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Firestein）所言，似乎“不可调和”。 不同的问题应该有不同的解决方法，我们需要对症下药。也许，有益的办法是按照难易程度划分争议性问题，这包括客观存在的分歧，以及对达成解决方案的可能性的不同看法。 例如，尽管批评的声浪在太平洋两岸此起彼伏，但在一些问题上两国政府仍然可以合作。拜登政府一直强调气候变化，但那并不是唯一的主题。 另一个主题或可是商业活动，两国政府都同意保持继续挂钩，而不是脱钩，这样一来，相关的贸易与投资问题——标准、规则、限制等——便可以在更积极的氛围中得到处理。 还有的是，两国政府的目标相同，却在方法上意见不一。例如，北京和华盛顿都支持第三世界的发展，但在“一带一路”倡议上有冲突。他们都支持伊朗和朝鲜的无核化，但在策略上有分歧。两国政府都渴望新能源的供应，但又更加偏爱各自能够控制的资源。 在这些领域妥协，有可能拉近两国政府的关系。也许，某些“一带一路”项目可以依照各方都接受的融资条件，与更加传统的发展融资渠道相互协调。而拟议中的对朝接触计划，如果美国就相关条件征求中方意见，北京也许就能更好地实施对朝制裁。一个合资的能源项目可能有助于避免冲突，同时推动两国的利益。 有些问题不可避免地会带来更大的挑战。然而，就算分歧严重，使问题的解决困难重重，对话也仍然是有用的。例如有关的经济努力，因为一方或双方政府认为脱钩是必要的。如何做到，而又把破坏降到最小？ 尽管两国政府都寻求占据主导地位，但潜在的地缘政治纠葛可能让它们有相似的目标。例如，缅甸发生政变既不符合华盛顿的利益，也不符合北京的利益，然而，两国政府对外部干预的适当性和有效性却有不同看法。但也许，双方可以就某些一般性步骤达成一致。 此外，有关记者、签证和领事馆问题，两国政府已经给对方施加了惩罚和报复。北京和华盛顿对他们眼中通常的“工具手段”有不同的看法，尽管如此，他们仍可以找到互利的折衷方案。事实上，在他们的视频会晤中，两位首脑已经同意放松对媒体的限制，这是一个积极的开始。 最后，一些问题只是表面上“无法化解”。说到目标，美国和中国在台湾、人权、东亚海域的领土争端、两国政府对经济胁迫的利用、军事采办和部署等方面，都存在严重的分歧。似乎没有理由去寻求解决这些问题的共识，因为两国政府立场对立，除非出现政治上的垮台，或军事上的失败，否则双方不太可能妥协。 然而，北京和华盛顿却可以把这些问题处理得更好——哪怕是从“拖延战术”中寻求德行。在无法达成最终解决方案的情况下，两国政府应当寻求双方都能接受的折衷方案。或许是保持一个独立存在的台湾，但同时，减少国际组织对它的承认，中美双方也减缓围绕台湾的军事活动。 在人权问题上，双方可以安排对话，相互尊重，倾听而不是妖魔化对方。例如，美国人应该理解，为什么中国要在新疆、香港这些有巨大差异的地区采取那样的行动。虽然大多数美国人仍对中国的政策持批评态度，但也许存在讨论的空间，去探讨不那么沉重的替代方案，以解决北京方面的担忧，这可能有助于推动事情向前发展。 在领土问题上，美国可以帮助中国及其邻国找到临时解决办法，包括暂时中止解决主权问题的努力，承认北京的尽管尚未达成协议的法律主张，共享经济发展，停止持续不断的军事化争端。与其推动解决问题，我们的目标不如是防止冲突，并制定积极的替代方案。 最根本的是双方都必须接受对方。美国人应当认识到，在态度和行为方面，中国不会变成另一个拥有更多人口的美国。中国人也应当明白，美国人很在乎价值观和态度，并且会照此行事。两国政府在讲和的时候都应该知道，即使他们尊重两国人民（虽然行动上通常不是），但分歧仍会存在，而且往往是很大的分歧。 最近的习拜会是必要的第一步，而现在是通过艰苦工作来解决部分分歧并管控其他问题的时候了。不管怎样本世纪终究是，中美两个最伟大国家之间的关系必须保持和平与合作。这需要我们在今后的岁月里付出艰苦而持久的努力。 [中美关系](https://cn.chinausfocus.com/tags/%E4%B8%AD%E7%BE%8E%E5%85%B3%E7%B3%BB/)[习拜会](https://cn.chinausfocus.com/tags/%E4%B9%A0%E6%8B%9C%E4%BC%9A/) - [](https://cn.chinausfocus.com/author/12/%E9%81%93%E6%A0%BC%C2%B7%E7%8F%AD%E5%A4%9A-doug-bandow.html) [Doug Bandow](https://cn.chinausfocus.com/author/12/%E9%81%93%E6%A0%BC%C2%B7%E7%8F%AD%E5%A4%9A-doug-bandow.html) *Senior Fellow, Cato Institute* # Joe Biden and Xi Jinping Have Talked: What Next? December 11 , 2021 | | |---| |  | | [Click to read the November issue of China-US Focus Digest](https://www.chinausfocus.com/magazine/v31/#p=1%20) | Relations between the U.S. and China took a precipitous dive during the Trump administration and that trajectory unexpectedly continued after President Joe Biden took over. Biden and President Xi Jinping finally talked—virtually, which may become the new norm in the post-COVID world. Hopefully their online meeting halted the relationship's rapid descent, but what next? A civil presidential chat is only a first step, necessary but not nearly enough. The talk is expected to represent a commitment to communication not only between the two principals, but also policymakers at all levels. The two governments largely went without contact between 1949 and 1972, with disastrous consequences—the Korean War. Instead of receding toward that ugly past with diminished dialogue, they should use the approaching anniversary of the fabled opening of the relationship to spur a reset. Of course, in some ways ties today are far more complex: two great, powerful nations are competing in the same international space. So how can leaders in Beijing and Washington manage such multifaceted relations? Biden made perhaps the single most important point when speaking with Xi: it is critical not to allow competition to become conflict. No doubt, hawkish critics of the People's Republic of China would contend that peace at any price is unacceptable. That is true in principle. However, it is difficult to imagine a serious cause for war. The U.S. and PRC are competitive, but the Pacific Ocean separates their homelands and militaries. China threatens no existential American interests: any foreseeable military clash would occur nearly on the PRC's border. Moreover, the potential cost of a serious contest with Beijing would not be Afghanistan/Iraq, but Korea/Vietnam, if not worse, potentially much worse. In this situation, both countries have very good reason to create strong firebreaks to war. Making relations between the two nations particularly complex is the number of ongoing controversies—investment, trade, intellectual property, Taiwan, territorial claims, religious liberty, Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, economic sanctions, climate change, the Belt and Road Initiative, cyber security, COVID-19, and more. Some appear amenable to cooperation or compromise. Others seem “irreconcilable,” as David J. Firestein of the George H.W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations, observed. Different issues should be addressed differently, as their unique circumstances require. It might help to separate controversies by level of difficulty, including divergence in objective and likelihood of resolution. For instance, despite the tsunami of criticism flying back-and-forth across the Pacific, there are issues upon which the two governments might cooperate. The Biden administration has emphasized climate change, but that subject is not alone. Another topic might be business activities which both governments agree warrant continued coupling rather than decoupling. Then relevant trade and investment questions—regarding standards, rules, restrictions, etc.—could be handled in a more positive environment. Elsewhere, both governments share objectives but disagree on means. For instance, Beijing and Washington favor Third World development while clashing over BRI. They back denuclearization of both Iran and North Korea but disagree over tactics. Both governments desire new energy supplies, while preferring sources over which each has control. In these areas compromise might bring the two governments closer together. Perhaps some BRI projects could be coordinated with more traditional sources of development finance, at financial terms agreeable to all. Beijing might better enforce sanctions against North Korea if Washington consulted the former over terms of a proposed engagement program with Pyongyang. A joint energy venture might help avoid conflict and move forward to both nations' advantage. Some issues inevitably would offer greater challenges. Yet even where significant differences make solutions difficult, dialogue would still prove useful. For instance, consider economic endeavors in which one or both governments believe decoupling is required. How to do so with the least disruption? Potential geopolitical entanglements might yield similar objectives even as both governments seek predominance. For instance, the coup in Burma/Myanmar was in neither Washington nor Beijing's interest. Yet the two governments have different views of the appropriateness and effectiveness of outside intervention. Perhaps they could agree to some common steps. Moreover, consider the mix of questions involving journalists, visas, and consulates over which the two governments have penalized and retaliated against the other. Beijing and Washington have different visions for what they often treat as weapons, but nevertheless might be able to find a mutually beneficial compromise. Indeed, in their virtual meet-up the two presidents agreed to relax media restrictions, a positive start. Finally, there are the seeming irreconcilables. When it comes to objectives, the U.S. and PRC are at sharp odds over Taiwan, human rights, territorial disputes in East Asian waters, use of economic coercion by both governments, and military acquisitions and deployments. There seems to be little reason to seek joint resolution of such issues, because the two governments take contending positions and are unlikely to compromise absent political collapse or military defeat. However, Beijing and Washington could do better at managing these problems—even finding virtue in “kicking the can down the road.” Where a final resolution is impossible, the two governments should seek intermediate accommodations which both parties could accept. Perhaps a Taiwan which retains its separate existence while pushing less for recognition from international organizations, and over which both China and the U.S. moderated their military activities. On human rights the parties could design a dialogue of mutual respect in which both sides listened rather than demonized. For instance, Americans should understand why the PRC has acted as it has in areas as diverse as Xinjiang and Hong Kong. While most Americans would remain critical of Chinese policies, there might be room for discussion of less burdensome alternatives to address Beijing's concerns which might help move the issue forward. On territorial questions America might help the PRC and its neighbors find a modus vivendi which mixed suspension of efforts to settle sovereignty, acknowledgement of though no agreement on Beijing's legal claims, shared economic development, and halt to ongoing militarization of disputes. Rather than pushing to solve the problems, the objective would be to prevent a clash while developing positive alternatives. Ultimately, both sides must accept the other. Americans should recognize that China will not turn into a more populous United States in attitude and behavior. Chinese should acknowledge that Americans care about values and attitudes and will act on them. Both governments should make peace knowing that there will be differences, often wide ones, even as they treat both peoples, though often not their actions, with respect. The recent Biden-Xi conversation was a necessary first step, but now comes the hard work of resolving some differences and managing other ones. However, this century ends up being known—as the American, Chinese, or Sino-American—relations between the two greatest nations must remain peaceful and cooperative. Which will require difficult and sustained work in the days and years ahead. # 习拜会：接下来该做什么？ # Joe Biden and Xi Jinping Have Talked: What Next? 2021-12-11 December 11 , 2021 相关内容 - [高市访美与中美日关系](https://cn.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/20260330/44235.html "高市访美与中美日关系") - [中国在伊朗问题上的微妙平衡](https://cn.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/20260330/44232.html "中国在伊朗问题上的微妙平衡") - [从“别做蠢事”到“史诗怒火”：特朗普如何解构美国外交战略](https://cn.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/20260323/44223.html "从“别做蠢事”到“史诗怒火”：特朗普如何解构美国外交战略") - [澜湄合作2.0：深化中国与东盟大陆国家关系](https://cn.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/20260319/44216.html "澜湄合作2.0：深化中国与东盟大陆国家关系") - [特朗普戳破“基于规则的国际秩序”虚伪面纱](https://cn.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/20260316/44213.html "特朗普戳破“基于规则的国际秩序”虚伪面纱") [关于我们](https://cn.chinausfocus.com/static/about.html)\|[联系我们](https://cn.chinausfocus.com/static/contact.html)\|[版权声明](https://cn.chinausfocus.com/static/copyright.html) © 2026 中美聚焦. All rights reserved.

中美关系在特朗普执政期间急转直下，然而乔·拜登总统上台后，这种趋势竟然出人意料地延续下来。终于，拜登总统和习近平主席举行了会晤——是以视频的形式，这也许将成为后疫情世界的新常态。但愿他们的视频会晤阻止了两国关系的快速下滑，可接下来呢？ 首脑之间进行一次彬彬有礼的交谈，还只是第一步，虽然有必要，但远远不够。估计，此次会晤代表了双方对沟通的承诺，不仅是首脑之间的沟通，也包括各级决策者之间的沟通。从1949年到1972年，中美两国政府之间基本没有联系，这导致了“朝鲜战争”这一灾难性的后果。双方不应减少对话，倒退回可悲的过去，而应该利用即将到来的两国关系破冰纪念日，刺激双边关系重置。 当然，从某些方面说，今天的双方关系要复杂得多：两个实力强大的大国正在同一国际空间内竞争。那么，北京和华盛顿的领导人该如何处理这一多层面的关系呢？拜登与习近平谈话最重要的一点也许就是：关键是不允许竞争变成冲突。 无疑，对中国持强硬批评态度的人会争辩说，为了和睦而不惜一切代价，是不可接受的。原则上这是对的，但很难想象有什么重要的原因要打一场战争。美国和中国是竞争的，但太平洋分隔开了双方的国土和军队。中国不会威胁美国的生存利益：任何可预见的军事冲突都将发生在中国的边界附近。而且，与北京重度竞争的潜在代价不是阿富汗/伊拉克，而是朝鲜/越南，这是最起码的，也许还更糟。在这种情况下，两国都有充分理由为避免战争建立坚固的防火带。 让两国关系变得尤为复杂的是双方存在诸多持续不断的分歧——投资、贸易、知识产权、台湾、领土主张、宗教自由、新疆、西藏、香港、经济制裁、气候变化、“一带一路”倡议、网络安全、新冠疫情，等等。其中一些看起来能合作或妥协，另一些则如乔治·布什美中关系基金会的方大卫（David J. Firestein）所言，似乎“不可调和”。 不同的问题应该有不同的解决方法，我们需要对症下药。也许，有益的办法是按照难易程度划分争议性问题，这包括客观存在的分歧，以及对达成解决方案的可能性的不同看法。 例如，尽管批评的声浪在太平洋两岸此起彼伏，但在一些问题上两国政府仍然可以合作。拜登政府一直强调气候变化，但那并不是唯一的主题。 另一个主题或可是商业活动，两国政府都同意保持继续挂钩，而不是脱钩，这样一来，相关的贸易与投资问题——标准、规则、限制等——便可以在更积极的氛围中得到处理。 还有的是，两国政府的目标相同，却在方法上意见不一。例如，北京和华盛顿都支持第三世界的发展，但在“一带一路”倡议上有冲突。他们都支持伊朗和朝鲜的无核化，但在策略上有分歧。两国政府都渴望新能源的供应，但又更加偏爱各自能够控制的资源。 在这些领域妥协，有可能拉近两国政府的关系。也许，某些“一带一路”项目可以依照各方都接受的融资条件，与更加传统的发展融资渠道相互协调。而拟议中的对朝接触计划，如果美国就相关条件征求中方意见，北京也许就能更好地实施对朝制裁。一个合资的能源项目可能有助于避免冲突，同时推动两国的利益。 有些问题不可避免地会带来更大的挑战。然而，就算分歧严重，使问题的解决困难重重，对话也仍然是有用的。例如有关的经济努力，因为一方或双方政府认为脱钩是必要的。如何做到，而又把破坏降到最小？ 尽管两国政府都寻求占据主导地位，但潜在的地缘政治纠葛可能让它们有相似的目标。例如，缅甸发生政变既不符合华盛顿的利益，也不符合北京的利益，然而，两国政府对外部干预的适当性和有效性却有不同看法。但也许，双方可以就某些一般性步骤达成一致。 此外，有关记者、签证和领事馆问题，两国政府已经给对方施加了惩罚和报复。北京和华盛顿对他们眼中通常的“工具手段”有不同的看法，尽管如此，他们仍可以找到互利的折衷方案。事实上，在他们的视频会晤中，两位首脑已经同意放松对媒体的限制，这是一个积极的开始。 最后，一些问题只是表面上“无法化解”。说到目标，美国和中国在台湾、人权、东亚海域的领土争端、两国政府对经济胁迫的利用、军事采办和部署等方面，都存在严重的分歧。似乎没有理由去寻求解决这些问题的共识，因为两国政府立场对立，除非出现政治上的垮台，或军事上的失败，否则双方不太可能妥协。 然而，北京和华盛顿却可以把这些问题处理得更好——哪怕是从“拖延战术”中寻求德行。在无法达成最终解决方案的情况下，两国政府应当寻求双方都能接受的折衷方案。或许是保持一个独立存在的台湾，但同时，减少国际组织对它的承认，中美双方也减缓围绕台湾的军事活动。 在人权问题上，双方可以安排对话，相互尊重，倾听而不是妖魔化对方。例如，美国人应该理解，为什么中国要在新疆、香港这些有巨大差异的地区采取那样的行动。虽然大多数美国人仍对中国的政策持批评态度，但也许存在讨论的空间，去探讨不那么沉重的替代方案，以解决北京方面的担忧，这可能有助于推动事情向前发展。 在领土问题上，美国可以帮助中国及其邻国找到临时解决办法，包括暂时中止解决主权问题的努力，承认北京的尽管尚未达成协议的法律主张，共享经济发展，停止持续不断的军事化争端。与其推动解决问题，我们的目标不如是防止冲突，并制定积极的替代方案。 最根本的是双方都必须接受对方。美国人应当认识到，在态度和行为方面，中国不会变成另一个拥有更多人口的美国。中国人也应当明白，美国人很在乎价值观和态度，并且会照此行事。两国政府在讲和的时候都应该知道，即使他们尊重两国人民（虽然行动上通常不是），但分歧仍会存在，而且往往是很大的分歧。 最近的习拜会是必要的第一步，而现在是通过艰苦工作来解决部分分歧并管控其他问题的时候了。不管怎样本世纪终究是，中美两个最伟大国家之间的关系必须保持和平与合作。这需要我们在今后的岁月里付出艰苦而持久的努力。