scott-rozelle/) - [![Photos of two men speaking each shown as a negative color inside a red and blue circle.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Kissinger-brzezinski-realism-foreign-policy-illustratrion.png?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/08/01/kissinger-brzezinski-trump-realism-realist-democracy-human-rights-us/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) Photos of two men speaking each shown as a negative color inside a red and blue circle. [Kissinger, Brzezinski, and the Promise of Realism ![This article has an audio recording](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/themes/foreign-policy-2017/assets/src/images/icons/audio.svg)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/08/01/kissinger-brzezinski-trump-realism-realist-democracy-human-rights-us/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) By [Daniel Fried](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/daniel-fried/) ## Iran War - [![Missiles are seen in the skies over Doha on March 3.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-2263948504.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/07/iran-united-states-gulf-uae-qatar-bahrain-saudi-oman-war/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524) Missiles are seen in the skies over Doha on March 3. [The Gulf’s Wartime Unity Is Unraveling ![This article has an audio recording](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/themes/foreign-policy-2017/assets/src/images/icons/audio.svg)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/07/iran-united-states-gulf-uae-qatar-bahrain-saudi-oman-war/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524) [Analysis](https://foreignpolicy.com/channel/analysis/) \\| [Omar H. Rahman](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/omar-h-rahman/) - [![A billboard displaying pictures of nuclear scientists, centrifuges and a sentence reading in Farsi: " Science is the power", at the Enqelab square in Tehran, on August 29, 2025.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/iran-bomb-nuclear-trump-war-ayatollah-khamenei-2231892170.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/07/iran-bomb-nuclear-trump-war-ayatollah-khamenei/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524) A billboard displaying pictures of nuclear scientists, centrifuges and a sentence reading in Farsi: " Science is the power", at the Enqelab square in Tehran, on August 29, 2025. [Preventing an Iranian Bomb Is Only Getting Harder](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/07/iran-bomb-nuclear-trump-war-ayatollah-khamenei/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524) [Argument](https://foreignpolicy.com/category/analysis/argument/) \\| [Eric Brewer](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/eric-brewer/) - [![The Albina Bulk carrier sits anchored on March 22, 2026 at Sultan Qaboos Port in Muscat, Oman.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-2267954580.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/07/iran-war-hormuz-toll-booth-peace/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524) The Albina Bulk carrier sits anchored on March 22, 2026 at Sultan Qaboos Port in Muscat, Oman. [The War Will End With a Hormuz Toll Booth](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/07/iran-war-hormuz-toll-booth-peace/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524) [Analysis](https://foreignpolicy.com/channel/analysis/) \\| [Amir Handjani](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/amir-handjani/) ## Trending - [Why Viktor Orban's Fidesz Party Lost](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/12/why-viktor-orbans-fidesz-party-lost/?tpcc=recirc_right_rail051524) By [Thomas Carothers](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/thomas-carothers/) - [What Really Happened in Islamabad—and What Trump Is Trying Now](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/13/iran-negotiations-islamabad-pakistan-vance-trump-cease-fire/?tpcc=recirc_right_rail051524) By [David Ignatius](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/david-ignatius/) - [What if the Ottomans Survived?](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/10/ottomans-middle-east-world-war-one/?tpcc=recirc_right_rail051524) By [Nick Danforth](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/nick-danforth/) - [The Man Who Shaped Washington’s View of the Middle East ![This article has an audio recording](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/themes/foreign-policy-2017/assets/src/images/icons/audio.svg)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/09/brett-mcgurk-middle-east-israel-gaza-iran/?tpcc=recirc_right_rail051524) By [Dion Nissenbaum](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/dion-nissenbaum/) - [America’s Problem With Diplomacy Predates Trump ![This article has an audio recording](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/themes/foreign-policy-2017/assets/src/images/icons/audio.svg)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/10/american-diplomacy-problem-witkoff-kushner-iran/?tpcc=recirc_right_rail051524) By [Emma Ashford](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/emma-ashford/) Loading graphics Footer navigation [Back to Foreign Policy Magazine home page](https://foreignpolicy.com/) - [Follow FP on Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/foreignpolicy.com) - [Follow FP on X](https://twitter.com/ForeignPolicy) - [Follow FP on LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/foreign-policy-magazine/) - [Follow FP on Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/foreignpolicymag/) - [Follow FP on Facebook](https://facebook.com/foreign.policy.magazine) ## [FP SOLUTIONS](https://solutions.foreignpolicy.com/) - [FP Analytics](https://fpanalytics.foreignpolicy.com/) - [FP Events](https://foreignpolicy.com/events/) - [FP Studios](https://foreignpolicy.com/fp-studios/) - [Simulations and Peacegames](https://fpanalytics.foreignpolicy.com/simulations-peacegames/) - [Advertise with FP](https://solutions.foreignpolicy.com/) - [Country Reports](https://sponsored.foreignpolicy.com/country-reports/) ## [Subscription Services](https://help.foreignpolicy.com/) - [Your FP Account](https://foreignpolicy.com/manage) - [Group Subscriptions](https://foreignpolicy.com/group-subscriptions/) - [Reprint Permissions](https://foreignpolicy.com/reprint-permissions/) - [FP Magazine Archive](https://foreignpolicy.com/print-archive/) - [Buy Back Issues](https://foreignpolicy.com/buy-back-issues/) ## [EDUCATION](https://foreignpolicy.com/fp-for-education/) - [Graduate Education Guide](https://fpguide.foreignpolicy.com/2026-spring-summer/) - [FP for Education](https://foreignpolicy.com/fp-for-education/) - [Institutional Access](https://foreignpolicy.com/group-subscriptions/) ## [ABOUT FP](https://foreignpolicy.com/staff/) - [Writer's Guidelines](https://foreignpolicy.submittable.com/submit) - [Contact FP](https://foreignpolicy.com/contact-us/) - [Meet the Staff](https://foreignpolicy.com/staff/) - [Work at FP](https://foreignpolicy.com/employment-opportunities/) - [AI Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/ai-policy/) - [Privacy Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/privacy/) - [Do Not Sell My Personal Information](https://foreignpolicy.com/do-not-sell-or-share-my-personal-information/) - [Terms of Use](https://foreignpolicy.com/termsofuse/) - [Accessibility](https://foreignpolicy.com/accessibility/) - [Follow FP on Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/foreignpolicy.com) - [Follow FP on X](https://twitter.com/ForeignPolicy) - [Follow FP on LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/foreign-policy-magazine/) - [Follow FP on Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/foreignpolicymag/) - [Follow FP on Facebook](https://facebook.com/foreign.policy.magazine) Foreign Policy Magazine is a division of Graham Holdings Company. 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Readable Markdown	## Beijing is less likely to risk an invasion while Trump is facilitating its pressure campaign against Taipei. By [Ali Wyne](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/ali-wyne/), the senior research and advocacy advisor for U.S.-China relations at the International Crisis Group. ![Two people are seen from behind stand with their necks craned to look up at a TV screen showing a news broadcast. On the screen, a video shows Trump and Xi shaking hands.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs-2243556773.jpg?quality=90) Two people are seen from behind stand with their necks craned to look up at a TV screen showing a news broadcast. On the screen, a video shows Trump and Xi shaking hands. People watch a news program showing a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea, seen in Taipei on Oct. 30, 2025. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP via Getty Images [My FP:](https://foreignpolicy.com/myfp) Follow topics and authors to get straight to what you like. Exclusively for FP subscribers. [Subscribe Now](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/25/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs/) \\| [Log In](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/25/trump-xi-china-taiwan-invasion-semiconductor-tariffs/) February 25, 2026, 10:48 AM At his January 2025 confirmation hearing to become the U.S. secretary of state, Marco Rubio [assessed](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r3sl7TtBUjI) that “unless something dramatic changes” in Asia’s military balance, China would attempt to invade Taiwan before the end of the decade. This view is widely shared. In May, for example, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party [warned](https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/media/press-releases/house-select-committee-warns-window-deter-war-china-closing-fast) that “the clock is ticking to stop a war in the Indo-Pacific—and this Congress may be America’s last full chance to do it.” The good news is that the short-term likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan has diminished, even as it remains too high. The cause of this development, however, is not exactly reassuring. The events of the past year give Chinese leader Xi Jinping good reason to believe that his U.S. counterpart, President Donald Trump, will facilitate his attempt to extend China’s influence over the island without having to gamble on an invasion. ## Stories Readers Liked - Go to slide 1 - Go to slide 2 - Go to slide 3 - Go to slide 4 - Go to slide 5 - Go to slide 6 - Go to slide 7 - Go to slide 8 - Go to slide 9 - Go to slide 10 - [![An illustration with a world map background texture and fire cutting through three rings in the map with three human figures inside.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/1-world-after-trump-brian-stauffer-illustration.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/23/post-trump-world-order-cold-war-spheres-of-influence/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) An illustration with a world map background texture and fire cutting through three rings in the map with three human figures inside. - [![An illustration shows semiconductor chips structured like a house of cards with a tiny city with government buildings atop it, ready to topple.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/1-AI-doomsday-house-of-cards-doug-chayka-illustration.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/24/ai-artificial-intelligence-doomsday-iran-war/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) An illustration shows semiconductor chips structured like a house of cards with a tiny city with government buildings atop it, ready to topple. - [![Two dozen or so scattered pedestrians walking on a large plaza are seen from overhead. There is a giant world map embedded in the pavement, with China highlighted in a dark red and all the other countries in pale gray.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/china-map-GettyImages-2262840218.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/25/china-us-russia-sphere-influence-geopolitics-competition/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) Two dozen or so scattered pedestrians walking on a large plaza are seen from overhead. There is a giant world map embedded in the pavement, with China highlighted in a dark red and all the other countries in pale gray. - [![A photo illustration shows fractured colored shard revealing images of nation states in decline: an upside down U.S. Capitol building, the EU building in Brussels, broken columns, part of Donald Trump's head, explosions in the Middle East, and a tank in Ukraine.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/1-doomsday-books-nation-state-illustration-2188671579.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/27/book-review-after-nations-dasgupta-westad-prasad-milanovic/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) A photo illustration shows fractured colored shard revealing images of nation states in decline: an upside down U.S. Capitol building, the EU building in Brussels, broken columns, part of Donald Trump's head, explosions in the Middle East, and a tank in Ukraine. [After the Nation-State](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/27/book-review-after-nations-dasgupta-westad-prasad-milanovic/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)By [Michael Hirsh](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/michael-hirsh/) - [![A photo illustration showing six classical Greek or Roman-style columns, plus a stack of televisions as the seventh pillar of populism. The TVs show images of Victor Orban, Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Donald Trump.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/1-trump-orban-modi-erdogan-Pillars-populism-2026.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/19/trump-erdogan-orban-modi-india-hungary-turkey-populism-corruptionthe-seven-pillars-of-populist-foreign-policy/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) A photo illustration showing six classical Greek or Roman-style columns, plus a stack of televisions as the seventh pillar of populism. The TVs show images of Victor Orban, Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Donald Trump. [The Seven Pillars of Populist Foreign Policy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/19/trump-erdogan-orban-modi-india-hungary-turkey-populism-corruptionthe-seven-pillars-of-populist-foreign-policy/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)By [Lisel Hintz](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/lisel-hintz/), [Berk Esen](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/berk-esen/), [Tudor Onea](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/tudor-onea/) - [![An illustration of a tombstone reading "RIP" appears in place of a globe on a circular stand.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/International-order-dead-foreign-policy-illustration.png?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/09/liberal-international-order-death-trump-greenland/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) An illustration of a tombstone reading "RIP" appears in place of a globe on a circular stand. - [![Central American migrant children play on a seesaw at a shelter in Ciudad Juárez, state of Chihuahua, Mexico.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/GettyImages-1231954938.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/23/trump-threats-europe-greenland-balance-power/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) Central American migrant children play on a seesaw at a shelter in Ciudad Juárez, state of Chihuahua, Mexico. - [![An illustration shows two men against a bright yellow background. One man wears a Western-style business suit and the other wears a black robe and white head covering. The men are shaking hands. Each holds a briefcase with money spilling out, the left man's briefcase shaped like the United States' and the right man's like the Arabian Peninsula.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/1-instrumental-capital-sovereign-wealth-sebastien-thibault.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/03/instrumental-capital-sovereign-wealth-funds-gulf/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) An illustration shows two men against a bright yellow background. One man wears a Western-style business suit and the other wears a black robe and white head covering. The men are shaking hands. Each holds a briefcase with money spilling out, the left man's briefcase shaped like the United States' and the right man's like the Arabian Peninsula. - [![A man in a coat outside of a glass office building, with high rise buildings under construction in the background.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/China-tech-dragon-development-tech-GettyImages-2187442299.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/10/china-tech-ai-innovation-economy-stagnation/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) A man in a coat outside of a glass office building, with high rise buildings under construction in the background. [China’s Tech Obsession Is Weighing Down Its Economy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/10/china-tech-ai-innovation-economy-stagnation/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524)By [Scott Kennedy](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/scott-kennedy/), [Scott Rozelle](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/scott-rozelle/) - [![Photos of two men speaking each shown as a negative color inside a red and blue circle.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Kissinger-brzezinski-realism-foreign-policy-illustratrion.png?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/08/01/kissinger-brzezinski-trump-realism-realist-democracy-human-rights-us/?tpcc=recirc_more_from_fp051524) Photos of two men speaking each shown as a negative color inside a red and blue circle. Iran War - [![Missiles are seen in the skies over Doha on March 3.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-2263948504.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/07/iran-united-states-gulf-uae-qatar-bahrain-saudi-oman-war/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524) Missiles are seen in the skies over Doha on March 3. - [![A billboard displaying pictures of nuclear scientists, centrifuges and a sentence reading in Farsi: " Science is the power", at the Enqelab square in Tehran, on August 29, 2025.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/iran-bomb-nuclear-trump-war-ayatollah-khamenei-2231892170.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/07/iran-bomb-nuclear-trump-war-ayatollah-khamenei/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524) A billboard displaying pictures of nuclear scientists, centrifuges and a sentence reading in Farsi: " Science is the power", at the Enqelab square in Tehran, on August 29, 2025. - [![The Albina Bulk carrier sits anchored on March 22, 2026 at Sultan Qaboos Port in Muscat, Oman.](https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-2267954580.jpg?w=800&quality=80)](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/07/iran-war-hormuz-toll-booth-peace/?tpcc=recirc_featured_horizontal051524) The Albina Bulk carrier sits anchored on March 22, 2026 at Sultan Qaboos Port in Muscat, Oman.
Shard	96 (laksa)
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