🕷️ Crawler Inspector

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Direct Parameter Lookup

Raw Queries and Responses

1. Shard Calculation

Query:

Response:

Calculated Shard: 152 (from laksa035)

2. Crawled Status Check

Query:

curl -X POST \
  'http://laksa152.int.ahrefs:8124/' \
  -H 'Content-Type: text/plain' \
  -H 'X-ClickHouse-Database: crawler3' \
  -H 'Authorization: Basic YXBpOg==' \
  -d 'SELECT getAhrefsURLFromUnparsed(src_unparsed) AS found_url, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(download_stamp), 0) AS crawl_time, ifNull(toUnixTimestamp(props_url_first_seen), 0) AS first_indexed_time, download_http_code AS http_code, src_unparsed AS src_unparsed, src_root_hash AS src_root_hash, history_drop_reason AS history_drop_reason, meta_title AS meta_title, meta_descriptions AS meta_descriptions, attrs_boilerpipe_text AS attrs_boilerpipe_text, attrs_markdown AS attrs_markdown, attrs_readable_markdown AS attrs_readable_markdown, meta_canonical AS meta_canonical FROM crawler3.page_info_local FINAL PREWHERE (src_root_hash, src_unparsed) IN ((getAhrefsRootHashFromUnparsed(getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework\')), getAhrefsUnparsedNoserviceFromURL(\'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework\'))) FORMAT JSONEachRow'

Response:

{"found_url":"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework","crawl_time":1774113340,"first_indexed_time":1401183114,"http_code":200,"src_unparsed":"org,wikipedia!en,\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework s443","src_root_hash":"17790707453426894952","history_drop_reason":null,"meta_title":"Agreed Framework - Wikipedia","meta_descriptions":[],"attrs_boilerpipe_text":"From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia\nThe\nAgreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea\n(\nKorean\n: \n북미제네바기본합의서\n) was signed on 21 October 1994, between\nNorth Korea\n(DPRK) and the\nUnited States\n. The objective of the agreement was the freezing and replacement of North Korea's indigenous\nnuclear power plant\nprogram with more\nnuclear proliferation\nresistant\nlight water reactor\npower plants, and the step-by-step normalization of\nrelations between the U.S. and the DPRK\n. Implementation of the agreement was troubled from the start, but its key elements were being implemented until it effectively broke down in 2003.\nAGREED FRAMEWORK COVER PAGE – IAEA\nAGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE #1 – IAEA: Replace the Nuclear(graphite) reactor to the Light-water\nAGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE #2- IAEA: Supply the alternative energy-Heavy Oil and freeze & dismantle the nuclear reactor\nAGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE #3 – IAEA: Establish a formal peace assurance between U.S. and DPRK\nThe 5 MWe pilot\nYongbyon nuclear reactor\n, made operational in 1986, showing the fuel access channels\nOn 12 December 1985, North Korea became a party to the Treaty on the\nNon-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons\n(NPT). On 10 April 1992, its NPT safeguards agreement entered into force. In May 1992, North Korea submitted its initial report to the IAEA under that agreement, and\nInternational Atomic Energy Agency\n(IAEA) inspections began. Shortly thereafter inconsistencies emerged between the North Korea initial declaration and the Agency's findings, centering on a mismatch between declared\nplutonium\nproduct and\nnuclear waste\nsolutions and the results of the Agency's analysis. The latter suggested that undeclared plutonium existed in North Korea. In order to find answers to the inconsistencies detected and to determine the completeness and correctness of the initial declaration provided, the IAEA requested access to additional information and to two sites which seemed to be related to the storage of nuclear waste.\n[\n1\n]\nThe DPRK refused access to the sites, and on 12 March 1993, North Korea announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT.\nOn 1 April 1993, the IAEA concluded that North Korea was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and referred this to the UN Security Council. Following UN Security Council\nresolution 825\n, which called upon the DPRK to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allow weapons inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into the country, North Korea \"suspended the effectuation\" of that withdrawal in June 1993.\n[\n1\n]\n[\n2\n]\nIn November 1993, North Korea proposed to the United States that the two governments negotiate a \"package solution\" to all of the issues dividing them. The\nClinton Administration\naccepted this in principle but conditioned such \"comprehensive\" talks on North Korea acting first to allow a resumption of IAEA inspections and to re-open negotiations with South Korea over nuclear questions (North Korea had broken off talks with South Korea in late 1992). North Korea approached the IAEA in January 1994, offering a single inspection, less comprehensive than those conducted by the IAEA in 1992. After several weeks of tough negotiations, the IAEA announced on 16 February 1994 that North Korea had accepted \"the inspection activities\" that the Agency had requested. In response, the Clinton Administration agreed to suspend the\nTeam Spirit\nmilitary exercise with South Korea (a long-standing North Korean demand) and begin a new round of talks with North Korea—subject to North Korea allowing full implementation of the IAEA inspection and beginning high level talks with South Korea.\n[\n3\n]\nMotivation\n : North Korea announced intention to withdraw from\nNPT\nand\nnon-compliance\nwith\nIAEA safeguards\n.\nSigned Date\n: 21 October 1994 by American ambassador\nRobert Gallucci\nand North Korean vice minister\nKang Sok-ju\nSummary\n: Freeze of North Korean nuclear program, leading to\ndenuclearization\nof the Korean Peninsula, and initial\nPeace agreement\nbetween the\nUnited States\nand North Korea\n[\n4\n]\n[\n5\n]\nStates\nAgreed Items\nProgress\nUnited States\nDeliver 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually to DPRK as an alternative energy\nMake arrangements for two 1000 MWe\nlight water reactors\nto DPRK with target date of 2003.\nProvide DPRK with formal assurance against the use of nuclear weapons by U.S,\nMove toward full normalization of political and economic relations\nThe heavy oil was delivered to the DPRK with some delays\nUnited States established international consortium\nKEDO\nto build LWRs, though U.S. Congress rejected U.S. funding for the project\nNorth Korea\nFreeze all graphite-moderated nuclear reactors (5MWe reactor and 50 & 200 MWe under construction)\nRemain a party to the NPT\nTake steps to implement 1992\nJoint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula\nDismantle graphite-moderated reactors when LWR project is completed\nMove toward full normalization of political and economic relations\nDPRK stopped operating 5 MWe reactor and abandoned reactors under construction\nDPRK \"suspended\" notification of withdrawal from NPT\nThe main provisions of the agreement\n[\n6\n]\nwere:\nDPRK's graphite-moderated 5MWe\nnuclear reactor\n, and the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors under construction, which could easily produce weapons grade\nplutonium\n, would be replaced with two 1000MW\nlight water reactors\n(LWR) power plants by a target date of 2003.\nOil for heating and electricity production would be provided while DPRK's reactors were shut down and construction halted, until completion of the first LWR power unit. The amount of oil was 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year.\nThe two sides would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.\nThe U.S. would provide formal\npeace\nand\nnational security\nassurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.\nThe DPRK would take steps to implement the 1992\nJoint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula\n[\n7\n]\nbetween South and North Korea.\nThe DPRK would remain a party to the\nNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty\n.\nIAEA\nad hoc and routine inspections would resume for facilities not subject to the freeze.\nExisting spent nuclear fuel stocks would be stored and ultimately disposed of without\nreprocessing\nin the DPRK.\nBefore delivery of key LWR nuclear components, the DPRK would come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.\nThere were also some confidential minutes supporting the agreement, which have not been made public.\n[\n8\n]\n[\n9\n]\nThese are reported to include that full-scope IAEA safeguards would be applied when the major non-nuclear components of the first LWR unit were completed but before the delivery of key nuclear components.\n[\n10\n]\nThe commitments in the agreement were voluntary and non-binding,\n[\ncitation needed\n]\nnot approved by the\nUnited States Senate\nas with a\ntreaty\n, though noted by the\nUnited Nations Security Council\n.\n[\n11\n]\n[\n12\n]\nIt was signed in the wake of North Korea's 90-day advance notification of its intended withdrawal from the\nNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty\n(which North Korea \"suspended\" after 89 days), a U.S. military buildup near the country, and U.S. plans to bomb the active\nYongbyon nuclear reactor\n.\n[\n13\n]\nThe U.S. regarded the Agreed Framework primarily as a non-proliferation agreement, whereas North Korea placed greater value on measures normalizing relations with the U.S.\n[\n14\n]\nTerms of the pact and consequent agreements included the shutdown of the pilot\nYongbyon nuclear reactor\n, abandoning the construction of two larger nuclear power plants, and the canning and sealing, under\nIAEA\nmonitoring, of spent fuel that could have been reprocessed to create plutonium for a\nnuclear weapon\n.\nIn exchange two\nlight water reactors\nwould be constructed in North Korea by 2003 at a cost of $4 billion, primarily supplied by South Korea.\n[\n15\n]\nIn the interim, North Korea would be supplied with 500,000 tons of\nheavy fuel oil\nannually, at no cost, to make up for lost energy production. North Korea was required to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, allowing the IAEA to verify the correctness and completeness of its initial declaration, before key nuclear components of the reactor would be delivered.  When the LWR plants were completed, North Korea would dismantle its other nuclear reactors and associated facilities.\nThe\nKorean Peninsula Energy Development Organization\n(KEDO) is a consortium of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and various other states that is responsible for implementing the energy-related parts of the agreement. North Korea would repay KEDO over a 20-year interest-free period after the completion of each LWR plant.\n[\n16\n]\nIt was reported that\nUS President\nBill Clinton\n's officials agreed to the plan only because they thought that the North Korean government would collapse before the nuclear power project was completed as North Korea's leader\nKim Il Sung\nhad recently died\n.\n[\n17\n]\nNorth Korean officials at the time also suspected the U.S. anticipated an early collapse of the DPRK.\n[\n18\n]\nImplementation of the agreement\n[\nedit\n]\nKEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005\nSoon after the agreement was signed,\nU.S. Congress\ncontrol changed to the\nRepublican Party\n, who did not support the agreement.\n[\n19\n]\n[\n20\n]\nSome Republican\nSenators\nwere strongly against the agreement, regarding it as\nappeasement\n.\n[\n21\n]\n[\n22\n]\nInitially,\nU.S. Department of Defense\nemergency funds not under Congress' control were used to fund the transitional oil supplies under the agreement,\n[\n23\n]\ntogether with international funding.  From 1996 Congress provided funding, though not always sufficient amounts.\n[\n14\n]\n[\n24\n]\nConsequently, some of the agreed transitional oil supplies were delivered late.\n[\n25\n]\nKEDO's first director,\nStephen Bosworth\n, later commented \"The Agreed Framework was a political orphan within two weeks after its signature\".\n[\n26\n]\nSome analysts believe North Korea agreed to the freeze primarily because of the U.S. agreement to phase out economic sanctions that had been in place since the\nKorean War\n. But because of congressional opposition, the U.S. failed to deliver on this part of the agreement.\n[\n27\n]\nInternational funding for the LWR replacement power plants had to be sought. Formal invitations to bid were not issued until 1998, by which time the delays were infuriating North Korea.\n[\n26\n]\nIn May 1998, North Korea warned it would restart nuclear research if the U.S. could not install the LWR.\n[\n28\n]\n[\n29\n]\nFormal ground breaking on the site was on 21 August 1997,\n[\n30\n]\nbut significant spending on the LWR project did not commence until 2000.\n[\n31\n]\nU.S. officials in 1998 testified to Congress that there were no fundamental violations of any aspect of the Framework Agreement by North Koreans.\n[\n32\n]\nJoel S. Wit, State Department Coordinator for implementation of the Agreed Framework (1995–2000)\n[\n33\n]\nduring the Clinton administration, stated that \"we did know about the DPRK cheating on the highly-enriched uranium front starting in 1998.\"\n[\n11\n]\nThe U.S. diplomat who negotiated the framework,\nRobert Gallucci\nhas warned that it could collapse if United States did not fulfill obligations that it agreed to.\n[\n32\n]\nThere was increasing disagreement between North Korea and the United States on the scope and implementation of the agreement. The United States did little to meet its commitment to normalize political and economic relations.\n[\n34\n]\nWhen by 1999 economic sanctions had not been lifted and full diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea had not been established, North Korea warned that they would resume nuclear research unless the United States kept up its end of the bargain.\n[\ncitation needed\n]\n[\n35\n]\nConstruction of the first LWR reactor began in August 2002.\n[\n36\n]\nConstruction of both reactors was well behind schedule.  The initial plan was for both reactors to be operational by 2003, but the construction had been halted indefinitely in late 2002.  Senators accused President Clinton of understating the cost of the project.\n[\n32\n]\nPrincipal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State\nRust Deming\ntold Congress \"to be frank, we have in past years not always met the fuel year deadline\".\n[\n32\n]\nFinal breakdown of the agreement\n[\nedit\n]\nIn January 2002, U.S. President\nGeorge W. Bush\nlabeled North Korea in his first\nState of the Union Address\nas part of an\nAxis of Evil\n.\n[\n37\n]\nIn October 2002, a U.S. delegation led by\nAssistant Secretary of State\nJames A. Kelly\nvisited North Korea to confront the North Koreans with the U.S. assessment that they had a\nuranium enrichment\nprogram.\n[\n38\n]\nThe parties' reports of the meeting differ. The U.S. delegation believed the North Koreans had admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium program.\n[\n39\n]\nThe North Koreans stated Kelly made his assertions in an arrogant manner, but failed to produce any evidence such as satellite photos, and they responded by denying that North Korea planned to produce nuclear weapons using enriched uranium. They went on to state that as an independent sovereign state North Korea was entitled to possess nuclear weapons for defense, although they did not possess such a weapon at that point in time.\n[\n8\n]\n[\n40\n]\n[\n41\n]\nRelations between the two countries, which had seemed hopeful two years earlier, quickly deteriorated into open hostility.\n[\n14\n]\nThe\nhighly enriched uranium\n(HEU) intelligence that James Kelly's accusation is based on is still controversial: According to the CIA fact sheet to Congress on 19 November 2002, there was \"clear evidence indicating the North has begun constructing a centrifuge facility\" and this plant could produce annually enough HEU for two or more nuclear weapons per year when it is finished. However, some experts assessed that the equipment North Korea imported was insufficient evidence of a production-scale enrichment program.\n[\n42\n]\nKEDO\nmembers considered in November 2002 whether to halt the fuel oil shipments in response to the previous month's developments.  U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly warned Japanese officials that the\nU.S. Congress\nwould not fund such shipments in the face of continued violations. The shipments were halted in December.\n[\n43\n]\nOn 10 January 2003, North Korea again announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.\n[\n44\n]\nOn February 10, 2005, North Korea finally declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons as a \"nuclear deterrent for self-defence\".\n[\n45\n]\nOn October 9, 2006,\nNorth Korea conducted a nuclear test\n. US intelligence agencies believe that North Korea has manufactured a handful of simple nuclear weapons.\nIn December 2003, KEDO suspended work on the pressurized water reactor project. Subsequently, KEDO shifted the focus of its efforts to ensuring that the LWR project assets at the construction site in North Korea and at manufacturers' facilities around the world ($1.5 billion invested to date) are preserved and maintained.\n[\n46\n]\nEach side blamed the other for ending the Agreed Framework. The United States pointed out that a North Korean uranium enrichment facility would violate the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,\n[\n47\n]\nwhich states \"The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.\"  North Korea accused the United States of a \"hostile policy\" including deliberately delaying fuel supplies and progress on the KEDO project that \"effectively nullified\" the agreement, listing North Korea as part of the \"Axis of evil\" and a target of the U.S. pre-emptive nuclear strikes.\n[\n48\n]\n[\n49\n]\n[\n50\n]\nAlthough the agreement had largely broken down, North Korea did not restart work on the two production size nuclear power plants that were frozen under the agreement. These plants could potentially have produced enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce several nuclear weapons per year. The Agreed Framework was successful in freezing North Korean plutonium production in Yongbyon plutonium complex for eight years from 1994 to December 2002;\n[\n51\n]\nhowever, it failed to stop North Korea from developing a secret highly enriched uranium program,\n[\n52\n]\nbegun in the \"mid- or late-1990s.\"\n[\n53\n]\nDiscussions took place through the\nSix-party talks\nabout a replacement agreement, reaching a preliminary accord on 19 September 2005. The accord made no mention of the U.S. contention that North Korea has a secret, underground enriched uranium program. However, the new accord would require North Korea to dismantle all nuclear facilities, not just specific plants as in the Agreed Framework.\n[\n54\n]\nUltimately the Six-party talks were discontinued in 2009.\nOn May 31, 2006, KEDO decided to terminate the LWR construction project.\n[\n55\n]\nNorth Korea and weapons of mass destruction\nSix-party talks\n2018 Korean peace process\n2018 North Korea–United States summit\n2019 North Korea–United States Hanoi Summit\n2019 Koreas–United States DMZ Summit\n^\na\nb\n\"Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards\"\n. IAEA. 14 October 2014.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 5 December 2014\n. Retrieved\n30 November\n2014\n.\n^\nSelig S. Harrison\n(2009).\nKorean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement\n. Princeton University Press. p. 209.\nISBN\n \n9781400824915\n. Retrieved\n30 November\n2014\n.\n^\n\"U.N. Security Council Consideration of North Korea's Violations of its Nuclear Treaty Obligations\"\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 2015-04-09\n. Retrieved\n2015-04-04\n.\n^\n\"\n\"Prevented war with North Korea in 1994 – here's what needs to be done\"\n.\niNews\n. .inews.co.uk. 5 September 2017.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 2017-09-10\n. Retrieved\n2017-09-10\n.\n^\n\"Statement from Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter on Current U.S.-North Korea Relations\"\n. cartercenter.org.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 2017-09-10\n. Retrieved\n2017-09-10\n.\n^\n\"Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea\"\n(PDF)\n. IAEA. 2 November 1994. INFCIRC\/457. Archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non 17 December 2003.\n^\nNPP\nArchived\n2007-09-30 at the\nWayback Machine\n^\na\nb\n\"Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for\"\n.\nKCNA\n. October 25, 2002. Archived from\nthe original\non 2009-09-08\n. Retrieved\n2009-03-15\n.\n^\nWilliam J. Clinton (March 4, 1999),\nPresidential Determination No. 99-16\n,\nThe White House\n, archived from\nthe original\non 2007-09-27\n, retrieved\n2007-09-27\n^\nInternational Institute for Strategic Studies\n(10 February 2004),\nNorth Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment\n, Palgrave Macmillan,\nISBN\n \n978-1-4039-3324-9\n,\narchived\nfrom the original on 11 March 2009\n, retrieved\n2009-03-05\n^\na\nb\nGlenn Kessler (March 13, 2015).\n\"Cotton's misguided history lesson on the North Korean nuclear deal\"\n.\nThe Washington Post\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 12 November 2016\n. Retrieved\n11 November\n2016\n.\nIn the Clinton administration,\"we did know about the DPRK cheating on the highly-enriched uranium front starting in 1998\"\n^\nStatement by the President of the Security Council\n,\nUnited Nations Security Council\n, 4 November 1994, S\/PRST\/1994\/64,\narchived\nfrom the original on 12 September 2016\n, retrieved\n7 September\n2017\n^\n\"frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: ashton carter\"\n. PBS. 2003-03-03.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 2009-03-29\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\na\nb\nc\nSiegfried S. Hecker; Sean C. Lee; Chaim Braun (Summer 2010).\n\"North Korea's Choice: Bombs Over Electricity\"\n.\nThe Bridge\n.\n40\n(2).\nNational Academy of Engineering\n:\n5–\n12. Archived from\nthe original\non 2010-12-05\n. Retrieved\n5 March\n2011\n.\n^\n\"Bill Text - 104th Congress (1995-1996) - THOMAS (Library of Congress)\"\n.\nthomas.loc.gov\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 2015-09-04.\n^\nAgreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea\nArchived\n2009-09-23 at the\nWayback Machine\n, KEDO, 1995\n^\nKessler, Glenn (2005-07-13).\n\"South Korea Offers To Supply Energy if North Gives Up Arms\"\n.\nWashingtonpost.com\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 2012-11-08\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\nKim Ji Yong (2003-01-27).\n\"DPRK Will Re-Operate Nuclear Facilities Within A Few Weeks to Produce Electricity\"\n. The People's Korea. Archived from\nthe original\non 2009-09-09\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\nLeon V Sigal (February 2007),\nNorth Korea: Negotiations Work\n, MIT Center for International Studies,\narchived\nfrom the original on 2009-09-09\n, retrieved\n2009-03-05\n^\nJoint resolution relating to the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework and the obligations of North Korea under that and previous agreements with respect to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and dialog with the Republic of Korea\nArchived\n2015-09-04 at the\nWayback Machine\n,\nHouse of Representatives\n,\n104th Congress\n, 1st Session, H.J. Res. 83, September 18, 1995\n^\n\"frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: robert gallucci\"\n. PBS. 10 April 2003.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 28 May 2009\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\n\"frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: perle\"\n. PBS. 2003-03-27.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 2009-03-28\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\n\"frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: william perry\"\n. PBS. 2003-02-26.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 28 May 2009\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\nLarry A. Niksch (March 17, 2003).\nNorth Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program\n(PDF)\n(Report). Congressional Research Service. IB91141.\nArchived\n(PDF)\nfrom the original on 4 September 2009\n. Retrieved\n2009-09-24\n.\n^\n\"Nuclear Nonproliferation \/ Heavy Fuel Oil Delivered to North Korea Under the Agreed Framework\"\n(PDF)\n.\nwww.globalsecurity.org\n. Archived from\nthe original\n(PDF)\non 2010-04-15.\n^\na\nb\nBehar, Richard (12 May 2003).\n\"Rummy's North Korea Connection What did Donald Rumsfeld know about ABB's deal to build nuclear reactors there? And why won't he talk about it?\"\n.\nCNN Money\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 22 November 2007.\n^\nSelig S. Harrison (March–April 2001),\nTime To Leave Korea?\n, Foreign Affairs, archived from\nthe original\non March 1, 2009\n, retrieved\n2009-06-09\n^\n\"LWR Provision is U.S. Obligation: DPRK FM Spokesman\"\n.\nKorean Central News Agency\n. 1998-03-06. Archived from\nthe original\non 2012-04-01\n. Retrieved\n2010-11-13\n.\n^\n\"Stalemated LWR Project to Prompt Pyongyang to Restart N-Program\"\n. The People's Korea. 1998-05-13. Archived from\nthe original\non 2009-08-24\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\n\"KEDO Breaks Ground on US Led Nuclear Project That will Undermine Client Status of S Korea\"\n.\nThe People's Korea\n. 21 August 1997. Archived from\nthe original\non 24 August 2009\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\n\"Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization Annual Report 2004\"\n(PDF)\n. Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. December 31, 2004.\nArchived\n(PDF)\nfrom the original on September 23, 2009\n. Retrieved\n2010-04-14\n.\n^\na\nb\nc\nd\nRyan, Maria (19 July 2017).\n\"Why the US's 1994 deal with North Korea failed – and what Trump can learn from it\"\n.\nThe Conversation\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 24 October 2017.\n^\n\"Joel S. Wit – Senior Research Scholar\"\n.\nColumbia University Weatherhead East Asian Institute\n. Columbia University.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 12 November 2016\n. Retrieved\n11 November\n2016\n.\nan important player in reaching the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. From 1995–2000, Mr. Wit was the State Department Coordinator for implementation of that agreement\n^\nLeon V. Sigal (18 May 2018).\n\"Pyongyang's Brushback Pitch\"\n.\n38 North\n. U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies\n. Retrieved\n23 May\n2018\n.\n^\nPollack, Jonathan D. (2003).\n\"The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework\"\n(PDF)\n.\nNaval War College Review\n.\n56\n(3)\n. Retrieved\nJune 16,\n2022\n.\n^\nTim Carter.\n\"Promoting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula and Beyond\"\n. KEDO.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 2009-09-08\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\nSiegfried S. Hecker (12 January 2017).\n\"The U.S. Must Talk to North Korea\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 17 August 2017\n. Retrieved\n17 August\n2017\n.\n^\nJames A. Kelly (July 15, 2004).\n\"Dealing With North Korea's Nuclear Programs\"\n. U.S. Department of State.\n^\n\"frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: nuclear capability: could north korea have a bomb?\"\n. PBS.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 6 June 2009\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\n\"\n\"J. Kelly Failed to Produce 'Evidence' in Pyongyang\"; Framed up \"Admission\" Story – DPRK FM Director O Song Chol\"\n. .korea-np.co.jp. Archived from\nthe original\non 2009-09-08\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\n\"Archived copy\"\n(PDF)\n.\nArchived\n(PDF)\nfrom the original on 2014-06-28\n. Retrieved\n2015-04-04\n.\n{{\ncite web\n}}\n:  CS1 maint: archived copy as title (\nlink\n)\n^\nAlbright, David (23 February 2007).\n\"North Korea's Alleged Large-Scale Enrichment Plant: Yet Another Questionable Extrapolation Based on Aluminum Tubes\"\n(PDF)\n. Institute for Science and International Security\n. Retrieved\n25 April\n2022\n.\n^\nTim Carter (14 November 2002).\n\"KEDO Executive Board Meeting Concludes – November 14, 2002\"\n. KEDO.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 7 June 2011\n. Retrieved\n2010-05-31\n.\n^\n\"DPRK FM sends letter to UNSC president\"\n.\nKCNA\n. January 10, 2003. Archived from\nthe original\non 2009-09-20\n. Retrieved\n2009-05-27\n.\n^\n\"DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-party Talks for Indefinite Period\"\n.\nKCNA\n. February 10, 2005. Archived from\nthe original\non 31 May 2009\n. Retrieved\n2009-05-27\n.\n^\nTim Carter (21 November 2003).\n\"KEDO Executive Board Meeting – November 21, 2003\"\n. KEDO.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 7 June 2011\n. Retrieved\n2010-05-31\n.\n^\n\"NPP\"\n.\nCarnegie Endowment for International Peace\n. Archived from\nthe original\non 2007-09-30\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\n\"Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for\"\n.\nKCNA\n. October 25, 2002. Archived from\nthe original\non 2009-09-08\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\n\"President Delivers State of the Union Address\"\n. Georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov. 2002-01-29. Archived from\nthe original\non 8 June 2009\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\nJohn Pike.\n\"Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts]\"\n. Globalsecurity.org.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 10 June 2009\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\nSelig Harrison (October 25, 2007).\n\"A U.S. Foreign Policy Expert Urged 'Continued Backing' of Nuclear Talks\"\n. Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States of America. Archived from the original on September 9, 2009\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\n\"Could North Korea Have A Bomb?\"\n.\nPBS.org\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 6 June 2009\n. Retrieved\n11 November\n2016\n.\n[In October 2002] Apparently surprised by how much the U.S. had learned, the Pyongyang officials admitted to the existence of the HUE program, in direct violation of the NPT.\n^\nDAVID E. SANGER (17 October 2002).\n\"NORTH KOREA SAYS IT HAS A PROGRAM ON NUCLEAR ARMS\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 13 March 2016\n. Retrieved\n11 November\n2016\n.\nIf the North Korean assertions are true – and administration officials assume they are – the government of Kim Jong Il began in the mid- or late-1990s a secret, parallel program to produce weapons-grade material from highly enriched uranium.\n^\nJoseph Kahn; David E. Sanger (September 20, 2005).\n\"U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open\"\n.\nThe New York Times\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on February 5, 2009\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\n^\n\"KEDO website homepage\"\n.\nArchived\nfrom the original on 2009-04-13\n. Retrieved\n2009-06-09\n.\nAgreed Framework between the USA and the DPRK\n– Geneva, October 21, 1994 (archived 2003-12-17)\nPress Briefing by Ambassador Gallucci on Korea (Agreed Framework)\n,\nWhite House\n, October 18, 1994\nProgramme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation Newsbrief, 3rd Quarter 1994\n– describes negotiations leading to Agreed Framework\nAgreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea\n– KEDO, 1995\nCh 14: North Korea\n– from\nDeadly Arsenals\n, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2002)\nNautilus Institute\n– In-depth coverage of the North Korean situation since 1997\nNorth Korea's Nuclear Breach\n–\nCarnegie Endowment for International Peace\nWashington was on brink of war with North Korea 5 years ago\n,\nCNN\n, October 4, 1999\nModernizing the US-DPRK Agreed Framework: The Energy Imperative\n, Nautilus Institute, February 16, 2001\nReport on Delay in Construction of Light-Water Reactor Project\n,\nKCNA\n, May 22, 2001\nNorth Korea's nuclear facilities by Google Earth\nBreak-down of Agreed Framework\nJ. Kelly Failed to Produce 'Evidence' in Pyongyang\n– O Song Chol, DPRK Foreign Ministry, January 18, 2003\nNorth Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program\n, Larry A. Niksch, Congressional Research Service – The Library of Congress, March 17, 2003\nThe History of the 1994 Agreed Framework\n, Daniel B. Poneman,\nThe Forum for International Policy\n, March 7, 2003\nExamining the Lessons of the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Deal\n,\nPBS\n, April 10, 2003\nThe United States, North Korea, And The End Of The Agreed Framework\n,\nNaval War College Review\n, Summer 2003\nDealing With North Korea's Nuclear Programs\n–\nJames A. Kelly\n, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 15, 2004\nDid North Korea Cheat?\n,\nForeign Affairs\n, January\/February 2005\nNorth Korea Says It Will Abandon Nuclear Efforts\n,\nThe New York Times\n, September 19, 2005\nKCNA Urges U.S. to Compensate for Losses Caused by Scrapping AF\n,\nKCNA\n, December 19, 2005\nThe Beijing Deal is not the Agreed Framework\n, Peter Hayes,\nNautilus Institute\n, February 14, 2007\nLewis, Jeffrey (15 May 2015).\n\"Revisiting the Agreed Framework\"\n.\n38 North\n. U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.\nJoint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula\nJoint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula\n– text of agreement, February 19, 1992\nJoint Declaration of South and North Korea of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula\n– analysis, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, 2002","attrs_markdown":"[Jump to content](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#bodyContent)\n\nMain menu\n\nMain menu\n\nmove to sidebar\n\nhide\n\nNavigation\n\n- [Main page](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Main_Page \"Visit the main page [z]\")\n- [Contents](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wikipedia:Contents \"Guides to browsing Wikipedia\")\n- [Current events](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Portal:Current_events \"Articles related to current events\")\n- [Random article](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Special:Random \"Visit a randomly selected article [x]\")\n- [About Wikipedia](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wikipedia:About \"Learn about Wikipedia and how it works\")\n- [Contact us](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wikipedia:Contact_us \"How to contact Wikipedia\")\n\nContribute\n\n- [Help](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Help:Contents \"Guidance on how to use and edit Wikipedia\")\n- [Learn to edit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Help:Introduction \"Learn how to edit Wikipedia\")\n- [Community portal](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wikipedia:Community_portal \"The hub for editors\")\n- [Recent changes](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Special:RecentChanges \"A list of recent changes to Wikipedia [r]\")\n- [Upload file](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wikipedia:File_upload_wizard \"Add images or other media for use on Wikipedia\")\n- [Special pages](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Special:SpecialPages \"A list of all special pages [q]\")\n\n[![](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/static\/images\/icons\/enwiki-25.svg) ![Wikipedia](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/static\/images\/mobile\/copyright\/wikipedia-wordmark-en-25.svg) ![The Free Encyclopedia](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/static\/images\/mobile\/copyright\/wikipedia-tagline-en-25.svg)](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Main_Page)\n\n[Search](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Special:Search \"Search Wikipedia [f]\")\n\nAppearance\n\n- [Donate](https:\/\/donate.wikimedia.org\/?wmf_source=donate&wmf_medium=sidebar&wmf_campaign=en.wikipedia.org&uselang=en)\n- [Create account](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Special:CreateAccount&returnto=Agreed+Framework \"You are encouraged to create an account and log in; however, it is not mandatory\")\n- [Log in](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Special:UserLogin&returnto=Agreed+Framework \"You're encouraged to log in; however, it's not mandatory. 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[o]\")\n\n## Contents\nmove to sidebar\n\nhide\n\n- [(Top)](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework)\n- [1 Background](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#Background)\n- [2 Agreement](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#Agreement)\n- [3 Implementation of the agreement](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#Implementation_of_the_agreement)\n- [4 Final breakdown of the agreement](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#Final_breakdown_of_the_agreement)\n- [5 See also](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#See_also)\n- [6 References](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#References)\n- [7 External links](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#External_links)\n\nToggle the table of contents\n\n# Agreed Framework\n6 languages\n\n- [Deutsch](https:\/\/de.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Genfer_Rahmenabkommen \"Genfer Rahmenabkommen – German\")\n- [فارسی](https:\/\/fa.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/%DA%86%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%86%D9%88%D8%A8_%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF_%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82 \"چارچوب مورد توافق – Persian\")\n- [日本語](https:\/\/ja.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/%E7%B1%B3%E6%9C%9D%E6%9E%A0%E7%B5%84%E3%81%BF%E5%90%88%E6%84%8F \"米朝枠組み合意 – Japanese\")\n- [한국어](https:\/\/ko.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/%EC%A0%9C%EB%84%A4%EB%B0%94_%ED%95%A9%EC%9D%98 \"제네바 합의 – Korean\")\n- [ไทย](https:\/\/th.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%AD%E0%B8%9A%E0%B8%84%E0%B8%A7%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%A1%E0%B8%95%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%A5%E0%B8%87 \"กรอบความตกลง – Thai\")\n- [中文](https:\/\/zh.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/%E6%9C%9D%E7%BE%8E%E6%A0%B8%E6%A1%86%E6%9E%B6%E5%8D%8F%E8%AE%AE \"朝美核框架协议 – Chinese\")\n\n[Edit links](https:\/\/www.wikidata.org\/wiki\/Special:EntityPage\/Q352182#sitelinks-wikipedia \"Edit interlanguage links\")\n\n- [Article](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework \"View the content page [c]\")\n- [Talk](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Talk:Agreed_Framework \"Discuss improvements to the content page [t]\")\n\nEnglish\n\n- [Read](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework)\n- [Edit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit \"Edit this page [e]\")\n- [View history](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=history \"Past revisions of this page [h]\")\n\nTools\n\nTools\n\nmove to sidebar\n\nhide\n\nActions\n\n- [Read](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework)\n- [Edit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit \"Edit this page [e]\")\n- [View history](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=history)\n\nGeneral\n\n- [What links here](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Special:WhatLinksHere\/Agreed_Framework \"List of all English Wikipedia pages containing links to this page [j]\")\n- [Related changes](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Special:RecentChangesLinked\/Agreed_Framework \"Recent changes in pages linked from this page [k]\")\n- [Upload file](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wikipedia:File_Upload_Wizard \"Upload files [u]\")\n- [Permanent link](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&oldid=1318055029 \"Permanent link to this revision of this page\")\n- [Page information](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=info \"More information about this page\")\n- [Cite this page](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Special:CiteThisPage&page=Agreed_Framework&id=1318055029&wpFormIdentifier=titleform \"Information on how to cite this page\")\n- [Get shortened URL](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Special:UrlShortener&url=https%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FAgreed_Framework)\n\nPrint\/export\n\n- [Download as PDF](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Special:DownloadAsPdf&page=Agreed_Framework&action=show-download-screen \"Download this page as a PDF file\")\n- [Printable version](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&printable=yes \"Printable version of this page [p]\")\n\nIn other projects\n\n- [Wikidata item](https:\/\/www.wikidata.org\/wiki\/Special:EntityPage\/Q352182 \"Structured data on this page hosted by Wikidata [g]\")\n\nAppearance\n\nmove to sidebar\n\nhide\n\nFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia\n\n1994 nuclear agreement between the United States and North Korea\n\nNot to be confused with [Framework agreement](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Framework_agreement \"Framework agreement\").\n\nThe **Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea** ([Korean](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_language \"Korean language\"): 북미제네바기본합의서) was signed on 21 October 1994, between [North Korea](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/North_Korea \"North Korea\") (DPRK) and the [United States](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_States \"United States\"). The objective of the agreement was the freezing and replacement of North Korea's indigenous [nuclear power plant](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_power_plant \"Nuclear power plant\") program with more [nuclear proliferation](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_proliferation \"Nuclear proliferation\") resistant [light water reactor](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Light_water_reactor \"Light water reactor\") power plants, and the step-by-step normalization of [relations between the U.S. and the DPRK](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_relations \"North Korea–United States relations\"). Implementation of the agreement was troubled from the start, but its key elements were being implemented until it effectively broke down in 2003.\n\n[![](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/commons\/thumb\/f\/fe\/Agreed_frame_work_1994_cover_page_1.jpg\/250px-Agreed_frame_work_1994_cover_page_1.jpg)](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:Agreed_frame_work_1994_cover_page_1.jpg)\n\nAGREED FRAMEWORK COVER PAGE – IAEA\n\n[![](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/commons\/thumb\/a\/a4\/AGREED_FRAMEWORK_PAGE1.jpg\/250px-AGREED_FRAMEWORK_PAGE1.jpg)](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:AGREED_FRAMEWORK_PAGE1.jpg)\n\nAGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE \\#1 – IAEA: Replace the Nuclear(graphite) reactor to the Light-water\n\n[![](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/commons\/thumb\/0\/02\/Agreed_frame_work_1994_page_2.jpg\/250px-Agreed_frame_work_1994_page_2.jpg)](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:Agreed_frame_work_1994_page_2.jpg)\n\nAGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE \\#2- IAEA: Supply the alternative energy-Heavy Oil and freeze & dismantle the nuclear reactor\n\n[![](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/commons\/thumb\/4\/46\/AGREED_FRAME_WORK_PAGE3.jpg\/250px-AGREED_FRAME_WORK_PAGE3.jpg)](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:AGREED_FRAME_WORK_PAGE3.jpg)\n\nAGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE \\#3 – IAEA: Establish a formal peace assurance between U.S. and DPRK\n\n## Background\n\\[[edit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=1 \"Edit section: Background\")\\]\n\n[![](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/commons\/thumb\/d\/d9\/Yongbyon_5_MWe_reactor_-_fuel_channels_access_ports.jpg\/250px-Yongbyon_5_MWe_reactor_-_fuel_channels_access_ports.jpg)](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:Yongbyon_5_MWe_reactor_-_fuel_channels_access_ports.jpg)\n\nThe 5 MWe pilot [Yongbyon nuclear reactor](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Yongbyon_Nuclear_Scientific_Research_Center \"Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center\"), made operational in 1986, showing the fuel access channels\n\nMain articles: [Timeline of the North Korean nuclear program](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Timeline_of_the_North_Korean_nuclear_program \"Timeline of the North Korean nuclear program\"), [North Korea nuclear weapons program](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/North_Korea_nuclear_weapons_program \"North Korea nuclear weapons program\"), and [1994 North Korean nuclear crisis](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/1994_North_Korean_nuclear_crisis \"1994 North Korean nuclear crisis\")\n\nOn 12 December 1985, North Korea became a party to the Treaty on the [Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_proliferation \"Nuclear proliferation\") (NPT). On 10 April 1992, its NPT safeguards agreement entered into force. In May 1992, North Korea submitted its initial report to the IAEA under that agreement, and [International Atomic Energy Agency](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/International_Atomic_Energy_Agency \"International Atomic Energy Agency\") (IAEA) inspections began. Shortly thereafter inconsistencies emerged between the North Korea initial declaration and the Agency's findings, centering on a mismatch between declared [plutonium](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Plutonium \"Plutonium\") product and [nuclear waste](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_waste \"Nuclear waste\") solutions and the results of the Agency's analysis. The latter suggested that undeclared plutonium existed in North Korea. In order to find answers to the inconsistencies detected and to determine the completeness and correctness of the initial declaration provided, the IAEA requested access to additional information and to two sites which seemed to be related to the storage of nuclear waste.[\\[1\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-iaea-factsheet-1) The DPRK refused access to the sites, and on 12 March 1993, North Korea announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT.\n\nOn 1 April 1993, the IAEA concluded that North Korea was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and referred this to the UN Security Council. Following UN Security Council [resolution 825](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_825 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 825\"), which called upon the DPRK to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allow weapons inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into the country, North Korea \"suspended the effectuation\" of that withdrawal in June 1993.[\\[1\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-iaea-factsheet-1)[\\[2\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-harrison-2009-2)\n\nIn November 1993, North Korea proposed to the United States that the two governments negotiate a \"package solution\" to all of the issues dividing them. The [Clinton Administration](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Clinton_Administration \"Clinton Administration\") accepted this in principle but conditioned such \"comprehensive\" talks on North Korea acting first to allow a resumption of IAEA inspections and to re-open negotiations with South Korea over nuclear questions (North Korea had broken off talks with South Korea in late 1992). North Korea approached the IAEA in January 1994, offering a single inspection, less comprehensive than those conducted by the IAEA in 1992. After several weeks of tough negotiations, the IAEA announced on 16 February 1994 that North Korea had accepted \"the inspection activities\" that the Agency had requested. In response, the Clinton Administration agreed to suspend the [Team Spirit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Team_Spirit \"Team Spirit\") military exercise with South Korea (a long-standing North Korean demand) and begin a new round of talks with North Korea—subject to North Korea allowing full implementation of the IAEA inspection and beginning high level talks with South Korea.[\\[3\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-3)\n\n## Agreement\n\\[[edit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=2 \"Edit section: Agreement\")\\]\n\n- **Motivation** : North Korea announced intention to withdraw from [NPT](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty \"Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty\") and [non-compliance](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Non-compliance \"Non-compliance\") with [IAEA safeguards](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/IAEA_safeguards \"IAEA safeguards\").\n- **Signed Date**: 21 October 1994 by American ambassador [Robert Gallucci](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Robert_Gallucci \"Robert Gallucci\") and North Korean vice minister [Kang Sok-ju](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Kang_Sok-ju \"Kang Sok-ju\")\n- **Summary**: Freeze of North Korean nuclear program, leading to [denuclearization](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Denuclearization \"Denuclearization\") of the Korean Peninsula, and initial [Peace agreement](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Peace_agreement \"Peace agreement\") between the [United States](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_States \"United States\") and North Korea[\\[4\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-4)[\\[5\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-5)\n\n| States | Agreed Items | Progress |\n|---|---|---|\n| ![](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/en\/thumb\/a\/a4\/Flag_of_the_United_States.svg\/40px-Flag_of_the_United_States.svg.png) [United States](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_States \"United States\") | Deliver 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually to DPRK as an alternative energy Make arrangements for two 1000 MWe [light water reactors](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Light_water_reactor \"Light water reactor\") to DPRK with target date of 2003. Provide DPRK with formal assurance against the use of nuclear weapons by U.S, Move toward full normalization of political and economic relations | The heavy oil was delivered to the DPRK with some delays United States established international consortium [KEDO](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Peninsula_Energy_Development_Organization \"Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization\") to build LWRs, though U.S. Congress rejected U.S. funding for the project |\n| ![](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/commons\/thumb\/5\/51\/Flag_of_North_Korea.svg\/40px-Flag_of_North_Korea.svg.png) [North Korea](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/North_Korea \"North Korea\") | Freeze all graphite-moderated nuclear reactors (5MWe reactor and 50 & 200 MWe under construction) Remain a party to the NPT Take steps to implement 1992 [Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Joint_Declaration_of_the_Denuclearization_of_the_Korean_Peninsula \"Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula\") Dismantle graphite-moderated reactors when LWR project is completed Move toward full normalization of political and economic relations | DPRK stopped operating 5 MWe reactor and abandoned reactors under construction DPRK \"suspended\" notification of withdrawal from NPT |\n\nThe main provisions of the agreement[\\[6\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-iaea-INFCIRC457-6) were:\n\n- DPRK's graphite-moderated 5MWe [nuclear reactor](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_power_plant \"Nuclear power plant\"), and the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors under construction, which could easily produce weapons grade [plutonium](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Plutonium \"Plutonium\"), would be replaced with two 1000MW [light water reactors](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Light_water_reactors \"Light water reactors\") (LWR) power plants by a target date of 2003.\n- Oil for heating and electricity production would be provided while DPRK's reactors were shut down and construction halted, until completion of the first LWR power unit. The amount of oil was 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year.\n- The two sides would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.\n- The U.S. would provide formal [peace](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Peace \"Peace\") and [national security](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/National_security \"National security\") assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.\n- The DPRK would take steps to implement the 1992 [Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Joint_Declaration_of_the_Denuclearization_of_the_Korean_Peninsula \"Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula\")[\\[7\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-7) between South and North Korea.\n- The DPRK would remain a party to the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty \"Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty\").\n- [IAEA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/IAEA \"IAEA\") ad hoc and routine inspections would resume for facilities not subject to the freeze.\n- Existing spent nuclear fuel stocks would be stored and ultimately disposed of without [reprocessing](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_reprocessing \"Nuclear reprocessing\") in the DPRK.\n- Before delivery of key LWR nuclear components, the DPRK would come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.\n\nThere were also some confidential minutes supporting the agreement, which have not been made public.[\\[8\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20021025-8)[\\[9\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-clinton-19990304-9) These are reported to include that full-scope IAEA safeguards would be applied when the major non-nuclear components of the first LWR unit were completed but before the delivery of key nuclear components.[\\[10\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-IISS-net-assesment-10)\n\nThe commitments in the agreement were voluntary and non-binding,\\[*[citation needed](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wikipedia:Citation_needed \"Wikipedia:Citation needed\")*\\] not approved by the [United States Senate](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_States_Senate \"United States Senate\") as with a [treaty](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Treaty \"Treaty\"), though noted by the [United Nations Security Council](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council \"United Nations Security Council\").[\\[11\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-wp-20150313-11)[\\[12\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-UNSC-S\/PRST\/1994\/64-12) It was signed in the wake of North Korea's 90-day advance notification of its intended withdrawal from the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty \"Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty\") (which North Korea \"suspended\" after 89 days), a U.S. military buildup near the country, and U.S. plans to bomb the active [Yongbyon nuclear reactor](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Yongbyon_Nuclear_Scientific_Research_Center \"Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center\").[\\[13\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-13)\n\nThe U.S. regarded the Agreed Framework primarily as a non-proliferation agreement, whereas North Korea placed greater value on measures normalizing relations with the U.S.[\\[14\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-bridge-hecker-2010-14)\n\nTerms of the pact and consequent agreements included the shutdown of the pilot [Yongbyon nuclear reactor](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Yongbyon_Nuclear_Scientific_Research_Center \"Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center\"), abandoning the construction of two larger nuclear power plants, and the canning and sealing, under [IAEA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/IAEA \"IAEA\") monitoring, of spent fuel that could have been reprocessed to create plutonium for a [nuclear weapon](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_weapon \"Nuclear weapon\"). In exchange two [light water reactors](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Light_water_reactor \"Light water reactor\") would be constructed in North Korea by 2003 at a cost of \\$4 billion, primarily supplied by South Korea.[\\[15\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-15) In the interim, North Korea would be supplied with 500,000 tons of [heavy fuel oil](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Heavy_fuel_oil \"Heavy fuel oil\") annually, at no cost, to make up for lost energy production. North Korea was required to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, allowing the IAEA to verify the correctness and completeness of its initial declaration, before key nuclear components of the reactor would be delivered. When the LWR plants were completed, North Korea would dismantle its other nuclear reactors and associated facilities.\n\nThe [Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Peninsula_Energy_Development_Organization \"Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization\") (KEDO) is a consortium of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and various other states that is responsible for implementing the energy-related parts of the agreement. North Korea would repay KEDO over a 20-year interest-free period after the completion of each LWR plant.[\\[16\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-16)\n\nIt was reported that [US President](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/President_of_the_United_States \"President of the United States\") [Bill Clinton](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Bill_Clinton \"Bill Clinton\")'s officials agreed to the plan only because they thought that the North Korean government would collapse before the nuclear power project was completed as North Korea's leader [Kim Il Sung](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Kim_Il_Sung \"Kim Il Sung\") [had recently died](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Death_and_state_funeral_of_Kim_Il_Sung \"Death and state funeral of Kim Il Sung\").[\\[17\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-17) North Korean officials at the time also suspected the U.S. anticipated an early collapse of the DPRK.[\\[18\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-18)\n\n## Implementation of the agreement\n\\[[edit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=3 \"Edit section: Implementation of the agreement\")\\]\n\n[![KEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/commons\/thumb\/d\/d4\/KEDO_funding.gif\/500px-KEDO_funding.gif)](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:KEDO_funding.gif \"KEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005\")\n\nKEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005\n\nSoon after the agreement was signed, [U.S. Congress](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/U.S._Congress \"U.S. Congress\") control changed to the [Republican Party](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Republican_Party_\$United_States\$ \"Republican Party (United States)\"), who did not support the agreement.[\\[19\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-sigal-19)[\\[20\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-20) Some Republican [Senators](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/U.S._Senator \"U.S. Senator\") were strongly against the agreement, regarding it as [appeasement](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Appeasement \"Appeasement\").[\\[21\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-21)[\\[22\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-22) Initially, [U.S. Department of Defense](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/U.S._Department_of_Defense \"U.S. Department of Defense\") emergency funds not under Congress' control were used to fund the transitional oil supplies under the agreement,[\\[23\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-23) together with international funding. From 1996 Congress provided funding, though not always sufficient amounts.[\\[14\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-bridge-hecker-2010-14)[\\[24\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-CRS-20030317-24) Consequently, some of the agreed transitional oil supplies were delivered late.[\\[25\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-25) KEDO's first director, [Stephen Bosworth](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Stephen_Bosworth \"Stephen Bosworth\"), later commented \"The Agreed Framework was a political orphan within two weeks after its signature\".[\\[26\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-cnnmoney-20030512-26)\n\nSome analysts believe North Korea agreed to the freeze primarily because of the U.S. agreement to phase out economic sanctions that had been in place since the [Korean War](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_War \"Korean War\"). But because of congressional opposition, the U.S. failed to deliver on this part of the agreement.[\\[27\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-27)\n\nInternational funding for the LWR replacement power plants had to be sought. Formal invitations to bid were not issued until 1998, by which time the delays were infuriating North Korea.[\\[26\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-cnnmoney-20030512-26) In May 1998, North Korea warned it would restart nuclear research if the U.S. could not install the LWR.[\\[28\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-28)[\\[29\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-29) Formal ground breaking on the site was on 21 August 1997,[\\[30\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-30) but significant spending on the LWR project did not commence until 2000.[\\[31\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-31)\n\nU.S. officials in 1998 testified to Congress that there were no fundamental violations of any aspect of the Framework Agreement by North Koreans.[\\[32\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32)\n\nJoel S. Wit, State Department Coordinator for implementation of the Agreed Framework (1995–2000)[\\[33\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-33) during the Clinton administration, stated that \"we did know about the DPRK cheating on the highly-enriched uranium front starting in 1998.\"[\\[11\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-wp-20150313-11)\n\nThe U.S. diplomat who negotiated the framework, [Robert Gallucci](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Robert_Gallucci \"Robert Gallucci\") has warned that it could collapse if United States did not fulfill obligations that it agreed to.[\\[32\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32)\n\nThere was increasing disagreement between North Korea and the United States on the scope and implementation of the agreement. The United States did little to meet its commitment to normalize political and economic relations.[\\[34\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-38north-20180518-34) When by 1999 economic sanctions had not been lifted and full diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea had not been established, North Korea warned that they would resume nuclear research unless the United States kept up its end of the bargain.\\[*[citation needed](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wikipedia:Citation_needed \"Wikipedia:Citation needed\")*\\][\\[35\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-35)\n\nConstruction of the first LWR reactor began in August 2002.[\\[36\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-36) Construction of both reactors was well behind schedule. The initial plan was for both reactors to be operational by 2003, but the construction had been halted indefinitely in late 2002. Senators accused President Clinton of understating the cost of the project.[\\[32\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32)\n\nPrincipal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State [Rust Deming](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Rust_Deming \"Rust Deming\") told Congress \"to be frank, we have in past years not always met the fuel year deadline\".[\\[32\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32)\n\n## Final breakdown of the agreement\n\\[[edit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=4 \"Edit section: Final breakdown of the agreement\")\\]\n\nIn January 2002, U.S. President [George W. Bush](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/George_W._Bush \"George W. Bush\") labeled North Korea in his first [State of the Union Address](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2002_State_of_the_Union_Address \"2002 State of the Union Address\") as part of an [Axis of Evil](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Axis_of_Evil \"Axis of Evil\").[\\[37\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-nyt-20170112-37)\n\nIn October 2002, a U.S. delegation led by [Assistant Secretary of State](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Assistant_Secretary_of_State \"Assistant Secretary of State\") [James A. Kelly](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/James_A._Kelly \"James A. Kelly\") visited North Korea to confront the North Koreans with the U.S. assessment that they had a [uranium enrichment](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Uranium_enrichment \"Uranium enrichment\") program.[\\[38\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-38) The parties' reports of the meeting differ. The U.S. delegation believed the North Koreans had admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium program.[\\[39\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-39) The North Koreans stated Kelly made his assertions in an arrogant manner, but failed to produce any evidence such as satellite photos, and they responded by denying that North Korea planned to produce nuclear weapons using enriched uranium. They went on to state that as an independent sovereign state North Korea was entitled to possess nuclear weapons for defense, although they did not possess such a weapon at that point in time.[\\[8\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20021025-8)[\\[40\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-40)[\\[41\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-41) Relations between the two countries, which had seemed hopeful two years earlier, quickly deteriorated into open hostility.[\\[14\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-bridge-hecker-2010-14)\n\nThe [highly enriched uranium](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Highly_enriched_uranium \"Highly enriched uranium\") (HEU) intelligence that James Kelly's accusation is based on is still controversial: According to the CIA fact sheet to Congress on 19 November 2002, there was \"clear evidence indicating the North has begun constructing a centrifuge facility\" and this plant could produce annually enough HEU for two or more nuclear weapons per year when it is finished. However, some experts assessed that the equipment North Korea imported was insufficient evidence of a production-scale enrichment program.[\\[42\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-albright-20070223-42)\n\n[KEDO](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Peninsula_Energy_Development_Organization \"Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization\") members considered in November 2002 whether to halt the fuel oil shipments in response to the previous month's developments. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly warned Japanese officials that the [U.S. Congress](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\") would not fund such shipments in the face of continued violations. The shipments were halted in December.[\\[43\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-43)\n\nOn 10 January 2003, North Korea again announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[\\[44\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20030110-44) On February 10, 2005, North Korea finally declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons as a \"nuclear deterrent for self-defence\".[\\[45\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20050210-45) On October 9, 2006, [North Korea conducted a nuclear test](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2006_North_Korean_nuclear_test \"2006 North Korean nuclear test\"). US intelligence agencies believe that North Korea has manufactured a handful of simple nuclear weapons.\n\nIn December 2003, KEDO suspended work on the pressurized water reactor project. Subsequently, KEDO shifted the focus of its efforts to ensuring that the LWR project assets at the construction site in North Korea and at manufacturers' facilities around the world (\\$1.5 billion invested to date) are preserved and maintained.[\\[46\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-46)\n\nEach side blamed the other for ending the Agreed Framework. The United States pointed out that a North Korean uranium enrichment facility would violate the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,[\\[47\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-47) which states \"The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.\" North Korea accused the United States of a \"hostile policy\" including deliberately delaying fuel supplies and progress on the KEDO project that \"effectively nullified\" the agreement, listing North Korea as part of the \"Axis of evil\" and a target of the U.S. pre-emptive nuclear strikes.[\\[48\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-48)[\\[49\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-49)[\\[50\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-50)\n\nAlthough the agreement had largely broken down, North Korea did not restart work on the two production size nuclear power plants that were frozen under the agreement. These plants could potentially have produced enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce several nuclear weapons per year. The Agreed Framework was successful in freezing North Korean plutonium production in Yongbyon plutonium complex for eight years from 1994 to December 2002;[\\[51\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-51) however, it failed to stop North Korea from developing a secret highly enriched uranium program,[\\[52\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-52) begun in the \"mid- or late-1990s.\"[\\[53\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-53)\n\nDiscussions took place through the [Six-party talks](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Six-party_talks \"Six-party talks\") about a replacement agreement, reaching a preliminary accord on 19 September 2005. The accord made no mention of the U.S. contention that North Korea has a secret, underground enriched uranium program. However, the new accord would require North Korea to dismantle all nuclear facilities, not just specific plants as in the Agreed Framework.[\\[54\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-54) Ultimately the Six-party talks were discontinued in 2009.\n\nOn May 31, 2006, KEDO decided to terminate the LWR construction project.[\\[55\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-55)\n\n## See also\n\\[[edit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=5 \"Edit section: See also\")\\]\n\n- [North Korea and weapons of mass destruction](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction \"North Korea and weapons of mass destruction\")\n- [Six-party talks](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Six-party_talks \"Six-party talks\")\n- [2018 Korean peace process](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2018_Korean_peace_process \"2018 Korean peace process\")\n- [2018 North Korea–United States summit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2018_North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_summit \"2018 North Korea–United States summit\")\n- [2019 North Korea–United States Hanoi Summit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2019_North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_Hanoi_Summit \"2019 North Korea–United States Hanoi Summit\")\n- [2019 Koreas–United States DMZ Summit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2019_Koreas%E2%80%93United_States_DMZ_Summit \"2019 Koreas–United States DMZ Summit\")\n\n## References\n\\[[edit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=6 \"Edit section: References\")\\]\n\n1. ^ [***a***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-iaea-factsheet_1-0) [***b***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-iaea-factsheet_1-1)\n   [\"Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards\"](http:\/\/www.iaea.org\/newscenter\/focus\/dprk\/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards). IAEA. 14 October 2014. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20141205004645\/http:\/\/www.iaea.org\/newscenter\/focus\/dprk\/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards) from the original on 5 December 2014. Retrieved 30 November 2014.\n2. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-harrison-2009_2-0)**\n   [Selig S. Harrison](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Selig_S._Harrison \"Selig S. Harrison\") (2009). [*Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement*](https:\/\/books.google.com\/books?id=csVMXWKo734C). Princeton University Press. p. 209. [ISBN](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/ISBN_\$identifier\$ \"ISBN (identifier)\")\n   \n   [9781400824915](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Special:BookSources\/9781400824915 \"Special:BookSources\/9781400824915\")\n   \n   . Retrieved 30 November 2014.\n3. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-3)**\n   [\"U.N. Security Council Consideration of North Korea's Violations of its Nuclear Treaty Obligations\"](https:\/\/fas.org\/spp\/starwars\/crs\/94-299f.htm). [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20150409003836\/https:\/\/fas.org\/spp\/starwars\/crs\/94-299f.htm) from the original on 2015-04-09. Retrieved 2015-04-04.\n4. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-4)**\n   [\"\"Prevented war with North Korea in 1994 – here's what needs to be done\"](https:\/\/inews.co.uk\/essentials\/news\/world\/north-korea-nuclear-negotiations-1994-2017-robert-gallucci\/). *iNews*. .inews.co.uk. 5 September 2017. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20170910220028\/https:\/\/inews.co.uk\/essentials\/news\/world\/north-korea-nuclear-negotiations-1994-2017-robert-gallucci\/) from the original on 2017-09-10. Retrieved 2017-09-10.\n5. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-5)**\n   [\"Statement from Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter on Current U.S.-North Korea Relations\"](https:\/\/www.cartercenter.org\/news\/pr\/north-korea-081017.html). cartercenter.org. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20170910173323\/https:\/\/www.cartercenter.org\/news\/pr\/north-korea-081017.html) from the original on 2017-09-10. Retrieved 2017-09-10.\n6. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-iaea-INFCIRC457_6-0)**\n   [\"Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20031217175315\/http:\/\/www.iaea.org\/Publications\/Documents\/Infcircs\/Others\/infcirc457.pdf) (PDF). IAEA. 2 November 1994. INFCIRC\/457. 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[\"North Korea's Alleged Large-Scale Enrichment Plant: Yet Another Questionable Extrapolation Based on Aluminum Tubes\"](https:\/\/isis-online.org\/publications\/dprk\/DPRKenrichment22Feb.pdf) (PDF). Institute for Science and International Security. Retrieved 25 April 2022.\n43. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-43)**\n    Tim Carter (14 November 2002). [\"KEDO Executive Board Meeting Concludes – November 14, 2002\"](http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/news_detail.asp?NewsID=23). KEDO. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20110607230234\/http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/news_detail.asp?NewsID=23) from the original on 7 June 2011. Retrieved 2010-05-31.\n44. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-KCNA-20030110_44-0)**\n    [\"DPRK FM sends letter to UNSC president\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090920185607\/http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/2003\/200301\/news01\/11.htm). [KCNA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Central_News_Agency \"Korean Central News Agency\"). January 10, 2003. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/2003\/200301\/news01\/11.htm#12) on 2009-09-20. Retrieved 2009-05-27.\n45. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-KCNA-20050210_45-0)**\n    [\"DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-party Talks for Indefinite Period\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090531175657\/http:\/\/kcna.co.jp\/item\/2005\/200502\/news02\/11.htm#1). [KCNA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Central_News_Agency \"Korean Central News Agency\"). February 10, 2005. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/2005\/200502\/news02\/11.htm#1) on 31 May 2009. Retrieved 2009-05-27.\n46. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-46)**\n    Tim Carter (21 November 2003). [\"KEDO Executive Board Meeting – November 21, 2003\"](http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/news_detail.asp?NewsID=25). KEDO. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20110607230304\/http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/news_detail.asp?NewsID=25) from the original on 7 June 2011. Retrieved 2010-05-31.\n47. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-47)**\n    [\"NPP\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20070930014646\/http:\/\/www.carnegieendowment.org\/npp\/koreadenuclearization.cfm). [Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Carnegie_Endowment_for_International_Peace \"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace\"). Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www.carnegieendowment.org\/npp\/koreadenuclearization.cfm) on 2007-09-30. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n48. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-48)**\n    [\"Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090908014926\/http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/2002\/200210\/news10\/25.htm). [KCNA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Central_News_Agency \"Korean Central News Agency\"). October 25, 2002. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/2002\/200210\/news10\/25.htm#4) on 2009-09-08. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n49. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-49)**\n    [\"President Delivers State of the Union Address\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090608080318\/http:\/\/georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov\/news\/releases\/2002\/01\/20020129-11.html). Georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov. 2002-01-29. Archived from [the original](https:\/\/georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov\/news\/releases\/2002\/01\/20020129-11.html) on 8 June 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n50. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-50)**\n    John Pike. [\"Nuclear Posture Review \\[Excerpts\\]\"](http:\/\/www.globalsecurity.org\/wmd\/library\/policy\/dod\/npr.htm). Globalsecurity.org. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090610094536\/http:\/\/www.globalsecurity.org\/wmd\/library\/policy\/dod\/npr.htm) from the original on 10 June 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n51. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-51)**\n    Selig Harrison (October 25, 2007). [\"A U.S. Foreign Policy Expert Urged 'Continued Backing' of Nuclear Talks\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090909072853\/http:\/\/www.dynamic-korea.com\/news\/view_news.php?uid=200700154588&main=KHF&sub=&keyword=selig%20harrison). Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States of America. Archived from the original on September 9, 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n52. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-52)**\n    [\"Could North Korea Have A Bomb?\"](https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/nukes\/nukes.html). *PBS.org*. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090606180425\/http:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/nukes\/nukes.html) from the original on 6 June 2009. Retrieved 11 November 2016. \"\\[In October 2002\\] Apparently surprised by how much the U.S. had learned, the Pyongyang officials admitted to the existence of the HUE program, in direct violation of the NPT.\"\n53. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-53)**\n    DAVID E. SANGER (17 October 2002). [\"NORTH KOREA SAYS IT HAS A PROGRAM ON NUCLEAR ARMS\"](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2002\/10\/17\/world\/north-korea-says-it-has-a-program-on-nuclear-arms.html?pagewanted=all). *[The New York Times](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/The_New_York_Times \"The New York Times\")*. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20160313043711\/http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2002\/10\/17\/world\/north-korea-says-it-has-a-program-on-nuclear-arms.html?pagewanted=all) from the original on 13 March 2016. Retrieved 11 November 2016. \"If the North Korean assertions are true – and administration officials assume they are – the government of Kim Jong Il began in the mid- or late-1990s a secret, parallel program to produce weapons-grade material from highly enriched uranium.\"\n54. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-54)**\n    Joseph Kahn; David E. Sanger (September 20, 2005). [\"U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open\"](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2005\/09\/20\/international\/asia\/20korea.html). *[The New York Times](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/The_New_York_Times \"The New York Times\")*. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090205045125\/http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2005\/09\/20\/international\/asia\/20korea.html) from the original on February 5, 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n55. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-55)**\n    [\"KEDO website homepage\"](http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/). [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090413090027\/http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/) from the original on 2009-04-13. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n\n## External links\n\\[[edit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=7 \"Edit section: External links\")\\]\n\n- [Agreed Framework between the USA and the DPRK](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20031217175315\/http:\/\/www.iaea.org\/Publications\/Documents\/Infcircs\/Others\/infcirc457.pdf) – Geneva, October 21, 1994 (archived 2003-12-17)\n- [Press Briefing by Ambassador Gallucci on Korea (Agreed Framework)](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20070929094316\/http:\/\/www.clintonfoundation.org\/legacy\/101894-press-briefing-by-ambassador-gallucci-on-korea.htm), [White House](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/White_House \"White House\"), October 18, 1994\n- [Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation Newsbrief, 3rd Quarter 1994](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20070701065811\/http:\/\/www.ppnn.soton.ac.uk\/nb27.pdf) – describes negotiations leading to Agreed Framework\n- [Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea](http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/pdfs\/SupplyAgreement.pdf) – KEDO, 1995\n- [Ch 14: North Korea](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20030403083117\/http:\/\/www.ceip.org\/files\/projects\/npp\/resources\/DeadlyArsenals\/chapters%20\$pdf\$\/Pages%20from%2014-NoKorea.pdf) – from *Deadly Arsenals*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2002)\n- [Nautilus Institute](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20030224165404\/http:\/\/www.nautilus.org\/fora\/) – In-depth coverage of the North Korean situation since 1997\n- [North Korea's Nuclear Breach](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20030305132639\/http:\/\/www.ceip.org\/files\/projects\/npp\/resources\/northkoreacrisis.htm) – *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*\n- [Washington was on brink of war with North Korea 5 years ago](http:\/\/www.cnn.com\/US\/9910\/04\/korea.brink\/), [CNN](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/CNN \"CNN\"), October 4, 1999\n- [Modernizing the US-DPRK Agreed Framework: The Energy Imperative](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20051218110023\/http:\/\/www.nautilus.org\/archives\/papers\/energy\/ModernizingAF.PDF), Nautilus Institute, February 16, 2001\n- [Report on Delay in Construction of Light-Water Reactor Project](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20070927181825\/http:\/\/www1.korea-np.co.jp\/pk\/161st_issue\/2001052201.htm), [KCNA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Central_News_Agency \"Korean Central News Agency\"), May 22, 2001\n- [North Korea's nuclear facilities by Google Earth](http:\/\/freekorea.us\/2008\/01\/27\/satellite-images-of-north-koreas-nuclear-facilities\/)\n\nBreak-down of Agreed Framework\n\n- [J. Kelly Failed to Produce 'Evidence' in Pyongyang](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090908012957\/http:\/\/www1.korea-np.co.jp\/pk\/188th_issue\/2003013001.htm) – O Song Chol, DPRK Foreign Ministry, January 18, 2003\n- [North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program](http:\/\/www.gwu.edu\/~nsarchiv\/NSAEBB\/NSAEBB87\/nk24.pdf), Larry A. Niksch, Congressional Research Service – The Library of Congress, March 17, 2003\n- [The History of the 1994 Agreed Framework](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20061208041852\/http:\/\/ffip.com\/infobriefs030703.htm), Daniel B. Poneman, [The Forum for International Policy](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=The_Forum_for_International_Policy&action=edit&redlink=1 \"The Forum for International Policy (page does not exist)\"), March 7, 2003\n- [Examining the Lessons of the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Deal](https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/themes\/lessons.html), [PBS](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Public_Broadcasting_Service \"Public Broadcasting Service\"), April 10, 2003\n- [The United States, North Korea, And The End Of The Agreed Framework](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20060406080625\/http:\/\/www.army.mil\/professionalwriting\/volumes\/volume1\/august_2003\/8_03_1.html), [Naval War College Review](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Naval_War_College_Review \"Naval War College Review\"), Summer 2003\n- [Dealing With North Korea's Nuclear Programs](https:\/\/2001-2009.state.gov\/p\/eap\/rls\/rm\/2004\/34395.htm) – [James A. Kelly](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/James_A._Kelly \"James A. Kelly\"), Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 15, 2004\n- [Did North Korea Cheat?](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20051226202624\/http:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.org\/20050101faessay84109\/selig-s-harrison\/did-north-korea-cheat.html), [Foreign Affairs](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\"), January\/February 2005\n- [North Korea Says It Will Abandon Nuclear Efforts](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2005\/09\/19\/international\/asia\/19korea.html?hp&ex=1127188800&en=1cab1bb77582f12a&ei=5094&partner=homepage), *[The New York Times](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/The_New_York_Times \"The New York Times\")*, September 19, 2005\n- [KCNA Urges U.S. to Compensate for Losses Caused by Scrapping AF](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20061029082308\/http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/2005\/200512\/news12\/20.htm#9), [KCNA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Central_News_Agency \"Korean Central News Agency\"), December 19, 2005\n- [The Beijing Deal is not the Agreed Framework](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20070927012430\/http:\/\/www.nautilus.org\/fora\/security\/07014Hayes.html), Peter Hayes, [Nautilus Institute](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nautilus_Institute_for_Security_and_Sustainability \"Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability\"), February 14, 2007\n- Lewis, Jeffrey (15 May 2015). [\"Revisiting the Agreed Framework\"](https:\/\/www.38north.org\/2015\/05\/jlewis051415\/). *[38 North](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/38_North \"38 North\")*. U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.\n\nJoint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula\n\n- [Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https:\/\/2001-2009.state.gov\/t\/ac\/rls\/or\/2004\/31011.htm) – text of agreement, February 19, 1992\n- [Joint Declaration of South and North Korea of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20030503150547\/http:\/\/nti.org\/e_research\/official_docs\/inventory\/pdfs\/koreanuc.pdf) – analysis, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, 2002\n\n| [v](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Template:Nuclear_program_of_North_Korea \"Template:Nuclear program of North Korea\") [t](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Template_talk:Nuclear_program_of_North_Korea \"Template talk:Nuclear program of North Korea\") [e](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Special:EditPage\/Template:Nuclear_program_of_North_Korea \"Special:EditPage\/Template:Nuclear program of North Korea\")[North Korea and weapons of mass destruction](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction \"North Korea and weapons of mass destruction\") |   |\n|---|---|\n| Main topics | [Timeline of the North Korean nuclear program](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Timeline_of_the_North_Korean_nuclear_program \"Timeline of the North Korean nuclear program\") [Nuclear power in North Korea](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_power_in_North_Korea \"Nuclear power in North Korea\") [1994 North Korean nuclear crisis](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/1994_North_Korean_nuclear_crisis \"1994 North Korean nuclear crisis\") [Agreed Framework]() [Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Peninsula_Energy_Development_Organization \"Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization\") [A. Q. Khan network](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Abdul_Qadeer_Khan#North_Korea,_Iran,_and_Libya \"Abdul Qadeer Khan\") [Japan–North Korea Pyongyang Declaration](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Japan%E2%80%93North_Korea_Pyongyang_Declaration \"Japan–North Korea Pyongyang Declaration\") [Six-party talks](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Six-party_talks \"Six-party talks\") [Sanctions against North Korea](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Sanctions_against_North_Korea \"Sanctions against North Korea\") [2017–18 North Korea crisis](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2017%E2%80%9318_North_Korea_crisis \"2017–18 North Korea crisis\") [2018 inter-Korean summit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/April_2018_inter-Korean_summit \"April 2018 inter-Korean summit\") [2018 DPRK—US Singapore Summit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2018_North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_Singapore_Summit \"2018 North Korea–United States Singapore Summit\") [2019 DPRK–US Hanoi Summit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2019_North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_Hanoi_Summit \"2019 North Korea–United States Hanoi Summit\") [2019 Koreas–US DMZ Summit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2019_Koreas%E2%80%93United_States_DMZ_Summit \"2019 Koreas–United States DMZ Summit\") |\n| [Missile tests](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/List_of_North_Korean_missile_tests \"List of North Korean missile tests\") | [1993](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/1993_North_Korean_missile_test \"1993 North Korean missile test\") [2006](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2006_North_Korean_missile_test \"2006 North Korean missile test\") [2009](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2009_North_Korean_missile_tests \"2009 North Korean missile tests\") [2013](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2013_North_Korean_missile_tests \"2013 North Korean missile tests\") [2014](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2014_North_Korean_missile_tests \"2014 North Korean missile tests\") [2017](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2017_North_Korean_missile_tests \"2017 North Korean missile tests\") [2021–2023](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2021%E2%80%932023_North_Korean_missile_tests \"2021–2023 North Korean missile tests\") |\n| [Nuclear tests](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/List_of_nuclear_weapons_tests_of_North_Korea \"List of nuclear weapons tests of North Korea\") |   |\n|   |   |\n| Fission | [2006](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2006_North_Korean_nuclear_test \"2006 North Korean nuclear test\") [2009](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2009_North_Korean_nuclear_test \"2009 North Korean nuclear test\") [2013](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2013_North_Korean_nuclear_test \"2013 North Korean nuclear test\") [September 2016](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/September_2016_North_Korean_nuclear_test \"September 2016 North Korean nuclear test\") |\n| Claimed as [thermonuclear](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Thermonuclear_weapon \"Thermonuclear weapon\") | [January 2016](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/January_2016_North_Korean_nuclear_test \"January 2016 North Korean nuclear test\") [2017](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2017_North_Korean_nuclear_test \"2017 North Korean nuclear test\") |\n| Facilities |   |\n|   |   |\n| Production | [Nyongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nyongbyon_Nuclear_Scientific_Research_Center \"Nyongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center\") [Kangson enrichment site](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Kangson_enrichment_site \"Kangson enrichment site\") [Pyongsan uranium mine](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Pyongsan_County#Uranium_mine_and_milling_plant \"Pyongsan County\") |\n| Testing | [Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Punggye-ri_Nuclear_Test_Site \"Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site\") |\n| People |   |\n|   |   |\n| Leaders | [Kim Jong Il](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Kim_Jong_Il \"Kim Jong Il\") [Kim Jong Un](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Kim_Jong_Un \"Kim Jong Un\") |\n| Diplomats | [Kang Sok-ju](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Kang_Sok-ju \"Kang Sok-ju\") [Kim Kye-gwan](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Kim_Kye-gwan \"Kim Kye-gwan\") [Choe Son-hui](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Choe_Son-hui \"Choe Son-hui\") |\n| Scientists | [Hong Sung-mu](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Hong_Sung-mu \"Hong Sung-mu\") [Ri Hong-sop](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Ri_Hong-sop \"Ri Hong-sop\") [Chon Chibu](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Chon_Chibu \"Chon Chibu\") [Kyong Won-ha](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Kyong_Won-ha \"Kyong Won-ha\") |\n| [Nuclear warheads](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_warhead \"Nuclear warhead\") |   |\n|   |   |\n| Warheads | [Hwasan-31](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Hwasan-31 \"Hwasan-31\") [tactical warhead](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Tactical_nuclear_weapon \"Tactical nuclear weapon\") [Hwasong-13 warhead](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Hwasong-13_warhead&action=edit&redlink=1 \"Hwasong-13 warhead (page does not exist)\") \\[[ko](https:\/\/ko.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/KN-08_%ED%95%B5%ED%83%84%EB%91%90 \"ko:KN-08 핵탄두\")\\] [Hwasong-15 warhead](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Hwasong-15_warhead&action=edit&redlink=1 \"Hwasong-15 warhead (page does not exist)\") \\[[ko](https:\/\/ko.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/KN-22_%EC%97%B4%ED%95%B5%ED%83%84%EB%91%90 \"ko:KN-22 열핵탄두\")\\] |\n| Land | *[Hwasong](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Hwasong_\$missile_family\$ \"Hwasong (missile family)\")* ballistic missiles [Intercontinental](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/ICBM \"ICBM\") [Hwasong-15](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Hwasong-15 \"Hwasong-15\") [Hwasong-17](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Hwasong-17 \"Hwasong-17\") [Hwasong-18](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Hwasong-18 \"Hwasong-18\") *Hwasal* cruise missiles [Hwasal-1](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Hwasal-1 \"Hwasal-1\") [Hwasal-2](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Hwasal-2 \"Hwasal-2\") |\n| Sea | *[Pukguksong](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_People%27s_Navy#Weapons \"Korean People's Navy\")* submarine-launched ballistic missiles |\n| [UN resolutions](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/List_of_United_Nations_Security_Council_resolutions_concerning_North_Korea \"List of United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning North Korea\") | [825](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_825 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 825\") [1695](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1695 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695\") [1718](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1718 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718\") [1874](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1874 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874\") [1928](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1928 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 1928\") [1985](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1985 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 1985\") [2087](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_2087 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 2087\") [2094](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_2094 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 2094\") [2270](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_2270 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270\") [2321](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_2321 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 2321\") [2371](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_2371 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 2371\") [2375](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_2375 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 2375\") [2397](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_2397 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 2397\") |\n| Related | [Korean People's Army](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_People%27s_Army \"Korean People's Army\") [Strategic Force](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_People%27s_Army_Strategic_Force \"Korean People's Army Strategic Force\") [Missile Administration](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/DPRK_Missile_Administration \"DPRK Missile Administration\") [Navy](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_People%27s_Navy \"Korean People's Navy\") [2024 DPRK–Russia treaty](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/North_Korean%E2%80%93Russian_Treaty_on_Comprehensive_Strategic_Partnership \"North Korean–Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership\") [Assassination of Kim Jong-nam](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Assassination_of_Kim_Jong-nam \"Assassination of Kim Jong-nam\") [South Korea and weapons of mass destruction](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/South_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction \"South Korea and weapons of mass destruction\") [South Korea Ballistic Missile Range Guidelines](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/South_Korea_Ballistic_Missile_Range_Guidelines \"South Korea Ballistic Missile Range Guidelines\") [Nuclear power in South Korea](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_power_in_South_Korea \"Nuclear power in South Korea\") [Pakistan–North Korea relations](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Pakistan%E2%80%93North_Korea_relations \"Pakistan–North Korea relations\") 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The objective of the agreement was the freezing and replacement of North Korea's indigenous [nuclear power plant](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_power_plant \"Nuclear power plant\") program with more [nuclear proliferation](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_proliferation \"Nuclear proliferation\") resistant [light water reactor](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Light_water_reactor \"Light water reactor\") power plants, and the step-by-step normalization of [relations between the U.S. and the DPRK](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_relations \"North Korea–United States relations\"). Implementation of the agreement was troubled from the start, but its key elements were being implemented until it effectively broke down in 2003.\n\n[![](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/commons\/thumb\/f\/fe\/Agreed_frame_work_1994_cover_page_1.jpg\/250px-Agreed_frame_work_1994_cover_page_1.jpg)](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:Agreed_frame_work_1994_cover_page_1.jpg)\n\nAGREED FRAMEWORK COVER PAGE – IAEA\n\n[![](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/commons\/thumb\/a\/a4\/AGREED_FRAMEWORK_PAGE1.jpg\/250px-AGREED_FRAMEWORK_PAGE1.jpg)](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:AGREED_FRAMEWORK_PAGE1.jpg)\n\nAGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE \\#1 – IAEA: Replace the Nuclear(graphite) reactor to the Light-water\n\n[![](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/commons\/thumb\/0\/02\/Agreed_frame_work_1994_page_2.jpg\/250px-Agreed_frame_work_1994_page_2.jpg)](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:Agreed_frame_work_1994_page_2.jpg)\n\nAGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE \\#2- IAEA: Supply the alternative energy-Heavy Oil and freeze & dismantle the nuclear reactor\n\n[![](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/commons\/thumb\/4\/46\/AGREED_FRAME_WORK_PAGE3.jpg\/250px-AGREED_FRAME_WORK_PAGE3.jpg)](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:AGREED_FRAME_WORK_PAGE3.jpg)\n\nAGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE \\#3 – IAEA: Establish a formal peace assurance between U.S. and DPRK\n\n[![](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/commons\/thumb\/d\/d9\/Yongbyon_5_MWe_reactor_-_fuel_channels_access_ports.jpg\/250px-Yongbyon_5_MWe_reactor_-_fuel_channels_access_ports.jpg)](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:Yongbyon_5_MWe_reactor_-_fuel_channels_access_ports.jpg)\n\nThe 5 MWe pilot [Yongbyon nuclear reactor](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Yongbyon_Nuclear_Scientific_Research_Center \"Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center\"), made operational in 1986, showing the fuel access channels\n\nOn 12 December 1985, North Korea became a party to the Treaty on the [Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_proliferation \"Nuclear proliferation\") (NPT). On 10 April 1992, its NPT safeguards agreement entered into force. In May 1992, North Korea submitted its initial report to the IAEA under that agreement, and [International Atomic Energy Agency](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/International_Atomic_Energy_Agency \"International Atomic Energy Agency\") (IAEA) inspections began. Shortly thereafter inconsistencies emerged between the North Korea initial declaration and the Agency's findings, centering on a mismatch between declared [plutonium](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Plutonium \"Plutonium\") product and [nuclear waste](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_waste \"Nuclear waste\") solutions and the results of the Agency's analysis. The latter suggested that undeclared plutonium existed in North Korea. In order to find answers to the inconsistencies detected and to determine the completeness and correctness of the initial declaration provided, the IAEA requested access to additional information and to two sites which seemed to be related to the storage of nuclear waste.[\\[1\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-iaea-factsheet-1) The DPRK refused access to the sites, and on 12 March 1993, North Korea announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT.\n\nOn 1 April 1993, the IAEA concluded that North Korea was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and referred this to the UN Security Council. Following UN Security Council [resolution 825](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_825 \"United Nations Security Council Resolution 825\"), which called upon the DPRK to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allow weapons inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into the country, North Korea \"suspended the effectuation\" of that withdrawal in June 1993.[\\[1\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-iaea-factsheet-1)[\\[2\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-harrison-2009-2)\n\nIn November 1993, North Korea proposed to the United States that the two governments negotiate a \"package solution\" to all of the issues dividing them. The [Clinton Administration](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Clinton_Administration \"Clinton Administration\") accepted this in principle but conditioned such \"comprehensive\" talks on North Korea acting first to allow a resumption of IAEA inspections and to re-open negotiations with South Korea over nuclear questions (North Korea had broken off talks with South Korea in late 1992). North Korea approached the IAEA in January 1994, offering a single inspection, less comprehensive than those conducted by the IAEA in 1992. After several weeks of tough negotiations, the IAEA announced on 16 February 1994 that North Korea had accepted \"the inspection activities\" that the Agency had requested. In response, the Clinton Administration agreed to suspend the [Team Spirit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Team_Spirit \"Team Spirit\") military exercise with South Korea (a long-standing North Korean demand) and begin a new round of talks with North Korea—subject to North Korea allowing full implementation of the IAEA inspection and beginning high level talks with South Korea.[\\[3\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-3)\n\n- **Motivation** : North Korea announced intention to withdraw from [NPT](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty \"Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty\") and [non-compliance](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Non-compliance \"Non-compliance\") with [IAEA safeguards](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/IAEA_safeguards \"IAEA safeguards\").\n- **Signed Date**: 21 October 1994 by American ambassador [Robert Gallucci](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Robert_Gallucci \"Robert Gallucci\") and North Korean vice minister [Kang Sok-ju](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Kang_Sok-ju \"Kang Sok-ju\")\n- **Summary**: Freeze of North Korean nuclear program, leading to [denuclearization](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Denuclearization \"Denuclearization\") of the Korean Peninsula, and initial [Peace agreement](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Peace_agreement \"Peace agreement\") between the [United States](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_States \"United States\") and North Korea[\\[4\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-4)[\\[5\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-5)\n\n| States | Agreed Items | Progress |\n|---|---|---|\n| ![](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/en\/thumb\/a\/a4\/Flag_of_the_United_States.svg\/40px-Flag_of_the_United_States.svg.png) [United States](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_States \"United States\") | Deliver 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually to DPRK as an alternative energy Make arrangements for two 1000 MWe [light water reactors](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Light_water_reactor \"Light water reactor\") to DPRK with target date of 2003. Provide DPRK with formal assurance against the use of nuclear weapons by U.S, Move toward full normalization of political and economic relations | The heavy oil was delivered to the DPRK with some delays United States established international consortium [KEDO](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Peninsula_Energy_Development_Organization \"Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization\") to build LWRs, though U.S. Congress rejected U.S. funding for the project |\n| ![](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/commons\/thumb\/5\/51\/Flag_of_North_Korea.svg\/40px-Flag_of_North_Korea.svg.png) [North Korea](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/North_Korea \"North Korea\") | Freeze all graphite-moderated nuclear reactors (5MWe reactor and 50 & 200 MWe under construction) Remain a party to the NPT Take steps to implement 1992 [Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Joint_Declaration_of_the_Denuclearization_of_the_Korean_Peninsula \"Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula\") Dismantle graphite-moderated reactors when LWR project is completed Move toward full normalization of political and economic relations | DPRK stopped operating 5 MWe reactor and abandoned reactors under construction DPRK \"suspended\" notification of withdrawal from NPT |\n\nThe main provisions of the agreement[\\[6\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-iaea-INFCIRC457-6) were:\n\n- DPRK's graphite-moderated 5MWe [nuclear reactor](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_power_plant \"Nuclear power plant\"), and the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors under construction, which could easily produce weapons grade [plutonium](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Plutonium \"Plutonium\"), would be replaced with two 1000MW [light water reactors](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Light_water_reactors \"Light water reactors\") (LWR) power plants by a target date of 2003.\n- Oil for heating and electricity production would be provided while DPRK's reactors were shut down and construction halted, until completion of the first LWR power unit. The amount of oil was 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year.\n- The two sides would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.\n- The U.S. would provide formal [peace](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Peace \"Peace\") and [national security](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/National_security \"National security\") assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.\n- The DPRK would take steps to implement the 1992 [Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Joint_Declaration_of_the_Denuclearization_of_the_Korean_Peninsula \"Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula\")[\\[7\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-7) between South and North Korea.\n- The DPRK would remain a party to the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty \"Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty\").\n- [IAEA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/IAEA \"IAEA\") ad hoc and routine inspections would resume for facilities not subject to the freeze.\n- Existing spent nuclear fuel stocks would be stored and ultimately disposed of without [reprocessing](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_reprocessing \"Nuclear reprocessing\") in the DPRK.\n- Before delivery of key LWR nuclear components, the DPRK would come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.\n\nThere were also some confidential minutes supporting the agreement, which have not been made public.[\\[8\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20021025-8)[\\[9\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-clinton-19990304-9) These are reported to include that full-scope IAEA safeguards would be applied when the major non-nuclear components of the first LWR unit were completed but before the delivery of key nuclear components.[\\[10\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-IISS-net-assesment-10)\n\nThe commitments in the agreement were voluntary and non-binding,\\[*[citation needed](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wikipedia:Citation_needed \"Wikipedia:Citation needed\")*\\] not approved by the [United States Senate](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_States_Senate \"United States Senate\") as with a [treaty](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Treaty \"Treaty\"), though noted by the [United Nations Security Council](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council \"United Nations Security Council\").[\\[11\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-wp-20150313-11)[\\[12\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-UNSC-S\/PRST\/1994\/64-12) It was signed in the wake of North Korea's 90-day advance notification of its intended withdrawal from the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty \"Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty\") (which North Korea \"suspended\" after 89 days), a U.S. military buildup near the country, and U.S. plans to bomb the active [Yongbyon nuclear reactor](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Yongbyon_Nuclear_Scientific_Research_Center \"Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center\").[\\[13\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-13)\n\nThe U.S. regarded the Agreed Framework primarily as a non-proliferation agreement, whereas North Korea placed greater value on measures normalizing relations with the U.S.[\\[14\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-bridge-hecker-2010-14)\n\nTerms of the pact and consequent agreements included the shutdown of the pilot [Yongbyon nuclear reactor](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Yongbyon_Nuclear_Scientific_Research_Center \"Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center\"), abandoning the construction of two larger nuclear power plants, and the canning and sealing, under [IAEA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/IAEA \"IAEA\") monitoring, of spent fuel that could have been reprocessed to create plutonium for a [nuclear weapon](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nuclear_weapon \"Nuclear weapon\"). In exchange two [light water reactors](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Light_water_reactor \"Light water reactor\") would be constructed in North Korea by 2003 at a cost of \\$4 billion, primarily supplied by South Korea.[\\[15\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-15) In the interim, North Korea would be supplied with 500,000 tons of [heavy fuel oil](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Heavy_fuel_oil \"Heavy fuel oil\") annually, at no cost, to make up for lost energy production. North Korea was required to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, allowing the IAEA to verify the correctness and completeness of its initial declaration, before key nuclear components of the reactor would be delivered. When the LWR plants were completed, North Korea would dismantle its other nuclear reactors and associated facilities.\n\nThe [Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Peninsula_Energy_Development_Organization \"Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization\") (KEDO) is a consortium of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and various other states that is responsible for implementing the energy-related parts of the agreement. North Korea would repay KEDO over a 20-year interest-free period after the completion of each LWR plant.[\\[16\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-16)\n\nIt was reported that [US President](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/President_of_the_United_States \"President of the United States\") [Bill Clinton](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Bill_Clinton \"Bill Clinton\")'s officials agreed to the plan only because they thought that the North Korean government would collapse before the nuclear power project was completed as North Korea's leader [Kim Il Sung](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Kim_Il_Sung \"Kim Il Sung\") [had recently died](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Death_and_state_funeral_of_Kim_Il_Sung \"Death and state funeral of Kim Il Sung\").[\\[17\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-17) North Korean officials at the time also suspected the U.S. anticipated an early collapse of the DPRK.[\\[18\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-18)\n\n## Implementation of the agreement\n\\[[edit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=3 \"Edit section: Implementation of the agreement\")\\]\n\n[![KEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005](https:\/\/upload.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/commons\/thumb\/d\/d4\/KEDO_funding.gif\/500px-KEDO_funding.gif)](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:KEDO_funding.gif \"KEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005\")\n\nKEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005\n\nSoon after the agreement was signed, [U.S. Congress](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/U.S._Congress \"U.S. Congress\") control changed to the [Republican Party](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Republican_Party_\$United_States\$ \"Republican Party (United States)\"), who did not support the agreement.[\\[19\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-sigal-19)[\\[20\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-20) Some Republican [Senators](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/U.S._Senator \"U.S. Senator\") were strongly against the agreement, regarding it as [appeasement](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Appeasement \"Appeasement\").[\\[21\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-21)[\\[22\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-22) Initially, [U.S. Department of Defense](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/U.S._Department_of_Defense \"U.S. Department of Defense\") emergency funds not under Congress' control were used to fund the transitional oil supplies under the agreement,[\\[23\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-23) together with international funding. From 1996 Congress provided funding, though not always sufficient amounts.[\\[14\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-bridge-hecker-2010-14)[\\[24\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-CRS-20030317-24) Consequently, some of the agreed transitional oil supplies were delivered late.[\\[25\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-25) KEDO's first director, [Stephen Bosworth](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Stephen_Bosworth \"Stephen Bosworth\"), later commented \"The Agreed Framework was a political orphan within two weeks after its signature\".[\\[26\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-cnnmoney-20030512-26)\n\nSome analysts believe North Korea agreed to the freeze primarily because of the U.S. agreement to phase out economic sanctions that had been in place since the [Korean War](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_War \"Korean War\"). But because of congressional opposition, the U.S. failed to deliver on this part of the agreement.[\\[27\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-27)\n\nInternational funding for the LWR replacement power plants had to be sought. Formal invitations to bid were not issued until 1998, by which time the delays were infuriating North Korea.[\\[26\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-cnnmoney-20030512-26) In May 1998, North Korea warned it would restart nuclear research if the U.S. could not install the LWR.[\\[28\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-28)[\\[29\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-29) Formal ground breaking on the site was on 21 August 1997,[\\[30\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-30) but significant spending on the LWR project did not commence until 2000.[\\[31\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-31)\n\nU.S. officials in 1998 testified to Congress that there were no fundamental violations of any aspect of the Framework Agreement by North Koreans.[\\[32\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32)\n\nJoel S. Wit, State Department Coordinator for implementation of the Agreed Framework (1995–2000)[\\[33\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-33) during the Clinton administration, stated that \"we did know about the DPRK cheating on the highly-enriched uranium front starting in 1998.\"[\\[11\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-wp-20150313-11)\n\nThe U.S. diplomat who negotiated the framework, [Robert Gallucci](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Robert_Gallucci \"Robert Gallucci\") has warned that it could collapse if United States did not fulfill obligations that it agreed to.[\\[32\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32)\n\nThere was increasing disagreement between North Korea and the United States on the scope and implementation of the agreement. The United States did little to meet its commitment to normalize political and economic relations.[\\[34\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-38north-20180518-34) When by 1999 economic sanctions had not been lifted and full diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea had not been established, North Korea warned that they would resume nuclear research unless the United States kept up its end of the bargain.\\[*[citation needed](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wikipedia:Citation_needed \"Wikipedia:Citation needed\")*\\][\\[35\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-35)\n\nConstruction of the first LWR reactor began in August 2002.[\\[36\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-36) Construction of both reactors was well behind schedule. The initial plan was for both reactors to be operational by 2003, but the construction had been halted indefinitely in late 2002. Senators accused President Clinton of understating the cost of the project.[\\[32\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32)\n\nPrincipal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State [Rust Deming](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Rust_Deming \"Rust Deming\") told Congress \"to be frank, we have in past years not always met the fuel year deadline\".[\\[32\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32)\n\n## Final breakdown of the agreement\n\\[[edit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=4 \"Edit section: Final breakdown of the agreement\")\\]\n\nIn January 2002, U.S. President [George W. Bush](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/George_W._Bush \"George W. Bush\") labeled North Korea in his first [State of the Union Address](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2002_State_of_the_Union_Address \"2002 State of the Union Address\") as part of an [Axis of Evil](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Axis_of_Evil \"Axis of Evil\").[\\[37\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-nyt-20170112-37)\n\nIn October 2002, a U.S. delegation led by [Assistant Secretary of State](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Assistant_Secretary_of_State \"Assistant Secretary of State\") [James A. Kelly](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/James_A._Kelly \"James A. Kelly\") visited North Korea to confront the North Koreans with the U.S. assessment that they had a [uranium enrichment](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Uranium_enrichment \"Uranium enrichment\") program.[\\[38\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-38) The parties' reports of the meeting differ. The U.S. delegation believed the North Koreans had admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium program.[\\[39\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-39) The North Koreans stated Kelly made his assertions in an arrogant manner, but failed to produce any evidence such as satellite photos, and they responded by denying that North Korea planned to produce nuclear weapons using enriched uranium. They went on to state that as an independent sovereign state North Korea was entitled to possess nuclear weapons for defense, although they did not possess such a weapon at that point in time.[\\[8\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20021025-8)[\\[40\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-40)[\\[41\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-41) Relations between the two countries, which had seemed hopeful two years earlier, quickly deteriorated into open hostility.[\\[14\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-bridge-hecker-2010-14)\n\nThe [highly enriched uranium](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Highly_enriched_uranium \"Highly enriched uranium\") (HEU) intelligence that James Kelly's accusation is based on is still controversial: According to the CIA fact sheet to Congress on 19 November 2002, there was \"clear evidence indicating the North has begun constructing a centrifuge facility\" and this plant could produce annually enough HEU for two or more nuclear weapons per year when it is finished. However, some experts assessed that the equipment North Korea imported was insufficient evidence of a production-scale enrichment program.[\\[42\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-albright-20070223-42)\n\n[KEDO](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Peninsula_Energy_Development_Organization \"Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization\") members considered in November 2002 whether to halt the fuel oil shipments in response to the previous month's developments. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly warned Japanese officials that the [U.S. Congress](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\") would not fund such shipments in the face of continued violations. The shipments were halted in December.[\\[43\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-43)\n\nOn 10 January 2003, North Korea again announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[\\[44\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20030110-44) On February 10, 2005, North Korea finally declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons as a \"nuclear deterrent for self-defence\".[\\[45\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20050210-45) On October 9, 2006, [North Korea conducted a nuclear test](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2006_North_Korean_nuclear_test \"2006 North Korean nuclear test\"). US intelligence agencies believe that North Korea has manufactured a handful of simple nuclear weapons.\n\nIn December 2003, KEDO suspended work on the pressurized water reactor project. Subsequently, KEDO shifted the focus of its efforts to ensuring that the LWR project assets at the construction site in North Korea and at manufacturers' facilities around the world (\\$1.5 billion invested to date) are preserved and maintained.[\\[46\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-46)\n\nEach side blamed the other for ending the Agreed Framework. The United States pointed out that a North Korean uranium enrichment facility would violate the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,[\\[47\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-47) which states \"The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.\" North Korea accused the United States of a \"hostile policy\" including deliberately delaying fuel supplies and progress on the KEDO project that \"effectively nullified\" the agreement, listing North Korea as part of the \"Axis of evil\" and a target of the U.S. pre-emptive nuclear strikes.[\\[48\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-48)[\\[49\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-49)[\\[50\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-50)\n\nAlthough the agreement had largely broken down, North Korea did not restart work on the two production size nuclear power plants that were frozen under the agreement. These plants could potentially have produced enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce several nuclear weapons per year. The Agreed Framework was successful in freezing North Korean plutonium production in Yongbyon plutonium complex for eight years from 1994 to December 2002;[\\[51\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-51) however, it failed to stop North Korea from developing a secret highly enriched uranium program,[\\[52\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-52) begun in the \"mid- or late-1990s.\"[\\[53\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-53)\n\nDiscussions took place through the [Six-party talks](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Six-party_talks \"Six-party talks\") about a replacement agreement, reaching a preliminary accord on 19 September 2005. The accord made no mention of the U.S. contention that North Korea has a secret, underground enriched uranium program. However, the new accord would require North Korea to dismantle all nuclear facilities, not just specific plants as in the Agreed Framework.[\\[54\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-54) Ultimately the Six-party talks were discontinued in 2009.\n\nOn May 31, 2006, KEDO decided to terminate the LWR construction project.[\\[55\\]](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-55)\n\n- [North Korea and weapons of mass destruction](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction \"North Korea and weapons of mass destruction\")\n- [Six-party talks](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Six-party_talks \"Six-party talks\")\n- [2018 Korean peace process](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2018_Korean_peace_process \"2018 Korean peace process\")\n- [2018 North Korea–United States summit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2018_North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_summit \"2018 North Korea–United States summit\")\n- [2019 North Korea–United States Hanoi Summit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2019_North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_Hanoi_Summit \"2019 North Korea–United States Hanoi Summit\")\n- [2019 Koreas–United States DMZ Summit](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2019_Koreas%E2%80%93United_States_DMZ_Summit \"2019 Koreas–United States DMZ Summit\")\n\n1. ^ [***a***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-iaea-factsheet_1-0) [***b***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-iaea-factsheet_1-1)\n   [\"Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards\"](http:\/\/www.iaea.org\/newscenter\/focus\/dprk\/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards). IAEA. 14 October 2014. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20141205004645\/http:\/\/www.iaea.org\/newscenter\/focus\/dprk\/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards) from the original on 5 December 2014. Retrieved 30 November 2014.\n2. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-harrison-2009_2-0)**\n   [Selig S. Harrison](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Selig_S._Harrison \"Selig S. Harrison\") (2009). [*Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement*](https:\/\/books.google.com\/books?id=csVMXWKo734C). Princeton University Press. p. 209. [ISBN](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/ISBN_\$identifier\$ \"ISBN (identifier)\")\n   \n   [9781400824915](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Special:BookSources\/9781400824915 \"Special:BookSources\/9781400824915\")\n   \n   . Retrieved 30 November 2014.\n3. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-3)**\n   [\"U.N. Security Council Consideration of North Korea's Violations of its Nuclear Treaty Obligations\"](https:\/\/fas.org\/spp\/starwars\/crs\/94-299f.htm). [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20150409003836\/https:\/\/fas.org\/spp\/starwars\/crs\/94-299f.htm) from the original on 2015-04-09. Retrieved 2015-04-04.\n4. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-4)**\n   [\"\"Prevented war with North Korea in 1994 – here's what needs to be done\"](https:\/\/inews.co.uk\/essentials\/news\/world\/north-korea-nuclear-negotiations-1994-2017-robert-gallucci\/). *iNews*. .inews.co.uk. 5 September 2017. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20170910220028\/https:\/\/inews.co.uk\/essentials\/news\/world\/north-korea-nuclear-negotiations-1994-2017-robert-gallucci\/) from the original on 2017-09-10. Retrieved 2017-09-10.\n5. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-5)**\n   [\"Statement from Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter on Current U.S.-North Korea Relations\"](https:\/\/www.cartercenter.org\/news\/pr\/north-korea-081017.html). cartercenter.org. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20170910173323\/https:\/\/www.cartercenter.org\/news\/pr\/north-korea-081017.html) from the original on 2017-09-10. Retrieved 2017-09-10.\n6. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-iaea-INFCIRC457_6-0)**\n   [\"Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20031217175315\/http:\/\/www.iaea.org\/Publications\/Documents\/Infcircs\/Others\/infcirc457.pdf) (PDF). IAEA. 2 November 1994. INFCIRC\/457. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www.iaea.org\/Publications\/Documents\/Infcircs\/Others\/infcirc457.pdf) (PDF) on 17 December 2003.\n7. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-7)** [NPP](http:\/\/www.carnegieendowment.org\/npp\/koreadenuclearization.cfm)[Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20070930014646\/http:\/\/www.carnegieendowment.org\/npp\/koreadenuclearization.cfm) 2007-09-30 at the [Wayback Machine](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wayback_Machine \"Wayback Machine\")\n8. ^ [***a***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-KCNA-20021025_8-0) [***b***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-KCNA-20021025_8-1)\n   [\"Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090908014926\/http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/2002\/200210\/news10\/25.htm). [KCNA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Central_News_Agency \"Korean Central News Agency\"). October 25, 2002. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/2002\/200210\/news10\/25.htm#1) on 2009-09-08. Retrieved 2009-03-15.\n9. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-clinton-19990304_9-0)**\n   William J. Clinton (March 4, 1999), [*Presidential Determination No. 99-16*](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20070927022519\/http:\/\/www.clintonfoundation.org\/legacy\/030499-presidential-memo-on-kedo.htm), [The White House](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/The_White_House \"The White House\"), archived from [the original](http:\/\/www.clintonfoundation.org\/legacy\/030499-presidential-memo-on-kedo.htm) on 2007-09-27, retrieved 2007-09-27\n10. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-IISS-net-assesment_10-0)**\n    [International Institute for Strategic Studies](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/International_Institute_for_Strategic_Studies \"International Institute for Strategic Studies\") (10 February 2004), [*North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment*](http:\/\/www.iiss.org\/publications\/strategic-dossiers\/north-korean-dossier\/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses\/), Palgrave Macmillan, [ISBN](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/ISBN_\$identifier\$ \"ISBN (identifier)\")\n    \n    [978-1-4039-3324-9](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Special:BookSources\/978-1-4039-3324-9 \"Special:BookSources\/978-1-4039-3324-9\")\n    \n    , [archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090311214952\/http:\/\/www.iiss.org\/publications\/strategic-dossiers\/north-korean-dossier\/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses\/) from the original on 11 March 2009, retrieved 2009-03-05\n11. ^ [***a***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-wp-20150313_11-0) [***b***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-wp-20150313_11-1)\n    Glenn Kessler (March 13, 2015). [\"Cotton's misguided history lesson on the North Korean nuclear deal\"](https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/news\/fact-checker\/wp\/2015\/03\/13\/cottons-misguided-history-lesson-on-the-north-korean-nuclear-deal\/). *The Washington Post*. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20161112081807\/https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/news\/fact-checker\/wp\/2015\/03\/13\/cottons-misguided-history-lesson-on-the-north-korean-nuclear-deal\/) from the original on 12 November 2016. Retrieved 11 November 2016. \"In the Clinton administration,\"we did know about the DPRK cheating on the highly-enriched uranium front starting in 1998\"\"\n12. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-UNSC-S\/PRST\/1994\/64_12-0)**\n    [*Statement by the President of the Security Council*](http:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/ga\/search\/view_doc.asp?symbol=S\/PRST\/1994\/64), [United Nations Security Council](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Security_Council \"United Nations Security Council\"), 4 November 1994, S\/PRST\/1994\/64, [archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20160912223420\/http:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/ga\/search\/view_doc.asp?symbol=S%2FPRST%2F1994%2F64) from the original on 12 September 2016, retrieved 7 September 2017\n13. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-13)**\n    [\"frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: ashton carter\"](https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/interviews\/acarter.html). PBS. 2003-03-03. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090329085454\/http:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/interviews\/acarter.html) from the original on 2009-03-29. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n14. ^ [***a***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-bridge-hecker-2010_14-0) [***b***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-bridge-hecker-2010_14-1) [***c***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-bridge-hecker-2010_14-2)\n    Siegfried S. Hecker; Sean C. Lee; Chaim Braun (Summer 2010). [\"North Korea's Choice: Bombs Over Electricity\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20101205175419\/http:\/\/cisac.stanford.edu\/publications\/north_koreas_choice_bombs_over_electricity\/). *The Bridge*. **40** (2). [National Academy of Engineering](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/National_Academy_of_Engineering \"National Academy of Engineering\"): 5–12\\. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/cisac.stanford.edu\/publications\/north_koreas_choice_bombs_over_electricity\/) on 2010-12-05. Retrieved 5 March 2011.\n15. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-15)**\n    [\"Bill Text - 104th Congress (1995-1996) - THOMAS (Library of Congress)\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20150904103407\/http:\/\/thomas.loc.gov\/cgi-bin\/query\/z?c104:H.J.RES.83.EH:). *thomas.loc.gov*. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/thomas.loc.gov\/cgi-bin\/query\/z?c104:H.J.RES.83.EH:) on 2015-09-04.\n16. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-16)** [Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea](http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/pdfs\/SupplyAgreement.pdf) [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090923120058\/http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/pdfs\/SupplyAgreement.pdf) 2009-09-23 at the [Wayback Machine](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wayback_Machine \"Wayback Machine\"), KEDO, 1995\n17. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-17)**\n    Kessler, Glenn (2005-07-13). [\"South Korea Offers To Supply Energy if North Gives Up Arms\"](https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2005\/07\/12\/AR2005071200220.html). *Washingtonpost.com*. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20121108180137\/http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2005\/07\/12\/AR2005071200220.html) from the original on 2012-11-08. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n18. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-18)**\n    Kim Ji Yong (2003-01-27). [\"DPRK Will Re-Operate Nuclear Facilities Within A Few Weeks to Produce Electricity\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090909024331\/http:\/\/www1.korea-np.co.jp\/pk\/188th_issue\/2003012701.htm). The People's Korea. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www1.korea-np.co.jp\/pk\/188th_issue\/2003012701.htm) on 2009-09-09. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n19. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-sigal_19-0)**\n    Leon V Sigal (February 2007), [*North Korea: Negotiations Work*](http:\/\/www.isn.ethz.ch\/isn\/Digital-Library\/Publications\/Detail\/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&ord582=grp2&id=31958), MIT Center for International Studies, [archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090909051426\/http:\/\/www.isn.ethz.ch\/isn\/Digital-Library\/Publications\/Detail\/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&ord582=grp2&id=31958) from the original on 2009-09-09, retrieved 2009-03-05\n20. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-20)** [Joint resolution relating to the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework and the obligations of North Korea under that and previous agreements with respect to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and dialog with the Republic of Korea](http:\/\/thomas.loc.gov\/cgi-bin\/query\/z?c104:H.J.RES.83.EH:) [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20150904103407\/http:\/\/thomas.loc.gov\/cgi-bin\/query\/z?c104:H.J.RES.83.EH:) 2015-09-04 at the [Wayback Machine](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wayback_Machine \"Wayback Machine\"), [House of Representatives](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_States_House_of_Representatives \"United States House of Representatives\"), [104th Congress](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/104th_Congress \"104th Congress\"), 1st Session, H.J. Res. 83, September 18, 1995\n21. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-21)**\n    [\"frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: robert gallucci\"](https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/interviews\/gallucci.html). PBS. 10 April 2003. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090528211359\/http:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/interviews\/gallucci.html) from the original on 28 May 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n22. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-22)**\n    [\"frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: perle\"](https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/interviews\/perle.html). PBS. 2003-03-27. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090328120918\/http:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/interviews\/perle.html) from the original on 2009-03-28. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n23. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-23)**\n    [\"frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: william perry\"](https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/interviews\/perry.html). PBS. 2003-02-26. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090528211409\/http:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/interviews\/perry.html) from the original on 28 May 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n24. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-CRS-20030317_24-0)**\n    Larry A. Niksch (March 17, 2003). [North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program](http:\/\/www.gwu.edu\/~nsarchiv\/NSAEBB\/NSAEBB87\/nk24.pdf) (PDF) (Report). Congressional Research Service. IB91141. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090904061135\/http:\/\/www.gwu.edu\/~nsarchiv\/NSAEBB\/NSAEBB87\/nk24.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 4 September 2009. Retrieved 2009-09-24.\n25. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-25)**\n    [\"Nuclear Nonproliferation \/ Heavy Fuel Oil Delivered to North Korea Under the Agreed Framework\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20100415032427\/http:\/\/www.globalsecurity.org\/wmd\/library\/report\/gao\/rc00020t.pdf) (PDF). *www.globalsecurity.org*. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www.globalsecurity.org\/wmd\/library\/report\/gao\/rc00020t.pdf#page=5) (PDF) on 2010-04-15.\n26. ^ [***a***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-cnnmoney-20030512_26-0) [***b***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-cnnmoney-20030512_26-1)\n    Behar, Richard (12 May 2003). [\"Rummy's North Korea Connection What did Donald Rumsfeld know about ABB's deal to build nuclear reactors there? And why won't he talk about it?\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20071122140941\/http:\/\/money.cnn.com\/magazines\/fortune\/fortune_archive\/2003\/05\/12\/342316\/). *CNN Money*. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/money.cnn.com\/magazines\/fortune\/fortune_archive\/2003\/05\/12\/342316\/) on 22 November 2007.\n27. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-27)**\n    Selig S. Harrison (March–April 2001), [*Time To Leave Korea?*](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090301161804\/http:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.org\/20010301faessay4263\/selig-s-harrison\/time-to-leave-korea.html), Foreign Affairs, archived from [the original](http:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.org\/20010301faessay4263\/selig-s-harrison\/time-to-leave-korea.html) on March 1, 2009, retrieved 2009-06-09\n28. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-28)**\n    [\"LWR Provision is U.S. Obligation: DPRK FM Spokesman\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20120401221837\/http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/1998\/9803\/news03\/06.htm). [Korean Central News Agency](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Central_News_Agency \"Korean Central News Agency\"). 1998-03-06. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/1998\/9803\/news03\/06.htm#8) on 2012-04-01. Retrieved 2010-11-13.\n29. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-29)**\n    [\"Stalemated LWR Project to Prompt Pyongyang to Restart N-Program\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090824204704\/http:\/\/www1.korea-np.co.jp\/pk\/042nd_issue\/98051302.htm). The People's Korea. 1998-05-13. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www1.korea-np.co.jp\/pk\/042nd_issue\/98051302.htm) on 2009-08-24. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n30. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-30)**\n    [\"KEDO Breaks Ground on US Led Nuclear Project That will Undermine Client Status of S Korea\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090824204606\/http:\/\/www1.korea-np.co.jp\/pk\/005th_issue\/97082102.htm). *The People's Korea*. 21 August 1997. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www1.korea-np.co.jp\/pk\/005th_issue\/97082102.htm) on 24 August 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n31. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-31)**\n    [\"Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization Annual Report 2004\"](http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/pdfs\/KEDO_AR_2004.pdf) (PDF). Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. December 31, 2004. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090923120054\/http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/pdfs\/KEDO_AR_2004.pdf) (PDF) from the original on September 23, 2009. Retrieved 2010-04-14.\n32. ^ [***a***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-conversation_32-0) [***b***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-conversation_32-1) [***c***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-conversation_32-2) [***d***](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-conversation_32-3)\n    Ryan, Maria (19 July 2017). [\"Why the US's 1994 deal with North Korea failed – and what Trump can learn from it\"](https:\/\/theconversation.com\/why-the-uss-1994-deal-with-north-korea-failed-and-what-trump-can-learn-from-it-80578). *The Conversation*. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20171024034157\/https:\/\/theconversation.com\/why-the-uss-1994-deal-with-north-korea-failed-and-what-trump-can-learn-from-it-80578) from the original on 24 October 2017.\n33. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-33)**\n    [\"Joel S. Wit – Senior Research Scholar\"](http:\/\/weai.columbia.edu\/joel-wit\/). *Columbia University Weatherhead East Asian Institute*. Columbia University. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20161112081119\/http:\/\/weai.columbia.edu\/joel-wit\/) from the original on 12 November 2016. Retrieved 11 November 2016. \"an important player in reaching the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. From 1995–2000, Mr. Wit was the State Department Coordinator for implementation of that agreement\"\n34. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-38north-20180518_34-0)**\n    Leon V. Sigal (18 May 2018). [\"Pyongyang's Brushback Pitch\"](https:\/\/www.38north.org\/2018\/05\/lsigal051818\/). *[38 North](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/38_North \"38 North\")*. U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Retrieved 23 May 2018.\n35. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-35)**\n    Pollack, Jonathan D. (2003). [\"The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework\"](https:\/\/digital-commons.usnwc.edu\/cgi\/viewcontent.cgi?article=2242&context=nwc-review) (PDF). *Naval War College Review*. **56** (3). Retrieved June 16, 2022.\n36. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-36)**\n    Tim Carter. [\"Promoting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula and Beyond\"](http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/news_detail.asp?NewsID=22). KEDO. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090908031931\/http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/news_detail.asp?NewsID=22) from the original on 2009-09-08. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n37. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-nyt-20170112_37-0)**\n    Siegfried S. Hecker (12 January 2017). [\"The U.S. Must Talk to North Korea\"](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2017\/01\/12\/opinion\/the-us-must-talk-to-north-korea.html). *[The New York Times](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/The_New_York_Times \"The New York Times\")*. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20170817210805\/https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2017\/01\/12\/opinion\/the-us-must-talk-to-north-korea.html) from the original on 17 August 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017.\n38. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-38)**\n    James A. Kelly (July 15, 2004). [\"Dealing With North Korea's Nuclear Programs\"](https:\/\/2001-2009.state.gov\/p\/eap\/rls\/rm\/2004\/34395.htm). U.S. Department of State.\n39. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-39)**\n    [\"frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: nuclear capability: could north korea have a bomb?\"](https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/nukes\/nukes.html). PBS. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090606180425\/http:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/nukes\/nukes.html) from the original on 6 June 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n40. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-40)**\n    [\"\"J. Kelly Failed to Produce 'Evidence' in Pyongyang\"; Framed up \"Admission\" Story – DPRK FM Director O Song Chol\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090908012957\/http:\/\/www1.korea-np.co.jp\/pk\/188th_issue\/2003013001.htm). .korea-np.co.jp. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www1.korea-np.co.jp\/pk\/188th_issue\/2003013001.htm) on 2009-09-08. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n41. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-41)**\n    [\"Archived copy\"](https:\/\/fas.org\/irp\/congress\/2004_hr\/012104hecker.pdf) (PDF). [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20140628181341\/http:\/\/fas.org\/irp\/congress\/2004_hr\/012104hecker.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 2014-06-28. Retrieved 2015-04-04.\n    \n    `{{cite web}}`: CS1 maint: archived copy as title ([link](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Category:CS1_maint:_archived_copy_as_title \"Category:CS1 maint: archived copy as title\"))\n42. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-albright-20070223_42-0)**\n    Albright, David (23 February 2007). [\"North Korea's Alleged Large-Scale Enrichment Plant: Yet Another Questionable Extrapolation Based on Aluminum Tubes\"](https:\/\/isis-online.org\/publications\/dprk\/DPRKenrichment22Feb.pdf) (PDF). Institute for Science and International Security. Retrieved 25 April 2022.\n43. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-43)**\n    Tim Carter (14 November 2002). [\"KEDO Executive Board Meeting Concludes – November 14, 2002\"](http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/news_detail.asp?NewsID=23). KEDO. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20110607230234\/http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/news_detail.asp?NewsID=23) from the original on 7 June 2011. Retrieved 2010-05-31.\n44. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-KCNA-20030110_44-0)**\n    [\"DPRK FM sends letter to UNSC president\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090920185607\/http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/2003\/200301\/news01\/11.htm). [KCNA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Central_News_Agency \"Korean Central News Agency\"). January 10, 2003. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/2003\/200301\/news01\/11.htm#12) on 2009-09-20. Retrieved 2009-05-27.\n45. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-KCNA-20050210_45-0)**\n    [\"DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-party Talks for Indefinite Period\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090531175657\/http:\/\/kcna.co.jp\/item\/2005\/200502\/news02\/11.htm#1). [KCNA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Central_News_Agency \"Korean Central News Agency\"). February 10, 2005. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/2005\/200502\/news02\/11.htm#1) on 31 May 2009. Retrieved 2009-05-27.\n46. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-46)**\n    Tim Carter (21 November 2003). [\"KEDO Executive Board Meeting – November 21, 2003\"](http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/news_detail.asp?NewsID=25). KEDO. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20110607230304\/http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/news_detail.asp?NewsID=25) from the original on 7 June 2011. Retrieved 2010-05-31.\n47. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-47)**\n    [\"NPP\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20070930014646\/http:\/\/www.carnegieendowment.org\/npp\/koreadenuclearization.cfm). [Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Carnegie_Endowment_for_International_Peace \"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace\"). Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www.carnegieendowment.org\/npp\/koreadenuclearization.cfm) on 2007-09-30. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n48. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-48)**\n    [\"Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090908014926\/http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/2002\/200210\/news10\/25.htm). [KCNA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Central_News_Agency \"Korean Central News Agency\"). October 25, 2002. Archived from [the original](http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/2002\/200210\/news10\/25.htm#4) on 2009-09-08. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n49. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-49)**\n    [\"President Delivers State of the Union Address\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090608080318\/http:\/\/georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov\/news\/releases\/2002\/01\/20020129-11.html). Georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov. 2002-01-29. Archived from [the original](https:\/\/georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov\/news\/releases\/2002\/01\/20020129-11.html) on 8 June 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n50. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-50)**\n    John Pike. [\"Nuclear Posture Review \\[Excerpts\\]\"](http:\/\/www.globalsecurity.org\/wmd\/library\/policy\/dod\/npr.htm). Globalsecurity.org. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090610094536\/http:\/\/www.globalsecurity.org\/wmd\/library\/policy\/dod\/npr.htm) from the original on 10 June 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n51. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-51)**\n    Selig Harrison (October 25, 2007). [\"A U.S. Foreign Policy Expert Urged 'Continued Backing' of Nuclear Talks\"](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090909072853\/http:\/\/www.dynamic-korea.com\/news\/view_news.php?uid=200700154588&main=KHF&sub=&keyword=selig%20harrison). Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States of America. Archived from the original on September 9, 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n52. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-52)**\n    [\"Could North Korea Have A Bomb?\"](https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/nukes\/nukes.html). *PBS.org*. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090606180425\/http:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/nukes\/nukes.html) from the original on 6 June 2009. Retrieved 11 November 2016. \"\\[In October 2002\\] Apparently surprised by how much the U.S. had learned, the Pyongyang officials admitted to the existence of the HUE program, in direct violation of the NPT.\"\n53. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-53)**\n    DAVID E. SANGER (17 October 2002). [\"NORTH KOREA SAYS IT HAS A PROGRAM ON NUCLEAR ARMS\"](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2002\/10\/17\/world\/north-korea-says-it-has-a-program-on-nuclear-arms.html?pagewanted=all). *[The New York Times](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/The_New_York_Times \"The New York Times\")*. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20160313043711\/http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2002\/10\/17\/world\/north-korea-says-it-has-a-program-on-nuclear-arms.html?pagewanted=all) from the original on 13 March 2016. Retrieved 11 November 2016. \"If the North Korean assertions are true – and administration officials assume they are – the government of Kim Jong Il began in the mid- or late-1990s a secret, parallel program to produce weapons-grade material from highly enriched uranium.\"\n54. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-54)**\n    Joseph Kahn; David E. Sanger (September 20, 2005). [\"U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open\"](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2005\/09\/20\/international\/asia\/20korea.html). *[The New York Times](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/The_New_York_Times \"The New York Times\")*. [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090205045125\/http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2005\/09\/20\/international\/asia\/20korea.html) from the original on February 5, 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n55. **[^](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-55)**\n    [\"KEDO website homepage\"](http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/). [Archived](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090413090027\/http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/) from the original on 2009-04-13. Retrieved 2009-06-09.\n\n- [Agreed Framework between the USA and the DPRK](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20031217175315\/http:\/\/www.iaea.org\/Publications\/Documents\/Infcircs\/Others\/infcirc457.pdf) – Geneva, October 21, 1994 (archived 2003-12-17)\n- [Press Briefing by Ambassador Gallucci on Korea (Agreed Framework)](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20070929094316\/http:\/\/www.clintonfoundation.org\/legacy\/101894-press-briefing-by-ambassador-gallucci-on-korea.htm), [White House](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/White_House \"White House\"), October 18, 1994\n- [Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation Newsbrief, 3rd Quarter 1994](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20070701065811\/http:\/\/www.ppnn.soton.ac.uk\/nb27.pdf) – describes negotiations leading to Agreed Framework\n- [Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea](http:\/\/www.kedo.org\/pdfs\/SupplyAgreement.pdf) – KEDO, 1995\n- [Ch 14: North Korea](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20030403083117\/http:\/\/www.ceip.org\/files\/projects\/npp\/resources\/DeadlyArsenals\/chapters%20\$pdf\$\/Pages%20from%2014-NoKorea.pdf) – from *Deadly Arsenals*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2002)\n- [Nautilus Institute](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20030224165404\/http:\/\/www.nautilus.org\/fora\/) – In-depth coverage of the North Korean situation since 1997\n- [North Korea's Nuclear Breach](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20030305132639\/http:\/\/www.ceip.org\/files\/projects\/npp\/resources\/northkoreacrisis.htm) – *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*\n- [Washington was on brink of war with North Korea 5 years ago](http:\/\/www.cnn.com\/US\/9910\/04\/korea.brink\/), [CNN](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/CNN \"CNN\"), October 4, 1999\n- [Modernizing the US-DPRK Agreed Framework: The Energy Imperative](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20051218110023\/http:\/\/www.nautilus.org\/archives\/papers\/energy\/ModernizingAF.PDF), Nautilus Institute, February 16, 2001\n- [Report on Delay in Construction of Light-Water Reactor Project](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20070927181825\/http:\/\/www1.korea-np.co.jp\/pk\/161st_issue\/2001052201.htm), [KCNA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Central_News_Agency \"Korean Central News Agency\"), May 22, 2001\n- [North Korea's nuclear facilities by Google Earth](http:\/\/freekorea.us\/2008\/01\/27\/satellite-images-of-north-koreas-nuclear-facilities\/)\n\nBreak-down of Agreed Framework\n\n- [J. Kelly Failed to Produce 'Evidence' in Pyongyang](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20090908012957\/http:\/\/www1.korea-np.co.jp\/pk\/188th_issue\/2003013001.htm) – O Song Chol, DPRK Foreign Ministry, January 18, 2003\n- [North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program](http:\/\/www.gwu.edu\/~nsarchiv\/NSAEBB\/NSAEBB87\/nk24.pdf), Larry A. Niksch, Congressional Research Service – The Library of Congress, March 17, 2003\n- [The History of the 1994 Agreed Framework](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20061208041852\/http:\/\/ffip.com\/infobriefs030703.htm), Daniel B. Poneman, [The Forum for International Policy](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/w\/index.php?title=The_Forum_for_International_Policy&action=edit&redlink=1 \"The Forum for International Policy (page does not exist)\"), March 7, 2003\n- [Examining the Lessons of the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Deal](https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/kim\/themes\/lessons.html), [PBS](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Public_Broadcasting_Service \"Public Broadcasting Service\"), April 10, 2003\n- [The United States, North Korea, And The End Of The Agreed Framework](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20060406080625\/http:\/\/www.army.mil\/professionalwriting\/volumes\/volume1\/august_2003\/8_03_1.html), [Naval War College Review](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Naval_War_College_Review \"Naval War College Review\"), Summer 2003\n- [Dealing With North Korea's Nuclear Programs](https:\/\/2001-2009.state.gov\/p\/eap\/rls\/rm\/2004\/34395.htm) – [James A. Kelly](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/James_A._Kelly \"James A. Kelly\"), Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 15, 2004\n- [Did North Korea Cheat?](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20051226202624\/http:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.org\/20050101faessay84109\/selig-s-harrison\/did-north-korea-cheat.html), [Foreign Affairs](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\"), January\/February 2005\n- [North Korea Says It Will Abandon Nuclear Efforts](https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2005\/09\/19\/international\/asia\/19korea.html?hp&ex=1127188800&en=1cab1bb77582f12a&ei=5094&partner=homepage), *[The New York Times](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/The_New_York_Times \"The New York Times\")*, September 19, 2005\n- [KCNA Urges U.S. to Compensate for Losses Caused by Scrapping AF](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20061029082308\/http:\/\/www.kcna.co.jp\/item\/2005\/200512\/news12\/20.htm#9), [KCNA](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Korean_Central_News_Agency \"Korean Central News Agency\"), December 19, 2005\n- [The Beijing Deal is not the Agreed Framework](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20070927012430\/http:\/\/www.nautilus.org\/fora\/security\/07014Hayes.html), Peter Hayes, [Nautilus Institute](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nautilus_Institute_for_Security_and_Sustainability \"Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability\"), February 14, 2007\n- Lewis, Jeffrey (15 May 2015). [\"Revisiting the Agreed Framework\"](https:\/\/www.38north.org\/2015\/05\/jlewis051415\/). *[38 North](https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/38_North \"38 North\")*. U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.\n\nJoint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula\n\n- [Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https:\/\/2001-2009.state.gov\/t\/ac\/rls\/or\/2004\/31011.htm) – text of agreement, February 19, 1992\n- [Joint Declaration of South and North Korea of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20030503150547\/http:\/\/nti.org\/e_research\/official_docs\/inventory\/pdfs\/koreanuc.pdf) – analysis, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, 2002","meta_canonical":null}

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Boilerpipe Text	From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ( Korean : 북미제네바기본합의서 ) was signed on 21 October 1994, between North Korea (DPRK) and the United States . The objective of the agreement was the freezing and replacement of North Korea's indigenous nuclear power plant program with more nuclear proliferation resistant light water reactor power plants, and the step-by-step normalization of relations between the U.S. and the DPRK . Implementation of the agreement was troubled from the start, but its key elements were being implemented until it effectively broke down in 2003. AGREED FRAMEWORK COVER PAGE – IAEA AGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE #1 – IAEA: Replace the Nuclear(graphite) reactor to the Light-water AGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE #2- IAEA: Supply the alternative energy-Heavy Oil and freeze & dismantle the nuclear reactor AGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE #3 – IAEA: Establish a formal peace assurance between U.S. and DPRK The 5 MWe pilot Yongbyon nuclear reactor , made operational in 1986, showing the fuel access channels On 12 December 1985, North Korea became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On 10 April 1992, its NPT safeguards agreement entered into force. In May 1992, North Korea submitted its initial report to the IAEA under that agreement, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections began. Shortly thereafter inconsistencies emerged between the North Korea initial declaration and the Agency's findings, centering on a mismatch between declared plutonium product and nuclear waste solutions and the results of the Agency's analysis. The latter suggested that undeclared plutonium existed in North Korea. In order to find answers to the inconsistencies detected and to determine the completeness and correctness of the initial declaration provided, the IAEA requested access to additional information and to two sites which seemed to be related to the storage of nuclear waste. [ 1 ] The DPRK refused access to the sites, and on 12 March 1993, North Korea announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT. On 1 April 1993, the IAEA concluded that North Korea was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and referred this to the UN Security Council. Following UN Security Council resolution 825 , which called upon the DPRK to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allow weapons inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into the country, North Korea "suspended the effectuation" of that withdrawal in June 1993. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] In November 1993, North Korea proposed to the United States that the two governments negotiate a "package solution" to all of the issues dividing them. The Clinton Administration accepted this in principle but conditioned such "comprehensive" talks on North Korea acting first to allow a resumption of IAEA inspections and to re-open negotiations with South Korea over nuclear questions (North Korea had broken off talks with South Korea in late 1992). North Korea approached the IAEA in January 1994, offering a single inspection, less comprehensive than those conducted by the IAEA in 1992. After several weeks of tough negotiations, the IAEA announced on 16 February 1994 that North Korea had accepted "the inspection activities" that the Agency had requested. In response, the Clinton Administration agreed to suspend the Team Spirit military exercise with South Korea (a long-standing North Korean demand) and begin a new round of talks with North Korea—subject to North Korea allowing full implementation of the IAEA inspection and beginning high level talks with South Korea. [ 3 ] Motivation : North Korea announced intention to withdraw from NPT and non-compliance with IAEA safeguards . Signed Date : 21 October 1994 by American ambassador Robert Gallucci and North Korean vice minister Kang Sok-ju Summary : Freeze of North Korean nuclear program, leading to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and initial Peace agreement between the United States and North Korea [ 4 ] [ 5 ] States Agreed Items Progress United States Deliver 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually to DPRK as an alternative energy Make arrangements for two 1000 MWe light water reactors to DPRK with target date of 2003. Provide DPRK with formal assurance against the use of nuclear weapons by U.S, Move toward full normalization of political and economic relations The heavy oil was delivered to the DPRK with some delays United States established international consortium KEDO to build LWRs, though U.S. Congress rejected U.S. funding for the project North Korea Freeze all graphite-moderated nuclear reactors (5MWe reactor and 50 & 200 MWe under construction) Remain a party to the NPT Take steps to implement 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Dismantle graphite-moderated reactors when LWR project is completed Move toward full normalization of political and economic relations DPRK stopped operating 5 MWe reactor and abandoned reactors under construction DPRK "suspended" notification of withdrawal from NPT The main provisions of the agreement [ 6 ] were: DPRK's graphite-moderated 5MWe nuclear reactor , and the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors under construction, which could easily produce weapons grade plutonium , would be replaced with two 1000MW light water reactors (LWR) power plants by a target date of 2003. Oil for heating and electricity production would be provided while DPRK's reactors were shut down and construction halted, until completion of the first LWR power unit. The amount of oil was 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year. The two sides would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations. The U.S. would provide formal peace and national security assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. The DPRK would take steps to implement the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula [ 7 ] between South and North Korea. The DPRK would remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty . IAEA ad hoc and routine inspections would resume for facilities not subject to the freeze. Existing spent nuclear fuel stocks would be stored and ultimately disposed of without reprocessing in the DPRK. Before delivery of key LWR nuclear components, the DPRK would come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. There were also some confidential minutes supporting the agreement, which have not been made public. [ 8 ] [ 9 ] These are reported to include that full-scope IAEA safeguards would be applied when the major non-nuclear components of the first LWR unit were completed but before the delivery of key nuclear components. [ 10 ] The commitments in the agreement were voluntary and non-binding, [ citation needed ] not approved by the United States Senate as with a treaty , though noted by the United Nations Security Council . [ 11 ] [ 12 ] It was signed in the wake of North Korea's 90-day advance notification of its intended withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which North Korea "suspended" after 89 days), a U.S. military buildup near the country, and U.S. plans to bomb the active Yongbyon nuclear reactor . [ 13 ] The U.S. regarded the Agreed Framework primarily as a non-proliferation agreement, whereas North Korea placed greater value on measures normalizing relations with the U.S. [ 14 ] Terms of the pact and consequent agreements included the shutdown of the pilot Yongbyon nuclear reactor , abandoning the construction of two larger nuclear power plants, and the canning and sealing, under IAEA monitoring, of spent fuel that could have been reprocessed to create plutonium for a nuclear weapon . In exchange two light water reactors would be constructed in North Korea by 2003 at a cost of $4 billion, primarily supplied by South Korea. [ 15 ] In the interim, North Korea would be supplied with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually, at no cost, to make up for lost energy production. North Korea was required to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, allowing the IAEA to verify the correctness and completeness of its initial declaration, before key nuclear components of the reactor would be delivered. When the LWR plants were completed, North Korea would dismantle its other nuclear reactors and associated facilities. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is a consortium of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and various other states that is responsible for implementing the energy-related parts of the agreement. North Korea would repay KEDO over a 20-year interest-free period after the completion of each LWR plant. [ 16 ] It was reported that US President Bill Clinton 's officials agreed to the plan only because they thought that the North Korean government would collapse before the nuclear power project was completed as North Korea's leader Kim Il Sung had recently died . [ 17 ] North Korean officials at the time also suspected the U.S. anticipated an early collapse of the DPRK. [ 18 ] Implementation of the agreement [ edit ] KEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005 Soon after the agreement was signed, U.S. Congress control changed to the Republican Party , who did not support the agreement. [ 19 ] [ 20 ] Some Republican Senators were strongly against the agreement, regarding it as appeasement . [ 21 ] [ 22 ] Initially, U.S. Department of Defense emergency funds not under Congress' control were used to fund the transitional oil supplies under the agreement, [ 23 ] together with international funding. From 1996 Congress provided funding, though not always sufficient amounts. [ 14 ] [ 24 ] Consequently, some of the agreed transitional oil supplies were delivered late. [ 25 ] KEDO's first director, Stephen Bosworth , later commented "The Agreed Framework was a political orphan within two weeks after its signature". [ 26 ] Some analysts believe North Korea agreed to the freeze primarily because of the U.S. agreement to phase out economic sanctions that had been in place since the Korean War . But because of congressional opposition, the U.S. failed to deliver on this part of the agreement. [ 27 ] International funding for the LWR replacement power plants had to be sought. Formal invitations to bid were not issued until 1998, by which time the delays were infuriating North Korea. [ 26 ] In May 1998, North Korea warned it would restart nuclear research if the U.S. could not install the LWR. [ 28 ] [ 29 ] Formal ground breaking on the site was on 21 August 1997, [ 30 ] but significant spending on the LWR project did not commence until 2000. [ 31 ] U.S. officials in 1998 testified to Congress that there were no fundamental violations of any aspect of the Framework Agreement by North Koreans. [ 32 ] Joel S. Wit, State Department Coordinator for implementation of the Agreed Framework (1995–2000) [ 33 ] during the Clinton administration, stated that "we did know about the DPRK cheating on the highly-enriched uranium front starting in 1998." [ 11 ] The U.S. diplomat who negotiated the framework, Robert Gallucci has warned that it could collapse if United States did not fulfill obligations that it agreed to. [ 32 ] There was increasing disagreement between North Korea and the United States on the scope and implementation of the agreement. The United States did little to meet its commitment to normalize political and economic relations. [ 34 ] When by 1999 economic sanctions had not been lifted and full diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea had not been established, North Korea warned that they would resume nuclear research unless the United States kept up its end of the bargain. [ citation needed ] [ 35 ] Construction of the first LWR reactor began in August 2002. [ 36 ] Construction of both reactors was well behind schedule. The initial plan was for both reactors to be operational by 2003, but the construction had been halted indefinitely in late 2002. Senators accused President Clinton of understating the cost of the project. [ 32 ] Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rust Deming told Congress "to be frank, we have in past years not always met the fuel year deadline". [ 32 ] Final breakdown of the agreement [ edit ] In January 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush labeled North Korea in his first State of the Union Address as part of an Axis of Evil . [ 37 ] In October 2002, a U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly visited North Korea to confront the North Koreans with the U.S. assessment that they had a uranium enrichment program. [ 38 ] The parties' reports of the meeting differ. The U.S. delegation believed the North Koreans had admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium program. [ 39 ] The North Koreans stated Kelly made his assertions in an arrogant manner, but failed to produce any evidence such as satellite photos, and they responded by denying that North Korea planned to produce nuclear weapons using enriched uranium. They went on to state that as an independent sovereign state North Korea was entitled to possess nuclear weapons for defense, although they did not possess such a weapon at that point in time. [ 8 ] [ 40 ] [ 41 ] Relations between the two countries, which had seemed hopeful two years earlier, quickly deteriorated into open hostility. [ 14 ] The highly enriched uranium (HEU) intelligence that James Kelly's accusation is based on is still controversial: According to the CIA fact sheet to Congress on 19 November 2002, there was "clear evidence indicating the North has begun constructing a centrifuge facility" and this plant could produce annually enough HEU for two or more nuclear weapons per year when it is finished. However, some experts assessed that the equipment North Korea imported was insufficient evidence of a production-scale enrichment program. [ 42 ] KEDO members considered in November 2002 whether to halt the fuel oil shipments in response to the previous month's developments. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly warned Japanese officials that the U.S. Congress would not fund such shipments in the face of continued violations. The shipments were halted in December. [ 43 ] On 10 January 2003, North Korea again announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. [ 44 ] On February 10, 2005, North Korea finally declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons as a "nuclear deterrent for self-defence". [ 45 ] On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test . US intelligence agencies believe that North Korea has manufactured a handful of simple nuclear weapons. In December 2003, KEDO suspended work on the pressurized water reactor project. Subsequently, KEDO shifted the focus of its efforts to ensuring that the LWR project assets at the construction site in North Korea and at manufacturers' facilities around the world ($1.5 billion invested to date) are preserved and maintained. [ 46 ] Each side blamed the other for ending the Agreed Framework. The United States pointed out that a North Korean uranium enrichment facility would violate the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, [ 47 ] which states "The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." North Korea accused the United States of a "hostile policy" including deliberately delaying fuel supplies and progress on the KEDO project that "effectively nullified" the agreement, listing North Korea as part of the "Axis of evil" and a target of the U.S. pre-emptive nuclear strikes. [ 48 ] [ 49 ] [ 50 ] Although the agreement had largely broken down, North Korea did not restart work on the two production size nuclear power plants that were frozen under the agreement. These plants could potentially have produced enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce several nuclear weapons per year. The Agreed Framework was successful in freezing North Korean plutonium production in Yongbyon plutonium complex for eight years from 1994 to December 2002; [ 51 ] however, it failed to stop North Korea from developing a secret highly enriched uranium program, [ 52 ] begun in the "mid- or late-1990s." [ 53 ] Discussions took place through the Six-party talks about a replacement agreement, reaching a preliminary accord on 19 September 2005. The accord made no mention of the U.S. contention that North Korea has a secret, underground enriched uranium program. However, the new accord would require North Korea to dismantle all nuclear facilities, not just specific plants as in the Agreed Framework. [ 54 ] Ultimately the Six-party talks were discontinued in 2009. On May 31, 2006, KEDO decided to terminate the LWR construction project. [ 55 ] North Korea and weapons of mass destruction Six-party talks 2018 Korean peace process 2018 North Korea–United States summit 2019 North Korea–United States Hanoi Summit 2019 Koreas–United States DMZ Summit ^ a b "Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards" . IAEA. 14 October 2014. Archived from the original on 5 December 2014 . Retrieved 30 November 2014 . ^ Selig S. Harrison (2009). Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement . Princeton University Press. p. 209. ISBN 9781400824915 . Retrieved 30 November 2014 . ^ "U.N. Security Council Consideration of North Korea's Violations of its Nuclear Treaty Obligations" . Archived from the original on 2015-04-09 . 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[o]") ## Contents move to sidebar hide - [(Top)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework) - [1 Background](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#Background) - [2 Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#Agreement) - [3 Implementation of the agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#Implementation_of_the_agreement) - [4 Final breakdown of the agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#Final_breakdown_of_the_agreement) - [5 See also](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#See_also) - [6 References](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#References) - [7 External links](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#External_links) Toggle the table of contents # Agreed Framework 6 languages - [Deutsch](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genfer_Rahmenabkommen "Genfer Rahmenabkommen – German") - [فارسی](https://fa.wikipedia.org/wiki/%DA%86%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%86%D9%88%D8%A8_%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF_%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82 "چارچوب مورد توافق – Persian") - [日本語](https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%B1%B3%E6%9C%9D%E6%9E%A0%E7%B5%84%E3%81%BF%E5%90%88%E6%84%8F "米朝枠組み合意 – Japanese") - [한국어](https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EC%A0%9C%EB%84%A4%EB%B0%94_%ED%95%A9%EC%9D%98 "제네바 합의 – Korean") - [ไทย](https://th.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%AD%E0%B8%9A%E0%B8%84%E0%B8%A7%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%A1%E0%B8%95%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%A5%E0%B8%87 "กรอบความตกลง – Thai") - [中文](https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%9C%9D%E7%BE%8E%E6%A0%B8%E6%A1%86%E6%9E%B6%E5%8D%8F%E8%AE%AE "朝美核框架协议 – Chinese") [Edit links](https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Special:EntityPage/Q352182#sitelinks-wikipedia "Edit interlanguage links") - [Article](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework "View the content page [c]") - [Talk](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Agreed_Framework "Discuss improvements to the content page [t]") English - [Read](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework) - [Edit](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit "Edit this page [e]") - [View history](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=history "Past revisions of this page [h]") Tools Tools move to sidebar hide Actions - [Read](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework) - [Edit](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit "Edit this page [e]") - [View history](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=history) General - [What links here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:WhatLinksHere/Agreed_Framework "List of all English Wikipedia pages containing links to this page [j]") - [Related changes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:RecentChangesLinked/Agreed_Framework "Recent changes in pages linked from this page [k]") - [Upload file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:File_Upload_Wizard "Upload files [u]") - [Permanent link](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&oldid=1318055029 "Permanent link to this revision of this page") - [Page information](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=info "More information about this page") - [Cite this page](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:CiteThisPage&page=Agreed_Framework&id=1318055029&wpFormIdentifier=titleform "Information on how to cite this page") - [Get shortened URL](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:UrlShortener&url=https%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FAgreed_Framework) Print/export - [Download as PDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:DownloadAsPdf&page=Agreed_Framework&action=show-download-screen "Download this page as a PDF file") - [Printable version](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&printable=yes "Printable version of this page [p]") In other projects - [Wikidata item](https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Special:EntityPage/Q352182 "Structured data on this page hosted by Wikidata [g]") Appearance move to sidebar hide From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 1994 nuclear agreement between the United States and North Korea Not to be confused with [Framework agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Framework_agreement "Framework agreement"). The Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ([Korean](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_language "Korean language"): 북미제네바기본합의서) was signed on 21 October 1994, between [North Korea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea "North Korea") (DPRK) and the [United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States "United States"). The objective of the agreement was the freezing and replacement of North Korea's indigenous [nuclear power plant](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_plant "Nuclear power plant") program with more [nuclear proliferation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation "Nuclear proliferation") resistant [light water reactor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light_water_reactor "Light water reactor") power plants, and the step-by-step normalization of [relations between the U.S. and the DPRK](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_relations "North Korea–United States relations"). Implementation of the agreement was troubled from the start, but its key elements were being implemented until it effectively broke down in 2003. [![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fe/Agreed_frame_work_1994_cover_page_1.jpg/250px-Agreed_frame_work_1994_cover_page_1.jpg)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Agreed_frame_work_1994_cover_page_1.jpg) AGREED FRAMEWORK COVER PAGE – IAEA [![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a4/AGREED_FRAMEWORK_PAGE1.jpg/250px-AGREED_FRAMEWORK_PAGE1.jpg)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:AGREED_FRAMEWORK_PAGE1.jpg) AGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE \#1 – IAEA: Replace the Nuclear(graphite) reactor to the Light-water [![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/02/Agreed_frame_work_1994_page_2.jpg/250px-Agreed_frame_work_1994_page_2.jpg)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Agreed_frame_work_1994_page_2.jpg) AGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE \#2- IAEA: Supply the alternative energy-Heavy Oil and freeze & dismantle the nuclear reactor [![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/46/AGREED_FRAME_WORK_PAGE3.jpg/250px-AGREED_FRAME_WORK_PAGE3.jpg)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:AGREED_FRAME_WORK_PAGE3.jpg) AGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE \#3 – IAEA: Establish a formal peace assurance between U.S. and DPRK ## Background \[[edit](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=1 "Edit section: Background")\] [![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d9/Yongbyon_5_MWe_reactor_-_fuel_channels_access_ports.jpg/250px-Yongbyon_5_MWe_reactor_-_fuel_channels_access_ports.jpg)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Yongbyon_5_MWe_reactor_-_fuel_channels_access_ports.jpg) The 5 MWe pilot [Yongbyon nuclear reactor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yongbyon_Nuclear_Scientific_Research_Center "Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center"), made operational in 1986, showing the fuel access channels Main articles: [Timeline of the North Korean nuclear program](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_North_Korean_nuclear_program "Timeline of the North Korean nuclear program"), [North Korea nuclear weapons program](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_nuclear_weapons_program "North Korea nuclear weapons program"), and [1994 North Korean nuclear crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_North_Korean_nuclear_crisis "1994 North Korean nuclear crisis") On 12 December 1985, North Korea became a party to the Treaty on the [Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation "Nuclear proliferation") (NPT). On 10 April 1992, its NPT safeguards agreement entered into force. In May 1992, North Korea submitted its initial report to the IAEA under that agreement, and [International Atomic Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Atomic_Energy_Agency "International Atomic Energy Agency") (IAEA) inspections began. Shortly thereafter inconsistencies emerged between the North Korea initial declaration and the Agency's findings, centering on a mismatch between declared [plutonium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plutonium "Plutonium") product and [nuclear waste](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_waste "Nuclear waste") solutions and the results of the Agency's analysis. The latter suggested that undeclared plutonium existed in North Korea. In order to find answers to the inconsistencies detected and to determine the completeness and correctness of the initial declaration provided, the IAEA requested access to additional information and to two sites which seemed to be related to the storage of nuclear waste.[\[1\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-iaea-factsheet-1) The DPRK refused access to the sites, and on 12 March 1993, North Korea announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT. On 1 April 1993, the IAEA concluded that North Korea was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and referred this to the UN Security Council. Following UN Security Council [resolution 825](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_825 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 825"), which called upon the DPRK to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allow weapons inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into the country, North Korea "suspended the effectuation" of that withdrawal in June 1993.[\[1\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-iaea-factsheet-1)[\[2\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-harrison-2009-2) In November 1993, North Korea proposed to the United States that the two governments negotiate a "package solution" to all of the issues dividing them. The [Clinton Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clinton_Administration "Clinton Administration") accepted this in principle but conditioned such "comprehensive" talks on North Korea acting first to allow a resumption of IAEA inspections and to re-open negotiations with South Korea over nuclear questions (North Korea had broken off talks with South Korea in late 1992). North Korea approached the IAEA in January 1994, offering a single inspection, less comprehensive than those conducted by the IAEA in 1992. After several weeks of tough negotiations, the IAEA announced on 16 February 1994 that North Korea had accepted "the inspection activities" that the Agency had requested. In response, the Clinton Administration agreed to suspend the [Team Spirit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Team_Spirit "Team Spirit") military exercise with South Korea (a long-standing North Korean demand) and begin a new round of talks with North Korea—subject to North Korea allowing full implementation of the IAEA inspection and beginning high level talks with South Korea.[\[3\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-3) ## Agreement \[[edit](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=2 "Edit section: Agreement")\] - Motivation : North Korea announced intention to withdraw from [NPT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty") and [non-compliance](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-compliance "Non-compliance") with [IAEA safeguards](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IAEA_safeguards "IAEA safeguards"). - Signed Date: 21 October 1994 by American ambassador [Robert Gallucci](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Gallucci "Robert Gallucci") and North Korean vice minister [Kang Sok-ju](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kang_Sok-ju "Kang Sok-ju") - Summary: Freeze of North Korean nuclear program, leading to [denuclearization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denuclearization "Denuclearization") of the Korean Peninsula, and initial [Peace agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_agreement "Peace agreement") between the [United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States "United States") and North Korea[\[4\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-4)[\[5\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-5) \| States \| Agreed Items \| Progress \| \|---\|---\|---\| \| ![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/a/a4/Flag_of_the_United_States.svg/40px-Flag_of_the_United_States.svg.png) [United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States "United States") \| Deliver 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually to DPRK as an alternative energy Make arrangements for two 1000 MWe [light water reactors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light_water_reactor "Light water reactor") to DPRK with target date of 2003. Provide DPRK with formal assurance against the use of nuclear weapons by U.S, Move toward full normalization of political and economic relations \| The heavy oil was delivered to the DPRK with some delays United States established international consortium [KEDO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Peninsula_Energy_Development_Organization "Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization") to build LWRs, though U.S. Congress rejected U.S. funding for the project \| \| ![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/51/Flag_of_North_Korea.svg/40px-Flag_of_North_Korea.svg.png) [North Korea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea "North Korea") \| Freeze all graphite-moderated nuclear reactors (5MWe reactor and 50 & 200 MWe under construction) Remain a party to the NPT Take steps to implement 1992 [Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Declaration_of_the_Denuclearization_of_the_Korean_Peninsula "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula") Dismantle graphite-moderated reactors when LWR project is completed Move toward full normalization of political and economic relations \| DPRK stopped operating 5 MWe reactor and abandoned reactors under construction DPRK "suspended" notification of withdrawal from NPT \| The main provisions of the agreement[\[6\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-iaea-INFCIRC457-6) were: - DPRK's graphite-moderated 5MWe [nuclear reactor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_plant "Nuclear power plant"), and the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors under construction, which could easily produce weapons grade [plutonium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plutonium "Plutonium"), would be replaced with two 1000MW [light water reactors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light_water_reactors "Light water reactors") (LWR) power plants by a target date of 2003. - Oil for heating and electricity production would be provided while DPRK's reactors were shut down and construction halted, until completion of the first LWR power unit. The amount of oil was 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year. - The two sides would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations. - The U.S. would provide formal [peace](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace "Peace") and [national security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security "National security") assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. - The DPRK would take steps to implement the 1992 [Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Declaration_of_the_Denuclearization_of_the_Korean_Peninsula "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula")[\[7\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-7) between South and North Korea. - The DPRK would remain a party to the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty"). - [IAEA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IAEA "IAEA") ad hoc and routine inspections would resume for facilities not subject to the freeze. - Existing spent nuclear fuel stocks would be stored and ultimately disposed of without [reprocessing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_reprocessing "Nuclear reprocessing") in the DPRK. - Before delivery of key LWR nuclear components, the DPRK would come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. There were also some confidential minutes supporting the agreement, which have not been made public.[\[8\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20021025-8)[\[9\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-clinton-19990304-9) These are reported to include that full-scope IAEA safeguards would be applied when the major non-nuclear components of the first LWR unit were completed but before the delivery of key nuclear components.[\[10\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-IISS-net-assesment-10) The commitments in the agreement were voluntary and non-binding,\[[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed "Wikipedia:Citation needed")\] not approved by the [United States Senate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Senate "United States Senate") as with a [treaty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty "Treaty"), though noted by the [United Nations Security Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council "United Nations Security Council").[\[11\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-wp-20150313-11)[\[12\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-UNSC-S/PRST/1994/64-12) It was signed in the wake of North Korea's 90-day advance notification of its intended withdrawal from the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty") (which North Korea "suspended" after 89 days), a U.S. military buildup near the country, and U.S. plans to bomb the active [Yongbyon nuclear reactor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yongbyon_Nuclear_Scientific_Research_Center "Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center").[\[13\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-13) The U.S. regarded the Agreed Framework primarily as a non-proliferation agreement, whereas North Korea placed greater value on measures normalizing relations with the U.S.[\[14\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-bridge-hecker-2010-14) Terms of the pact and consequent agreements included the shutdown of the pilot [Yongbyon nuclear reactor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yongbyon_Nuclear_Scientific_Research_Center "Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center"), abandoning the construction of two larger nuclear power plants, and the canning and sealing, under [IAEA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IAEA "IAEA") monitoring, of spent fuel that could have been reprocessed to create plutonium for a [nuclear weapon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon "Nuclear weapon"). In exchange two [light water reactors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light_water_reactor "Light water reactor") would be constructed in North Korea by 2003 at a cost of \$4 billion, primarily supplied by South Korea.[\[15\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-15) In the interim, North Korea would be supplied with 500,000 tons of [heavy fuel oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heavy_fuel_oil "Heavy fuel oil") annually, at no cost, to make up for lost energy production. North Korea was required to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, allowing the IAEA to verify the correctness and completeness of its initial declaration, before key nuclear components of the reactor would be delivered. When the LWR plants were completed, North Korea would dismantle its other nuclear reactors and associated facilities. The [Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Peninsula_Energy_Development_Organization "Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization") (KEDO) is a consortium of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and various other states that is responsible for implementing the energy-related parts of the agreement. North Korea would repay KEDO over a 20-year interest-free period after the completion of each LWR plant.[\[16\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-16) It was reported that [US President](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States "President of the United States") [Bill Clinton](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Clinton "Bill Clinton")'s officials agreed to the plan only because they thought that the North Korean government would collapse before the nuclear power project was completed as North Korea's leader [Kim Il Sung](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Il_Sung "Kim Il Sung") [had recently died](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_and_state_funeral_of_Kim_Il_Sung "Death and state funeral of Kim Il Sung").[\[17\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-17) North Korean officials at the time also suspected the U.S. anticipated an early collapse of the DPRK.[\[18\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-18) ## Implementation of the agreement \[[edit](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=3 "Edit section: Implementation of the agreement")\] [![KEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d4/KEDO_funding.gif/500px-KEDO_funding.gif)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:KEDO_funding.gif "KEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005") KEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005 Soon after the agreement was signed, [U.S. Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Congress "U.S. Congress") control changed to the [Republican Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republican_Party_$United_States$ "Republican Party (United States)"), who did not support the agreement.[\[19\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-sigal-19)[\[20\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-20) Some Republican [Senators](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Senator "U.S. Senator") were strongly against the agreement, regarding it as [appeasement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeasement "Appeasement").[\[21\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-21)[\[22\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-22) Initially, [U.S. Department of Defense](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Department_of_Defense "U.S. Department of Defense") emergency funds not under Congress' control were used to fund the transitional oil supplies under the agreement,[\[23\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-23) together with international funding. From 1996 Congress provided funding, though not always sufficient amounts.[\[14\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-bridge-hecker-2010-14)[\[24\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-CRS-20030317-24) Consequently, some of the agreed transitional oil supplies were delivered late.[\[25\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-25) KEDO's first director, [Stephen Bosworth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Bosworth "Stephen Bosworth"), later commented "The Agreed Framework was a political orphan within two weeks after its signature".[\[26\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-cnnmoney-20030512-26) Some analysts believe North Korea agreed to the freeze primarily because of the U.S. agreement to phase out economic sanctions that had been in place since the [Korean War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War "Korean War"). But because of congressional opposition, the U.S. failed to deliver on this part of the agreement.[\[27\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-27) International funding for the LWR replacement power plants had to be sought. Formal invitations to bid were not issued until 1998, by which time the delays were infuriating North Korea.[\[26\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-cnnmoney-20030512-26) In May 1998, North Korea warned it would restart nuclear research if the U.S. could not install the LWR.[\[28\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-28)[\[29\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-29) Formal ground breaking on the site was on 21 August 1997,[\[30\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-30) but significant spending on the LWR project did not commence until 2000.[\[31\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-31) U.S. officials in 1998 testified to Congress that there were no fundamental violations of any aspect of the Framework Agreement by North Koreans.[\[32\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32) Joel S. Wit, State Department Coordinator for implementation of the Agreed Framework (1995–2000)[\[33\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-33) during the Clinton administration, stated that "we did know about the DPRK cheating on the highly-enriched uranium front starting in 1998."[\[11\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-wp-20150313-11) The U.S. diplomat who negotiated the framework, [Robert Gallucci](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Gallucci "Robert Gallucci") has warned that it could collapse if United States did not fulfill obligations that it agreed to.[\[32\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32) There was increasing disagreement between North Korea and the United States on the scope and implementation of the agreement. The United States did little to meet its commitment to normalize political and economic relations.[\[34\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-38north-20180518-34) When by 1999 economic sanctions had not been lifted and full diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea had not been established, North Korea warned that they would resume nuclear research unless the United States kept up its end of the bargain.\[[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed "Wikipedia:Citation needed")\][\[35\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-35) Construction of the first LWR reactor began in August 2002.[\[36\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-36) Construction of both reactors was well behind schedule. The initial plan was for both reactors to be operational by 2003, but the construction had been halted indefinitely in late 2002. Senators accused President Clinton of understating the cost of the project.[\[32\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State [Rust Deming](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rust_Deming "Rust Deming") told Congress "to be frank, we have in past years not always met the fuel year deadline".[\[32\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32) ## Final breakdown of the agreement \[[edit](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=4 "Edit section: Final breakdown of the agreement")\] In January 2002, U.S. President [George W. Bush](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_W._Bush "George W. Bush") labeled North Korea in his first [State of the Union Address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_State_of_the_Union_Address "2002 State of the Union Address") as part of an [Axis of Evil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_of_Evil "Axis of Evil").[\[37\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-nyt-20170112-37) In October 2002, a U.S. delegation led by [Assistant Secretary of State](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assistant_Secretary_of_State "Assistant Secretary of State") [James A. Kelly](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_A._Kelly "James A. Kelly") visited North Korea to confront the North Koreans with the U.S. assessment that they had a [uranium enrichment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium_enrichment "Uranium enrichment") program.[\[38\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-38) The parties' reports of the meeting differ. The U.S. delegation believed the North Koreans had admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium program.[\[39\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-39) The North Koreans stated Kelly made his assertions in an arrogant manner, but failed to produce any evidence such as satellite photos, and they responded by denying that North Korea planned to produce nuclear weapons using enriched uranium. They went on to state that as an independent sovereign state North Korea was entitled to possess nuclear weapons for defense, although they did not possess such a weapon at that point in time.[\[8\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20021025-8)[\[40\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-40)[\[41\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-41) Relations between the two countries, which had seemed hopeful two years earlier, quickly deteriorated into open hostility.[\[14\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-bridge-hecker-2010-14) The [highly enriched uranium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Highly_enriched_uranium "Highly enriched uranium") (HEU) intelligence that James Kelly's accusation is based on is still controversial: According to the CIA fact sheet to Congress on 19 November 2002, there was "clear evidence indicating the North has begun constructing a centrifuge facility" and this plant could produce annually enough HEU for two or more nuclear weapons per year when it is finished. However, some experts assessed that the equipment North Korea imported was insufficient evidence of a production-scale enrichment program.[\[42\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-albright-20070223-42) [KEDO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Peninsula_Energy_Development_Organization "Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization") members considered in November 2002 whether to halt the fuel oil shipments in response to the previous month's developments. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly warned Japanese officials that the [U.S. Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress "United States Congress") would not fund such shipments in the face of continued violations. The shipments were halted in December.[\[43\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-43) On 10 January 2003, North Korea again announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[\[44\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20030110-44) On February 10, 2005, North Korea finally declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons as a "nuclear deterrent for self-defence".[\[45\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20050210-45) On October 9, 2006, [North Korea conducted a nuclear test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_North_Korean_nuclear_test "2006 North Korean nuclear test"). US intelligence agencies believe that North Korea has manufactured a handful of simple nuclear weapons. In December 2003, KEDO suspended work on the pressurized water reactor project. Subsequently, KEDO shifted the focus of its efforts to ensuring that the LWR project assets at the construction site in North Korea and at manufacturers' facilities around the world (\$1.5 billion invested to date) are preserved and maintained.[\[46\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-46) Each side blamed the other for ending the Agreed Framework. The United States pointed out that a North Korean uranium enrichment facility would violate the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,[\[47\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-47) which states "The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." North Korea accused the United States of a "hostile policy" including deliberately delaying fuel supplies and progress on the KEDO project that "effectively nullified" the agreement, listing North Korea as part of the "Axis of evil" and a target of the U.S. pre-emptive nuclear strikes.[\[48\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-48)[\[49\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-49)[\[50\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-50) Although the agreement had largely broken down, North Korea did not restart work on the two production size nuclear power plants that were frozen under the agreement. These plants could potentially have produced enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce several nuclear weapons per year. The Agreed Framework was successful in freezing North Korean plutonium production in Yongbyon plutonium complex for eight years from 1994 to December 2002;[\[51\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-51) however, it failed to stop North Korea from developing a secret highly enriched uranium program,[\[52\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-52) begun in the "mid- or late-1990s."[\[53\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-53) Discussions took place through the [Six-party talks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-party_talks "Six-party talks") about a replacement agreement, reaching a preliminary accord on 19 September 2005. The accord made no mention of the U.S. contention that North Korea has a secret, underground enriched uranium program. However, the new accord would require North Korea to dismantle all nuclear facilities, not just specific plants as in the Agreed Framework.[\[54\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-54) Ultimately the Six-party talks were discontinued in 2009. On May 31, 2006, KEDO decided to terminate the LWR construction project.[\[55\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-55) ## See also \[[edit](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=5 "Edit section: See also")\] - [North Korea and weapons of mass destruction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction "North Korea and weapons of mass destruction") - [Six-party talks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-party_talks "Six-party talks") - [2018 Korean peace process](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Korean_peace_process "2018 Korean peace process") - [2018 North Korea–United States summit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_summit "2018 North Korea–United States summit") - [2019 North Korea–United States Hanoi Summit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_Hanoi_Summit "2019 North Korea–United States Hanoi Summit") - [2019 Koreas–United States DMZ Summit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Koreas%E2%80%93United_States_DMZ_Summit "2019 Koreas–United States DMZ Summit") ## References \[[edit](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=6 "Edit section: References")\] 1. ^ [*a](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-iaea-factsheet_1-0) [b](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-iaea-factsheet_1-1) ["Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards"](http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards). IAEA. 14 October 2014. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20141205004645/http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards) from the original on 5 December 2014. Retrieved 30 November 2014. 2. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-harrison-2009_2-0)* [Selig S. Harrison](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selig_S._Harrison "Selig S. Harrison") (2009). [Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement](https://books.google.com/books?id=csVMXWKo734C). Princeton University Press. p. 209. [ISBN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISBN_$identifier$ "ISBN (identifier)") [9781400824915](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9781400824915 "Special:BookSources/9781400824915") . Retrieved 30 November 2014. 3. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-3) ["U.N. Security Council Consideration of North Korea's Violations of its Nuclear Treaty Obligations"](https://fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/94-299f.htm). [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20150409003836/https://fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/94-299f.htm) from the original on 2015-04-09. Retrieved 2015-04-04. 4. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-4) [""Prevented war with North Korea in 1994 – here's what needs to be done"](https://inews.co.uk/essentials/news/world/north-korea-nuclear-negotiations-1994-2017-robert-gallucci/). iNews. .inews.co.uk. 5 September 2017. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20170910220028/https://inews.co.uk/essentials/news/world/north-korea-nuclear-negotiations-1994-2017-robert-gallucci/) from the original on 2017-09-10. Retrieved 2017-09-10. 5. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-5) ["Statement from Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter on Current U.S.-North Korea Relations"](https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/north-korea-081017.html). cartercenter.org. 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[^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-25) ["Nuclear Nonproliferation / Heavy Fuel Oil Delivered to North Korea Under the Agreed Framework"](https://web.archive.org/web/20100415032427/http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/gao/rc00020t.pdf) (PDF). www.globalsecurity.org. Archived from [the original](http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/gao/rc00020t.pdf#page=5) (PDF) on 2010-04-15. 26. ^ [*a](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-cnnmoney-20030512_26-0) [b](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-cnnmoney-20030512_26-1) Behar, Richard (12 May 2003). ["Rummy's North Korea Connection What did Donald Rumsfeld know about ABB's deal to build nuclear reactors there? And why won't he talk about it?"](https://web.archive.org/web/20071122140941/http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/05/12/342316/). CNN Money. 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Archived from [the original](http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1998/9803/news03/06.htm#8) on 2012-04-01. Retrieved 2010-11-13. 29. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-29) ["Stalemated LWR Project to Prompt Pyongyang to Restart N-Program"](https://web.archive.org/web/20090824204704/http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/042nd_issue/98051302.htm). The People's Korea. 1998-05-13. Archived from [the original](http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/042nd_issue/98051302.htm) on 2009-08-24. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 30. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-30) ["KEDO Breaks Ground on US Led Nuclear Project That will Undermine Client Status of S Korea"](https://web.archive.org/web/20090824204606/http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/005th_issue/97082102.htm). The People's Korea. 21 August 1997. Archived from [the original](http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/005th_issue/97082102.htm) on 24 August 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 31. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-31) ["Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization Annual Report 2004"](http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/KEDO_AR_2004.pdf) (PDF). Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. December 31, 2004. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090923120054/http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/KEDO_AR_2004.pdf) (PDF) from the original on September 23, 2009. Retrieved 2010-04-14. 32. ^ [*a](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-conversation_32-0) [b](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-conversation_32-1) [c](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-conversation_32-2) [d](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-conversation_32-3) Ryan, Maria (19 July 2017). ["Why the US's 1994 deal with North Korea failed – and what Trump can learn from it"](https://theconversation.com/why-the-uss-1994-deal-with-north-korea-failed-and-what-trump-can-learn-from-it-80578). The Conversation. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20171024034157/https://theconversation.com/why-the-uss-1994-deal-with-north-korea-failed-and-what-trump-can-learn-from-it-80578) from the original on 24 October 2017. 33. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-33)* ["Joel S. Wit – Senior Research Scholar"](http://weai.columbia.edu/joel-wit/). Columbia University Weatherhead East Asian Institute. Columbia University. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20161112081119/http://weai.columbia.edu/joel-wit/) from the original on 12 November 2016. Retrieved 11 November 2016. "an important player in reaching the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. From 1995–2000, Mr. Wit was the State Department Coordinator for implementation of that agreement" 34. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-38north-20180518_34-0) Leon V. Sigal (18 May 2018). ["Pyongyang's Brushback Pitch"](https://www.38north.org/2018/05/lsigal051818/). [38 North](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/38_North "38 North"). U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Retrieved 23 May 2018. 35. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-35) Pollack, Jonathan D. (2003). ["The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework"](https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2242&context=nwc-review) (PDF). Naval War College Review. 56 (3). Retrieved June 16, 2022. 36. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-36) Tim Carter. ["Promoting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula and Beyond"](http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=22). KEDO. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090908031931/http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=22) from the original on 2009-09-08. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 37. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-nyt-20170112_37-0) Siegfried S. Hecker (12 January 2017). ["The U.S. Must Talk to North Korea"](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/opinion/the-us-must-talk-to-north-korea.html). [The New York Times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Times "The New York Times"). [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20170817210805/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/opinion/the-us-must-talk-to-north-korea.html) from the original on 17 August 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017. 38. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-38) James A. Kelly (July 15, 2004). ["Dealing With North Korea's Nuclear Programs"](https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm). U.S. Department of State. 39. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-39) ["frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: nuclear capability: could north korea have a bomb?"](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/nukes/nukes.html). PBS. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090606180425/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/nukes/nukes.html) from the original on 6 June 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 40. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-40) [""J. Kelly Failed to Produce 'Evidence' in Pyongyang"; Framed up "Admission" Story – DPRK FM Director O Song Chol"](https://web.archive.org/web/20090908012957/http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/188th_issue/2003013001.htm). .korea-np.co.jp. Archived from [the original](http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/188th_issue/2003013001.htm) on 2009-09-08. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 41. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-41) ["Archived copy"](https://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/012104hecker.pdf) (PDF). [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20140628181341/http://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/012104hecker.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 2014-06-28. Retrieved 2015-04-04. `{{cite web}}`: CS1 maint: archived copy as title ([link](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:CS1_maint:_archived_copy_as_title "Category:CS1 maint: archived copy as title")) 42. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-albright-20070223_42-0) Albright, David (23 February 2007). ["North Korea's Alleged Large-Scale Enrichment Plant: Yet Another Questionable Extrapolation Based on Aluminum Tubes"](https://isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKenrichment22Feb.pdf) (PDF). Institute for Science and International Security. Retrieved 25 April 2022. 43. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-43) Tim Carter (14 November 2002). ["KEDO Executive Board Meeting Concludes – November 14, 2002"](http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=23). KEDO. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20110607230234/http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=23) from the original on 7 June 2011. Retrieved 2010-05-31. 44. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-KCNA-20030110_44-0) ["DPRK FM sends letter to UNSC president"](https://web.archive.org/web/20090920185607/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200301/news01/11.htm). [KCNA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Central_News_Agency "Korean Central News Agency"). January 10, 2003. Archived from [the original](http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200301/news01/11.htm#12) on 2009-09-20. Retrieved 2009-05-27. 45. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-KCNA-20050210_45-0) ["DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-party Talks for Indefinite Period"](https://web.archive.org/web/20090531175657/http://kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200502/news02/11.htm#1). [KCNA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Central_News_Agency "Korean Central News Agency"). February 10, 2005. Archived from [the original](http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200502/news02/11.htm#1) on 31 May 2009. Retrieved 2009-05-27. 46. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-46) Tim Carter (21 November 2003). ["KEDO Executive Board Meeting – November 21, 2003"](http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=25). KEDO. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20110607230304/http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=25) from the original on 7 June 2011. Retrieved 2010-05-31. 47. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-47) ["NPP"](https://web.archive.org/web/20070930014646/http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/koreadenuclearization.cfm). [Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carnegie_Endowment_for_International_Peace "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"). Archived from [the original](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/koreadenuclearization.cfm) on 2007-09-30. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 48. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-48) ["Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for"](https://web.archive.org/web/20090908014926/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2002/200210/news10/25.htm). [KCNA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Central_News_Agency "Korean Central News Agency"). October 25, 2002. Archived from [the original](http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2002/200210/news10/25.htm#4) on 2009-09-08. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 49. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-49) ["President Delivers State of the Union Address"](https://web.archive.org/web/20090608080318/http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html). Georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov. 2002-01-29. Archived from [the original](https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html) on 8 June 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 50. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-50) John Pike. ["Nuclear Posture Review \[Excerpts\]"](http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm). Globalsecurity.org. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090610094536/http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm) from the original on 10 June 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 51. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-51) Selig Harrison (October 25, 2007). ["A U.S. Foreign Policy Expert Urged 'Continued Backing' of Nuclear Talks"](https://web.archive.org/web/20090909072853/http://www.dynamic-korea.com/news/view_news.php?uid=200700154588&main=KHF&sub=&keyword=selig%20harrison). Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States of America. Archived from the original on September 9, 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 52. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-52) ["Could North Korea Have A Bomb?"](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/nukes/nukes.html). PBS.org. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090606180425/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/nukes/nukes.html) from the original on 6 June 2009. Retrieved 11 November 2016. "\[In October 2002\] Apparently surprised by how much the U.S. had learned, the Pyongyang officials admitted to the existence of the HUE program, in direct violation of the NPT." 53. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-53) DAVID E. SANGER (17 October 2002). ["NORTH KOREA SAYS IT HAS A PROGRAM ON NUCLEAR ARMS"](https://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/17/world/north-korea-says-it-has-a-program-on-nuclear-arms.html?pagewanted=all). [The New York Times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Times "The New York Times"). [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20160313043711/http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/17/world/north-korea-says-it-has-a-program-on-nuclear-arms.html?pagewanted=all) from the original on 13 March 2016. Retrieved 11 November 2016. "If the North Korean assertions are true – and administration officials assume they are – the government of Kim Jong Il began in the mid- or late-1990s a secret, parallel program to produce weapons-grade material from highly enriched uranium." 54. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-54) Joseph Kahn; David E. Sanger (September 20, 2005). ["U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open"](https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/20/international/asia/20korea.html). [The New York Times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Times "The New York Times"). [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090205045125/http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/20/international/asia/20korea.html) from the original on February 5, 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 55. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-55) ["KEDO website homepage"](http://www.kedo.org/). [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090413090027/http://www.kedo.org/) from the original on 2009-04-13. Retrieved 2009-06-09. ## External links \[[edit](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=7 "Edit section: External links")\] - [Agreed Framework between the USA and the DPRK](https://web.archive.org/web/20031217175315/http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc457.pdf) – Geneva, October 21, 1994 (archived 2003-12-17) - [Press Briefing by Ambassador Gallucci on Korea (Agreed Framework)](https://web.archive.org/web/20070929094316/http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/101894-press-briefing-by-ambassador-gallucci-on-korea.htm), [White House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_House "White House"), October 18, 1994 - [Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation Newsbrief, 3rd Quarter 1994](https://web.archive.org/web/20070701065811/http://www.ppnn.soton.ac.uk/nb27.pdf) – describes negotiations leading to Agreed Framework - [Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea](http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/SupplyAgreement.pdf) – KEDO, 1995 - [Ch 14: North Korea](https://web.archive.org/web/20030403083117/http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/DeadlyArsenals/chapters%20$pdf$/Pages%20from%2014-NoKorea.pdf) – from Deadly Arsenals, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2002) - [Nautilus Institute](https://web.archive.org/web/20030224165404/http://www.nautilus.org/fora/) – In-depth coverage of the North Korean situation since 1997 - [North Korea's Nuclear Breach](https://web.archive.org/web/20030305132639/http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/northkoreacrisis.htm) – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - [Washington was on brink of war with North Korea 5 years ago](http://www.cnn.com/US/9910/04/korea.brink/), [CNN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CNN "CNN"), October 4, 1999 - [Modernizing the US-DPRK Agreed Framework: The Energy Imperative](https://web.archive.org/web/20051218110023/http://www.nautilus.org/archives/papers/energy/ModernizingAF.PDF), Nautilus Institute, February 16, 2001 - [Report on Delay in Construction of Light-Water Reactor Project](https://web.archive.org/web/20070927181825/http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/161st_issue/2001052201.htm), [KCNA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Central_News_Agency "Korean Central News Agency"), May 22, 2001 - [North Korea's nuclear facilities by Google Earth](http://freekorea.us/2008/01/27/satellite-images-of-north-koreas-nuclear-facilities/) Break-down of Agreed Framework - [J. Kelly Failed to Produce 'Evidence' in Pyongyang](https://web.archive.org/web/20090908012957/http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/188th_issue/2003013001.htm) – O Song Chol, DPRK Foreign Ministry, January 18, 2003 - [North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk24.pdf), Larry A. Niksch, Congressional Research Service – The Library of Congress, March 17, 2003 - [The History of the 1994 Agreed Framework](https://web.archive.org/web/20061208041852/http://ffip.com/infobriefs030703.htm), Daniel B. Poneman, [The Forum for International Policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=The_Forum_for_International_Policy&action=edit&redlink=1 "The Forum for International Policy (page does not exist)"), March 7, 2003 - [Examining the Lessons of the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Deal](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/themes/lessons.html), [PBS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Broadcasting_Service "Public Broadcasting Service"), April 10, 2003 - [The United States, North Korea, And The End Of The Agreed Framework](https://web.archive.org/web/20060406080625/http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume1/august_2003/8_03_1.html), [Naval War College Review](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_War_College_Review "Naval War College Review"), Summer 2003 - [Dealing With North Korea's Nuclear Programs](https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm) – [James A. Kelly](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_A._Kelly "James A. Kelly"), Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 15, 2004 - [Did North Korea Cheat?](https://web.archive.org/web/20051226202624/http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050101faessay84109/selig-s-harrison/did-north-korea-cheat.html), [Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs "Foreign Affairs"), January/February 2005 - [North Korea Says It Will Abandon Nuclear Efforts](https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/19/international/asia/19korea.html?hp&ex=1127188800&en=1cab1bb77582f12a&ei=5094&partner=homepage), [The New York Times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Times "The New York Times"), September 19, 2005 - [KCNA Urges U.S. to Compensate for Losses Caused by Scrapping AF](https://web.archive.org/web/20061029082308/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200512/news12/20.htm#9), [KCNA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Central_News_Agency "Korean Central News Agency"), December 19, 2005 - [The Beijing Deal is not the Agreed Framework](https://web.archive.org/web/20070927012430/http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07014Hayes.html), Peter Hayes, [Nautilus Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nautilus_Institute_for_Security_and_Sustainability "Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability"), February 14, 2007 - Lewis, Jeffrey (15 May 2015). ["Revisiting the Agreed Framework"](https://www.38north.org/2015/05/jlewis051415/). [38 North](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/38_North "38 North"). U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula - [Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31011.htm) – text of agreement, February 19, 1992 - [Joint Declaration of South and North Korea of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https://web.archive.org/web/20030503150547/http://nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/koreanuc.pdf) – analysis, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, 2002 \| [v](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Nuclear_program_of_North_Korea "Template:Nuclear program of North Korea") [t](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template_talk:Nuclear_program_of_North_Korea "Template talk:Nuclear program of North Korea") [e](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:EditPage/Template:Nuclear_program_of_North_Korea "Special:EditPage/Template:Nuclear program of North Korea")[North Korea and weapons of mass destruction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction "North Korea and weapons of mass destruction") \| \| \|---\|---\| \| Main topics \| [Timeline of the North Korean nuclear program](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_North_Korean_nuclear_program "Timeline of the North Korean nuclear program") [Nuclear power in North Korea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_North_Korea "Nuclear power in North Korea") [1994 North Korean nuclear crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_North_Korean_nuclear_crisis "1994 North Korean nuclear crisis") [Agreed Framework]() [Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Peninsula_Energy_Development_Organization "Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization") [A. Q. Khan network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul_Qadeer_Khan#North_Korea,_Iran,_and_Libya "Abdul Qadeer Khan") [Japan–North Korea Pyongyang Declaration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan%E2%80%93North_Korea_Pyongyang_Declaration "Japan–North Korea Pyongyang Declaration") [Six-party talks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-party_talks "Six-party talks") [Sanctions against North Korea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanctions_against_North_Korea "Sanctions against North Korea") [2017–18 North Korea crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017%E2%80%9318_North_Korea_crisis "2017–18 North Korea crisis") [2018 inter-Korean summit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/April_2018_inter-Korean_summit "April 2018 inter-Korean summit") [2018 DPRK—US Singapore Summit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_Singapore_Summit "2018 North Korea–United States Singapore Summit") [2019 DPRK–US Hanoi Summit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_Hanoi_Summit "2019 North Korea–United States Hanoi Summit") [2019 Koreas–US DMZ Summit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Koreas%E2%80%93United_States_DMZ_Summit "2019 Koreas–United States DMZ Summit") \| \| [Missile tests](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_North_Korean_missile_tests "List of North Korean missile tests") \| [1993](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_North_Korean_missile_test "1993 North Korean missile test") [2006](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_North_Korean_missile_test "2006 North Korean missile test") [2009](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_North_Korean_missile_tests "2009 North Korean missile tests") [2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_North_Korean_missile_tests "2013 North Korean missile tests") [2014](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_North_Korean_missile_tests "2014 North Korean missile tests") [2017](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_North_Korean_missile_tests "2017 North Korean missile tests") [2021–2023](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021%E2%80%932023_North_Korean_missile_tests "2021–2023 North Korean missile tests") \| \| [Nuclear tests](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_weapons_tests_of_North_Korea "List of nuclear weapons tests of North Korea") \| \| \| \| \| \| Fission \| [2006](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_North_Korean_nuclear_test "2006 North Korean nuclear test") [2009](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_North_Korean_nuclear_test "2009 North Korean nuclear test") [2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_North_Korean_nuclear_test "2013 North Korean nuclear test") [September 2016](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_2016_North_Korean_nuclear_test "September 2016 North Korean nuclear test") \| \| Claimed as [thermonuclear](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thermonuclear_weapon "Thermonuclear weapon") \| [January 2016](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January_2016_North_Korean_nuclear_test "January 2016 North Korean nuclear test") [2017](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_North_Korean_nuclear_test "2017 North Korean nuclear test") \| \| Facilities \| \| \| \| \| \| Production \| [Nyongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nyongbyon_Nuclear_Scientific_Research_Center "Nyongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center") [Kangson enrichment site](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kangson_enrichment_site "Kangson enrichment site") [Pyongsan uranium mine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyongsan_County#Uranium_mine_and_milling_plant "Pyongsan County") \| \| Testing \| [Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punggye-ri_Nuclear_Test_Site "Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site") \| \| People \| \| \| \| \| \| Leaders \| [Kim Jong Il](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Jong_Il "Kim Jong Il") [Kim Jong Un](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Jong_Un "Kim Jong Un") \| \| Diplomats \| [Kang Sok-ju](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kang_Sok-ju "Kang Sok-ju") [Kim Kye-gwan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Kye-gwan "Kim Kye-gwan") [Choe Son-hui](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Choe_Son-hui "Choe Son-hui") \| \| Scientists \| [Hong Sung-mu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_Sung-mu "Hong Sung-mu") [Ri Hong-sop](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ri_Hong-sop "Ri Hong-sop") [Chon Chibu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chon_Chibu "Chon Chibu") [Kyong Won-ha](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyong_Won-ha "Kyong Won-ha") \| \| [Nuclear warheads](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_warhead "Nuclear warhead") \| \| \| \| \| \| Warheads \| [Hwasan-31](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hwasan-31 "Hwasan-31") [tactical warhead](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_nuclear_weapon "Tactical nuclear weapon") [Hwasong-13 warhead](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hwasong-13_warhead&action=edit&redlink=1 "Hwasong-13 warhead (page does not exist)") \[[ko](https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/KN-08_%ED%95%B5%ED%83%84%EB%91%90 "ko:KN-08 핵탄두")\] [Hwasong-15 warhead](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hwasong-15_warhead&action=edit&redlink=1 "Hwasong-15 warhead (page does not exist)") \[[ko](https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/KN-22_%EC%97%B4%ED%95%B5%ED%83%84%EB%91%90 "ko:KN-22 열핵탄두")\] \| \| Land \| [Hwasong](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hwasong_$missile_family$ "Hwasong (missile family)") ballistic missiles [Intercontinental](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICBM "ICBM") [Hwasong-15](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hwasong-15 "Hwasong-15") [Hwasong-17](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hwasong-17 "Hwasong-17") [Hwasong-18](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hwasong-18 "Hwasong-18") Hwasal cruise missiles [Hwasal-1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hwasal-1 "Hwasal-1") [Hwasal-2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hwasal-2 "Hwasal-2") \| \| Sea \| [Pukguksong](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_People%27s_Navy#Weapons "Korean People's Navy") submarine-launched ballistic missiles \| \| [UN resolutions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_Nations_Security_Council_resolutions_concerning_North_Korea "List of United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning North Korea") \| [825](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_825 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 825") [1695](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1695 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695") [1718](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1718 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718") [1874](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1874 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874") [1928](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1928 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1928") [1985](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1985 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1985") [2087](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_2087 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 2087") [2094](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_2094 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 2094") [2270](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_2270 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270") [2321](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_2321 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 2321") [2371](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_2371 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 2371") [2375](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_2375 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 2375") [2397](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_2397 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 2397") \| \| Related \| [Korean People's Army](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_People%27s_Army "Korean People's Army") [Strategic Force](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_People%27s_Army_Strategic_Force "Korean People's Army Strategic Force") [Missile Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DPRK_Missile_Administration "DPRK Missile Administration") [Navy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_People%27s_Navy "Korean People's Navy") [2024 DPRK–Russia treaty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korean%E2%80%93Russian_Treaty_on_Comprehensive_Strategic_Partnership "North Korean–Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership") [Assassination of Kim Jong-nam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Kim_Jong-nam "Assassination of Kim Jong-nam") [South Korea and weapons of mass destruction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction "South Korea and weapons of mass destruction") [South Korea Ballistic Missile Range Guidelines](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Korea_Ballistic_Missile_Range_Guidelines "South Korea Ballistic Missile Range Guidelines") [Nuclear power in South Korea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_South_Korea "Nuclear power in South Korea") [Pakistan–North Korea relations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan%E2%80%93North_Korea_relations "Pakistan–North Korea relations") \| ![](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:CentralAutoLogin/start?useformat=desktop&type=1x1&usesul3=1) Retrieved from "<https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&oldid=1318055029>" [Categories](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Category "Help:Category"): - [North Korea–United States relations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_relations "Category:North Korea–United States relations") - [Politics of North Korea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Politics_of_North_Korea "Category:Politics of North Korea") - [Nuclear 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Readable Markdown	From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ([Korean](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_language "Korean language"): 북미제네바기본합의서) was signed on 21 October 1994, between [North Korea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea "North Korea") (DPRK) and the [United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States "United States"). The objective of the agreement was the freezing and replacement of North Korea's indigenous [nuclear power plant](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_plant "Nuclear power plant") program with more [nuclear proliferation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation "Nuclear proliferation") resistant [light water reactor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light_water_reactor "Light water reactor") power plants, and the step-by-step normalization of [relations between the U.S. and the DPRK](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_relations "North Korea–United States relations"). Implementation of the agreement was troubled from the start, but its key elements were being implemented until it effectively broke down in 2003. [![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fe/Agreed_frame_work_1994_cover_page_1.jpg/250px-Agreed_frame_work_1994_cover_page_1.jpg)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Agreed_frame_work_1994_cover_page_1.jpg) AGREED FRAMEWORK COVER PAGE – IAEA [![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a4/AGREED_FRAMEWORK_PAGE1.jpg/250px-AGREED_FRAMEWORK_PAGE1.jpg)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:AGREED_FRAMEWORK_PAGE1.jpg) AGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE \#1 – IAEA: Replace the Nuclear(graphite) reactor to the Light-water [![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/02/Agreed_frame_work_1994_page_2.jpg/250px-Agreed_frame_work_1994_page_2.jpg)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Agreed_frame_work_1994_page_2.jpg) AGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE \#2- IAEA: Supply the alternative energy-Heavy Oil and freeze & dismantle the nuclear reactor [![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/46/AGREED_FRAME_WORK_PAGE3.jpg/250px-AGREED_FRAME_WORK_PAGE3.jpg)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:AGREED_FRAME_WORK_PAGE3.jpg) AGREED FRAMEWORK PAGE \#3 – IAEA: Establish a formal peace assurance between U.S. and DPRK [![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d9/Yongbyon_5_MWe_reactor_-_fuel_channels_access_ports.jpg/250px-Yongbyon_5_MWe_reactor_-_fuel_channels_access_ports.jpg)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Yongbyon_5_MWe_reactor_-_fuel_channels_access_ports.jpg) The 5 MWe pilot [Yongbyon nuclear reactor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yongbyon_Nuclear_Scientific_Research_Center "Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center"), made operational in 1986, showing the fuel access channels On 12 December 1985, North Korea became a party to the Treaty on the [Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation "Nuclear proliferation") (NPT). On 10 April 1992, its NPT safeguards agreement entered into force. In May 1992, North Korea submitted its initial report to the IAEA under that agreement, and [International Atomic Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Atomic_Energy_Agency "International Atomic Energy Agency") (IAEA) inspections began. Shortly thereafter inconsistencies emerged between the North Korea initial declaration and the Agency's findings, centering on a mismatch between declared [plutonium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plutonium "Plutonium") product and [nuclear waste](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_waste "Nuclear waste") solutions and the results of the Agency's analysis. The latter suggested that undeclared plutonium existed in North Korea. In order to find answers to the inconsistencies detected and to determine the completeness and correctness of the initial declaration provided, the IAEA requested access to additional information and to two sites which seemed to be related to the storage of nuclear waste.[\[1\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-iaea-factsheet-1) The DPRK refused access to the sites, and on 12 March 1993, North Korea announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT. On 1 April 1993, the IAEA concluded that North Korea was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and referred this to the UN Security Council. Following UN Security Council [resolution 825](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_825 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 825"), which called upon the DPRK to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allow weapons inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into the country, North Korea "suspended the effectuation" of that withdrawal in June 1993.[\[1\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-iaea-factsheet-1)[\[2\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-harrison-2009-2) In November 1993, North Korea proposed to the United States that the two governments negotiate a "package solution" to all of the issues dividing them. The [Clinton Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clinton_Administration "Clinton Administration") accepted this in principle but conditioned such "comprehensive" talks on North Korea acting first to allow a resumption of IAEA inspections and to re-open negotiations with South Korea over nuclear questions (North Korea had broken off talks with South Korea in late 1992). North Korea approached the IAEA in January 1994, offering a single inspection, less comprehensive than those conducted by the IAEA in 1992. After several weeks of tough negotiations, the IAEA announced on 16 February 1994 that North Korea had accepted "the inspection activities" that the Agency had requested. In response, the Clinton Administration agreed to suspend the [Team Spirit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Team_Spirit "Team Spirit") military exercise with South Korea (a long-standing North Korean demand) and begin a new round of talks with North Korea—subject to North Korea allowing full implementation of the IAEA inspection and beginning high level talks with South Korea.[\[3\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-3) - Motivation : North Korea announced intention to withdraw from [NPT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty") and [non-compliance](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-compliance "Non-compliance") with [IAEA safeguards](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IAEA_safeguards "IAEA safeguards"). - Signed Date: 21 October 1994 by American ambassador [Robert Gallucci](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Gallucci "Robert Gallucci") and North Korean vice minister [Kang Sok-ju](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kang_Sok-ju "Kang Sok-ju") - Summary: Freeze of North Korean nuclear program, leading to [denuclearization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denuclearization "Denuclearization") of the Korean Peninsula, and initial [Peace agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_agreement "Peace agreement") between the [United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States "United States") and North Korea[\[4\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-4)[\[5\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-5) \| States \| Agreed Items \| Progress \| \|---\|---\|---\| \| ![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/a/a4/Flag_of_the_United_States.svg/40px-Flag_of_the_United_States.svg.png) [United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States "United States") \| Deliver 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually to DPRK as an alternative energy Make arrangements for two 1000 MWe [light water reactors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light_water_reactor "Light water reactor") to DPRK with target date of 2003. Provide DPRK with formal assurance against the use of nuclear weapons by U.S, Move toward full normalization of political and economic relations \| The heavy oil was delivered to the DPRK with some delays United States established international consortium [KEDO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Peninsula_Energy_Development_Organization "Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization") to build LWRs, though U.S. Congress rejected U.S. funding for the project \| \| ![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/51/Flag_of_North_Korea.svg/40px-Flag_of_North_Korea.svg.png) [North Korea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea "North Korea") \| Freeze all graphite-moderated nuclear reactors (5MWe reactor and 50 & 200 MWe under construction) Remain a party to the NPT Take steps to implement 1992 [Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Declaration_of_the_Denuclearization_of_the_Korean_Peninsula "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula") Dismantle graphite-moderated reactors when LWR project is completed Move toward full normalization of political and economic relations \| DPRK stopped operating 5 MWe reactor and abandoned reactors under construction DPRK "suspended" notification of withdrawal from NPT \| The main provisions of the agreement[\[6\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-iaea-INFCIRC457-6) were: - DPRK's graphite-moderated 5MWe [nuclear reactor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_plant "Nuclear power plant"), and the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors under construction, which could easily produce weapons grade [plutonium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plutonium "Plutonium"), would be replaced with two 1000MW [light water reactors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light_water_reactors "Light water reactors") (LWR) power plants by a target date of 2003. - Oil for heating and electricity production would be provided while DPRK's reactors were shut down and construction halted, until completion of the first LWR power unit. The amount of oil was 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year. - The two sides would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations. - The U.S. would provide formal [peace](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace "Peace") and [national security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security "National security") assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. - The DPRK would take steps to implement the 1992 [Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Declaration_of_the_Denuclearization_of_the_Korean_Peninsula "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula")[\[7\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-7) between South and North Korea. - The DPRK would remain a party to the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty"). - [IAEA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IAEA "IAEA") ad hoc and routine inspections would resume for facilities not subject to the freeze. - Existing spent nuclear fuel stocks would be stored and ultimately disposed of without [reprocessing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_reprocessing "Nuclear reprocessing") in the DPRK. - Before delivery of key LWR nuclear components, the DPRK would come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. There were also some confidential minutes supporting the agreement, which have not been made public.[\[8\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20021025-8)[\[9\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-clinton-19990304-9) These are reported to include that full-scope IAEA safeguards would be applied when the major non-nuclear components of the first LWR unit were completed but before the delivery of key nuclear components.[\[10\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-IISS-net-assesment-10) The commitments in the agreement were voluntary and non-binding,\[[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed "Wikipedia:Citation needed")\] not approved by the [United States Senate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Senate "United States Senate") as with a [treaty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty "Treaty"), though noted by the [United Nations Security Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council "United Nations Security Council").[\[11\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-wp-20150313-11)[\[12\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-UNSC-S/PRST/1994/64-12) It was signed in the wake of North Korea's 90-day advance notification of its intended withdrawal from the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty") (which North Korea "suspended" after 89 days), a U.S. military buildup near the country, and U.S. plans to bomb the active [Yongbyon nuclear reactor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yongbyon_Nuclear_Scientific_Research_Center "Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center").[\[13\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-13) The U.S. regarded the Agreed Framework primarily as a non-proliferation agreement, whereas North Korea placed greater value on measures normalizing relations with the U.S.[\[14\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-bridge-hecker-2010-14) Terms of the pact and consequent agreements included the shutdown of the pilot [Yongbyon nuclear reactor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yongbyon_Nuclear_Scientific_Research_Center "Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center"), abandoning the construction of two larger nuclear power plants, and the canning and sealing, under [IAEA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IAEA "IAEA") monitoring, of spent fuel that could have been reprocessed to create plutonium for a [nuclear weapon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon "Nuclear weapon"). In exchange two [light water reactors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light_water_reactor "Light water reactor") would be constructed in North Korea by 2003 at a cost of \$4 billion, primarily supplied by South Korea.[\[15\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-15) In the interim, North Korea would be supplied with 500,000 tons of [heavy fuel oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heavy_fuel_oil "Heavy fuel oil") annually, at no cost, to make up for lost energy production. North Korea was required to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, allowing the IAEA to verify the correctness and completeness of its initial declaration, before key nuclear components of the reactor would be delivered. When the LWR plants were completed, North Korea would dismantle its other nuclear reactors and associated facilities. The [Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Peninsula_Energy_Development_Organization "Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization") (KEDO) is a consortium of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and various other states that is responsible for implementing the energy-related parts of the agreement. North Korea would repay KEDO over a 20-year interest-free period after the completion of each LWR plant.[\[16\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-16) It was reported that [US President](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States "President of the United States") [Bill Clinton](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Clinton "Bill Clinton")'s officials agreed to the plan only because they thought that the North Korean government would collapse before the nuclear power project was completed as North Korea's leader [Kim Il Sung](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Il_Sung "Kim Il Sung") [had recently died](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_and_state_funeral_of_Kim_Il_Sung "Death and state funeral of Kim Il Sung").[\[17\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-17) North Korean officials at the time also suspected the U.S. anticipated an early collapse of the DPRK.[\[18\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-18) ## Implementation of the agreement \[[edit](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=3 "Edit section: Implementation of the agreement")\] [![KEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d4/KEDO_funding.gif/500px-KEDO_funding.gif)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:KEDO_funding.gif "KEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005") KEDO funding per year 1995 to 2005 Soon after the agreement was signed, [U.S. Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Congress "U.S. Congress") control changed to the [Republican Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republican_Party_$United_States$ "Republican Party (United States)"), who did not support the agreement.[\[19\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-sigal-19)[\[20\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-20) Some Republican [Senators](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Senator "U.S. Senator") were strongly against the agreement, regarding it as [appeasement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeasement "Appeasement").[\[21\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-21)[\[22\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-22) Initially, [U.S. Department of Defense](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Department_of_Defense "U.S. Department of Defense") emergency funds not under Congress' control were used to fund the transitional oil supplies under the agreement,[\[23\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-23) together with international funding. From 1996 Congress provided funding, though not always sufficient amounts.[\[14\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-bridge-hecker-2010-14)[\[24\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-CRS-20030317-24) Consequently, some of the agreed transitional oil supplies were delivered late.[\[25\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-25) KEDO's first director, [Stephen Bosworth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Bosworth "Stephen Bosworth"), later commented "The Agreed Framework was a political orphan within two weeks after its signature".[\[26\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-cnnmoney-20030512-26) Some analysts believe North Korea agreed to the freeze primarily because of the U.S. agreement to phase out economic sanctions that had been in place since the [Korean War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War "Korean War"). But because of congressional opposition, the U.S. failed to deliver on this part of the agreement.[\[27\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-27) International funding for the LWR replacement power plants had to be sought. Formal invitations to bid were not issued until 1998, by which time the delays were infuriating North Korea.[\[26\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-cnnmoney-20030512-26) In May 1998, North Korea warned it would restart nuclear research if the U.S. could not install the LWR.[\[28\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-28)[\[29\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-29) Formal ground breaking on the site was on 21 August 1997,[\[30\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-30) but significant spending on the LWR project did not commence until 2000.[\[31\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-31) U.S. officials in 1998 testified to Congress that there were no fundamental violations of any aspect of the Framework Agreement by North Koreans.[\[32\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32) Joel S. Wit, State Department Coordinator for implementation of the Agreed Framework (1995–2000)[\[33\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-33) during the Clinton administration, stated that "we did know about the DPRK cheating on the highly-enriched uranium front starting in 1998."[\[11\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-wp-20150313-11) The U.S. diplomat who negotiated the framework, [Robert Gallucci](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Gallucci "Robert Gallucci") has warned that it could collapse if United States did not fulfill obligations that it agreed to.[\[32\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32) There was increasing disagreement between North Korea and the United States on the scope and implementation of the agreement. The United States did little to meet its commitment to normalize political and economic relations.[\[34\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-38north-20180518-34) When by 1999 economic sanctions had not been lifted and full diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea had not been established, North Korea warned that they would resume nuclear research unless the United States kept up its end of the bargain.\[[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed "Wikipedia:Citation needed")\][\[35\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-35) Construction of the first LWR reactor began in August 2002.[\[36\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-36) Construction of both reactors was well behind schedule. The initial plan was for both reactors to be operational by 2003, but the construction had been halted indefinitely in late 2002. Senators accused President Clinton of understating the cost of the project.[\[32\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State [Rust Deming](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rust_Deming "Rust Deming") told Congress "to be frank, we have in past years not always met the fuel year deadline".[\[32\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-conversation-32) ## Final breakdown of the agreement \[[edit](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Agreed_Framework&action=edit&section=4 "Edit section: Final breakdown of the agreement")\] In January 2002, U.S. President [George W. Bush](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_W._Bush "George W. Bush") labeled North Korea in his first [State of the Union Address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_State_of_the_Union_Address "2002 State of the Union Address") as part of an [Axis of Evil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_of_Evil "Axis of Evil").[\[37\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-nyt-20170112-37) In October 2002, a U.S. delegation led by [Assistant Secretary of State](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assistant_Secretary_of_State "Assistant Secretary of State") [James A. Kelly](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_A._Kelly "James A. Kelly") visited North Korea to confront the North Koreans with the U.S. assessment that they had a [uranium enrichment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium_enrichment "Uranium enrichment") program.[\[38\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-38) The parties' reports of the meeting differ. The U.S. delegation believed the North Koreans had admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium program.[\[39\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-39) The North Koreans stated Kelly made his assertions in an arrogant manner, but failed to produce any evidence such as satellite photos, and they responded by denying that North Korea planned to produce nuclear weapons using enriched uranium. They went on to state that as an independent sovereign state North Korea was entitled to possess nuclear weapons for defense, although they did not possess such a weapon at that point in time.[\[8\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20021025-8)[\[40\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-40)[\[41\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-41) Relations between the two countries, which had seemed hopeful two years earlier, quickly deteriorated into open hostility.[\[14\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-bridge-hecker-2010-14) The [highly enriched uranium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Highly_enriched_uranium "Highly enriched uranium") (HEU) intelligence that James Kelly's accusation is based on is still controversial: According to the CIA fact sheet to Congress on 19 November 2002, there was "clear evidence indicating the North has begun constructing a centrifuge facility" and this plant could produce annually enough HEU for two or more nuclear weapons per year when it is finished. However, some experts assessed that the equipment North Korea imported was insufficient evidence of a production-scale enrichment program.[\[42\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-albright-20070223-42) [KEDO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Peninsula_Energy_Development_Organization "Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization") members considered in November 2002 whether to halt the fuel oil shipments in response to the previous month's developments. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly warned Japanese officials that the [U.S. Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress "United States Congress") would not fund such shipments in the face of continued violations. The shipments were halted in December.[\[43\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-43) On 10 January 2003, North Korea again announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[\[44\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20030110-44) On February 10, 2005, North Korea finally declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons as a "nuclear deterrent for self-defence".[\[45\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-KCNA-20050210-45) On October 9, 2006, [North Korea conducted a nuclear test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_North_Korean_nuclear_test "2006 North Korean nuclear test"). US intelligence agencies believe that North Korea has manufactured a handful of simple nuclear weapons. In December 2003, KEDO suspended work on the pressurized water reactor project. Subsequently, KEDO shifted the focus of its efforts to ensuring that the LWR project assets at the construction site in North Korea and at manufacturers' facilities around the world (\$1.5 billion invested to date) are preserved and maintained.[\[46\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-46) Each side blamed the other for ending the Agreed Framework. The United States pointed out that a North Korean uranium enrichment facility would violate the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,[\[47\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-47) which states "The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." North Korea accused the United States of a "hostile policy" including deliberately delaying fuel supplies and progress on the KEDO project that "effectively nullified" the agreement, listing North Korea as part of the "Axis of evil" and a target of the U.S. pre-emptive nuclear strikes.[\[48\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-48)[\[49\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-49)[\[50\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-50) Although the agreement had largely broken down, North Korea did not restart work on the two production size nuclear power plants that were frozen under the agreement. These plants could potentially have produced enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce several nuclear weapons per year. The Agreed Framework was successful in freezing North Korean plutonium production in Yongbyon plutonium complex for eight years from 1994 to December 2002;[\[51\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-51) however, it failed to stop North Korea from developing a secret highly enriched uranium program,[\[52\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-52) begun in the "mid- or late-1990s."[\[53\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-53) Discussions took place through the [Six-party talks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-party_talks "Six-party talks") about a replacement agreement, reaching a preliminary accord on 19 September 2005. The accord made no mention of the U.S. contention that North Korea has a secret, underground enriched uranium program. However, the new accord would require North Korea to dismantle all nuclear facilities, not just specific plants as in the Agreed Framework.[\[54\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-54) Ultimately the Six-party talks were discontinued in 2009. On May 31, 2006, KEDO decided to terminate the LWR construction project.[\[55\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_note-55) - [North Korea and weapons of mass destruction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction "North Korea and weapons of mass destruction") - [Six-party talks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-party_talks "Six-party talks") - [2018 Korean peace process](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Korean_peace_process "2018 Korean peace process") - [2018 North Korea–United States summit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_summit "2018 North Korea–United States summit") - [2019 North Korea–United States Hanoi Summit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_Hanoi_Summit "2019 North Korea–United States Hanoi Summit") - [2019 Koreas–United States DMZ Summit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Koreas%E2%80%93United_States_DMZ_Summit "2019 Koreas–United States DMZ Summit") 1. ^ [*a](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-iaea-factsheet_1-0) [b](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-iaea-factsheet_1-1) ["Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards"](http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards). IAEA. 14 October 2014. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20141205004645/http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards) from the original on 5 December 2014. Retrieved 30 November 2014. 2. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-harrison-2009_2-0)* [Selig S. Harrison](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selig_S._Harrison "Selig S. Harrison") (2009). [Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement](https://books.google.com/books?id=csVMXWKo734C). Princeton University Press. p. 209. [ISBN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISBN_$identifier$ "ISBN (identifier)") [9781400824915](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9781400824915 "Special:BookSources/9781400824915") . Retrieved 30 November 2014. 3. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-3) ["U.N. Security Council Consideration of North Korea's Violations of its Nuclear Treaty Obligations"](https://fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/94-299f.htm). [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20150409003836/https://fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/94-299f.htm) from the original on 2015-04-09. Retrieved 2015-04-04. 4. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-4) [""Prevented war with North Korea in 1994 – here's what needs to be done"](https://inews.co.uk/essentials/news/world/north-korea-nuclear-negotiations-1994-2017-robert-gallucci/). iNews. .inews.co.uk. 5 September 2017. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20170910220028/https://inews.co.uk/essentials/news/world/north-korea-nuclear-negotiations-1994-2017-robert-gallucci/) from the original on 2017-09-10. Retrieved 2017-09-10. 5. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-5) ["Statement from Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter on Current U.S.-North Korea Relations"](https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/north-korea-081017.html). cartercenter.org. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20170910173323/https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/north-korea-081017.html) from the original on 2017-09-10. Retrieved 2017-09-10. 6. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-iaea-INFCIRC457_6-0) ["Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea"](https://web.archive.org/web/20031217175315/http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc457.pdf) (PDF). IAEA. 2 November 1994. INFCIRC/457. Archived from [the original](http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc457.pdf) (PDF) on 17 December 2003. 7. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-7) [NPP](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/koreadenuclearization.cfm)[Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20070930014646/http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/koreadenuclearization.cfm) 2007-09-30 at the [Wayback Machine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayback_Machine "Wayback Machine") 8. ^ [*a](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-KCNA-20021025_8-0) [b](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-KCNA-20021025_8-1) ["Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for"](https://web.archive.org/web/20090908014926/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2002/200210/news10/25.htm). [KCNA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Central_News_Agency "Korean Central News Agency"). October 25, 2002. Archived from [the original](http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2002/200210/news10/25.htm#1) on 2009-09-08. Retrieved 2009-03-15. 9. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-clinton-19990304_9-0)* William J. Clinton (March 4, 1999), [Presidential Determination No. 99-16](https://web.archive.org/web/20070927022519/http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/030499-presidential-memo-on-kedo.htm), [The White House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_White_House "The White House"), archived from [the original](http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/030499-presidential-memo-on-kedo.htm) on 2007-09-27, retrieved 2007-09-27 10. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-IISS-net-assesment_10-0) [International Institute for Strategic Studies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Institute_for_Strategic_Studies "International Institute for Strategic Studies") (10 February 2004), [North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment](http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/), Palgrave Macmillan, [ISBN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISBN_$identifier$ "ISBN (identifier)") [978-1-4039-3324-9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-1-4039-3324-9 "Special:BookSources/978-1-4039-3324-9") , [archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090311214952/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/) from the original on 11 March 2009, retrieved 2009-03-05 11. ^ [*a](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-wp-20150313_11-0) [b](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-wp-20150313_11-1) Glenn Kessler (March 13, 2015). ["Cotton's misguided history lesson on the North Korean nuclear deal"](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/03/13/cottons-misguided-history-lesson-on-the-north-korean-nuclear-deal/). The Washington Post. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20161112081807/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/03/13/cottons-misguided-history-lesson-on-the-north-korean-nuclear-deal/) from the original on 12 November 2016. Retrieved 11 November 2016. "In the Clinton administration,"we did know about the DPRK cheating on the highly-enriched uranium front starting in 1998"" 12. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-UNSC-S/PRST/1994/64_12-0)* [Statement by the President of the Security Council](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/1994/64), [United Nations Security Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council "United Nations Security Council"), 4 November 1994, S/PRST/1994/64, [archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20160912223420/http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S%2FPRST%2F1994%2F64) from the original on 12 September 2016, retrieved 7 September 2017 13. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-13) ["frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: ashton carter"](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/acarter.html). PBS. 2003-03-03. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090329085454/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/acarter.html) from the original on 2009-03-29. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 14. ^ [*a](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-bridge-hecker-2010_14-0) [b](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-bridge-hecker-2010_14-1) [c](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-bridge-hecker-2010_14-2) Siegfried S. Hecker; Sean C. Lee; Chaim Braun (Summer 2010). ["North Korea's Choice: Bombs Over Electricity"](https://web.archive.org/web/20101205175419/http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/north_koreas_choice_bombs_over_electricity/). The Bridge. 40* (2). [National Academy of Engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Academy_of_Engineering "National Academy of Engineering"): 5–12\. Archived from [the original](http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/north_koreas_choice_bombs_over_electricity/) on 2010-12-05. Retrieved 5 March 2011. 15. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-15) ["Bill Text - 104th Congress (1995-1996) - THOMAS (Library of Congress)"](https://web.archive.org/web/20150904103407/http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:H.J.RES.83.EH:). thomas.loc.gov. Archived from [the original](http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:H.J.RES.83.EH:) on 2015-09-04. 16. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-16) [Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea](http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/SupplyAgreement.pdf) [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090923120058/http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/SupplyAgreement.pdf) 2009-09-23 at the [Wayback Machine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayback_Machine "Wayback Machine"), KEDO, 1995 17. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-17) Kessler, Glenn (2005-07-13). ["South Korea Offers To Supply Energy if North Gives Up Arms"](https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/12/AR2005071200220.html). Washingtonpost.com. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20121108180137/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/12/AR2005071200220.html) from the original on 2012-11-08. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 18. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-18) Kim Ji Yong (2003-01-27). ["DPRK Will Re-Operate Nuclear Facilities Within A Few Weeks to Produce Electricity"](https://web.archive.org/web/20090909024331/http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/188th_issue/2003012701.htm). The People's Korea. Archived from [the original](http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/188th_issue/2003012701.htm) on 2009-09-09. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 19. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-sigal_19-0) Leon V Sigal (February 2007), [North Korea: Negotiations Work](http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&ord582=grp2&id=31958), MIT Center for International Studies, [archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090909051426/http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&ord582=grp2&id=31958) from the original on 2009-09-09, retrieved 2009-03-05 20. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-20) [Joint resolution relating to the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework and the obligations of North Korea under that and previous agreements with respect to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and dialog with the Republic of Korea](http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:H.J.RES.83.EH:) [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20150904103407/http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:H.J.RES.83.EH:) 2015-09-04 at the [Wayback Machine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayback_Machine "Wayback Machine"), [House of Representatives](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives "United States House of Representatives"), [104th Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/104th_Congress "104th Congress"), 1st Session, H.J. Res. 83, September 18, 1995 21. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-21) ["frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: robert gallucci"](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/gallucci.html). PBS. 10 April 2003. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090528211359/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/gallucci.html) from the original on 28 May 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 22. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-22) ["frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: perle"](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/perle.html). PBS. 2003-03-27. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090328120918/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/perle.html) from the original on 2009-03-28. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 23. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-23) ["frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: interviews: william perry"](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/perry.html). PBS. 2003-02-26. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090528211409/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/perry.html) from the original on 28 May 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 24. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-CRS-20030317_24-0) Larry A. Niksch (March 17, 2003). [North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk24.pdf) (PDF) (Report). Congressional Research Service. IB91141. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090904061135/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk24.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 4 September 2009. Retrieved 2009-09-24. 25. 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["The U.S. Must Talk to North Korea"](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/opinion/the-us-must-talk-to-north-korea.html). [The New York Times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Times "The New York Times"). [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20170817210805/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/opinion/the-us-must-talk-to-north-korea.html) from the original on 17 August 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017. 38. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-38) James A. Kelly (July 15, 2004). ["Dealing With North Korea's Nuclear Programs"](https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm). U.S. Department of State. 39. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-39) ["frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: nuclear capability: could north korea have a bomb?"](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/nukes/nukes.html). PBS. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090606180425/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/nukes/nukes.html) from the original on 6 June 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 40. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-40) [""J. Kelly Failed to Produce 'Evidence' in Pyongyang"; Framed up "Admission" Story – DPRK FM Director O Song Chol"](https://web.archive.org/web/20090908012957/http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/188th_issue/2003013001.htm). .korea-np.co.jp. Archived from [the original](http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/188th_issue/2003013001.htm) on 2009-09-08. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 41. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-41) ["Archived copy"](https://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/012104hecker.pdf) (PDF). [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20140628181341/http://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/012104hecker.pdf) (PDF) from the original on 2014-06-28. Retrieved 2015-04-04. `{{cite web}}`: CS1 maint: archived copy as title ([link](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:CS1_maint:_archived_copy_as_title "Category:CS1 maint: archived copy as title")) 42. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-albright-20070223_42-0) Albright, David (23 February 2007). ["North Korea's Alleged Large-Scale Enrichment Plant: Yet Another Questionable Extrapolation Based on Aluminum Tubes"](https://isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKenrichment22Feb.pdf) (PDF). Institute for Science and International Security. Retrieved 25 April 2022. 43. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-43) Tim Carter (14 November 2002). ["KEDO Executive Board Meeting Concludes – November 14, 2002"](http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=23). KEDO. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20110607230234/http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=23) from the original on 7 June 2011. Retrieved 2010-05-31. 44. 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[^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-46) Tim Carter (21 November 2003). ["KEDO Executive Board Meeting – November 21, 2003"](http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=25). KEDO. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20110607230304/http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=25) from the original on 7 June 2011. Retrieved 2010-05-31. 47. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-47) ["NPP"](https://web.archive.org/web/20070930014646/http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/koreadenuclearization.cfm). [Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carnegie_Endowment_for_International_Peace "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"). Archived from [the original](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/koreadenuclearization.cfm) on 2007-09-30. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 48. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-48) ["Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for"](https://web.archive.org/web/20090908014926/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2002/200210/news10/25.htm). [KCNA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Central_News_Agency "Korean Central News Agency"). October 25, 2002. Archived from [the original](http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2002/200210/news10/25.htm#4) on 2009-09-08. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 49. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-49) ["President Delivers State of the Union Address"](https://web.archive.org/web/20090608080318/http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html). Georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov. 2002-01-29. Archived from [the original](https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html) on 8 June 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 50. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-50) John Pike. ["Nuclear Posture Review \[Excerpts\]"](http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm). Globalsecurity.org. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090610094536/http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm) from the original on 10 June 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 51. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-51) Selig Harrison (October 25, 2007). ["A U.S. Foreign Policy Expert Urged 'Continued Backing' of Nuclear Talks"](https://web.archive.org/web/20090909072853/http://www.dynamic-korea.com/news/view_news.php?uid=200700154588&main=KHF&sub=&keyword=selig%20harrison). Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States of America. Archived from the original on September 9, 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 52. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-52) ["Could North Korea Have A Bomb?"](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/nukes/nukes.html). PBS.org. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090606180425/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/nukes/nukes.html) from the original on 6 June 2009. Retrieved 11 November 2016. "\[In October 2002\] Apparently surprised by how much the U.S. had learned, the Pyongyang officials admitted to the existence of the HUE program, in direct violation of the NPT." 53. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-53) DAVID E. SANGER (17 October 2002). ["NORTH KOREA SAYS IT HAS A PROGRAM ON NUCLEAR ARMS"](https://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/17/world/north-korea-says-it-has-a-program-on-nuclear-arms.html?pagewanted=all). [The New York Times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Times "The New York Times"). [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20160313043711/http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/17/world/north-korea-says-it-has-a-program-on-nuclear-arms.html?pagewanted=all) from the original on 13 March 2016. Retrieved 11 November 2016. "If the North Korean assertions are true – and administration officials assume they are – the government of Kim Jong Il began in the mid- or late-1990s a secret, parallel program to produce weapons-grade material from highly enriched uranium." 54. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-54) Joseph Kahn; David E. Sanger (September 20, 2005). ["U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open"](https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/20/international/asia/20korea.html). [The New York Times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Times "The New York Times"). [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090205045125/http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/20/international/asia/20korea.html) from the original on February 5, 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 55. [^](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Framework#cite_ref-55) ["KEDO website homepage"](http://www.kedo.org/). [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20090413090027/http://www.kedo.org/) from the original on 2009-04-13. Retrieved 2009-06-09. - [Agreed Framework between the USA and the DPRK](https://web.archive.org/web/20031217175315/http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc457.pdf) – Geneva, October 21, 1994 (archived 2003-12-17) - [Press Briefing by Ambassador Gallucci on Korea (Agreed Framework)](https://web.archive.org/web/20070929094316/http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/101894-press-briefing-by-ambassador-gallucci-on-korea.htm), [White House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_House "White House"), October 18, 1994 - [Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation Newsbrief, 3rd Quarter 1994](https://web.archive.org/web/20070701065811/http://www.ppnn.soton.ac.uk/nb27.pdf) – describes negotiations leading to Agreed Framework - [Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea](http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/SupplyAgreement.pdf) – KEDO, 1995 - [Ch 14: North Korea](https://web.archive.org/web/20030403083117/http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/DeadlyArsenals/chapters%20$pdf$/Pages%20from%2014-NoKorea.pdf) – from Deadly Arsenals, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2002) - [Nautilus Institute](https://web.archive.org/web/20030224165404/http://www.nautilus.org/fora/) – In-depth coverage of the North Korean situation since 1997 - [North Korea's Nuclear Breach](https://web.archive.org/web/20030305132639/http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/northkoreacrisis.htm) – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - [Washington was on brink of war with North Korea 5 years ago](http://www.cnn.com/US/9910/04/korea.brink/), [CNN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CNN "CNN"), October 4, 1999 - [Modernizing the US-DPRK Agreed Framework: The Energy Imperative](https://web.archive.org/web/20051218110023/http://www.nautilus.org/archives/papers/energy/ModernizingAF.PDF), Nautilus Institute, February 16, 2001 - [Report on Delay in Construction of Light-Water Reactor Project](https://web.archive.org/web/20070927181825/http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/161st_issue/2001052201.htm), [KCNA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Central_News_Agency "Korean Central News Agency"), May 22, 2001 - [North Korea's nuclear facilities by Google Earth](http://freekorea.us/2008/01/27/satellite-images-of-north-koreas-nuclear-facilities/) Break-down of Agreed Framework - [J. Kelly Failed to Produce 'Evidence' in Pyongyang](https://web.archive.org/web/20090908012957/http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/188th_issue/2003013001.htm) – O Song Chol, DPRK Foreign Ministry, January 18, 2003 - [North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk24.pdf), Larry A. Niksch, Congressional Research Service – The Library of Congress, March 17, 2003 - [The History of the 1994 Agreed Framework](https://web.archive.org/web/20061208041852/http://ffip.com/infobriefs030703.htm), Daniel B. Poneman, [The Forum for International Policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=The_Forum_for_International_Policy&action=edit&redlink=1 "The Forum for International Policy (page does not exist)"), March 7, 2003 - [Examining the Lessons of the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Deal](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/themes/lessons.html), [PBS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Broadcasting_Service "Public Broadcasting Service"), April 10, 2003 - [The United States, North Korea, And The End Of The Agreed Framework](https://web.archive.org/web/20060406080625/http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume1/august_2003/8_03_1.html), [Naval War College Review](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_War_College_Review "Naval War College Review"), Summer 2003 - [Dealing With North Korea's Nuclear Programs](https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm) – [James A. Kelly](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_A._Kelly "James A. Kelly"), Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 15, 2004 - [Did North Korea Cheat?](https://web.archive.org/web/20051226202624/http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050101faessay84109/selig-s-harrison/did-north-korea-cheat.html), [Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs "Foreign Affairs"), January/February 2005 - [North Korea Says It Will Abandon Nuclear Efforts](https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/19/international/asia/19korea.html?hp&ex=1127188800&en=1cab1bb77582f12a&ei=5094&partner=homepage), [The New York Times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Times "The New York Times"), September 19, 2005 - [KCNA Urges U.S. to Compensate for Losses Caused by Scrapping AF](https://web.archive.org/web/20061029082308/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200512/news12/20.htm#9), [KCNA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Central_News_Agency "Korean Central News Agency"), December 19, 2005 - [The Beijing Deal is not the Agreed Framework](https://web.archive.org/web/20070927012430/http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07014Hayes.html), Peter Hayes, [Nautilus Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nautilus_Institute_for_Security_and_Sustainability "Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability"), February 14, 2007 - Lewis, Jeffrey (15 May 2015). ["Revisiting the Agreed Framework"](https://www.38north.org/2015/05/jlewis051415/). [38 North](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/38_North "38 North"). U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula - [Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31011.htm) – text of agreement, February 19, 1992 - [Joint Declaration of South and North Korea of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula](https://web.archive.org/web/20030503150547/http://nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/koreanuc.pdf) – analysis, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, 2002
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