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| Meta Title | Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster | EARTH 107: Coastal Processes, Hazards and Society |
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| Boilerpipe Text | Let us return to the example of the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami and subsequent Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Fukushima Daiichi and several other Japanese nuclear plants were all exposed to tsunami hazard, in the sense that they were close enough to the coast that a tsunami could affect their operations. The plants are designed to automatically shut down during earthquake and tsunami events, but the shutdown process itself requires power, which is provided by diesel generators. They are also protected by seawalls that are designed to prevent flooding by waters up to a specified height.
Damage at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. In the background, note the seawall which was insufficient to prevent damage.
There were two major sources of sensitivity at Fukushima Daiichi, one of which applied to all of the other Japanese nuclear facilities, and one of which was particular to Fukushima Daiichi. If the on-site diesel generators at any plant flooded and failed, no additional failsafe mechanism was available, and a meltdown became possible. This potential for failure greatly increased the sensitivity of these plants and the surrounding populated places and property. More importantly, in this example, if the seawalls were too low and could, therefore, be overtopped by a tsunami, then flooding might disable the generators. This is exactly what happened at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Its seawall was 19 feet high. Despite warnings in a 2008 report suggesting that the plant could be exposed to a tsunami of up to 33 feet, the plant was still protected only by the existing 19-foot seawall when the tsunami struck. The tsunami that made landfall reached over 40 feet high, even larger than the earlier report had suggested was possible. Because the seawall was inadequately protective relative to the magnitude of the potential hazard, the plant was more sensitive to a catastrophic meltdown, which in turn increased the sensitivity of nearby populations to exposure to radioactive materials and long-term contamination of property and natural resources.
Map of First-Year Radiation Dose Estimate in the Area near Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.
What lessons might we learn from the Fukushima nuclear disaster that could reduce sensitivity to similar future hazard events? This is a particularly tricky question in this case. Earthquakes of the magnitude of the Tōhoku earthquake, which was the initial hazard event that triggered the tsunami and subsequent nuclear disaster, are extremely rare. However, sensitivity to a hazard of this magnitude was sufficiently great that the result was a catastrophe. The extents to which countries should prepare for very rare events with potentially extreme consequences are difficult political and policy questions.
However, setting those questions aside, there are two main ways in which sensitivity could have been reduced in this situation. First, the seawall was far too short and could have been overtopped by a much smaller seismic event and tsunami. To reduce this sensitivity, seawalls protecting nuclear power plants should be built to withstand a tsunami of the highest possible levels. Second, any additional strengthening or redundancy in the electrical power system responsible for powering shutdown during a seismic event would further reduce reactor sensitivity to a tsunami.
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4. [Case Studies: Exposure, Sensitivity, and Adaptive Capacity in Real Examples](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/841)
# Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster
Let us return to the example of the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami and subsequent Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Fukushima Daiichi and several other Japanese nuclear plants were all exposed to tsunami hazard, in the sense that they were close enough to the coast that a tsunami could affect their operations. The plants are designed to automatically shut down during earthquake and tsunami events, but the shutdown process itself requires power, which is provided by diesel generators. They are also protected by seawalls that are designed to prevent flooding by waters up to a specified height.
Damage at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. In the background, note the seawall which was insufficient to prevent damage.
Credit: [Tokyo Electric and Power Company](http://photo.tepco.co.jp/en/date/2013/201302-e/130201-01e.html)
There were two major sources of sensitivity at Fukushima Daiichi, one of which applied to all of the other Japanese nuclear facilities, and one of which was particular to Fukushima Daiichi. If the on-site diesel generators at any plant flooded and failed, no additional failsafe mechanism was available, and a meltdown became possible. This potential for failure greatly increased the sensitivity of these plants and the surrounding populated places and property. More importantly, in this example, if the seawalls were too low and could, therefore, be overtopped by a tsunami, then flooding might disable the generators. This is exactly what happened at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Its seawall was 19 feet high. Despite warnings in a 2008 report suggesting that the plant could be exposed to a tsunami of up to 33 feet, the plant was still protected only by the existing 19-foot seawall when the tsunami struck. The tsunami that made landfall reached over 40 feet high, even larger than the earlier report had suggested was possible. Because the seawall was inadequately protective relative to the magnitude of the potential hazard, the plant was more sensitive to a catastrophic meltdown, which in turn increased the sensitivity of nearby populations to exposure to radioactive materials and long-term contamination of property and natural resources.
Map of First-Year Radiation Dose Estimate in the Area near Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.
Credit: [NNSA DOE Dose Map Fukushima](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/91/NNSA_DOE_Dose_Map_Fukushima.png), Nuclear Incident Team DoE, Public domain, via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NNSA_DOE_Dose_Map_Fukushima.png)
What lessons might we learn from the Fukushima nuclear disaster that could reduce sensitivity to similar future hazard events? This is a particularly tricky question in this case. Earthquakes of the magnitude of the Tōhoku earthquake, which was the initial hazard event that triggered the tsunami and subsequent nuclear disaster, are extremely rare. However, sensitivity to a hazard of this magnitude was sufficiently great that the result was a catastrophe. The extents to which countries should prepare for very rare events with potentially extreme consequences are difficult political and policy questions.
However, setting those questions aside, there are two main ways in which sensitivity could have been reduced in this situation. First, the seawall was far too short and could have been overtopped by a much smaller seismic event and tsunami. To reduce this sensitivity, seawalls protecting nuclear power plants should be built to withstand a tsunami of the highest possible levels. Second, any additional strengthening or redundancy in the electrical power system responsible for powering shutdown during a seismic event would further reduce reactor sensitivity to a tsunami.
***
## Learning Check Point
Please take a few minutes to think about what you just learned then answer the question below.
[Printer-friendly version](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/book/export/html/1426 "Show a printer-friendly version of this book page and its sub-pages.")
## Book traversal links for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster
- [**‹** 1992 Hurricane Andrew and Housing Sensitivity in South Florida](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1421 "Go to previous page")
- [Up](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/841 "Go to parent page")
- [Tacloban, Philippines, and Super Typhoon Haiyan **›**](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1641 "Go to next page")
## Search
## Lessons
- [Earth 107N - Coastal Processes, Hazards, and Society](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/2)
- [Module 1: Societies and Economics of Coastal Regions](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/3)
- [Module 2: Coastal Landscapes](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/6)
- [Capstone Project: Stage 1 Instructions](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1036)
- [Module 3: Coastal Systems: Landscapes and Processes](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/517)
- [Module 4: Sea Level Rise](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/524)
- [Capstone Project: Stage 2 Instructions and Examples](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1037)
- [Module 5: Hurricane Formation and Evolution](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1602)
- [Module 6: Hurricane Stories](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/525)
- [Module 7: Tsunami](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/675)
- [Module 8: Coastal Engineering: Hard and Soft Structures](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/527)
- [Capstone Project: Stage 3 Instructions and Examples](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1747)
- [Module 9: Managed Retreat](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/694)
- [Module 10: Smart Building](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/695)
- [Capstone Project: Stage 4 Instructions and Examples](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1039)
- [Module 11: Vulnerability to Coastal Hazards: Policy for Coastal Resilience](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1443)
- [Goals and Objectives](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/851)
- [Vulnerability's Three Dimensions Introduction](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/707)
- [Assessing Vulnerability: The Vulnerability Scoping Diagram](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/708)
- [Dimension 1: Exposure](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/732)
- [Dimension 2: Sensitivity](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/733)
- [Dimension 3: Adaptive Capacity](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/734)
- [Case Studies: Exposure, Sensitivity, and Adaptive Capacity in Real Examples](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/841)
- [2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1422)
- [1992 Hurricane Andrew and Housing Sensitivity in South Florida](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1421)
- [Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1426)
- [Tacloban, Philippines, and Super Typhoon Haiyan](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1641)
- [Module 11 Lab: Discussion](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1461)
- [Summary and Final Tasks](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/710)
- [Module 12: Emergency Management Cycle for Coastal Hazards](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/697)
- [Capstone Project: Stage 5 Instructions and Examples](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1524)
- [Module 13: Sea Level Rise Policy](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/node/1425)
Authors: Sean Cornell, Associate Professor Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania, Duncan Fitzgerald, Professor Boston University, Nathan Frey, Research Assistant The Pennsylvania State University, Ioannis Georgiou, Associate Professor, University of New Orleans, Kevin C. Hanegan, Research Assistant University of New Orleans, Li-San Hung, Research Assistant The Pennsylvania State University, Mark Kulp, Associate Professor University of New Orleans, Diane Maygarden, Research Associate University of New Orleans, David Retchless, Research Assistant The Pennsylvania State University, and Brent Yarnal, Professor The Pennsylvania State University, Tim Bralower, Professor The Pennsylvania State University. Team Lead: Tim Bralower, Professor, The Pennsylvania State University. Learning Designer: April Millet, The Pennsylvania State University
Unless otherwise noted, this site is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License(opens in a new tab)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/deed.en), part of Penn State's College of Earth and Mineral Sciences' OER Initiative and the Libraries’ Repository of Open and Affordable Materials ([ROAM(opens in a new tab)](https://roam.libraries.psu.edu/)).
The College of Earth and Mineral Sciences is committed to making its websites accessible to all users, and welcomes comments or suggestions on access improvements. Please send [comments or suggestions on accessibility to the site editor.](mailto:editor@dutton.psu.edu) (opens email client).
The John A. Dutton Institute for Teaching and Learning Excellence is the learning design unit of the College of Earth and Mineral Sciences at The Pennsylvania State University. [About the Institute](https://dutton.psu.edu/about) \| [Contact Us](https://dutton.psu.edu/contact-us) \| [Email the Site Editor.](mailto:editor@dutton.psu.edu) (opens email client)
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| Readable Markdown | Let us return to the example of the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami and subsequent Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Fukushima Daiichi and several other Japanese nuclear plants were all exposed to tsunami hazard, in the sense that they were close enough to the coast that a tsunami could affect their operations. The plants are designed to automatically shut down during earthquake and tsunami events, but the shutdown process itself requires power, which is provided by diesel generators. They are also protected by seawalls that are designed to prevent flooding by waters up to a specified height.
Damage at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. In the background, note the seawall which was insufficient to prevent damage.
There were two major sources of sensitivity at Fukushima Daiichi, one of which applied to all of the other Japanese nuclear facilities, and one of which was particular to Fukushima Daiichi. If the on-site diesel generators at any plant flooded and failed, no additional failsafe mechanism was available, and a meltdown became possible. This potential for failure greatly increased the sensitivity of these plants and the surrounding populated places and property. More importantly, in this example, if the seawalls were too low and could, therefore, be overtopped by a tsunami, then flooding might disable the generators. This is exactly what happened at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Its seawall was 19 feet high. Despite warnings in a 2008 report suggesting that the plant could be exposed to a tsunami of up to 33 feet, the plant was still protected only by the existing 19-foot seawall when the tsunami struck. The tsunami that made landfall reached over 40 feet high, even larger than the earlier report had suggested was possible. Because the seawall was inadequately protective relative to the magnitude of the potential hazard, the plant was more sensitive to a catastrophic meltdown, which in turn increased the sensitivity of nearby populations to exposure to radioactive materials and long-term contamination of property and natural resources.
Map of First-Year Radiation Dose Estimate in the Area near Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.
What lessons might we learn from the Fukushima nuclear disaster that could reduce sensitivity to similar future hazard events? This is a particularly tricky question in this case. Earthquakes of the magnitude of the Tōhoku earthquake, which was the initial hazard event that triggered the tsunami and subsequent nuclear disaster, are extremely rare. However, sensitivity to a hazard of this magnitude was sufficiently great that the result was a catastrophe. The extents to which countries should prepare for very rare events with potentially extreme consequences are difficult political and policy questions.
However, setting those questions aside, there are two main ways in which sensitivity could have been reduced in this situation. First, the seawall was far too short and could have been overtopped by a much smaller seismic event and tsunami. To reduce this sensitivity, seawalls protecting nuclear power plants should be built to withstand a tsunami of the highest possible levels. Second, any additional strengthening or redundancy in the electrical power system responsible for powering shutdown during a seismic event would further reduce reactor sensitivity to a tsunami.
***
## Learning Check Point
Please take a few minutes to think about what you just learned then answer the question below.
[Printer-friendly version](https://courses.ems.psu.edu/earth107/book/export/html/1426 "Show a printer-friendly version of this book page and its sub-pages.") |
| Shard | 94 (laksa) |
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| Unparsed URL | edu,psu!ems,courses,/earth107/node/1426 s443 |